JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - This is a revision application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for the quashing of an order made by the learned Civil Judge, Varanasi. The case first came on for hearing before our brother Asthana who being of the opinion that a question of substantial importance arose in the case referred it to a larger Bench. 2. The respondents, Moolchand, Haridas and Raghunath Prasad, constituted a partnership firm, Messrs Kanhaiya Oil Mills, which had a branch business under the name of Moolchand Haridas. The applicant, the Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd., obtained a decree against Moolchand Haridas for Rs. 25,000/-. The applicant put the decree into execution against the three partners, and in execution attached three houses belonging to them. Two houses. No. K. 46/186 and K. 47/144, were auctioned on July 9, 1959 for a total sum of Rs. 4,600/-, and the sale was confirmed on September 22, 1959. The third house, No. K. 47/103, was auctioned on July 14, 1959 for Rs. 9,500/. and the sale was confirmed on Oct. 25, 1960. Pursuant to income tax assessments against the partnership firm, M/S Kanhaiya Oil Mills, its liability to income tax was determined at Rs. 1,48,378/-. The Income Tax Officer issued a certificate under Section 46(2) of the Income Tax Act for the recovery of this tax to the Collector of Varanasi desiring that recovery proceedings be taken against the three partners. Consequent upon this recovery certificate, the Collector addressed a letter on July 14, 1959 to the court executing the applicant's decree and prayed that the sale proceeds of the three houses be adjusted towards the satisfaction of the income tax liability assessed against Messrs Kanhaiya Oil Mills. On January 2, 1960 the applicant filed an objection against the claim made by the Collector. The executing Court held that the income tax dues were recoverable from the three partners of Messrs. Kanhaiya Oil Mills of which Moolchand Haridas was a branch business, that for the purpose of recovering income tax dues it was not necessary for the Collector to follow the procedure laid down for recovery of arrears of land revenue, and that he could in this behalf invoke the inherent powers of the court by an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court, treating the Collectors letter as an application under Section 151, directed that the sale proceeds should be first paid towards the income tax dues. 3. Before us, learned counsel for the applicant contends that the Collector has not established that a debt was due to the Income Tax Department and that even if he succeeded in doing so the debt was due from Messrs. Kanhaiya Oil Mills and not from the partners who were distinct in law from the partnership firm. The question whether or not a debt is due to the Income lax Department depends upon whether, pursuant to the assessment, a notice of demand under the Income Tax Act has been issued. In Doorga Prasad v. Secretary of State, AIR 1945 P.C. 62 it was observed : "In their Lordships opinion although income tax may be popularly described as due for a certain year, it is not in law so due. It is calculated and assessed by reference to the income of the assessee for a given year, but it is due when demand is made under Section 29 and Section 45. It then becomes a debt due to the Crown, but not for a particular period." 4. Learned counsel for the applicant says that the issue of a notice of demand has not been proved. This objection was not taken before the court below. We see no reason why it should be allowed to be raised now. Indeed, it is possible to say that a certificate having been issued by the Income Tax Officer under Section 46(2) of the Income Tax Act it should be presumed that a notice of demand was issued. 5. We are also unable to accept the contention that the tax cannot be recovered from the respondents, Moolchand, Haridas and Raghunath Prasad. The assessment was made against Messrs. Kanhaiya Oil Mills. It was a partnership firm, and the respondents have been found to be its partners. Now while it is true that under the Income Tax Act a partnership firm is an entity distinct from its partners, that is so only for the purpose of assessment. The assessment was made against Messrs. Kanhaiya Oil Mills. It was a partnership firm, and the respondents have been found to be its partners. Now while it is true that under the Income Tax Act a partnership firm is an entity distinct from its partners, that is so only for the purpose of assessment. In Income Tax Commissioner v. Gibbs, 1942 AC 402 lord Macmillan observed : "Justification is thus not wanting for the view expressed by Romer, L. J., in Watson & Everitt v. Blunden, 18 Tax Cas., 409 that for taxing purposes: A partnership firm is treated as an entity distinct from the persons who constitute the firm ." 6. The question whether the income tax assessed upon a partnership firm can be recovered from its partners has been discussed in Simons Income Tax (2nd Edn.) vol. 1, pp. 337, 510, where it is stated : "That tax assessed in the firm name is a partnership debt for which all who were partners at the time when the debt was incurred. . . .are jointly liable. This means that any or all of those persons may be sued for the whole of the tax due (when the assessment becomes final) without reference to their respective shares under the partnership agreement..........." This statement of the law received the approval of Sir Raymond Evershed M. R. in Stevens v. Britten, 1954 (3) All. E.R. 385. 7. The income tax law treats a partnership firm as a distinct assessable entity, distinct from its partners who are separate assessable entities. The law contemplates a separate assessment proceeding against the partnership firm. Upon completion of the assessment, a notice of demand is issued in the name of the partnership firm. When once a notice of demand is issued, the income tax liability becomes a debt. It is a partnership debt. As a partnership debt, it is a debt owed by all those who are members of the partnership firm. No special provision under the income tax law is necessary for the purpose of recovering the tax assessed against a partnership firm from its partners. That is an obligation which arises upon the ordinary provisions of the law relating to partnership. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the income tax assessed against Messrs. Kanhaiya Oil Mills can be recovered from its partners. This contention of the applicant must, therefore, fail. 8. That is an obligation which arises upon the ordinary provisions of the law relating to partnership. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the income tax assessed against Messrs. Kanhaiya Oil Mills can be recovered from its partners. This contention of the applicant must, therefore, fail. 8. It is next urged by the applicant that the Collector was not entitled to invoke the inherent powers of the executing court for payment of the sale proceeds towards the income tax liability and that the only procedure open to him was that laid down in Section 46(2) of the Income Tax Act. There is force in this contention. Section 46(2) empowers the Collector, on receipt of a recovery certificate from the Income Tax Officer, to proceed to recover the amount specified in the certificate as if it were an arrear of land revenue. He is also entitled, while so proceeding, to invoke the aid of the powers which a Civil Court has under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of recovering an amount due under a decree. What is the scope of his powers under Section 46(2) has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Purshottam v. B. M. Desai, AIR 1956 SC 20 where Das Actg. C.J. (as he then was), observed:- "All that the sub-section directs the Collector to do is to proceed to recover the certified amount as if it were an arrear of land revenue, that is to say, he is to adopt the procedure prescribed by the appropriate law of his State for the recovery of land revenue and that in thus proceeding he is, under the proviso, to have all the powers a Civil Court has under the Code. The sub-section does not prescribe two separate procedures .......... In our opinion the proviso does not indicate a different and alternative mode of recovery of the certified amount of tax but only confers additional powers on the Collector for the better and more effective application of the only mode of recovery authorised by the body of sub-Section (2) of Section 46. . . ." 9. The Collector is bound to proceed to recover the, income tax due as if it were an arrear of land revenue and in this behalf he must follow the procedure which has been laid down in Chapter X of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. . . ." 9. The Collector is bound to proceed to recover the, income tax due as if it were an arrear of land revenue and in this behalf he must follow the procedure which has been laid down in Chapter X of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. Section 282 provides for the manner in which the movable property of a defaulter may be proceeded against, and sub-Section (2) of that section declares that every attachment and sale of movable property shall be made according to the law in force for the time being for the attachment and sale of movable property in execution of a decree of a Civil Court. The Code of Civil Procedure details the manner in which execution of a decree can be had be attachment and sale of movable property. That is the procedure which must be followed by the Collector when proceeding against movable property for recovering income tax of dues pursuant to a recovery certificate under Section 46(2) of the Income Tax Act. That is the procedure enjoined upon him by the statute and that is the only procedure which he can follow. Adopting the rule formulated in Taylor v. Taylor, 876 (1) Ch. Div. 426 the Judicial Committee declared in Nazir Ahmad v. Kind Emperor, AIR 1936 P.C. 253 (2) that "Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden." 10. We may, in passing, contrast the limited power conferred upon the Collector with the wide choice open to the Income Tax Officer in the matter of recovering income tax dues. The Income Tax Officer is not limited to issuing a recovery certificate under Section 46(2) to the Collector. He can also adopt other modes of recovery. He may, subject to a direction from the Commissioner in this behalf, proceed to recover the amount due by any process enforceable for the recovery of arrears of any municipal tax or local rate. In a case where the Income received by the assessee is chargeable under the head "Salaries", the Income Tax Officer may require any person paying the same to deduct from any payment subsequently made the amount of the tax due from such assessee. In a case where the Income received by the assessee is chargeable under the head "Salaries", the Income Tax Officer may require any person paying the same to deduct from any payment subsequently made the amount of the tax due from such assessee. He may also require a person from whom money is due or would become due from an assessee to pay so much of the money as is sufficient to discharge the tax liability. The scope of his choice as regards the modes of recovery is still not exhausted. The Explanation to Section 46(7) declares that the several modes of recovery specified in the section do not affect in any way any other law relating to the recovery of debts due to Government and that it shall be lawful for the Income Tax Officer to have recourse to any such mode of recovery notwithstanding that the tax due is being recovered from an assessee by any other mode. 11. The jurisdiction of the Collector to take proceedings for recovery of income tax dues flows entirely from the recovery certificate issued to him by the Income Tax Officer under Section 46(2), and that jurisdiction must be exercised for recovering the dues in the only mode provided by law, namely, as if they were arrears of land revenue. It is not open to the Collector to ignore that procedure and invoke the provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. In B. S. Corporation v. Union of India AIR 1956 Cal. 26 , a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held, in a case where a certificate under Section 46(2) of the Income Tax Act had been forwarded to the Collector for recovery of income tax dues, that the proper procedure to be followed by the Collector was that set out either in order 21, Rule 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Rule 22 framed under the Public Demands Recovery Act and that there was no necessity at all for importing the provisions of Section 151 of the Code. The learned Judges proceeded to decide the case upon the application of the latter Rule as the attachment was actually made under that provision. This decision was followed by Sinha, J. in Associated Pictures v. Union of India, AIR 1959 Cal. 179 . 13. The learned Judges proceeded to decide the case upon the application of the latter Rule as the attachment was actually made under that provision. This decision was followed by Sinha, J. in Associated Pictures v. Union of India, AIR 1959 Cal. 179 . 13. Learned Counsel for the Collector relied upon a decision in Manickam Chettiar v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1938 Mad. 360 where a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that the court had inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code to order the payment of a Crown debt to the Government on the mere application of the Income Tax Officer. The Calcutta High Court in the two cases mentioned above dissented from this decision. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the correctness of the decision. It is distinguishable upon facts from the case before us. In that case the application was made by the income Tax Officer while in the present case it is the Collector who applied to the executing Court, and, as we have already pointed out, the Collector can only proceed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 46(2) of the Income Tax Act. Learned counsel then referred us to the decision in Pappu Reddiar v. Union of India, (1962) 46 I.T.R. 325. There again the application for payment of arrears of income tax was made by the Income Tax Officer and not by the Collector. Reliance was also placed upon E & T Officer v. Gauri Mal Butail, AIR 1961 Pun. 292 but in that case the application was made by the Excise and Taxation Officer. The same position obtained in State of Kerala v. E. P. Mathew, AIR 1961 Kerala 18 where the application, which was treated as one under Section 151 of the Code, was made not by the Collector pursuant to a recovery certificate under Section 46 (2), but the State itself. Reference was also made to Governor General in Council v. Chotalal Shivadas, (1937) 7 ITR 411 but in that case reliance was placed by the court upon Manickam Chettiar's case (supra) which, as we have pointed out, in distinguishing upon facts. 14. Reference was also made to Governor General in Council v. Chotalal Shivadas, (1937) 7 ITR 411 but in that case reliance was placed by the court upon Manickam Chettiar's case (supra) which, as we have pointed out, in distinguishing upon facts. 14. In our judgment, therefore, the executing court referred in holding that its inherent powers could be invoked for making the order which it did and that it was not obligatory upon the Collector to proceed to recover the dues as arrears of land revenue. 15. We have held earlier that the dues being a partnership debt could be recovered from the partners. The houses were the property of the partners. But once the houses were sold in execution of the applicant's decree, the sale proceeds could not be said to be their property available directly for the recovery of the income tax dues. The sale proceeds were held by the Court for the satisfaction of the decree under execution. They were available also for rateable distribution under Section 73. The Collector, could not, by adding a letter to the executing Court, request that the sale proceeds be paid to him for the satisfaction of the income tax liability. If he could proceed in this behalf, it was by recourse to the provisions of order 2 Rule 52. That was the view also taken by this Court in Than Mal v. The income Tax Officer, AIR 1958 All 636 we have considered the question whether the letter of the Collector can be construed as a notice under Or. 21, R. 52, and we are of the view that it cannot. There is no prayer by the Collector for attachment of the sale proceeds. 16. Towards the conclusion of his submission, learned counsel for the Collector contended that the present revision application was no maintainable and relied in this behalf on Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Dittu Mal Hardial, AIR 1936 Lah. 521. In that case what was decided was that certain person was not entitled to priority, no revision jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or of failing to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or exercising it illegally and with material irregularity. In the present case, however, it appears that the Court below passed the impugned order on the erroneous assumption that it had inherent power to do so. In the present case, however, it appears that the Court below passed the impugned order on the erroneous assumption that it had inherent power to do so. We have also found that the Collector did not proceed under Or. 21, R. 52. This plea advanced on behalf of the Collector must also fail. 17. The revision application is, therefore, allowed, the order of the learned civil Judge is set aside and the request contained in the letter of the Collector must be refused. The applicant is entitled to its costs.