JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. :- This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and is directed against the order passed by the Election Tribunal (Civil Judge), Aligarh on 20.2.1963, dismissing the election field by the petitioner Radha Krishna Visharad (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner). The petitioner and respondent Nos. 2 to 6 filed their nomination papers for election to the office of the Parmukh of the Kshetra Samiti Gonda, district Aligarh in the last general elections. The petitioner's nomination was rejected at the scrutiny. In a contest, which was held subsequently, between the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 the respondent No. 2 emerged out successful. The petitioner filed an election petition challenging the validity of the election of the respondent No. 2 before the District Judge, Aligarh. This application was transferred for disposal to the Civil Judge of the same place. The main question before the learned Civil Judge was whether the Returning Officer was correct in rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner on the ground that he was disqualified from being elected to the office of the Parmukh by virtue of the provisions of Section 13 (c) of the Kshetra Samiti and Zila Parishad Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The learned Civil Judge framed the following six issues :- 1. Whether there has been an illegal and improper rejection of the nomination paper of the petitioner as alleged? 2. Whether there has been an illegal and improper acceptance of the nomination papers of the respondents 3 and4? If so, its effect. 3. Whether the petition is bad in law according to Rule 36(2) of the rules as alleged? 4. Whether the petition is liable to fail under Rule 36(1) of the Rules as alleged? 5. Whether the election is void and illegal as alleged in para (1) of the summary? 6. To what relief, if any, is that petitioner entitled? The learned Civil Judge answered the issues Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents and we are not concerned with the questions covered by those issues. On issue No. 2 the learned Civil Judge recorded the finding that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are not disqualified and their nomination papers have not been illegally and improperly accepted. No one has challenged before us this finding also. 3. On issue No. 2 the learned Civil Judge recorded the finding that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are not disqualified and their nomination papers have not been illegally and improperly accepted. No one has challenged before us this finding also. 3. The entire submission before us has been confined to the question covered by issue No. 1. The petitioner is admittedly a lecturer in the Jawahar Inter College Iglas in the district of Aligarh. It is also a matter of admission that the said College receives a grant in aid from the State Government and to the institution are applicable the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Act of 1921 (U.P. Act No. II of 1921) herein below referred to as the Education Act. 4. Section 13(C) so far as it is relevant for our purposes reads as follows:- "13. Disqualifications for being chosen or co-opted as member-A person shall be disqualified for being chosen a member of a Kshettra Samiti Under Clause (iii) of sub-Section (1) of Section 6 or co-opted as a member of a Kshettra Samiti under sub-Section (2) of that section or for being elected as Parmukh under Section 7 if he- (a).......... (b).......... (c) holds any place of profit in the gifts or disposal of Government or any local authority including a Gaon Sabha, or is an honorary Magistrate or an honorary assistant Collector, or an honorary munsif; (d) having held any office under Government or any Zila Parishad, Kshettra Samiti, Gaon Sabha, Nayaya Panchayat, Municipal Board, society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, has been dismissed for corruption or disloyalty to the State unless a period of five years has elapsed since his dismissal; 5. The ground on which the Returning Officer rejected the nomination paper of the petitioner was that inasmuch as he was in service of the Jawahar Inter College, which was an institution receiving grant in aid from the Government, he was holding a `place of profit in the gift or disposal of the Government.' This view found favour with the learned Civil Judge also. Therefore, the only question-that we are called upon to decide in this case-is whether the Returning Officer and the learned Civil Judge are right in holding that the petitioner holds a place of profits in the gift or disposal of the Government. Therefore, the only question-that we are called upon to decide in this case-is whether the Returning Officer and the learned Civil Judge are right in holding that the petitioner holds a place of profits in the gift or disposal of the Government. It would contribute to a clear understanding of the grounds on which it has been urged before us and was found by the learned Civil Judge that the petitioner holds a place of profit in the gift or disposal of the Government if certain provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act are considered and analysed. Section 16-A of the Act provides that there shall be a scheme of administration for every institution which shall, amongst other matters, provide for constitution of a Committee of management vested with the authority to make and conduct the affairs of the institution and that the scheme of administration shall describe subject to any regulations respective powers and duties of the Head Master or the Principal, as the case may be, and the committee of management in relation to the institution. The provision requires that the scheme of administration of every institution shall be subject to the approval of the Director and any amendment to or change in the scheme of administration shall be made only with his approval and that every recognised institution shall be managed in accordance with the scheme of administration. No doubt, this provision does give some say to the Director in the management of the affairs even of a private institution. 6. Section 16-D of the Eduction Act provides that the Director may cause a recognised institution to be inspected from time and may direct a management to remove any defect or deficiency found on inspection or otherwise, in default may refer the matter to the Board for withdrawal of recognition or to the State Government for taking action against the institution and to compel it to rectify the mistake and comply with the direction. This provision undoubtedly gives some control to the Director, the Board and the Government over the affairs of the institution. 7. This provision undoubtedly gives some control to the Director, the Board and the Government over the affairs of the institution. 7. Section 16-E of the Education Act provides that the qualification for the appointment of Principals, Headmasters and teachers shall be prescribed by regulations, there shall be a selection committee for the purpose of selecting candidates for appointment as teacher in the institution and a similar committee for selecting the Principal or Headmaster of an institution and confers on the Director the power to prepare for each region a panel of persons to act as nominated members in a selection committee. This provision reveals that the appointment to the teaching staff of a recognised institution can be only on the basis of selection made by a selection committee, some members of which are to be chosen out of a panel prepared by the Director. 8. Section 16-F of the Education Act confers certain powers upon the District Inspector of Schools, the Regional Deputy Director and Director of Education in connection with temporary appointments in the event of a qualified person not being available and of approving appointments to the teachings staff. All that this provision provides for is the procedure by which the members of the teaching staff shall be appointed and for the approval of the Director to the appointments. 9. Section 16-G of the Education Act provides that every person employed in a recognised institution shall be governed by such conditions of service as may be prescribed by regulations and any agreement between the management and such employee in so far as it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the Regulations shall be void. This section also provides that the Regulations may prescribe for the period of probation, the conditions of confirmation and the procedure and conditions for promotion and punishment including suspension pending enquiry and the emoluments for the period of suspension and termination of service with notice, as also for scales of pay, payment of salaries, transfer of service from one recognised institution to another, grant of leave and Provident Fund and other benefits and maintenance of record of work and service. Sub-Section (3) of Section 16-G provides that no Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector, and for an appeal against the order of the Inspector to the Regional Appellate Committee which shall consist of the Regional Deputy Director of Education, a member of the State Managers' Association and a member of U.P. Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh. Sub-Section (4) of this section provides that the decision made by the Regional Appellate Committee shall not be questioned in any court. 10. In our judgment there is no provision in the Education Act which makes the Government the appointing authority of a member of the teaching staff of a recognised institution. It is true that the grant it gives is also utilised along with other funds of the institution towards the payment of the salary of the staff but that does not mean that the Government pays the salary. Like every other contribution the Government grant is a source of income, the other usual sources being the income from fees, endowments, if any, and subscriptions, if any. Once the Government grant is paid to the institution it becomes the money of the institution and ceases to be the Government money in the same manner as the subscription or donation made by a private individual. The Government aid thus merges in the revenues of the institution and thereafter loses its separate identity completely. Consequently, the circumstances that the Government gives grant-in-aid to the Jawahar Inter College where the petitioner is employed cannot justify the conclusion that the post held by the petitioner is in the gift or disposal of the Government. None of the provisions of the Act on which reliance was placed before us, and which we have already analysed earlier in this judgment shows that it is the Government which appoints a member of the teaching staff of a recognised institution. The Jawahar Inter College is not a Government unit. None of the provisions of the Act on which reliance was placed before us, and which we have already analysed earlier in this judgment shows that it is the Government which appoints a member of the teaching staff of a recognised institution. The Jawahar Inter College is not a Government unit. The idea in framing the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, and for amending it by means of U.P. Act XXXV of 1958, which introduced the provisions enumerated above in this judgment, was only to regulate the manner in which recognised institutions would conduct themselves and was not to make a recognised institution a department of the Government. The Preamble of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, reads:- "Whereas it is expedient to establish a Board to take the place of the Allahabad University in regulating and supervising the system of High School and Intermediate Education in the United Provinces, and to prescribe courses therefor," The Preamble of the U.P. Intermediate Education (Amendment) Act, 1958, provides: "Whereas it is expedient to amend the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, for the purposes hereinafter appearing." The two preambles read together clearly show that all that the Government intended to do was to regulate the working of recognised institutions and to provide for High School and Intermediate Examinations. The Government at no stage intended to own the private recognised institutions. All it wanted to do was to regulate their activities and provide a standard for education in examinations. The position of a teacher of a recognised institution is similar to that of a teacher in a University which is created by a statute and is aided and subsidised by the Government. The Jawahar Inter College is a juristic person having its separate existence and is not a department of the Government. The case of a member of its teaching staff cannot be worse than that of an employee in the Life Insurance Corporation which has been sponsored by the Government. In G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Krishnamurthi A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 343, the learned Judges observed as follows:- "Pausing here, we might summarise the position and analyse the tests for determining the constitutional position of a Public Corporation as either a department of Government or as a servant of the State. In G. Narayanaswami Naidu v. Krishnamurthi A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 343, the learned Judges observed as follows:- "Pausing here, we might summarise the position and analyse the tests for determining the constitutional position of a Public Corporation as either a department of Government or as a servant of the State. If the statute in terms answered the question, as it did in the case of the Central Land Board under the Country and Town Planning Act, 1947, the need for any further enquiry is obviated. But in the absence of such statutory declaration or provision, the intention of parliament has to be gathered from the provisions of the statute constituting the Corporation. These provisions have to be judged in the light of the following: First the incorporation of the body though not determinative is of some significance, as an indication by Parliament of its intention to create a legal entity with a personality of its own, distinct from the State; secondly the degree of control exercised by the Minister over the functioning of the Corporation is a very relevant factor, a complete dependence on him marking it as really a governmental body, while comparative freedom to pursue its administration being treated as an element negativing an intention to constitute it a Government agent, this semi-autonomy deriving from the desire to avoid plenary Parliamentary control over the details of its normal administration. Third is the degree of dependence of the Corporation on the Government for its financial needs. Lastly, we consider the functional or the historical aspect, some of the decisions laying stress on whether the function discharged by the Corporation could really be treated as historically as a pure Governmental function-one which pertained to sovereignty or whether it was the administration of a matter merely of local or regional concern." 11. In Madan Mohan Lal v. Om Prakash A.I.R. 1957 All. 384 a Single Judge of this Court held that the servants of the Life Insurance Corporation are not Government servants. 12. In Madan Mohan Lal v. Om Prakash A.I.R. 1957 All. 384 a Single Judge of this Court held that the servants of the Life Insurance Corporation are not Government servants. 12. In Abdul Shakoor v. Rikhab Chand, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 52, the question arose as to whether an employee of the Dargah Sheikh Nizamuddin Chishti which was controlled by Dargah Khwaja Saheb Act (Act XXXXVI of 1953) could be elected to the Council of States and the Supreme Court while holding that he could be so elected observed as follows:- "No doubt the Committee of the Durgah Endowment is to be appointed by the Government of India but it is a body corporate with perpetual succession acting within the four corners of the Act. Merely because the Committee or the members of the Committee are removable by the Government of India or the Committee can make bye-laws prescribing the duties and powers of its employees cannot in our opinion convert the servants of the Committee into holders of office of profit under the Government of India. The appellant is neither appointed by the Government of India nor is removeable by the Government of India nor is he paid out of the revenues of India. The power of the Government to appoint a person to an office of profit or to continue him in that office or revoke his appointment at their discretion and payment from out of Government revenues are important factors in determining whether that person is holding an office of profit under the Government though payment from a source other than Government revenue is not always a decisive factor. But the appointment of the appellant does not come within this test." These cases support our view that the petitioner cannot be treated to be a Government servant nor can it be said that the post he is occupying is in the gift or control of the Government. We have already said above that the Jawahar Inter College is a juristic person, an institution having autonomy in the discharge of its functions and that the mere fact that the Government or some of its officers have some regulatory control on its activities or functioning, neither converts the institution into a Government unit or department nor renders its employees as holding a post of profit in the gift or disposal of the Government. Before a person can make a gift of a thing or before he can dispose it of the thing must belong to him. There is nothing in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and nothing has been brought to our notice on the basis of which we can hold that the post occupied by the petitioner belongs to the Government which the Government can gift or dispose away. The funds from which salary of the petitioner is paid belong to the institution and not to the Government. The property of the Jawahar Inter College is not Government property. Consequently, we see no justification for holding that the post held by the petitioner is in the gift or disposal of the Government. It has been contended that there is a world of difference between the word 'gift' and 'disposal' and that for purposes of disposal it is not necessary that the Government must own the post which the petitioner is occupying. It is true that there is some difference between the word "gift" and the word "disposal", but in our opinion both require disposing power in the Government. In other words it must be the Government which must be competent to give the post to whomsoever it likes, but as said earlier this we do not find to be the case in view of the legal provisions already discussed above. 13. It appears to us that the words "holds a place of profit in the gift or disposal of Government" have been brought from the English statutes relating to local authorities. Similar words occur in the relevant provisions of Section 13-D(c) of the U.P. Municipalities Act and Section 25(1)(c) of the Municipal Corporation Act. 14. Lamb v. Jeffries 1956 (1) All E.R. 317 was cited before us. In that case the question was whether Lamb who was Assistant Master in a school could also act as a member of the Town Council of the borough of Lowestoft. Funds for payment of salaries of Assistant Masters were furnished by the County Council to the Town Council. An information was preferred against Lamb under Section 84 of the Local Government Act, 1933, for having acted as a member of the Town Council while disqualified from so acting on the ground that he held a paid office in the gift or disposal of the town council within Section 59(1)(a) of the Act of 1933. An information was preferred against Lamb under Section 84 of the Local Government Act, 1933, for having acted as a member of the Town Council while disqualified from so acting on the ground that he held a paid office in the gift or disposal of the town council within Section 59(1)(a) of the Act of 1933. It was held by a majority that Lamb was disqualified from being elected a member of the Town Council. In our judgment our case is distinguishable on the ground that unlike Lamb's case where the payment was made from the funds furnished by the County Council, the payment to the petitioner is made not from the Government funds but from those of the Jawahar Inter College. It would also be noticed that Stable, J. one of the three learned Judges who decided the case did not agree with the majority view and held that Lamb did not occupy a post of profit in the gift or disposal of the county council. 15. Cravelle Smit v. Towlin (1911) 2 K.B.D. 9 (at 11) was next cited and the following passage occurring at page 11 was placed before us:- "Section 46 sub-Section (1) says that a person shall be disqualified for being a member or Chairman of a council......of a district ......if he (d) holds any paid office under the district council...... That section is in perfectly general terms and I do not feel myself at liberty to put a limited construction upon it. We must look at the mischief which was contemplated by the Legislature when enacting it. The appellant holds the office of clerk to the joint hospital committee for the borough of Richmond and the Heston and Isleworth urban district, a body which came into existence under an agreement made under the powers conferred by Sections 131 and 285 of the Public Health Act, 1875. The scheme of that agreement was that the borough council and the district council should each appoint six of their members to act upon the joint committee, and that those twelve gentlemen should become the authority charged with the duty of providing and maintaining the joint hospitals. The funds for the purpose were provided partly out of contributions levied upon the rateable property in the borough and the urban district respectively, and partly from receipts from other sources. The funds for the purpose were provided partly out of contributions levied upon the rateable property in the borough and the urban district respectively, and partly from receipts from other sources. Those latter receipts were small in amount, but it would not have made any difference if they had been large. The question is what was the real position of those twelve gentlemen. They acted as the agents of the two councils in carrying out the work which those councils had jointly undertaken. They were not a corporation, and there was nothing in the Public Health Act to give them a separate independent existence. They were merely the delegates of the two authorities respectively who appointed them. Then there is a provision in the agreement that it shall not be determined except by the mutual consent of both parties. Under those circumstances it would not in my opinion be right to hold that the appellant could concurrently be chairman of the district council and salaried clerk to the "joint committee, for he might have a personal interest in using his influence to prolong the existence of the committee though its continuance might be opposed to the interests of his district." This case also, in our judgment is clearly distinguishable, firstly on the ground that the Jawahar Inter College is a separate entity from the Government and, secondly, because the petitioner has no adverse interest to the Kshettra Samiti. 16. Rex v. Davies (1932) All E.R. 824 was also relied upon. In that case a road-man who had for many years been employed of a county council on a section of main road within an urban district area was in 1928 elected a member of the Urban District Council. When the Local Government Act, 1929, came into force on April 1, 1930, the Urban District Council claimed to exercise power of maintenance and repair of county roads in its are including the above section of the main road. The roadman continued to be employed as before and received his wages in the first instance from the Urban District Council which was reimbursed by the County Council upto the amount included in the district surveyor's estimate. He continued to act as an Urban District Councillor and was re-elected in 1931. The roadman continued to be employed as before and received his wages in the first instance from the Urban District Council which was reimbursed by the County Council upto the amount included in the district surveyor's estimate. He continued to act as an Urban District Councillor and was re-elected in 1931. It was held by the Kings Bench Division that the roadman was under the control of and bound to obey the orders of the Urban District Council, he must be regarded as being employed by that council and not by the county council, and he was for that reason, disqualified under Section 46(1) of the Local Government Act, 1894, from holding the office of Urban District Councillor. The test applied by their Lordships was the same as the one laid down by Blackstone, J. in Rex v. N. (1) E.L.R. (2) at page 347, as to who was to control over the work and whom the person concerned is bound to obey. So far as the present case is concerned it is the authorities of the Jawahar Inter College that the petitioner is bound to obey and they alone have control over the petitioner. This case, therefore, cannot be of any assistance to us or of help of Mr. Gaur. 17. The last case on which reliance was placed by Mr. Gaur is Bagget v. Meux 13 L.J. Ch. 228 at 232. It was observed there as follows:- "I am reminded of the word `disposal' of an argument at the bar which was founded on this expression in Mr. Warren's will. It was more than once mentioned, but it was not used by him in the sense in which I have used it. I think he used it, and correctly in the sense of regulating, ordering, conducting and the government; meaning by it, little, if anything, more than he afterwards described by the word "management". This case which was one relating to the construction of a will cannot be of any help for the simple reason that the decision is based upon the reading of the whole will and on the finding that the word `disposal' had taken colour from the context in which it was used. This case which was one relating to the construction of a will cannot be of any help for the simple reason that the decision is based upon the reading of the whole will and on the finding that the word `disposal' had taken colour from the context in which it was used. The case, therefore, is no authority for the proposition for which it is sough to be used that if the Government has some say in the management of the institution all teaching posts in the institution are at the disposal of the Government. 18. Whereas it is true that the petitioner is holding a place of profit inasmuch as he is difficult to see that the place is in the gift or the disposal of the Government. We are unable to accept Mr. Gour's submission that the effect of the various provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act is to give to the Government a final say in the appointment of the members of the teaching staff of recognised institutions. We have already analysed the relevant provisions and held that a recognised institution in U.P. and in the present case, the Jawahar Intermediate College, is a juristic person, having an autonomy to deal with its affairs as it likes and that even though some public officers, i.e. the District Inspector of Schools, the Regional Deputy Director and the Director of Education have some say in the management of its affairs, neither they nor the Government have any ownership over the institution. We have already repelled Mr. Gour's submission that the circumstance that the Government gives financial grant to the Jawahar Intermediate College is conclusive or determinative of the question as to who pays the petitioner. Once the Government has paid the grant and the same has been received by the Jawahar Intermediate College, it gets merged in its funds and thereafter ceases to be Government money. Consequently, the payment of the salary to the petitioner is made not by the Government but by the Jawahar Intermediate College. Under these circumstances, we are wholly unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner was occupying a place of profit in the gift or the disposal of the Government. 19. Consequently, the payment of the salary to the petitioner is made not by the Government but by the Jawahar Intermediate College. Under these circumstances, we are wholly unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner was occupying a place of profit in the gift or the disposal of the Government. 19. We, therefore, allow this petition quash the order of the Election Tribunal dated 20th February, 1963 as also that of the returning officer and in exercise of our power under Article 226 of the Constitution send back the case to the Election Tribunal (Civil Judge), Aligarh for decided it in the light of our decision. There is however no order as to costs.