Judgment :- 1. The petitioner having been selected by the Kerala Public Service Commission for recruitment as a clerk on Rs. 40 120 per mensem, was provisionally appointed a Lower Division Clerk by the District Collector, Palghat, by order Ext. P-2 dated March 13, 1962, which reads: " .... The appointment is on a purely provisional basis terminable on one month's notice on either side or sooner on termination of the vacancies whichever is earlier and subject to the verification of their date of birth, educational qualification, certificate of physical fitness etc ...." While he was thus employed, the District Collector terminated his service by order Ext. P-4 dated June 9, 1962 "with immediate effect" without assigning any reason therefor and without giving the stipulated one month's notice; and the same was implemented by the Tahsildar, Perintalmanna, who relieved him from service by order, Ext. P-3 dated June 14, 1962. (Though the date of relief is mentioned to be 12-4-1962 in Ext. P.3 served on the petitioner, the office copy thereof shown to us by the learned Government Pleader mentions it as 12-6-1962, the month being corrected with pen as 6 by an overwriting on the original typewritten figure 4.) It is to quash Exts. P-3 and P-4 by a writ of certiorari that this O. P. is moved. 2. The learned Government Pleader contended that the order of appointment reserves power in the Government to terminate the petitioner's service without assigning any reason, on a month's notice, that the instant termination was in exercise of that power and that therefore the petitioner could not claim any relief other than a month's pay in lieu of the notice. We do not feel convinced of this argument. Neither a month's notice, nor a month's salary in lieu of notice was given or offered to the petitioner before termination of his service. The plea in Para.10 of the counter affidavit on behalf of the State is thus: "The petitioner is however eligible to get one month's notice pay if his services are terminated without notice. In the present case the Government have not denied the petitioner the notice pay. The question of payment of notice pay will be considered if requested for by the petitioner." 3. In the present case the Government have not denied the petitioner the notice pay. The question of payment of notice pay will be considered if requested for by the petitioner." 3. It is pertinent to note here that even now the petitioner has not been offered a month's pay in lieu of notice and the counter-affidavit says only that the Government, will consider the same "if requested for by the petitioner". Regarding employees in industries, the Supreme Court has held that failure to pay the prescribed compensation at the time of retrenchment renders orders of termination of their services "invalid and inoperative". (Vide The State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR. 1960 SC. 610). We do not find any reason why the same shall not be the consequence of a non-compliance of a month's notice stipulated under Ext. P-2, particularly when a greater security in public service is envisaged in Art.16 and 311 of the Constitution. It must then follow that the impugned orders have to be declared invalid and inoperative for the reason that they were violative of the terms of Ext. P-2, there being no allegation of any misconduct in the service of the petitioner in this case. 4. The reason for the termination of the petitioner's service is given by the State in the counter-affidavit thus: "The services of the petitioner were terminated for the sole reason that he was found not suitable for appointment to Government Service on verification of character and antecedents." The standard of character and antecedents expected of a public servant must necessarily vary with the character of the post in which he is employed. That which may be very relevant for a "sensitive post" may be unnecessary for "the post of a last grade servant or a Lower Division Clerk in the Registration department. The test of "character and antecedents" for employment in public service must have a real relation to the duties and responsibilities of the post concerned. It further follows that if this Court is to safeguard the fundamental right guaranteed in Art.16 of the Constitution, it has to be convinced that in assessing the character and antecedents of a person as a qualification for his employment in public service, relevancy has been kept in view by the authorities concerned. It further follows that if this Court is to safeguard the fundamental right guaranteed in Art.16 of the Constitution, it has to be convinced that in assessing the character and antecedents of a person as a qualification for his employment in public service, relevancy has been kept in view by the authorities concerned. The necessity for such a disclosure becomes greater when the termination of service is averred to be 'arbitrary, capricious and mala fide' as is done by the petitioner in this case. The 2nd respondent the District Collector, Palghat, who is the officer responsible for the termination of the petitioner' service, has not chosen to file any reply to the averments in the affidavit in support of the motion in this O. P. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State by an Assistant Grade I of the Secretariat, Trivandrum, gives no indication as to the nature of the defects in the character and antecedents of the petitioner that induced the Collector to terminate his service. There is not even an affirmation before us by any responsible officer that the test applied in the instant case was nothing but relevant to the post concerned. The records relating to the verification of the petitioner's character and antecedents have not been placed before us. We have therefore to accept the sworn statement of the petitioner: "The order terminating my services while retaining those who are junior to me and appointing in my own place a candidate selected later than I is arbitrary, capricious and mala fide." 5. A contention was raised on behalf of the State that the removal of the petitioner from his temporary post, not having been in the nature of punishment, would not attract Art.311 (2) of the Constitution. In view of our decision on the aspects of notice and of the relevancy of the test of character and antecedents, it is agreed that a decision on this aspect is unnecessary in this case. 6. In the result, the Rule is made absolute. A writ of certiorari will issue to quash the impugned orders. Costs follow the event. Allowed.