ORDER Shivdayal, J.- 1. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petitioner was an occupancy tenant and the respondents were his sub-lessees by virtue of Pattas dated January 7, 1927, granted to them by his father, Bhaiyalal, for a period of 11 years. 2. On October, 25 1050, the petitioner instituted a suit for ejectment under the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, No. 66 of 1950, (hereinafter called the Tenancy Act). On October 133 1953, the Tahsil Court passed a decree for ejectment in favour of (he petitioner. The respondents appealed but the S. D. O. dismissed it on August 24, 1960. They went in second appeal before the Revenue Commissioner. .On November 28, 1960, that appeal was allowed, following the decision in Raghunath Singh Vs. Gangabai, 1960 JLJ 998 . It was held that the respondents, being sub-lessees, were protected by the statute. The petitioner applied in revision to the Board of Revenue but he did not succeed. Now, he invokes the powers of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 3. On October 19, 1955. had come into force the M. B. Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act, No. 29 of 1955 (hereinafter called the Protection Act) and on October 2, 1959, had came into force the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, (hereinafter called the Land Revenue Code). 4. The only question for determination, which was pressed before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondents have wrongly been held to be immune from eviction as a combined effect of the provisions contained in the Protection Act and the' Land Revenue Code. It was also urged that the decision in Reghunath Singh Vs. Gangabai (supra) did not lay dawn the correct law. 5. The M. B, Tenancy Act of 1950 permitted grant of sub-leases by specified classes of persons suffering under certain disabilities; it also recognised sub-leases which had been effected properly and legally prior to the commencement of that Act. Those provisions were contained in sections 74 and 75 of that Act. A sub-lease could be determined as provided in those sections, whereafter, possession was to revert to the lessor. 6. It is well known that the legislature endeavoured to abolish the rights or intermediaries and to create direct relationship of landlord and tenant between the State arid the tiller of the soil. A sub-lease could be determined as provided in those sections, whereafter, possession was to revert to the lessor. 6. It is well known that the legislature endeavoured to abolish the rights or intermediaries and to create direct relationship of landlord and tenant between the State arid the tiller of the soil. A sub-lessee, being the actual tiller, was contemplated to be retrained undisturbed. It appears that the legislature without finally making up its mind as to the future status of the sub-lessees, who continued as such even after the abolition of Zamindaris and Jagirs, as an ad interim step, enacted the Protection Act of 1955. This was a temporary measure. It was provided in section 3 of that Act that no suit could be instituted for eviction of a sub-lessee other than one under section 74 of the M. B. Tenancy Act of 1950, and under section 4 all pending suits for ejectment of sub-lessees from Ryotwari land were stayed. Eventually, the Legislature decided to confer the status of an occupancy tenant on the sub-lessee and this was manifested in section 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code of 1959, which came into force on October 2, 1959. On that date, the present case was pending before the S. D. O. in appeal. 7. It is clear enough from the scheme of section 185 of the Land Revenue Code that the sub-lessees on whom occupancy rights were conferred were described with the same nomenclature which was employed in each of the various regions comprising the new State of Madhya Pradesh under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The present case is from Madhya Bharat region and sub-clause (b) of clause (ii) of sub-section (I) applies; 8. In order that a sub-lessee may claim the conferral of occupancy tenancy under S. 185 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code 1959 two conditions must be satisfied : (1) That he was a Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Protection Act of 1955. (2) The sub-lease continued to be in force on the date of the commencement of the Code. (2) The sub-lease continued to be in force on the date of the commencement of the Code. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not contend before us that the respondents were not Ryotwari sub-lessees within the meaning of section 2 of the Protection Act, inasmuch as when sub-leases were granted to them in 1927 they were not persons to whom "a Pucca Tenant" of a "Ryotwari Land" had sub-let on sub-lease. In fact it was conceded by Shri Mungre that the first condition was satisfied. All that he urged before us was that the sub lease having been determined under the existing law which was in force on October 25, 1950, and a suit having been instituted, the respondents had ceased to be sub-lessees, and they were mere trespassers, so that they did not get any benefit under the Protection Act of 1955 or the land Revenue Code of 1959. 9. We have given a serious thought to the point raised. In our view, the expression "sub-lease" in the Protection Act of 1955 and in the Land Revenue Code of 1959 is used in a broader sense so as to include a lessee whose tenancy has been determined. This becomes plain as we carefully peruse the wording of section 4 of the Protection Act, which provides for stay of suits, proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings "for the ejectment of Ryotwari sub-lessees" from Ryotwari land. Now, in the strict sense, a suit for ejectment can be instituted only when the tenancy has been determined. If the expression "sub-lessee" was used in that narrow and strict sense so as not to include a tenant whose tenancy had been determined, stay of a suit against a "sub-lessee' in that strict sense, was out of the question. Likewise, there could not be any proceeding in execution of a decree for the ejectment against a "sub-lessee" in that strict sense, was out of the question. Likewise, there could not be any proceeding in execution of a decree for the ejectment against a "sub-lessee" in that narrow sense which could be stayed. The construction would, therefore, render the provision and that is cantrary to the conons of interpretation of statutes See in this context Shyamlal Vs. Umacharan, 1960 JLJ 892 . Likewise, there could not be any proceeding in execution of a decree for the ejectment against a "sub-lessee" in that narrow sense which could be stayed. The construction would, therefore, render the provision and that is cantrary to the conons of interpretation of statutes See in this context Shyamlal Vs. Umacharan, 1960 JLJ 892 . In our judgment, a person who was a Ryotwari sub-lessee at one time and his possession continued upto October 2, 1959, became an occupancy tenant of the State by virtue of section 185 of the Land Revenue Code of 1959, inspite of the fact that the sub-lease might not be subsisting and a suit for ejectment might be pending at any stage of the litigation. He is entitled to the benefit of section 159 of the Land Revenue Code, irrespective of whether legal action for ejectment had been commenced against him or not. In the present case, since the ejectment proceedings were pending in an appeal Court the second requirement of section 159 is also fulfilled. 10. We desire to add that we do not feel called upon here to express any opinion regarding the further view taken in Raghunath singh's case (supra) that in a case where a decree for ejectment had been passed and an appeal from it was pending, the sub-lessee could claim the benefit of section 185 of the Code only if the execution of the decree had been stayed, but not if he had been dispossessed in execution before October 2, 1959. 11. In the result, this petition is dismissed. We direct, that the parties shall bear their own costs in all the Courts. 12. Sharma J, I agree.