Judgment :- 1. This petition was heard along with O. P. Nos. 2700 and 2849 of 1962. A copy of our judgment in those petitions will be appended to this judgment and treated as part of it. 2. The only further question urged in this petition relates to S.9 [2] of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950. The relevant portion of that subsection reads as follows: "In computing the total agricultural income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included (a) so much of the agricultural income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly (iii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart; or (iv) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child not being a married daughter by such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration." 3. The Travancore-Cochin Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, was renamed the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, and extended to the whole of the State of Kerala on 1st April 1957. This was done by the Travancore-Cochin Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1957. 4. The contention of the petitioner is that the gifts that he effected were prior to the extension of the Act to the area with which we are concerned, namely, that portion of the Kerala State which was in the Madras State prior to the formation of the Kerala State on 1st November 1956 under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. S.9 [2] of the Agricultural Income-tax, 1950, corresponds to S.16 [3] of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The relevant portion of sub-section (3] of S.16 reads as follows: "In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included (a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly (iii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart; or (iv) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child, not being a married daughter, by such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration." 5. Sub-section [3] of S.16 was introduced by S.2 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1937. S.5 of the amending Act controlled the operation of S.2. Sub-section [3] of S.16 was introduced by S.2 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1937. S.5 of the amending Act controlled the operation of S.2. It specifically stated that the amendment made by S.2 "shall not have effect in respect of any income chargeable to income-tax for any year ending before the 1st day of April 1937." 6. The question whether transfers effected before 1937 would come within the ambit of sub-section (3) of S.16 arose for consideration in Rai Bahadur H. P. Banerjee v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1941) IX I. T. B. 137. Harries, C. J. said: "The wording of the sub-section is wide enough to cover not only income from assets transferred by a husband to his wife after the passing of the Act but also income arising from such assets transferred before the passing of the Act." The decision was followed in Pandit Gaya Prasad Tewari v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1942) X I. T. R.308, Sardami Narain Kaur In re (1943) XI I. T. R.448 and Sheikh Mohammed Naqi v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1945) XIII I.T.R. 452. 7. S.16 (1) (c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as substituted by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939, and omitting its provisos, reads as follows: "In computing the total income of an assessee (c) all income arising to any person by virtue of a settlement or disposition whether revocable or not, and whether effected before or after the commencement of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939 (VII of 1939), from assets remaining the property of the settlor or disposer, shall be deemed to be income of the settlor or disponer, and all income arising to any person by virtue of a revocable transfer of assets shall be deemed to be income of the transferor." The words "whether effected before or after the commencement" occurring in S.16 (1) (c) were copied in S.9 (1) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950. S.9 (1), without its provisos, reads as follows: "In computing the total agricultural income of an assessee all agricultural income arising to any person by virtue of a settlement or disposition, whether revocable or not, and whether effected before or after the commencement of this Act, from assets remaining the property of the settlor or disponer shall be deemed to be the agricultural income of the settlor or disponer and all agricultural income arising to any person by virtue of a revocable transfer of assets shall be deemed to be the agricultural income of the transferor." 8. Counsel for the petitioner emphasised the presence of the words "whether effected before or after the commencement of this Act." in sub-section (1) of S.9 and their absence in sub-section (2) of that section. The presence of the words "whether effected before or after the commencement of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939 '(11 of 1939) " in S.16 (1) (c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the absence of a similar phraseology in S.16 (3) of that Act was emphasised in Pandit Gaya Prasad Tewari v. Commissioner of Income-tax 11942] X I. T. R.308. Collister and Bajpai, JJ. said: "Learned counsel for the assessee pleads that the section is not applicable in the present case for the reason that the transfer was effected in 1922, i. e., long before the 1st April 1937; and in support of this contention he relies upon the analogy of sub-section (1) (c) of S.16, in which the words 'whether effected before or after the commencement of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939' occur. It is true that no such clause finds place in sub-section (3), but the Legislature enacted a separate section (S. 5) in the amending Act which leaves no room for doubt as regards its intention. This Act is not concerned with the date of the transfer; it is concerned with the income arising from the property and chargeable to income-tax for any year commencing on or after the 1st April 1937. S.16 (3) is wide enough to apply to income arising from transfers effected before the passing of the amending Act unless the income is chargeable for a year ending before the 1st April 1937." 9. The position is the same when we read S.9 (2) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, with S.3, the charging section of the Act. S.16 (3) is wide enough to apply to income arising from transfers effected before the passing of the amending Act unless the income is chargeable for a year ending before the 1st April 1937." 9. The position is the same when we read S.9 (2) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, with S.3, the charging section of the Act. Such a reading makes it quite clear that the date of the transfer is immaterial and that all agricultural income subsequent to the commencement of the Act is within the net of taxation. 10. The presence of the words "whether effected before or after the commencement of this Act" in sub-section (1) of S.9 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, may be the product of a blind copying; the absence of those words in sub-section (2) of S.9 of that Act is certainly not of any material significance. It follows that the petition should fail and be dismissed. Judgment accordingly. No costs. 0. P. Nos. 8700 and 3849 of 1962. JUDGMENT M. S. Menon, C. J. 1A. The main question for determination in these two petitions is whether the income derived by the petitioner from lands in the Malabar portion of this State is liable to agricultural income-tax under the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950. It is common ground that in order to constitute such income an agricultural income for the purposes of taxation under the said Act it should fulfil the definition of that expression in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. 2A. Agricultural Income is defined in S.2 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It is agreed that in order to come within that definition the income of the petitioner must have been derived from lands "assessed to land revenue in the taxable territories", and that the sole question for determination is whether the lands from which the agricultural income was derived in these cases can be considered as lands assessed to land revenue or not. 3A. The lands are situated, as already indicated, in that portion of this State which was part of the Malabar district in the Madras State prior to the formation of the State of Kerala on 1st November 1956. On that date the lands were lands assessed to land revenue. 4A. 3A. The lands are situated, as already indicated, in that portion of this State which was part of the Malabar district in the Madras State prior to the formation of the State of Kerala on 1st November 1956. On that date the lands were lands assessed to land revenue. 4A. The Travavcore-Cochin Land Tax (Amendment) Act, 1957, renamed the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, as the Land Tax Act 1955, and extended it to the whole of the State of Kerala on 1st September 1957. S.10 of the amending Act also repealed the Madras Land Revenue (Surcharge) Act, 1954, and the Madras Land Revenue (Additional Surcharge) Act, 1955, as in force in the Malabar District referred to in sub-section (2) of S.5 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. 5A. The validity of the Land Tax Act, 1955, was successfully challenged before the Supreme Court in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala AIR. 1961 SC. 552 and the Kerala Land Tax Ordinance, 1961, followed. The Ordinance was subsequently repealed and replaced by the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961. 6A. The validity of the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, was challenged before this Court in Ravi Varma Raja v. Deputy Tahsildar, Chittur 1963 KLT.15. The challenge succeeded and Vaidialingam, J. directed the State to forbear "from taking further action on the basis of the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, or the rules framed thereunder." 7A. The Kerala Land Revenue Settlement and Assessment (Revival) Bill, 1963 L. A. Bill No. 11 of 1963 was then framed; but it has not, as yet, been passed into law. The statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill says: "The Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961 (Act B of 1961) has been struck down by the High Court of Kerala as unconstitutional. The lack of provision for reasonable classification of lands for purposes of assessment is the most important ground on which the Court struck down the Act. It is necessary, therefore, to base the system of land revenue assessment, on principles of reasonable classification of lands. A new land revenue assessment of lands is proposed for the whole State. Some time is required for it. It is necessary, therefore, to base the system of land revenue assessment, on principles of reasonable classification of lands. A new land revenue assessment of lands is proposed for the whole State. Some time is required for it. Pending the introduction of such land revenue assessment, it is necessary to revive, as a temporary measure, the land revenue assessment based on the Land Revenue Settlement which was in force immediately before the introduction of basic tax in the different parts of the State. The Bill seeks to achieve this object." 8A. The question for determination in these petitions is whether the lands concerned can be considered as assessed to land revenue in spite of the fact that the Land Tax Act, 1955, and the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, no longer subsist and the Kerala Land Revenue Settlement and Assessments (Revival) Bill, 1963, has not yet been enacted by the Legislature. The answer will depend on the exact effect of the striking down of the Land Tax Act, 1955, by the Supreme Court and the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, by this Court. 9A. When an Act is declared to be ultra vires by a court what happens is not a repeal but a declaration to the effect that the impugned Act had no existence whatsoever in the eye of the law. This must naturally mean that the original state of affairs prior to the passing of the Act struck down continues to be in force in all its original vigour and that the legislative history represented by the Act struck down should be deemed to have been obliterated. 10A. As stated by Willis on Constitutional law: "A judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute neither annuls not repeals the statute but has the effect of ignoring or disregarding it so far as the determination of the rights of private parties is concerned. The courts generally say that the effect of an unconstitutional statute is nothing. It is as though it had never been passed." (Page 89). The above passage sums up the law on the subject, and it has been quoted with approval in Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay AIR. 1955 SC. 123. To the same effect is the judgment of Vaidialingam, J. in Lakshmi v. Narayana Iyer 1963 KLT.1114. 11A. Nothing can be altered or repealed by a nullity. The above passage sums up the law on the subject, and it has been quoted with approval in Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay AIR. 1955 SC. 123. To the same effect is the judgment of Vaidialingam, J. in Lakshmi v. Narayana Iyer 1963 KLT.1114. 11A. Nothing can be altered or repealed by a nullity. The following passage occurs in an American case cited on page 491 of volume 73 of the United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition: "We suppose it clear that no law can be changed or repealed by a subsequent act which is void because unconstitutional. An act which violates the Constitution has no power, and can, of course, neither build up nor tear down. It can neither create new rights nor destroy existing ones. It is an empty legislative declaration without force or vitality." 12A. There are certain other questions raised in these petitions. But it is agreed that as far as they are concerned, an appeal as provided under the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, and not these proceedings, affords the proper remedy. 13A. A question of limitation may arise. We dare say that the time spent in this Court will be taken into account and a condonation will be forthcoming under S.31 (3) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950. 14A. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that the lands with which we are concerned are lands assessed to land revenue, repel the contention of the petitioner and dismiss these petitions. Judgment accordingly. No costs.