JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - The petitioner is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and has its registered office at Lucknow. It is alleged that its financial position in the years 1957/58 was very bad and that with a view to effect economy it decided to reduce the three shifts working in the lino operating department to two. In order to give effect to this decision it became necessary to retrench certain workmen. Accordingly notices dated December 29/30, 1959, were served upon eight workmen informing them that their service would not be required on and from January 1, 1960, and that they should collect all their dues including the retrenchment compensation, notice pay etc. from the Accounts Department immediately. Notices dated January 1, 1960, purporting to be under clause (c) of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act) were dispatched to the authorities specified on January 4, 1960. It is the case of the petitioner that the workmen concerned did not come on December 31, 1959, to collect the one month's wages in lieu of notice and the retrenchment compensation but that they took the amounts sometimes later. By a notification dated May 30, 1961, the State Government referred to adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, the following matter of dispute: "Whether the employers retrenched their workmen named in the annexure with effect from 1st January, 1960, legally and or justifiably? If not, to what relief are the workmen entitled?" In the annexure the names of eight workmen who had been retrenched were set out. It may be mentioned that one of the workmen, namely Sri Abdul Aziz, died before the Tribunal entered upon the reference. The points in controversy between the parties will appear from the following eight issues framed by the Tribunal: (1) Whether retrenchment is a subject on which the Industrial Tribunal is competent to adjudicate? (2) Whether the retrenchment has been based, on the low output by the Lino Operators and is fair? (3) Whether retrenchment in other cases is covered by the rule last come first go? (4) Whether the workmen have given any convent to their retrenchment? If so, is the present dispute by them barred? (5) Whether old age and infirmity is a sufficient ground for retrenchment of a workman? (3) Whether retrenchment in other cases is covered by the rule last come first go? (4) Whether the workmen have given any convent to their retrenchment? If so, is the present dispute by them barred? (5) Whether old age and infirmity is a sufficient ground for retrenchment of a workman? (6) Have the workmen taken their dues in full satisfaction of their claims? If so, are they barred from raising the present dispute? (7) To what relief, if any, are the workmen entitled? (8) Whether the employers have complied with the provisions of Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act? The Tribunal decided only issues Nos. 1 and 8 but did not go into issues Nos. 2 to 7 which really related to the merits of the retrenchment. On issue No. 1 it held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question of retrenchment. Under issue No. 8 it held that the provisions of rule 42(1) were mandatory, that the employers had not complied with the provisions of that rule and had not fulfilled the conditions precedent to the retrenchment of the workmen laid down in Section 6-N of the U.P. Act and that accordingly the retrenchment was not legally made. It therefore directed the re-instatement of the workmen and further directed that they be paid their wages from January 1, 1960, till the date of re-instatement. This writ petition has been filed praying for the issue of an order, direction or writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the award of the Tribunal and for the issue of an order, direction or writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the State Government not to implement the aforesaid award. 2. It is necessary at this stage to set out the relevant provisions of the U.P. Act and of the rules. 2. It is necessary at this stage to set out the relevant provisions of the U.P. Act and of the rules. Section 6-N of the U.P. Act, which is in the same words as Section 25-F of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) runs as follows: "6-N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen - No workmen employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer, until - (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice: Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies the date for the termination of service; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months, and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the State Government." Rule 42(1) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957, runs as follows:- "42. Procedure for retrenchment of workmen - (1) If any employer desires to retrench any workman, employed in his establishment who has been in continuous service under him for not less than one year (hereinafter, referred to as 'workmen' in this rule and in rule 43) he shall give notice of such retrenchment in Form XIX to the Secretary to Government U.P. Labour (A) Department, to the Labour Commissioner, U.P., and to the Conciliation Officer of the area concerned by registered post, in the following manner; (a) Where a notice, as required under Clause (a) of Section 6-N is given to the workmen, notice of retrenchment shall be sent to the same day on which notice is given to the workmen; (b) Where no notice is given to the workmen, and he is paid one month's wages in lieu of notice, notice of retrenchment shall be sent on the same date on which wages are paid to the workmen, and (c) Where retrenchment is or is intended to be carried out under an agreement, which specifies a date for the termination of service, notice of retrenchment shall be sent on the date on which the agreement was made, if the period from the date of the agreement to the date of retrenchment is of less than one month, otherwise not less than one month before the date of retrenchment". 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Tribunal has wrongly interpreted rule 42(1) in holding that the provisions thereof are mandatory and in holding the retrenchment to be invalid on account of non-compliance with the provisions thereof. In this case there is no dispute that the employers had given to the workmen retrenched one month's wages in lieu of notice and had also paid to them retrenchment compensation provided by law. The only finding which the Tribunal has arrived at against the petitioner is that the notices required to be given under clause (c) of Section 6-N were not given within the time prescribed by rule 42(1) and further that some of the information contained therein was incorrect. The real question which arises for consideration in this case is whether the provisions of rule 42 are mandatory or merely directory. The real question which arises for consideration in this case is whether the provisions of rule 42 are mandatory or merely directory. Though in the beginning learned counsel for the petitioner contended that clause (c) of Section 6-N was itself merely directory and not mandatory, he ultimately had give up this extreme position. Indeed, it is clear from the language of Section 6-N itself that it was incumbent upon the employer who desired to retrench his workmen to fulfil the three conditions laid down in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that section. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the conditions laid down in clauses (a) and (b) are mandatory and no retrenchment could be effected without first complying with them. In the case of State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 610, the Supreme Court has held that clause (b) of Section 25-F of the Central Act. which is equivalent to clause (b) of Section 6-N of the U.P. Act, is mandatory, Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 6-N stand on the same footing and if clause (b) is mandatory clause (a) is also bound to be mandatory. Clauses (a) and (b) being mandatory, it would be proper to construe clause (c) also to be mandatory, as the three clauses are governed by the same words in the main section. It must accordingly be held that the giving of the notice under clause (c) of Section 6-N is a mandatory provision. 4. I am of opinion that though the giving of notice under clause (c) of Section 6-N of the U.P. Act is mandatory, the words in clause (c) "in the prescribed manner" and accordingly Rule 42 also are merely directory. It is open to a court to hold that a particular section is mandatory and that a portion of it or some words therein are merely directory. That this can be done is clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 687 where their Lordships held that though the provisions of Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act 1951 were mandatory, the words "in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission" occurring in that section itself were merely directory. To determine whether any part of a provision is mandatory or merely directory it has to be seen whether a strict and literal compliance alone with the provisions would achieve the purpose of that provision. In Banwari Lal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 849, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "No general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that non-observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity, or only directory, i.e., a direction the non-observance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity, whatever other consequences may occur. But in such case the court has to decide the legislative intent. Did the Legislature intend in making the statutory provisions that non-observance of this would entail invalidity or did it not? To decide this we have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same." Again in the Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1694, it was observed: "The question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory has to be decided not merely on the basis of any specific provision which, for instance, sets out the consequences of the omission to observe the requirement, but on the purpose for which the requirement has been acted, particularly in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the general scheme thereof. It would, inter alia, depend on whether the requirement is instead on as a protection for the safe-guarding of the right of liberty of person or of property which the action might involve." Neither the language of the provision nor the employment of the auxiliary verb "shall" is conclusive for determining whether the provision is mandatory or directory. It is necessary for deciding this question to look into the purpose of the provision and the mischief that would be caused by non-observance thereof. 5. It is to be notice that clause (c) of Section 6-N of the U.P. Act does not itself lay down the time within which the notice to the State Government is to be given or served: not does it lay down the particulars that are to be supplied to the State Government in the notice. 5. It is to be notice that clause (c) of Section 6-N of the U.P. Act does not itself lay down the time within which the notice to the State Government is to be given or served: not does it lay down the particulars that are to be supplied to the State Government in the notice. These matters have been left to be prescribed by the State Government. It may also be noticed that what the State Government has to prescribe is the manner in which the notice is to be served on the State Government. It is a moot question whether the manner of service would include the time within which the notice is to be given or served. 6. Coming to the purpose of clause (c) of Sec, 6-N, it is contended by the petitioner that the only purpose of clause (c) is statistical, that is to say, the collection of facts and figures regarding the number of workmen employed in particular industries and the number of workmen retrenched by various employers. On the other hand, it is contended by the respondents that the object of all provisions of the U.P. Act is the maintenance of industrial peace and the purpose of clause (c) of Section 6-N is to bring to the notice of the State Government the fact of retrenchment of workmen by the employer so as to enable the State Government either for conciliation or adjudication the dispute regarding retrenchment or to pass a remedial order under Section 3(b) of the U.P. Act. I agree with the respondents that the purpose of clause (c) of Section 6-N is to enable the State Government to take appropriate action in respect of the retrenchment. It is concluded by learned counsel for the respondents that the purpose is not to enable the State Government to take any preventive action. 7. The question now arises whether this purpose will be defeated if the notice is not given strictly within the time prescribed by rule 42 or is deficient in some respects regarding the particulars to be supplied. In my view, the purpose will not be defeated. 7. The question now arises whether this purpose will be defeated if the notice is not given strictly within the time prescribed by rule 42 or is deficient in some respects regarding the particulars to be supplied. In my view, the purpose will not be defeated. Since the State Government is not to take any preventive action but only a remedial action either by way of a reference or by way of an order under section 3(b), a little delay in the sending of the notice or a little inaccuracy in the contents thereof cannot at all affect the action to be taken by the State Government. It has to be noticed in this connection that this provisions in this clause (c) of Section 6-N or in the rules does not confer any direct benefit on the workmen and a strict non-observance thereof does not cause any loss or prejudice to them. The State Government may well prescribe a longer period of time within which the notice may be sent or served. In fact, it has been brought to my notice that under section 25-F of the Central Act the rules framed by the Central Government and by some State Governments prescribe a longer period for sending these notices than that prescribed under the U.P. rules. Rule 76(b) of the Central Rules prescribes that the notice of retrenchment shall be sent within three days from the date on which one month's wages in lieu of notice are paid to the workmen. Rule 78(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Rules, rule 78(b) of the Bihar Rules, rule 76(b) of the Kerala Rules, rule 77(b) of the Mysore Rules and rule 76(b) of the Rajasthan Rules lay down a similar period of three days within which the notice is to be sent. Rule 80(1)(ii) of the Bombay Rules provides that the notice of retrenchment may be sent within seven days of the date of retrenchment if the workman is paid one month's wages in lieu of notice. Rule 80(1)(ii) of the Bombay Rules provides that the notice of retrenchment may be sent within seven days of the date of retrenchment if the workman is paid one month's wages in lieu of notice. If the purpose of clause (c) of Section 25-F, which is equivalent to clause (c) of Section 6-N of the U.P. Act, is not defeated in Bombay, if the notice is given within seven days or if the notice is given in the other States within three days, it surely will be defeated here if the notice is given after four days of the date on which one month's wages in lieu of notice are given to a workman. In every case it will have to be seen whether the notice has been given within a reasonable time or not. By this I do not mean that an employer can flout rule 42 with impunity; if he violates any of the provisions of this rule he can suitably be dealt with under Section 14 of the U.P. Act. But a violation of rule 42 would not necessarily invalidate the retrenchment of a workman. In this connection I may refer to the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, (1961) 2 L.L.J. 727 , where the learned Judges were considering whether clause (c) of Section 25-F of the Central Act, read with Rule 80 of the Bombay Rules, was mandatory or merely directory. In that case no notice had been given in the manner prescribed by rule 80 of the Bombay Rules. The learned Judges observed as follows: "From this sub-rule it is clear that it is open to an employer to retrench a workman and then to send a notice to the State Government within seven days of doing that. Therefore, if he complies with this provision, that is, if he sends a notice of the Government seven days after the retrenchment of the workman, the retrenchment will be perfectly valid. From this it would follow that the service of a notice upon the Government is not a condition precedent to the making of retrenchment. It is merely a condition and nothing more. Non-compliance with a condition of this kind would, therefore, amount not to an illegality, but to an irregularity, which could be waived. From this it would follow that the service of a notice upon the Government is not a condition precedent to the making of retrenchment. It is merely a condition and nothing more. Non-compliance with a condition of this kind would, therefore, amount not to an illegality, but to an irregularity, which could be waived. From the stand taken by the Government in this case, it is clear that the Government waived this irregularity. In the circumstances, it must be held that the retrenchment of the petitioners 2 and 3 was not illegal at all. It is not clear from the report whether no notice at all was given or whether the notice was given but it was not in the prescribed manner. With respect, I am unable to agree with the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court that the employer can totally dispense with the requirement of giving notice to the Government under clause (c) of Section 25-F of the Cental Act; but I agree to this extent that if the notice is not given strictly in the manner prescribed, that would be a mere irregularity which could be waived. 8. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the word "until" in Section 6-N. The only effect it has is that the giving of the notice under clause (c) is imperative; but it does not necessarily require that the notice must be given before the retrenchment becomes effective. In considering the proviso to Section 6-E(2)(b) of the U.P. Act, which requires that no workmen shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer, the Supreme Court has held in The Straw Board Manufacturing Company v. Govind, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1500, that it was not necessary that the application for approval should have been made before the dismissal and that it was sufficient if it could be shown that the dismissal, the payment of wages and the making of the application were parts of the same transaction. The points to be noted is that though the making of the payment and the making of the application for approval were both governed by the words "unless", and has "has been" still it was held that the application could be made after the dismissal and the payment. Similarly, in the present case, though the three clauses of Section 6-N are governed by the word "until", it can be held that the requirement of clause (c) need not necessarily be fulfilled before the retrenchment comes into effect. 9. I am accordingly of the opinion that the words "in the prescribed manner" in clause (c) of Section 6-N and rule 42 are merely directory and not mandatory and that a substantiate compliance with the provisions thereof would be sufficient. 10. In this connection it is relevant to note that though the notices under clause (c) of Section 6-N were sent to the prescribed authorities on January 4, 1960, the reference to adjudication was not made till May 30, 1961. It is obvious from this that the delay of four days in sending the notices is insignificant compared to the time taken by the State Government in making the reference. This delay of four days cannot, in the circumstances of this case, be said to be unreasonable. The Tribunal has further held that the notices were incorrect in certain particulars prescribed by rule 42. Keeping in view the purposes of clause (c) of Section 6-N and the fact that the rule 42 is merely directory, I find that there has been substantial compliance with the provision of this rule. 11. It has ben urged by the respondents that this court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution as the error of law is not apparent on the face of the award. This is not correct. The Tribunal has held rule 42(1) to be mandatory only for the reason that the word "shall" has been used in the main clause and in the sub-clauses of this rule. There is a patent error of law in the reason given by the Tribunal. It is well settled now that the mere use of the word "shall" cannot make any provision mandatory. In this connection it was observed by the Supreme Court in The Collector of Monghyr v. Keshave Prasad (Supra) at page. There is a patent error of law in the reason given by the Tribunal. It is well settled now that the mere use of the word "shall" cannot make any provision mandatory. In this connection it was observed by the Supreme Court in The Collector of Monghyr v. Keshave Prasad (Supra) at page. 1701; "It is needless to add that the employment of the auxiliary very "shall" is inconclusive and similarly the absence of the imperative is not conclusive either". 12. There is, thus, a manifest error of law apparent on the face of the award. Further, by its wrong interpretation of rule 42 the Tribunal has failed to administer the law which it was bound to. The fact that the construction presented some difficulty does not make any difference. In this connection I cannot do better than quote the following observations of the Madras High Court in P.S. Desikachari v. M/s Associated Publishers, A.I.R. 1962 Madras 327, with which I respectfully agree: "The possibility of two interpretations can seldom arise where the question can seldom arise where the question involved is one of law not depending on facts. Where constructions of a statute arises, as in the present case, there could be only one view, the view that is ultimately accepted by the superior court. A mere difficulty in the construction of the section cannot absolve the superior court of its duty to interpret it. If as a result of such interpretation, it is found that the inferior tribunal has erred it will really be a case of the tribunal not administering the law which it is bound to administer." 13. In the result, I allow the writ petition and direct the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the award of the Industrial Tribunal. The result of this order is that the Tribunal will rehear and dispose of the reference afresh. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.