JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is an application in revision by Khan Gufran Zahidi to challenge his conviction of an offence punishable under Section 153-A, I.P.C. and the sentence of six months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100/-. The charge framed against the applicant was: "That you on 29/30th May, 1959, in your newspaper Urdu daily Siyasat Jadid issue dated 30-5-1959 (local dated 29-5-1959) being the editor, printer and publisher of the aforesaid newspaper engraved and printed at Hindustani Press, 105/232, Chamanganj, and published from 105/233 Chamanganj, police circle Sisamau, Kanpur, the news item - `Main Wazir Police hota to tamam masjidon ko topon se ura deta aur lashon ke dher lagadeta. Ek din ke lie bhi hukumat mil jae to main tamam Musalmano ho bhag jane per majboor kar dun. Jin Mandiron ko Masjidon men tabdil kar liya gaya hai woh jab tak Hinduon ko wapas na ki jaengi us waqat tak Hindustan men fisadaat hote rahenge. Dafa 144 khatam hote hi Bhopal men firqaparaston ki zahar afsanion ke silsila phir jari ho gaya. Mahasabhahi mokarriron ne al ailan kaha ki ek nahin ek hazar fisad honge aur koi uneh rok nahin sakta'. maliciously with intention of promoting feelings of enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muslims, the two different classes of citizens of India, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 153-A of the I.P.C.". 2. The Magistrate was inclined to be of the opinion that the news item so published by the applicant was not fully correct and some inflammatory sentences were added to it and that was done with the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between Hindus and Muslims. He also observed in the alternative that even if it be taken for granted that the accused published only those facts which were narrated by the speakers in the meetings, still the way and circumstances in which they were published clearly indicated that the intention of the applicant was not an honest one and it was done with malicious intention in order to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between Hindus and Muslims. The Sessions Judge hearing the appeal did not record any finding on the truth of the statements referred to in the news item, but on a perusal thereof recorded the finding that the charge was established. 3. The Sessions Judge hearing the appeal did not record any finding on the truth of the statements referred to in the news item, but on a perusal thereof recorded the finding that the charge was established. 3. For the disposal of the present revision, it is not necessary to record a finding as to whether the speeches of the speakers in the meetings held at Bhopal and Sironj had in fact been correctly reproduced by the applicant in the above issue of his newspaper. We can start with the assumption that in the main report speeches had, on the whole, been correctly reproduced. The heading of the news-item published in thick block letters has, however, not been published to give a proper synopsis of the news item and the point for consideration shall be whether the heading can be read by itself or it must be deemed to be a part of the news item and no inference be drawn from the heading alone. On this point detailed comments shall be made later. 4. Section 153-A, I.P.C. was amended in 1961, and substantial changes were made therein. The news-item in question was published in the issue of May 30, 1959, and shall be governed by the law in existence prior to the amendment of 1961. Unamended Section 153-A (to be referred hereinafter as Section 153-A) runs as below: "Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Explanation. - It does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this section to point out, without malicious intention and with an honest view to their removal, matters which are producing or have a tendency to produce, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India." When the Parliament amended Section 153-A material changes were made not only in the main offence but also by deleting the explanation which was a good defence for acts which would otherwise be illegal. Amended Section 153-A runs as below: "153-A. Whoever - (a) Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, language, etc. Amended Section 153-A runs as below: "153-A. Whoever - (a) Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, language, etc. and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony - by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes, or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities, or (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities and which disturb or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both." 5. It shall be found that Section 153-A has been worded generally to apply to all the classes of citizens of India and not to classes to be distinguished on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community. It is, on the other hand, contended on behalf of the applicant, that if the political parties are also covered by Section 153-A it shall not be possible for the citizens to criticise the acts of the political parties, which they can legitimately do to bring to the notice of the public the improper acts of that party. Reliance was also placed upon a few observations made in certain reported decisions. When the Legislature used general words to cover all the classes of the citizens of India, the Courts of Law shall not be justified in restricting the scope on supposed intention of the Legislature. The general words must be given their ordinary meaning and must be made applicable to all the classes provided that it is possible to place the person in a distinct class or group. The class or group can be based not only on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community but also on political or economic affiliation. However, the explanation to Section 153-A protects honest criticism or any act of the person criticising a political party without a malicious intention. In other words, therefore, even though promotion of feelings of enmity and hatred between different political parties would be punishable under Section 153-A, still any honest criticism without any malicious intention would be a good defence, as laid down in the explanation thereto. In other words, therefore, even though promotion of feelings of enmity and hatred between different political parties would be punishable under Section 153-A, still any honest criticism without any malicious intention would be a good defence, as laid down in the explanation thereto. 6. No decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court has been brought to my notice. The decisions relied upon are of other High Courts and it may here be observed at the very outset that all the High Courts have not taken the same view. In fact the same High Court has at occasions made conflicting observations. In Emp. v. Banomali Maharana, A.I.R. 1943 Pat. 382 a limited group of Zamindars (e.g. of South Orissa) was not held to form a class within the meaning of Section 153-A and a pamphlet directed only against the particular persons of a limited group was held not to excite hatred between classes within the meaning of Section 153-A. This case apparently followed a decision of the Bombay High Court in Narayan Vasudev Phadke v. Emp., AIR 1940 Bom. 379. It appears to me that the observations of Wassoodew, J. in the above Bombay case had been accepted and made a rule applicable to the Patna case. 7. In Narayan Vasudev Phadke v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1940 Bom. 379 the speech which was the subject of conviction of Phadke of offences under Sections 124-A and 153-A, I.P.C. was delivered to an audience consisting of the members of the Peasants Union Kalyan Taluka. The gist of the speech was that the Zamindars and Sawkars were oppressing the tenants and the Government was behind them and the tenants could not get rid of the Sawkars and Zamindars unless they get rid of the Government. Beaumont, C. J., observed that Sawkars could not constitute a class, as the term Sawkars in the sense of moneylenders was too vague a term to designate a class within the meaning of Section 153-A. This observation was made keeping in mind the fact that not only recognised Sawkars or money lenders carried on money lending business but there were probably many other people who indulged casually in money lending business. Beaumont, C. J. felt some difficulty about Zamindars but keeping in mind the institution of Zamindars in Bombay province it was observed that they also could not be placed in a distinct class within the meaning of Section 153-A. Beaumont, C. J. observed: There is more difficulty about zamindars. It is, however, clear that the expression `Zamindars' is not used by the accused in its technical sense, because there are no zamindars in the technical sense in this Province. So that we are not concerned to consider whether zamindars in a technical sense may constitute a class. I believe there is some authority for the proposition that they may, but we have not to consider that question at all. The accused used the word in the speech in question in the sense of landlords, landlords, that is, who have let out their land at a rent. There are difficulties in saying that landlords who let out their land at a rent constitute one class, and the persons to whom the land is let out another, because obviously people might come into both classes in respect of the same land." Wassoodew, J. went further still and gave a restricted meaning to the term class within the meaning of Section 153-A. He observed that "the expression `classes of His Majesty's subjects' in Section 153-A of the Code is used in a restrictive sense as denoting a collection of individuals or groups bearing a common and exclusive designation and also possessing common and exclusive characteristics which may be associated with their origin, race or religion, and that the term class within that section carries with it the idea of numerical strength so large as could be grouped in a single homogeneous community." Wassoodew, J. then considered classes or groups based on materialistic or economic conceptions and expressed his opinion that none of these groups could claim both exclusive and common characteristic which could be readily ascertained, and which, in his opinion, constituted the essential quality of the class mentioned in Section 153-A, I.P.C. I am inclined to agree with the observations of Beaumont, C. J., of course for the reasons already indicated above. It is however necessary that the `classes' must be distinct and not vague and ordinarily exclusive of each other. It is however necessary that the `classes' must be distinct and not vague and ordinarily exclusive of each other. But to say that the classes must be associated with their origin, race or religion, is to narrow down the scope of a term which has otherwise a general meaning. Before a set of persons can be placed in one class it is necessary that they must be in a sufficient number and not only a counted few. Otherwise, a group would be too small to be treated as a class of the citizens of the country. 8. Beaumont, C. J. made a similar observation in Maniben Liladhar Kara v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 65. He observed in this case also that the class contemplated by Section 153-A need not be divided on racial or religious grounds. In this case the word capitalist was considered to be too vague to denote a definite and ascertainable class so as to come within Section 153-A. Nanavati, J., the other Judge deciding the case of Maniben Liladhar Kara v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 65 laid down the important ingredients in the connotation of the term classes: (i) Words used must point to a well defined and readily ascertained group. (ii) Some element of permanence or stability in the group be present. (iii) The group must be sufficiently numerous and widespread to be designated as such. Nanavati, J. did not also restrict the scope of the term classes as used in Section 153-A to only those classes based on religion, caste etc. It will thus be found that the Judges of the Bombay High Court have not invariably taken the restricted view expressed by Wassoodew, J. in Narayan Vasudev Phadke v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1940 Bom. 379. 9. Jonnalagadda Ramalingayya and others v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 835 relates to case under the press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 as amended in 1932, but as the meaning of the same term `classes' was considered this case can usefully be considered while commenting upon the scope of Section 153-A. Beasley, C. J. and Gentle, J. were of the opinion that the Zamindars, millowners and land owners formed a sufficiently ascertained class for the purposes of Section 4(1) (d) of Press Act. They apparently accepted the classification of classes based on grounds other than religion, caste, creed etc. 10. In A. M. A. Zaman v. Emp, A.I.R. 193 Cal. They apparently accepted the classification of classes based on grounds other than religion, caste, creed etc. 10. In A. M. A. Zaman v. Emp, A.I.R. 193 Cal. 139 the question for consideration was whether criticism in an article of British Imperialism and Rulers of India accusing them of exploting and crushing the workers and the proletariat, could be said to be calculated to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between the Europeans as Europeans and the Indians as Indians. Every European did not necessarily have the outlook of a die-hard and, consequently, British Imperialism could not be placed at par with Europeans and it could not be said that the author of the article intended to promote feelings of hatred between Europeans and Indians. As the facts of this case are different, it cannot be utilised to infer that the classes within the meaning of Section 153-A must relate to religion, race, creed or community. 11. It will thus be found that the Madras High Court has taken a view against the restricted scope of Section 153-A and the Judges of the Bombay High Court do not also appear to have taken the view that the classes within the meaning of Section 153-A must be on the ground of religion, race, language, caste or community. On a reading of Section 153-A and also the reported decisions of other High Courts brought to my notice, I have no hesitation in giving the ordinary meaning to the general words used in Section 153-A, namely that classes, contemplated therein include groups based on other factors also. In the circumstances, a distinct political party can be placed among classes as contemplated by Section 153-A. 12. In the present case the heading of the news-item is the subject of charge. Heading is a part of the article but can be treated distinctly. A newspaper is meant to be read by all and not necessarily by those who have time to spare. Newspaper is not meant for specialists only. It is meant for every member of the public irrespective of the profession that he carries. A historian or a critic would invariably go through the whole of the article to know the full facts and to criticise the author of the article if necessary. But every citizen engaged in his own day to day work cannot ordinarily spare time to read every word of the article. A historian or a critic would invariably go through the whole of the article to know the full facts and to criticise the author of the article if necessary. But every citizen engaged in his own day to day work cannot ordinarily spare time to read every word of the article. Ordinarily such persons peruse the heading, and if they feel interested and at the same time can spare time go through the whole of the article. It is not unusual for readers to merely read the heading and then pass over to the next article. It is an important duty of an editor to give a heading which gives a clear idea of what the article contains. To give a precise of the article in the heading is difficult but the heading is not to mislead the readers. Consequently, if it is found that the heading is different from what is contained in the article (news-item) inference can be drawn from the heading itself. But where the heading does not give a story different from what is contained in the news-item, for drawing inferences the news item as a whole must be read. To put it differently, the heading is a part of the news-item (article) but in certain respects heading stands in a category of its own. 13. A perusal of the news-item in question makes it clear that what has been given out in the heading and which is the subject of the charge is a distorted version of what was uttered by the speaker in the meeting. The news-item as published by the applicant makes it clear that what the speaker had said in the meeting was: "aur kaha ki ... . fisadat kal dauran main jin masajid say patthar phainkey gayay they. Agar Main Wazir Police hota to un masajid ko topon say ura deta aur lashon ke dher lagwadeta agar main Madhya Pradesh main ek din ke liyay zamindar bana diya jaoon to aik din main in miyaon (Musalmanon) ka dimag thik kar doon. What the speaker meant was that he would raze to the ground, even at the risk of killing numerous persons, those mosques from which stones had been thrown during the disturbances. What the speaker meant was that he would raze to the ground, even at the risk of killing numerous persons, those mosques from which stones had been thrown during the disturbances. The heading, on the other hand, suggests that the speaker wanted to raze to the ground all the mosques and to kill muslims, of course if he was appointed the Home Minister for a single day. The two reveal quite a different story. The speech as contained in the news-item would suggest to the readers that the speaker was an extraordinary strict person who would not hesitate to kill a dozen persons for the harm done by an individual. Peaceful Muslim citizens would not feel un-nerved on reading such a speech and, in one way, would have no hatred or enmity with that speaker or his party. But on leading the report as contained in the heading every Muslim will bear enmity with the speaker and his party. Why a distorted heading was given shall have to be inferred from the circumstances and not from what the applicant now professes. We have to determine the intention of the accused from the publication itself. When a distorted heading is given, the Courts can presume that the publication was not with an honest intention. In other words, the applicant is not entitled to the protection of the Explanation of Section 153-A. 14. The alleged utterance is said to have been made by a leader of the Hindu Mahasabha in the meetings held at Bhopal and Sironj. Hindu Mahasabha is a well known political party. It has distinct membership, such that members thereof are invariably not members of other political parties. Even now Hindu Mahasabha commands sufficient membership to justify being placed in a class for the purpose of Section 153-A. The heading thus intended to promote and there was an attempt to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between the members of the Hindu Mahasabha and persons not belonging to this class, and as the publication was not without malicious intention the offence under Section 153-A was made out. 15. To get over this difficulty two other contentions were raised before me. Firstly, that the speech reported in the newspaper was of a mad person and the readers would have felt annoyed with that mad person and not with the political party. 15. To get over this difficulty two other contentions were raised before me. Firstly, that the speech reported in the newspaper was of a mad person and the readers would have felt annoyed with that mad person and not with the political party. It was also contended that Section 153-A being general was hit by Article 19 of the Constitution of India and on this ground also no criminal offence was made out. 16. The aims and object of a political party are generally assumed to be what are expressed in the election manifesto and other pamphlets or are publicly uttered by its leaders. Persons reading the news-item would have inferred that what the speaker was saying in the meeting was the aim and object of that political party. Consequently, the enmity or hatred created would have been not only against that individual but against the party as a whole. An individual could not be placed in a distinct class within the meaning of Section 153-A but his party would. 17. Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India gives a right to the citizens of India to freedom of speech and expression; but as laid down in clause (2) thereof, the State can place reasonable restrictions on the exercise of such right. Such restrictions can be imposed, among others in relation to incitement to an offence. Enmity or hatred invariably leads to violence and promotion of enmity or hatred is, in substance, incitement to an offence. In other words, therefore, the restriction imposed by Section 153-A in the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and expression is reasonable and constitutional. 18. To sum up, by publication of the heading the applicant promoted or attempted to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between classes of the citizens of India and he was not entitled to the protection of the Explanation of Section 153-A. However, he cannot be convicted of the offence due to improper framing of the charge. In the charge he was alleged to have promoted feelings of enmity or hatred between Hindus and Muslims. Every Hindu is not a member of the Hindu Mahasabha, nor has every Hindu sympathy for what is preached or advocated by that party. In the charge he was alleged to have promoted feelings of enmity or hatred between Hindus and Muslims. Every Hindu is not a member of the Hindu Mahasabha, nor has every Hindu sympathy for what is preached or advocated by that party. Hindu and Hindu Mahasabha cannot be placed at par and it cannot be said that enmity or hatred created against the Hindu Mahasabha is an enmity or hatred created against the Hindus as a whole. When the prosecution indicated wrong classes of the citizens of India in the charge, the benefit thereof shall go to the accused, and he shall deserve acquittal, all the more when the present is not a case in which retrial after necessary amendment of the charge may be ordered. 19. The revision is hereby allowed and the applicant is acquitted of the charge. His conviction and sentence are set aside. He is on bail and his bail bonds are discharged. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded to him.