JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - These writ petitions have come before us on a reference made by our brother Seth by means of an order dated 4th November 1963. The questions raised before us are purely of law which are common to both the writ petitions (Nos. 3769 and 3770 of 1963). In both the cases the petitioners and the non official respondents are rival candidates at an election held to elect the Pramukhs of the Kshettra Samitis concerned. Both the petitioners were declared elected. Whereupon election petitions were filed challenging their elections. By means of the writ petitions before us it has been prayed that orders in the nature of writ of prohibition be issued by this Court commanding the learned Civil Judges concerned not to proceed with the hearing of the election petitions. 2. We have heard Mr. C. S. P. Singh for the petitioners and Mr. S. C. Khare for the non official respondents. Mr. Singh has made the following three submissions before us: (1) That there being no provision in the U.P. Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for an election petition, no petition could be filed, and in any case if Section 7 of the Act is invoked in support of Rule 35 which permits filing of an election petition, Section 7 is invalid on the grounds that it permits delegation of essential legislative functions. (2) That Section 7 of the Act is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India being discriminatory in nature there being no legislative guidance for the rule making authority to frame the rules. (3) That in any case there being no specific rule providing grounds on which election petitions can be filed the provisions of Rule 35 are unenforceable and unadministerable with the result that no election petition could be filed. We will take the submissions seriatim: 3. Mr. Singh has contended that under the provisions of section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code a Civil Court is competent to entertain a suit of a civil nature including one in respect of an election matter and that the only limitation on the power of the civil court to entertain such a suit can be provided by a special legislation curtailing the jurisdiction of the civil court to investigate into such matters. It is urged that there is nothing in the Act which takes away that vast jurisdiction of the civil court and there is nothing to show that a civil court cannot entertain a suit either for the declaration that a particular person is elected Adhyaksh or for the declaration that he is not. Mr. Singh further proceeds by saying that there being no restriction on the powers of the civil court and there being nothing in the Act relating to an election petition the result of a rule framed by a subordinate authority would be to defeat the provisions of Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code which is a Central Act passed by a legislative body. Putting differently, the argument is that the effect of the rule is to repeal the provisions of Section 9 of the Code so far as election disputes under the Act are concerned. In our judgment, there is no substance in this submission. It is wrong to assume that there has been any repeal of the provisions of the Code. The entire effect of Section 7 read with Rule 35 of the Act is to provide that regarding elections of Adhyakshas of Kshettra Samitis not the civil court but the election tribunal will decide the matter. The view that we are taking finds support from Hari Shanker Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 465 . 4. We have also no hesitation in rejecting the other submission made by Mr. Singh in this connection, i.e., that a subordinate body-in the present case the State Government has set at naught the express provision of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The State Government is the delegate and the power to make rules flows from the authority conferred upon it by the State legislature by means of Section 7 of the Act. Consequently, it is wrong to submit that it is an executive order or a legislative provision made by a subordinate authority which results in bye-passing a provision in a statute validly passed by a legislature. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the first submission of Mr. Singh is without substance. 5. Consequently, it is wrong to submit that it is an executive order or a legislative provision made by a subordinate authority which results in bye-passing a provision in a statute validly passed by a legislature. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the first submission of Mr. Singh is without substance. 5. Coming to the second submission, it may be pointed out that the rule making power under which the State of Uttar Pradesh has purported to act is to be culled out from the provisions of Section 7 of the Act, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: "(1) Every Kshettra Samiti shall have- (a) a Pramukh who shall be elected by the members mentioned in sub-Secs. (1) and (2) of Section 6 out of persons whose names are registered as electors in the Assembly Rolls from any area included in the Khand and (b) one senior Up-Pramukh and one Junior Up-Pramukh to be elected by members mentioned in sub-Secs. (1) and (2) of Section 6 out of themselves. The aforesaid election shall be held by secret ballot and in the manner provided by rules which shall also provide for resolution of doubts and disputes relating to the election of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh." (Italicised by us). The sole question to consider, therefore, is whether by the use of the words "provide for resolution of doubts and disputes relating to the election," the legislature intended to confer on the State Government the power to make a rule permitting filing of an election petition. Mr. Singh contends that the expression "doubts and disputes" is extremely vague and that something more than this should have been said in order to provide a legislative policy on the basis of which rules could have been framed. We are unable to agree. It is clear from the phraseology of the above noted provision that the rule making authority had been given the power of making all such rules which would be necessary for the resolving of all doubts and disputes relating to the elections. The expression "doubts and disputes" is of the widest possible amplitude and comprehends in it also the resolution of doubts and disputes relating to the election of a Pramukh on the ground that the election was not held in accordance with the rules or for any other reason provided for in the law. The expression "doubts and disputes" is of the widest possible amplitude and comprehends in it also the resolution of doubts and disputes relating to the election of a Pramukh on the ground that the election was not held in accordance with the rules or for any other reason provided for in the law. In our judgment, there is no question of there being no legislative guidance in the present case. The legislature in unequivocal terms conferred on the rule making authority power to make all such rules which in its opinion were necessary in order to ensure that the elections were held in a fair manner and also to provide the machinery and the procedure through which it could be determined whether the elections were so held. In the circumstances we are not prepared to accept the submission of the learned counsel that Rule 35 of the Rules is beyond the rule making power of the State Government. We are also not impressed by the submission that the provision is vague. 6. It is true that there is no specific rule providing for the grounds on which an election petition can be founded but there is certainly a rule in the shape of R. 35 permitting filing of such a petition. It is well settled that a rule making authority, be it the legislature or an executive body, does not frame a provision only in order to make it unworkable or unadministerable. Every effort has got to be made to see that provision is worked and that too in the spirit and according to the provisions of the Act. In our judgment it would be subversive of the scheme of the rules to suggest that even though the rules did provide for the filing of a petition, their silence with regard to the grounds is indicative of the rule making authority having decided that no election petition should be filed. In our judgment it would be subversive of the scheme of the rules to suggest that even though the rules did provide for the filing of a petition, their silence with regard to the grounds is indicative of the rule making authority having decided that no election petition should be filed. It is true that it would have been conclusive to the convenience of the parties and would also have resulted in better draftsmanship if specific rules were provided giving the grounds on which an election petition can be filed but the mere absence of such rules in our opinion does not justify the conclusion that the rule making authority wanted to bring in an absurd position of first providing for election petitions being filed and then taking away that remedy by not stating the grounds on which such petitions could be filed. Reading all the provisions of the Act and the Rules it appears to us that an election petition can be filed on the grounds alleged in the election petitions giving rise to the writ petition before us. Beyond this we are not called upon to decide in this case. 7. The only grounds on which both the petitions are founded are that the votes were not correctly counted at the time of counting of the votes, inasmuch as there was a mistake in totalling or that the votes cast in favour of one party were excluded from his count and included in the count of the other party. It is well settled that when there are rules requiring a thing to be done in a particular manner, the thing must be borne in that manner or not at all. See Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 : 1936 ALJ 895. There are rules giving the manner in which votes would be admitted or rejected. The rules proceed on the assumption that those responsible for counting of votes would do so correctly and in accordance with the rules and when there are allegations that the counting was not correct and the rules relating to exclusion and inclusion of votes were violated, it would be erroneous to hold that notwithstanding the fact that an election petition has been provided for by Rule 35, the present election petitions are not maintainable. If an election petition cannot be filed on the grounds alleged in the election petitions giving rise to the writ petitions before us, it is difficult to see on what other grounds an election can be filed. In any case it cannot be said that there is patent want of jurisdiction on the part of the Civil Judges concerned to try the election petitions giving rise to these writ petitions. It is well settled that a writ of prohibition can go only in a case of patent and clear want of jurisdiction and it does not issue where something can be said in support of the jurisdiction of the court or the tribunal, as the case may be. 8. For all these reasons we are of the opinion that these writ petitions must be dismissed. We order accordingly. We, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs. Stay orders, if any, are vacated.