JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, J. 1. In this appeal by defendants 2 to 4, from a decree in a suit for partition, the main point urged relates to the devolution of the property of an Ezhava female who died before the Ezhava Act came into force. The suit was instituted by several plaintiffs out of which the first and the 11th plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 5 are the children of one Nangeli Velumpi. Plaintiffs 1 and 11 who are daughters of Nangeli Velumpi have children of their own and the first plaintiff claimed for her thavazhi 10/40 shares in the plaint property and the 11th plaintiff claimed 25/40 shares in the plaint property. This claim has been decreed. 2. On behalf of the appellants, counsel contended that according to the principles of Marumakkathayam Law before it was modified by any legislation, a thavazhi of a woman meant herself and her children but not her children's children in the female line. It is admitted that on the death of Nangeli Velumpi in 1097, her properties devolved on her thavazhi. For the proposition that this thavazhi can consist only of her children, plaintiffs 1 and 11 and defendants 1 to 5, reliance was placed on the decision in Amina Beevi v. Vasudevan ( 1956 KLT 117 F. B.). Dealing with the question of a gift by a marumakkathayee mother to her daughter, it was held that the presumption is that the gift enured to the benefit of the subtarwad of the donee. Reference was made by counsel for the appellant to the statement in paragraph 18 of the Judgment to the effect. "In the present case, there is nothing to show that the intention of the fourth defendant's mother in making the acquisition in the name of the fourth defendant was that the property should belong to the fourth defendant absolutely and not to the thavazhi consisting of herself and her children." Based on the underlined portion, it was argued that the Court has proceeded on the basis that the thavazhi of a female consists of only her children. I think this argument is fallacious. In that case, the fourth defendant had only children. Admittedly there was nothing in the Judgment to indicate that the fourth defendant's children had children and that the Court intended to exclude such children's children from the thavazhi. 3. I think this argument is fallacious. In that case, the fourth defendant had only children. Admittedly there was nothing in the Judgment to indicate that the fourth defendant's children had children and that the Court intended to exclude such children's children from the thavazhi. 3. Similar is the ruling in Krishnan Nair v Damodaran Nair (ILR XXXVIII Madras 48). What was held therein is that the self acquisition of a female member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad does not lapse on her death to her tarwad, but descends to her thavazhi, which will be her issue, if she has any, and in the absence of the issue, will be her mother and her descendants. It is suggested that "her issue" mentioned in the Judgment excludes descendants other than the children, like children's children. I am unable to accept this contention. On behalf of the respondents, my attention has been invited to a decision in Divakaran v Mani ( 1954 KLT 812 ) and the observation therein supports the view that even before the passing of the Ezhava Act, Act III of 1100, the Marumakkathayam Law thought of a thavazhi as consisting of a female and her children howlowsoever in the female line. In paragraph 3 of the Judgment, it is mentioned: "Relying on the ordinary connotation of the term 'tavazhi' in Marumakkathayam Law the appellant's learned counsel contends that the tavazhi on which the properties devolve under section 18 is the intestate female's thavazhi consisting of her sons and daughters and her daughter's descendants in the female line, and that the children of her sons and other descendants in the male line would not be included in that 'thavazhi'." 4. It appears to me that before the advent of statutory law which modified I the principles and customs of Marumakkathayam Law, property used to be held mostly by a tarwad. This tarwad may consist of a number of thavazhies or at times only of one thavazhi in the sense that the common ancestress and her descendants howlowsoever in the female line alone are included therein. When a member of such a tarwad had separate properties, the question had arisen on whom it will devolve on her death, and the rival claimants, were the entire tarwad and the tavazhi of the deceased. When a member of such a tarwad had separate properties, the question had arisen on whom it will devolve on her death, and the rival claimants, were the entire tarwad and the tavazhi of the deceased. So far as the Travancore area is concerned, it has been authoritatively ruled very early that the thavazhi of a deceased will take the property in preference to the tarwad. I have always understood this statement to mean that it will be taken by the tarwad with the necessary incidents of tarwad property. One of these incidents is : the females in the female line howlowsoever getting interest in the property and even after born children acquiring interest by birth. Nothing has been brought to my notice by which it has become necessary to mutilate this tarwad to consist of a group of persons, the mother and her children alone, and not the children's children as contended by counsel for the appellant. Such a notion appears to me to be against the very concept of Marumakkathayam Law. 5. Counsel for the appellant has raised another argument and suggested that even assuming that the devolution was on the tavazhi of Nangeli Velumpi succession having opened at a particular time, i.e., on her death, it is only those who were alive at the time of the death of Nangeli Velumpi who can get interest in the property. If the property has devolved on her tavazhi with the incidents of tarwad , property, an after born child must also get interest in the property. I have already held that the property devolved on the tavazhi of Nangeli Velumpi with the incidents of tarwad property. I negative this contention as well. 6. Finally it was urged that a decree debt in O. S. No. 89 of 1956 evidenced by Ext. D10 decree which was obtained on a hypothecation bond which was executed by Nangeli Velumpi, Ext. D 9, has been discharged by defendants 1 and 2 by executing Ext. D 11 hypothecation bond and that the properties hypothecated under Ext. D 11 are the separate properties of defendants 1 and 2, and the plaint property on which there was a charge as per the decree, Ext. D 10, having been relieved of the burden of that decree debt, defendants 1 and 2 must have a special right to the extent of the amount covered by Ext. D 10. D 11 are the separate properties of defendants 1 and 2, and the plaint property on which there was a charge as per the decree, Ext. D 10, having been relieved of the burden of that decree debt, defendants 1 and 2 must have a special right to the extent of the amount covered by Ext. D 10. The amount covered by Ext. D 10 is Rs. 250/-. I think this contention is well founded. The properties under Ext. D 10 are not scheduled to the plaint. They are, therefore, not partible and the contention that they are the separate properties of defendants 1 and 2 have to be accepted. For the discharge of the liability on the tarwad property, defendants 1 and 2 had to encumber their own property. They will, therefore, have to be reimbursed to the extent of the amount covered by Ext. D 10. At the time of partition, this will be provided for. 7. I allow this appeal to the extent of giving a special right in favour of defendants 1 and 2 to the extent of Rs. 250/-. In other respects, I dismiss this appeal with costs.