JUDGMENT S.D. Singh, J. - This appeal and the two connected appeals nos. 1549 and 1550 of 1958 arise out of execution proceedings in three different cases. The first appeals in all the three cases were decided by the Additional District Judge, Varanasi, under the same judgment. 2. Five different suits were filed against one Rochumal, two by Rochal Dass, one by Vasudeo and two by Jyoti Prasad for the recovery of different amounts. It was alleged that the North Eastern Railway owed some money to Rochumal and applications for attachment before judgment of the different amounts were made in all the five suits; and even attachment before judgment was made as prayed. The five suits were heard and decided by a single judgment. After these suits were decreed, applications for execution of those decrees were moved and the North Eastern Railway was required to deposit the amounts due under the five decrees in compliance with the attachment before judgment. The North Eastern Railway contested the applications on the ground that it had its own claim against Rochumal and was not, therefore, liable to pay any amount towards the five decrees. The objections being decided against the North Eastern Railway, the Union of India filed five appeals in respect of orders passed against it in the five execution cases. While these first appeals were still pending, the two appeals arising out of the execution applications of Jyoti Prasad abated as after his death, his legal representatives were not brought on record in time. When the other three appeals came up for hearing, it was contended before the Additional District Judge, who heard those appeals, that since the two appeals against Jyoti Prasad had abated, even the other three appeals would be barred by the principle of res judicata, and this contention somehow found favour with the Additional District Judge. 3. The Additional District Judge relied upon three decisions of this Court, Zaharia v. Dibia, VII A.L.J. 851 Dakhni Din v. Syed Ali Asghar, VII A.L.J. 995 and Balhari Pande v. Shiva Sampat Pande, XVIII A.L.J. 40 and they, along with some other decisions of this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, were relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in support of their contention that the principle of res judicata applies to the facts in these appeals. 4. 4. For the application of the principle of res judicata there is one basic requirement and it is this that the parties to the two litigations must be the same. If a decision has been given between two parties in respect of any question of law or fact or even if such a decision is implied in an order of the court, that decision becomes final as between them or their representatives and would operate as res judicata in respect of the very same question in any future litigation between them. But if the decision was not given to between the same parties, it would not operate as res judicata either under Sec. 11, C P. C. or on general principles governing the application of the rule of res judicata. 5. The Additional District Judge relied upon the three decisions of this Court without caring to see whether those decisions were really applicable and if they continued to be good law. Two of these decisions, Zaharia v. Dibia, VII A.L.J. 851 and Dakhni Din v. Syed Ali Asghar, VII A.L.J. 995 have either been overruled or explained in Ghanshatn Singh v. Bhola Singh, XXI A.L.J. 465 but this latter decision has not been taken notice of by the Additional District Judge. 6. In Zaharia v. Dibia, VII A.L.J. 851 there were two rival preemption suits, in which the rival plaintiffs were made defendants in one another's suit with the result that the parties in both the suits were the same. Both the suits were decided by a common judgment, but appeal was preferred in only one of them. It was held that the appeal was barred by the principle of res judicata as the decree in the other suit remained unreversed. In Dakhni Din v. Syed All Asghar, VII A.L.J. 995 there were two suits on the basis of several mortgage deeds executed by the same mortgagor and in favour of the same mortgagee, but in respect of two different properties. The properties involved in both the suits were also mortgaged earlier with a prior mortgagee, who was joined as a defendant in both the suits. One of the questions raised in the two suits was whether the prior mortgage had been paid off, but it was held that it was not. The properties involved in both the suits were also mortgaged earlier with a prior mortgagee, who was joined as a defendant in both the suits. One of the questions raised in the two suits was whether the prior mortgage had been paid off, but it was held that it was not. This finding covered both the suits, but an appeal was preferred in only one and it was, therefore, held that the finding in the suit in which no appeal was preferred operated as res judicata in the appeal in the other suit. In Ghansham Singh v. Bhola Singh which was heard by five judges, it was observed in respect of the former suit: "It, therefore, becomes necessary to lay down once and for all the practice which should in future bind the court and to negative the general applicability of the rule in Zaharia v. Debra." And proceeding further it was pointed out in the same case that Dakhni Din v. Syed Ali Asghar, VII A.L.J. 995 and several other reported decisions were to be treated as being no longer good law. But even if the two decisions are relied upon as good law, it will be noticed that in both decisions the judgments which were held to operate as res judicata were inter partes. 7. The third case relied upon by the Additional District Judge is Balhari Pande v. Shiva Sampat Pande, XVIII A.L.J. 40. In that case two appeals were preferred against a decree passed by the Munsif and the lower appellate court dismissed both the appeals. Only one second appeal was filed in the High Court. It was held that the decree in the other first appeal having become final, it would operate as res judicata in the second appeal, which was filed in the High Court. On facts this decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case at all, but even this decision cannot be said to be good law in view of what has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Narhari v. Shanker, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 419. There two appeals were filed against the decree of the trial court in the same suit. Both the appeals were allowed by the first appellate court and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed by one judgment, though two decrees were prepared in the two appeals. There two appeals were filed against the decree of the trial court in the same suit. Both the appeals were allowed by the first appellate court and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed by one judgment, though two decrees were prepared in the two appeals. The plaintiffs filed two appeals in the High Court but one of them was found to be bailed by time; and applying the principles of res judicata, the High Court dismissed even the other appeal. Under these circumstances their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed; "The plaintiffs in their appeal to the High Court have impleaded all the defendants as respondents and their prayer covers both the appeals and they have paid consolidated court fee for the whole suit. It is now well settled that where there has been one trial, one finding, and one decision, there need not be two appeals even though two decree may have been drawn up. As has been observed by Tek Chand, J. in his learned judgment in `A. I. R. 1927 Lab. 289' mentioned above, the deter-mining factor is not the decree but the matter in controversy. As he puts it later in his judgment, the estoppel is not created by the decree but it can only be created by the judgment. The question of res judicata arises only when there are two suits. Even when there are two suits, it has been held that a decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata." In view of this decision of the Supreme Court, Balhari Pande v. Shiva Sampat Pande, XVIII A.L.J. 40 can no longer be said to be good law. 8. Reliance was then placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on Mohammad Mohtashim v. Joti Pra sad, A.I.R. 1941 Alld. 277 = 1941 A.L.J. 246 Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 941 and Bhagwan Sahai v. Daryao Kunwar, 1962 A.L.J. 1153. None of these cases, however, appears to be applicable to the facts of the present appeals. Reliance was then placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on Mohammad Mohtashim v. Joti Pra sad, A.I.R. 1941 Alld. 277 = 1941 A.L.J. 246 Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 941 and Bhagwan Sahai v. Daryao Kunwar, 1962 A.L.J. 1153. None of these cases, however, appears to be applicable to the facts of the present appeals. In Mohamrnad Mohtashim v. Joti Prasad, A.I.R. 1941 Alld. 277 = 1941 A.L.J. 246 one suit was filed by the creditor for the recovery of the money due to him on the basis of a pronote and the other by the debtor under Sec. 33 of the Agriculturists Relief Act for accounting. The two suits were heard together and decided by the same judgment. When only one appeal was preferred in one of the two suits by the debtor, it was held that the judgment in the other suit having become final, operated as res judicata. It is obvious that the judgment which operated as res judicata was inter partes. In Satyadhyan v. Smt, Deorajin Debi, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 941 the decision which was held to operate as res judicata was given at an earlier stage in the same proceeding, and was necessarily, therefore, inter parties. In Bhagwan Sahai v. Daryao Kunwar, 1962 A.L.J. 1153 the dispute was between, say, A and B about ownership of certain property. Two suits were filed by A against B and two suits were filed by B against A, and in all the four suits the question to be decided related to title to that property, though the reliefs claimed were different. Five issues were common to all the four suits, which were heard and decided by a common judgment. Out of the four appeals filed by A, one was dismissed as having got barred by time and one on account of A having failed to deposit the translation and printing charges in the High Court. The result was that the decision in these two suits out of which these two appeals arose became final, and it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that the findings in respect of the five issues operated as res judicata in the other two appeals as well, Even in this case the decision which operated as res judicata was inter parties. 9. 9. While discussing the law of res judicata Takru, J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, while mentioning the essential conditions for the application of the doctrine of res judicata specifically said: "(2) That the former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim." In Srinivas R. Acharya v. Purshottam Chaturbhuj, AIR 1953 Bombay 313 it is observed: "The doctrine of res judicata is not merely a technical doctrine. It is directly founded on the general rule that a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause," There can be no question of a person being vexed twice if the previous judgment was not inter partes. 10. Some other decisions were also referred to on behalf of the appellants in support of the contention that in order that the principle of res judicata may apply, the previous decision must be inter partes. But it is not necessary to make any reference to them. In the instant case the present appellants were no parties to the two appeals which abated on account of the legal representatives of Jyoti Prasad not having been brought on record in time. There were five independent suits, two by Rochal Dass, one by Vasdeo and two by Jyoti Prasad, against the same defendant Rochu Mal. Jyoti Prasad had nothing to do with the three suits of Rochal Das and Vasudeo and Rochal Dass and Vasudeo had nothing to do with the two suits of Jyoti Prasad. It may be that there were certain questions of law and fact common to the five suits because of which they were heard together and decided by a common judgment, but that did not mean that the plaintiff to one suit became a party to the other suits. It was just a coincidence that all the five decree holders applied at the same time for the attachment to the money which was alleged to be due to Rochu Mal. When the decree holders applied for execution of their respective decrees, the North Eastern Railway contested its liability, and as there was a common question of fact involved as to whether the North Eastern Railway was liable to pay any money to Rochu Mal, the five objections in the five execution cases were heard and decided by the Execution Court by a common judgment. As the decision was against the North Eastern Railway, five appeals were filed by the Union of India against the five decree holders. If Jyoti Prasad's legal representatives were not brought on record within time and the two appeals consequently abated as against them, the findings in those appeals on questions of fact, or may be even question of law, cannot become final even against Vasudeo and Rochal Das, who were no parties to the appeals filed against Jyoti Prasad. The dispute against them has not been heard or decided at all. The reason given by the Additional District Judge that the hearing of the three appeals on merits may result in inconsistent findings is no consideration at all in applying the principle of res judicata. If the same question of fact arises for decision between A and B and also between A and C, a decision in one case can never operate as res judicata in the ether. Each case will have to be decided on its own merits; and merely to avoid inconsistent findings in the two cases, the decision in B's case cannot be thrust over the parties in C's case. 11. The appeals are consequently allowed. The judgments and decrees of the lower appellate court are set aside. The three appeals which were dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Varanasi, are remanded back for re-hearing in accordance with law. The appellants will get their costs from the contesting respondents in the three appeals.