Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition Mr. M. Ramanatha Pillai, learned counsel for the petitioner, seeks the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records which led to the issue of the notice Ex. P-1 and also to quash the sale of the petitioner's properties held on 9-1-1963. There is also a prayer for the issue of a writ of prohibition, restraining the respondents from taking any steps for taking possession of the properties sold or depriving the petitioner from his possession of the properties on the basis of the sale that is stated to have taken place on 9-1-1963. 2. The circumstances, that have led to the filing of this writ petition, may be briefly narrated. The petitioner appears to have defaulted in respect of payment of certain abkari dues. Though there is a slight controversy raised by the petitioner regarding the actual amounts due by him, I do not think it necessary to enter into that controversy. Under Ext. P-1, it is seen that a notice is issued on 20-11-1962 under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951 (Act VII of 1951), stating that an extent of about 1 acre 24 cents of property in S. No. 1146/1A in the area mentioned therein has been attached and that the said property will be brought to sale on 9-1-1963. The amount that is stated to be due from the petitioner is Rs. 2163-98 in Ex. P-1. Whatever may he the actual amount due, the proceedings that have been initiated under Ex. P-1, namely issue of notice, is really under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951. That notice itself contains an endorsement by the Tahsildar to the effect that if there are no bidders on the date of the sale, the property will be purchased for a nominal price by the Government. Actually it is seen that on 9-1-1963 the property was bid by the Tahsildar on behalf of the State Government for 5 nP. as there were no bidders. The petitioner filed an application on 8-2-1963 before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Muvattupuzha, for setting aside the sale. But the said Officer by his order Ex. P-2, dated 11-3-1963, rejected the petitioner's application. That is why the petitioner has come up to this Court. 3. as there were no bidders. The petitioner filed an application on 8-2-1963 before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Muvattupuzha, for setting aside the sale. But the said Officer by his order Ex. P-2, dated 11-3-1963, rejected the petitioner's application. That is why the petitioner has come up to this Court. 3. As I mentioned earlier, there is also a grievance made by the petitioner that the amount of Rs. 2163-98 referred to in Ex. P-1 was itself arrived at after calculating interest at 9% but that on the date of sale when the petitioner was prepared to pay the amount, the Tahsildar declined to receive the amount and demanded in turn a sum of Rs. 2414-60, calculating interest at 6%. No doubt, this stand taken by the petitioner regarding this aspect, is controverted by the State Government in these proceedings. And that is why I do not think it necessary to enter into a controversy regarding those aspects, as they are matters of detail. 4. The main attack that is levelled as against the sale proceedings initiated as against the petitioner and which have resulted in the sale of the petitioner's property, is the one based upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court, reported in Ramrao v. State of Bombay [AIR. 1963 SC. 827]. According to Mr. Ramanatha Pillai, learned counsel for the petitioner, the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951, make it very clear that the sale of a defaulter's property is to be "in the manner provided under the statute"; and those provisions also make it very clear that the sale is to be in public auction. I will be referring immediately to the relevant-provisions of that statute. It is upon those provisions, and relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, that Mr. Ramanatha Pillai has urged that when the defaulter's property can be sold only in public auction, in this case there has been no public auction, and the purchase by the Tahsildar on behalf of the State Government that a pre-determined price of 5 nP. is absolutely illegal and void. 5. Ramanatha Pillai has urged that when the defaulter's property can be sold only in public auction, in this case there has been no public auction, and the purchase by the Tahsildar on behalf of the State Government that a pre-determined price of 5 nP. is absolutely illegal and void. 5. This stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is no doubt controverted by the learned Government Pleader, by referring to the instructions contained in the Land Revenue Manual, Volume III [Revised Edition], Part I, at page 252, and particularly what is contained in Para.29 thereof relating to collection of revenue. I will be referring to that provision also a little later. According to the learned Government Pleader, that provision really enables the Tahsildar or the Officer in charge of the conduct of the sale to bid on behalf of the Government at the price mentioned therein, in the absence of bidders; and it is really in accordance with those instructions or directions that the purchase of the property in question on behalf of the Government for 5 nP. took place on 9-1-1963. The learned Government Pleader also urged that under more or less similar circumstances an attack levelled as against sales conducted in the manner referred to above have been upheld by this Court, in the first instance by M.S. Menon, J. (as he then was] in the decision reported in Mathai v. The Tahsildar, Meenachil Taluk [1957 KLT. 289) and later by the learned appellate judges on appeal, by Sankaran and Raman Nayar, JJ., reported in Mathai v. Tahsildar, Meenachil Taluk [1958 KLT. 1133]. 6. Ordinarily, in view of the fact that there is a judgment of a learned Single Judge, reported in Mathai v. Tahsildar, Meenachil Taluk [1957 KLT. 289] - which judgment has also been approved on appeal in the decision reported in Mathai v. Tahsildar, Meenachil Taluk [1958 KLT. 1133]- I should place this original petition for consideration at the hands of a Division Bench at any rate. But, in my view, - as I will immediately show - after a reference to the provisions of the statute itself, the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ramrao v. State of Bombay (1963 SC. 827) makes all the difference in this matter. But, in my view, - as I will immediately show - after a reference to the provisions of the statute itself, the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ramrao v. State of Bombay (1963 SC. 827) makes all the difference in this matter. And, having due regard to the provisions of Art.141 of the Constitution, which categorically states that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India, in my opinion, it becomes unnecessary to refer this matter to a Division Bench, and it can be disposed of by me on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court. 7. So far as the directions relied upon by the learned Government Pleader and referred to by me above are concerned, Mr. Ramanatha Pillai, learned counsel for the petitioner, takes up the position that those directions have not been issued under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, nor have they been issued even under the provisions of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act. Those directions, according to the learned counsel, at the most can only be executive directions; and inasmuch as the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951, clearly lay down the procedure to be adopted in the matter of effecting sales of defaulter's property for arrears of revenue, those directions have no further force after the passing of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the reliance placed by the learned Government Pleader on those directions contained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual and which was the basis of the decisions of this Court in Mathai v. Tahsildar, Meenachil Taluk [1957 KLT. 289] and Mathai v. Tahsildar, Meenachil Taluk [1958 KLT. 11331, will no longer be of any assistance to the learned Government Pleader, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramrao v. State of Bombay [AIR. 1963 SC. 827]. 8. After giving due consideration to all the aspects placed before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as well as by the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State, and having due regard also to the decision of the Supreme Court adverted to by me earlier, this writ petition will have to be allowed, and the purchase of the property of the petitioner by the Government for a predetermined price of 5 nP. on 9-1-1963 will have to be set aside as illegal and void. 9. There can be no controversy that the notice Ext. P1 was issued under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951, [Act VII of 1951]. S.6 of the said statute, which deals with the process of recovering arrears of revenue, provides that when public revenue due on land may be in arrear, such arrear, together with interest if any and costs of process, may be recovered by the sale of the defaulter's movable or immovable property or by all or any of these processes "in the manner hereinafter provided." In this case, we are only concerned with the attempt made by the State Government to recover the dues by sale of the defaulter's immovable property. In such a case, it also follows, from the mandatory provision in S.6, that the sale of immovable property of the defaulter can be effected only "in the manner hereinafter provided". As to what exactly is the "manner hereinafter provided" as referred to in S.6, will become clear by reference to certain other sections of the statute. 10. S.36 to 52 are found in the group of sections coming under the heading "sale of immovable property attached." S.36 states that in the sale of immovable property under the Act, the rules referred to therein shall be observed. One such rule is to be found in sub-S. [3] of S.36, to the effect that "The sale shall be by public auction to the highest bidder." 11. The question that arises in the case now before me is as to whether the purchase by the State Government of the property of the petitioner for a pre-determined price of 5 nP. on 9-1-1963, is a purchase in pursuance of sale "by public auction to the highest bidder", as is mandatory under sub-S. [3] of S.36 of the Act. It is to be noted, that so far as I could see, there is no provision in the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, authorising the State to frame any rules for any purpose whatsoever; S.64 of the Act repeals the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act, I of 1068, and the Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, IV of 1083. It is to be noted, that so far as I could see, there is no provision in the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, authorising the State to frame any rules for any purpose whatsoever; S.64 of the Act repeals the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act, I of 1068, and the Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, IV of 1083. It will also be seen that the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act, I of 1068, which was repealed, also did not contain any provision enabling the authorities concerned to frame any rules whatsoever. I am referring to this aspect because the scope and effect of the directions issued by the Government and relied on by the learned Government Pleader, will have to be adjudicated upon in these proceedings. 12. The directions relied upon by the learned Government Pleader in support of his contention that it was perfectly legitimate for the officer conducting the sale to have purchased the property of the petitioner for a pre-determined price of 5 nP. on 9-1-1953, are to be found, according to him, in Para.29 of S. III(B) in Chapter VII, relating to Collection of Revenue, found in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Volume III (Revised Edition), Part I, at page 252. Para.29 deals with "Buying in for Government." The material part that is to be noted is to be found in clause (i) of that paragraph which is as follows: "29 (1). When a portion of a registered land in a Pakuthi is sold for arrears of tax due thereon and no bidders are forthcoming, a larger extent of the land should be notified for sale again. Thus gradually in one or two sales the whole extent of the land should be sold, and if there are no bidders still forthcoming, the same should bid for the Sarkar for a nominal value of one Chuckram to be paid out of the office contingency. The Tahsildar should credit this one Chuckram in the accounts towards part payment of the arrears and take steps to record the land as Tharisu...." The other matters provided in the sub-clause need not be adverted to for the present purpose. No doubt, prima facie, it will appear that this provision will enable the authorities to purchase the property for a nominal price of one Chuckram to be paid out of the Office contingency, if there are no bidders forthcoming. No doubt, prima facie, it will appear that this provision will enable the authorities to purchase the property for a nominal price of one Chuckram to be paid out of the Office contingency, if there are no bidders forthcoming. Even from the above extract, it will be seen that before that stage is reached, certain other formalities have to be gone into. But those questions do not arise for consideration in this case. 13. This provision, no doubt, came up for consideration before my learned brother M.S. Menon, J. (as he then was), in the decision reported in Mathai v. Tahasildar, Meenachil Taluk (1957 KLT. 289). No doubt it was also urged before the learned judge in that case that the purchase on behalf of the State Government of the defaulter's property for a predetermined nominal price of one anna is illegal and void. But the learned judge was not prepared to accept that contention, and ultimately held that the purchase by the Government of the property at the sale in the manner indicated in the decision was perfectly justified. But the point to be noted is that the learned judge rests his decision on the provision contained in Para.29 relating to collection of revenue, occurring in Chapter VII of the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, Volume III, Part I page 252. In fact, the learned judge has extracted the material part of Para.29, at page 292 of the report. 14. The judgment of the learned judge was taken up on appeal in A. S. No. 196/1957, which was decided by Sankaran and Raman Nayar, JJ. That decision is reported in Mathai v. Tahsildar, Meenachil Taluk (1958 KLT. 1133). Sankaran, J., as he then was, delivering judgment on behalf of the Bench, deals with the ground of illegality urged by the appellant in that case against the bid, on the ground that the bid was for a nominal amount of one anna. In this connection, the learned judge refers to the provisions contained in sub-S. (3) of S.36 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, and also states that when there is only one bidder there is no scope for competition. In this connection, the learned judge refers to the provisions contained in sub-S. (3) of S.36 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, and also states that when there is only one bidder there is no scope for competition. But the learned judge expresses the view that there is nothing wrong or illegal in accepting his bid as the highest bid, and inasmuch as that was what happened in the case before the learned judges, they ultimately confirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. It is on these two decisions, as I mentioned earlier, that the learned Government Pleader has placed reliance. 15. But the question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the provisions contained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual, referred to above, and the decisions of this court adverted to by me earlier, can be considered to assist the State in its attempt to sustain the purchase on 9-1-1963 of the defaulter's property, after the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ramrao v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1963 SC. 827). In that case, the Supreme Court had to consider the effect of a purchase on behalf of the State Government, more or less under identical circumstances. The learned judges in that case were considering the effect of such a purchase in view of the provisions contained in S.167 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (V of 1879). In fact, the particular provision which the learned judges were dealing with, namely S.167 of that statute, was to the effect that "Sales shall be by public auction by such person as the Collector may direct." That provision is more or less similar to the provisions contained in sub-S. (3) of S.36 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, to which I have already made reference. In the case before the Supreme Court also, it will be seen that inasmuch as there was no bidder on the date of sale, the property was purchased on behalf of the State Government for a nominal price of one rupee, and that sale was challenged as not being in conformity with the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. In the case before the Supreme Court also, it will be seen that inasmuch as there was no bidder on the date of sale, the property was purchased on behalf of the State Government for a nominal price of one rupee, and that sale was challenged as not being in conformity with the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. The learned judges, in considering this aspect, pose the question that arose for decision, as to whether a sale for a 'nominal' bid of one rupee, is a "sale by auction" within the provision of S.167 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code; and the learned judges state at page 833 of the report as follows: "There is no provision corresponding to this in the Bombay Code. The question then arises whether a purchase for a predetermined nominal price of rupee one for property, what ever its actual market value, is a sale by public auction within S.167 of the Code. An auction has been described as "the proceeding at which people are invited to compete for the purchase of property by successive offers of advancing sums and a sale by auction is a means of ascertaining what the thing is worth, viz., its fair market price. If at the sale there are no bids, there cannot be a sale. A sale for a predetermined nominal sum cannot, in our opinion, be held to bear "sale by public auction,' in the absence of any provision for such sales in the statute. Such a sale appears to us to be somewhat analogous to what Sir Richard Couch described though in a slightly different context. "The offer and acceptance of a rupee was a colourable attempt to obtain a title without paying for the land. Virtually it was a present which it was not open to the authorities to make." Vide Luckmeshwar Singh v. Chairman of the Darbunga Municipality (ILR.18 Crl. 99 (106) (P.C.)." In the above extract it will be seen that the learned judges are of the view that a sale for a predetermined nominal amount cannot, in the opinion of Their Lordships, be held to bear "sale by public auction" in the absence of any provision for such sales in the statute. 16. 99 (106) (P.C.)." In the above extract it will be seen that the learned judges are of the view that a sale for a predetermined nominal amount cannot, in the opinion of Their Lordships, be held to bear "sale by public auction" in the absence of any provision for such sales in the statute. 16. No doubt, there was another contention that appears to have been taken before Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case, namely that the sale notice itself contained a provision to the effect that the Government will bid the property for a nominal sum of rupee one, if there were no bidders. I have already indicated that in the present case also there is some such endorsement in the notice Ext. P1, issued by the Tahsildar. Such an endorsement was relied upon to show that the party was put on notice that in the contingency of there being no bidders, the Government itself would purchase the property, and therefore the owner of the property, cannot take any objection to the manner in which the property had been purchased for a nominal sum of rupee one by the Government. This contention also has been rejected by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In dealing with this contention, the learned judges at page 833 of the report, observe as follows: ... In our opinion, it is an essential condition of the passing of property from the defaulter in invitum that there should be a sale by public auction and if a sale in the manner in which it has been conducted in the present case does not amount to a sale by public auction there is no question of the title to property passing by virtue of such a sale..." The above extract also will clearly show that one of the essential conditions of the passing of property from the defaulter, is that there should be a sale by public auction; and, if a sale, in the manner in which it has been conducted, does not amount to a sale by public auction, there is no question of title to the property passing by virtue of such sale. 17. 17. Therefore, it will be seen that according to Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, a purchase by the Government of the defaulter's property for a pre-determined nominal price, is contrary to the provisions of S.167 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code; and notwithstanding the fact there was an endorsement in the sale notice to the effect that in case of there being no bidders the property will be purchased by the Government itself, there can be no question of the party being unable to challenge that sale. In fact, according to the learned judges of the Supreme Court, such an endorsement serves no purpose whatsoever because from the fact that the purchase is lacking in bidders it cannot certainly be stated that the purchase under the circumstances is at a public auction, as is mandatory under S.167 of the Bombay Code. 18. In my view, the position is identical with the one that existed in the case before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision in Ramrao State of Bombay (AIR. 1963 SC. 827), referred to above. And, applying the principles laid down by their Lordships in that decision, it has to be held in this case that the purchase of the petitioner's property for a predetermined price of 5nP. by the Government at the auction on 9-1-1963, cannot be considered to be a purchase at a sale in public auction, as is mandatory under S.36(3) of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951 (Act No. VII of 1951). The instructions or directions contained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual already referred to and relied upon by the learned Government Pleader, are also of no assistance to the Government to sustain the purchase. Because admittedly those instructions or directions have not been given by virtue of any rule making power vested in the. Government, either under the provisions of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act or under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act. In fast, I have already adverted to the circumstance that neither of those statutes contains any provision enabling the Government to frame rules for any purpose whatsoever. Government, either under the provisions of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act or under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act. In fast, I have already adverted to the circumstance that neither of those statutes contains any provision enabling the Government to frame rules for any purpose whatsoever. If that is so, the directions contained in the Travancore Land Revenue Manual can only be considered to be in the nature of executive directions and they will have no force whatsoever, especially in view of the fact that S.6 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951 lays down that the sale of immovable property of the defaulter shall be "in the manner provided hereinafter". The manner in which such sales are to be conducted is also provided in S.32 to 52 of that statute. I have already mentioned that under sub-S. (3) of S.36 of the Act, one of the essential conditions to be complied with in the matter of sale of immovable property attached, is that the sale is to be by public auction. Admittedly, there is no provision in the statute itself authorising the State Government to purchase the property for a pre-determined nominal price, when there are no bidders on the date of sale. As to how far such a provision if contained in the statute itself is valid, is a matter which I am not called upon to adjudicate in these proceedings. 19. Therefore, ultimately the position is that the purchase on behalf of the State Government of the petitioner's property at the auction on 9-1-1963 for a pre-determined nominal price of 5 nP., must be held to be illegal and void, and that sale will have to be set aside. 20. Then the question is as to what further directions are to be given in this writ petition. The attachment that is stated to have been effected of the petitioner's property by the revenue authorities under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, will continue to be in force, pending further adjudication on this matter. The petitioner has got a grievance that the amount which is sought to be recovered as against him is not correct. That is a matter which will have to be investigated by the authorities. The petitioner has got a grievance that the amount which is sought to be recovered as against him is not correct. That is a matter which will have to be investigated by the authorities. The Tahsildar, namely the 2nd respondent in these proceedings, will issue a fresh notice to the petitioner, indicating clearly the actual amount which, according to the State, is due from the petitioner; and the petitioner will be given a reasonable time in the said notice to file his objections if any, and then the 2nd respondent will make a final adjudication on that aspect. When once the amount has been settled, it is open to the authorities to give a further time to the petitioner calling upon him to pay the amount actually due. If the petitioner does not comply with the demand within a reasonable time to be given to him, it is open to the authorities to proceed further, if it becomes necessary to have a sale of the petitioner's property. But that must be in accordance with the provisions of the statute and in the light of the directions and observations made in this judgment. Pending such adjudication and payment of the amount by the petitioner, the attachment will continue to be in force. If the petitioner defaults in the payment of the amount, the attachment will continue to be in force and further action can be taken by the authorities in accordance with the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951. 21. Subject to these directions and observations, the writ petition is allowed, and parties will bear their own costs.