JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This is an appeal by the plaintiffs. The suit was for an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' right to use the land in dispute as a 'khaliyan' (threshing floor) and for directing the defendants to remove certain in pegs etc. made by them in the land in dispute. 2. The plaintiffs were the zamindars in the village and owned the land in dispute as such before the commencement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950. By virtue of Section 6 of that Act the plaintiffs' right, title and interest in the land in suit vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh with effect from 1-7-1952. In October, 1956 the defendants interfered with the continued exercise of the plaintiffs right to use the land in dispute as a threshing floor. Hence the suit. 3. To the suit, the Gaon Samaj and the State of Uttar Pradesh were added as parties as it was alleged that they are the owners of the land in suit. 4. Several technical and other pleas were raised in defence but in this appeal we are concerned with only one, namely, that the plaintiffs no longer have any right to continue to use the land in dispute as Khaliyan.' They were the zamindars, their right and title having vested in the State, they have no right left in the land in suit. 5. The trial court rejected the various pleas raised in defence, on the question of the plaintiffs' right to use the land as the Khaliyan. The trial court interpreted Section 7(aa) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in favour of the plaintiffs and held that they have a right to continue to enjoy the land in suit as a "Khaliyan." The suit, consequently was decreed. 6. The State of Uttar Pradesh filed an appeal. The learned Additional Civil Judge disagreed with the trial court in its interpretation of Section 7 of the aforesaid Act. It has held that the plaintiffs do not have any right to continue to use the land in suit as a 'khaliyan'. On this finding, the appeal was allowed, and the suit was dismissed. 7. The learned Additional Civil Judge disagreed with the trial court in its interpretation of Section 7 of the aforesaid Act. It has held that the plaintiffs do not have any right to continue to use the land in suit as a 'khaliyan'. On this finding, the appeal was allowed, and the suit was dismissed. 7. The plaintiffs have come to this Court in Second appeal and have reiterated that they have in law, a right to continue to use the land in suit as a Khaliyan in the same way as they did prior to the abolition of the zamindari. 8. U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as its preamble shows, was passed with a view to provide for the abolition of the zamindari system, which involved intermediaries between the tillers of the soil and the State. Section 6 of this Act provides that with effect from the date of vesting all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances. The rigour of this provision has in certain matters been mitigated by Sections 7 and 9 of the Act. Section 9 of the Act provides that all wells, trees in abadi, and all buildings situate within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary, tenant or person. It provides for a continuity of the possession of wells, trees and buildings, even though under Section 6 of the Act the title of an intermediary in respect of these things vested in the State. Sec. 7 of the Act runs as follows:- "Saving in respect of certain rights-Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way affect the right of any person - (a) to continue to work any mines comprised in any estate hereinbefore acquired which shall be governed by the law for the time being in force; (aa) being a bhumidhar, sirdar, adhivasi or asami of any land, to continue to enjoy any easement or any similar right for the more beneficial enjoyment of the land, as he was enjoying on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting; (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sec. 7 of the Act also seeks to provide for a continued beneficial enjoyment of land. 9. The legislature in enacting this Act sought to abolish the zamindari system but preserved the existing beneficial enjoyment of land by the tillers of the soil. The object behind Sections 7(aa) of the Act is to benefit the cultivators as well as cultivatory holdings. These provisions are in their nature beneficent legislation. In interpreting a piece of beneficent legislation, if there is any doubt about the meaning of its material provisions, that doubt should be resolved in favour of the beneficent object. The material provisions should be liberally construed. See Jivabhai Purshottam v. Chhagan Karson and others, AIR 1961 SC 1491 . 10. Prior to this Act, zamindars had cultivatory holdings, which were called their sir or khudkasht. In respect of sir and khudkasht, the rights of the zamindars have been recognised by this Act. Section 18 of the Act provides that all lands in possession of or held or deemed to be held by an intermediary as sir, khudkasht or an intermediary's grove, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such intermediary, who shall be entitled to retain possession as a Bhumidhar thereof. Section 7(aa) of the Act, when it uses the term bhumidhar, includes within its operation zamindars who held cultivatory holdings called their sir or khudkasht. It places bhumidhars on the same level as other cultivators, who were not zamindars but have now become bhumidhars, sirdars, adhivasis or asamis. The object of this provision is to confer on all these classes of cultivators, to an equal extent, rights of beneficial enjoyment of the land. There is in the scheme of this provision no intention to discriminate between those cultivators who were zamindars and those who were not. 11. It is urged that Section 7 (aa) of the Act confines its operation to "easement or any similar right." It is argued that the words "any similar right" should be read ejusdem generis with the word "easement." That is to say "any similar right" must be in their nature easements. Easements can be acquired only in the land belonging to some one other than the claimant. Easements can be acquired only in the land belonging to some one other than the claimant. The erstwhile zamindars who were the owners of the land, could not have claimed any easement in their own lands. If the erstwhile zamindars were enjoying a piece of land for the more beneficial enjoyment of some other land, their enjoyment of the former will not be in the character of an easement. As such, Section 7(aa) of the Act cannot entitle them to continue to do so. The basic link in this line of argument is the application of rule of ejusdem generis. In support, reliance is placed on the following observation of the Supreme Court in Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504 (523) :- "the true scope of the rule of ejusdem generis is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified and not its reverse, that specific words which precede are controlled by the general words which follow." In that case their Lordships were construing the following phrase occurring in Article 31-A (2) of the Constitution:- "The expression "estate" shall ...... also include any jagir, inam, muafi or other similar grant." It was argued that the word Jagir should be read ejusdem generis with "other similar grant." Their Lordships refused to apply the rule of ejusdem generis. 12. Normally, general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning. In construing them, they ought to be allowed the play of their amplitude. The rule of ejusdem generis must be confined within narrow limits. The words must be clearly restrictive in their intendment. The controlling word should represent a genus comprising more than one species before the rule can be applied. If the controlling word is such that it comprises the whole genus, the following words would become mere surplusage. Courts should lean against such a construction as far as possible. See State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810 . 13. In Lila Vati Rai v. Bombay State, AIR 1957 SC 521 the Supreme Court approved the following observation of the Court of appeal in the case of Skinner & Co. v. Shew and Co., (1893) 1 Ch. See State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810 . 13. In Lila Vati Rai v. Bombay State, AIR 1957 SC 521 the Supreme Court approved the following observation of the Court of appeal in the case of Skinner & Co. v. Shew and Co., (1893) 1 Ch. 413:- "The rule of ejusdem generis is intended to be applied where general words have been used following particular and specific words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that the legislature presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense; that is to say, as belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific words. Such a restricted meaning has to be given to words of general import only where the context of the whole scheme of legislation requires it. But where the context and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require such restricted meaning to be attached to words of general import, it becomes the duty of the Courts to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning." 14. Section 7(aa) of the Act is a piece of beneficent legislation. It is intended to benefit the cultivators generally. The context and the object of this section does not require that a restricted meaning be put to its provision. The section speaks of a bhumidhar among the class of persons who will continue to enjoy the rights mentioned in the section. Having thus included those zamindars who had cultivatory holdings within the ambit of this section, the intention of the legislature is clear. The benefit of the section was intended for them also. By applying the rule of "ejusdem generis," this intention will be frustrated. The effect would be that the ex-zamindars would not be entitled to the benefit intended by this section. The rule of "ejusdem generis" is hence clearly incapable. 15. Easement is a well known class of rights. By using the word "easement," that class was completely represented in the section. If the object was to represent a genus by using the word easements, then the other words, namely, "any similar right" would become mere surplusage. Such a construction is to be avoided. The words "any similar right" are of general import. They should receive their full and natural meaning, specially when by so construing them, the avowed intention of the legislature will be fulfilled. 16. Such a construction is to be avoided. The words "any similar right" are of general import. They should receive their full and natural meaning, specially when by so construing them, the avowed intention of the legislature will be fulfilled. 16. The controlling words in this section consist in the phrase "the more beneficial enjoyment of the land." Those rights, be they easements or otherwise, which tend to the more beneficial enjoyment of the land, are sought to be preserved. In my opinion, the phrase "any similar rights" does not connote such rights which could be in law defined as easements. 17. If the operation of this section is confined to easements alone, several other difficulties would arise. Tenants usually use some plot of land for various agricultural purposes. They have threshing floor for properly husbanding the crop after harvesting it; to put manure heaps, to construct cattle shed etc. Sugarcane cultivators use plots in the abadi for putting a sugarcane crusher, or for a fire place for boiling cane juice. These and other various uses were the requirements of beneficent cultivation. Question arose as to their nature. It was suggested that they are of the nature of easements. In two Full Benches, this Court ruled that such rights are not easements because a tenant cannot acquire an easement over land belonging to his own landlord. See Udit Singh v. Kashi Rams, ILR 14 All. 185 (F.B.) and Abdul Rashid v. Braham Saran, 1938 A.L.J. 436 (FB). 18. In the Full Bench decision of Babu Lal v. Ram Prasad and others, 1938 A.L.J. 1088 Iqbal Ahmad, J. who delivered the leading judgment held that the use of a plot of land for such purposes makes it appurtenant to the cultivatory holding. He held that the word "appurtenant" is used in two senses, one meaning incorporeal hereditament's such as rights of way, of common, of piscary and the like; secondly as equivalent to such a phrase as "usually enjoyed with." His lordship observed. "I am clear that the word "appurtenant" to a holding has been used in this country in the secondary sense noted above and not in the sense of a right of easement. "I am clear that the word "appurtenant" to a holding has been used in this country in the secondary sense noted above and not in the sense of a right of easement. It is well settled that a tenant cannot acquire a prescriptive right of easement as against his landholder vide Udit Singh v. Kashi Ram, ILR 14 All 185 and Abdul Rashid v. Braham Saran, 1938 ALJ 436 (F.B.). In view of these decisions, it is impossible to hold that by holding possession of a plot of land for more than 20 years a tenant could claim a prescriptive right for the use of that plot as against his landholder. Similarly Section 13 of the Indian Easements Act is of no avail to the tenants for the simple reason that section is confined in its operation to easements of necessity and quasi easements accruing on transfer or testamentary disposition of immovable property or on a partition being made of joint property. Easements of necessity or quasi easements for the convenient occupation of agricultural holdings are unknown to law as administered in this country." 19. There is thus ample authorities for the view that the enjoyment of the rights incidental to the agricultural business of the cultivators were recognised as appurtenances to the holdings; in the sense that they were "usually enjoyed with" them and that they were not of the nature of easements. All such rights not being easements, would stand excluded from the operation of Section 7 (aa) of the Act if the phrase "any similar right" is interpreted to mean rights of the nature of easements. If this really was the intention, the legislature need not have enacted. Section 7 Clause (aa) of the Act at all. 20. For all these reasons, the words "any similar right" should not be interpreted as being controlled by the word "easement." They represent a different category of rights. The words are of general import and should receive from the courts their full and natural meaning. 21. It has been found by both the courts below that the plaintiffs-appellants have been using the land in dispute as their "khaliyan" for a long time. In my opinion, they have a right to continue to do so. 22. In the result, the appeal succeeds. 21. It has been found by both the courts below that the plaintiffs-appellants have been using the land in dispute as their "khaliyan" for a long time. In my opinion, they have a right to continue to do so. 22. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored with costs of the trial and the lower appellate court.