JUDGMENT :- The third defendant in Kent Suit No. 4 of 1958 is the appellant in this second appeal. The first respondent as plaintiff filed the said suit against this appellant and against respondents 2 to 4, who were defendants 1, 2 and 4, claiming rent of 12 pots of paddy for a land under patta No. 90/1-Naharup Patna, stating that the said land was granted to him by the Government as service land, that the defendants took the land on lease 10 years ago and that they paid loushal upto the year, 1956, but that in December, 1957, when he demanded the loushal they refused to pay the same. Respondents 2 to 4 denied that they took the land on lease and said that they had nothing to do with the said land. The appellant, who was the main contesting defendant said that the land was reclaimed more than 60 years ago by his grand-father Padma Singh, that the said land was attached to the Office of the second member of the Nambol Panchayat and hence Padma Singh used to pay loushal to the successive second members during their tenures of Office, that after Padma Singhs death his son Thanin Singh, the father of the appellant continued to pay loushal to the successive second members, that there was no agreement of lease between the appellants father or the appellant and the first respondent and no agreement to pay loushal, that the first respondent received loushal in accordance with the previous arrangement so long as he continued to be the second member of the Panchayat and that after the Panchayat was abolished in 1953, no loushal was paid to the first respondent and the first respondent lost his right to claim loushal with the abolition of the Panchayat Court in 1953. 2. The first respondent examined 5 witnesses and he tried to prove that about 5 years before suit, when he was a second member of the Panchayat, the appellant and respondents 2 to 4 had entered into an agreement of lease with him agreeing to pay 12 pots of paddy as loushal. But the learned Munsiff disbelieved the said evidence adduced for the first respondent. But the learned Munsiff disbelieved the said evidence adduced for the first respondent. He held that as the land was admittedly service land, the first respondent could claim lousbal from the occupant of the land only so long as he continued as second member of the Panchayat and that when the Panchayat Court was abolished in 1953, the interest of the first respondent as landlord was determined and he did not have any further right to realise the rent and hence the first respondent had no cause of action to file a suit. The first respondent went in appeal to the District Court and the District Judge in appeal reversed the decision of the Munsiff. According to the District Judge, the land was no doubt service land attached to the second membership of the Panchayat, but when the Panchayat Court was abolished at a time when the first respondent was a second member; it has to be taken that the first respondent continued in possession and enjoyment of the land under the Government either as a lessee or as a trespasser, that the appellant held an inferior title derived from the first respondent and since he cannot assert title to the land without surrendering his tenancy to the first respondent, that the first respondent must be held to be still in possession of the land though he may have lost his title and interest, but that as between the first respondent and the appellant his title still remained good as landlord though it may not hold good against the Government and that therefore the appellant was bound to pay the loushal to the first respondent. He accordingly gave a decree to the first respondent. It is against the said decision that the appellant has come up in second appeal. 3. I am afraid, I cannot agree with the finding of the appellate Court. It is admitted on both sides that the land in question is service land attached to the second membership of the Nambol Panchayat. There is no patta issued in favour of the first respondent or in favour of the second member of the Panchayat. The evidence on the plaintiffs side was that though there is no patta issued in the names of the members, it is entered in the Government records. Though the patta number is referred to as 90/1-Naharup Pana, the pata itself was not produced. The evidence on the plaintiffs side was that though there is no patta issued in the names of the members, it is entered in the Government records. Though the patta number is referred to as 90/1-Naharup Pana, the pata itself was not produced. But it is clear that the patta does not stand in the name of the first respondent. It would appear that the first respondent was at one time .the third member of the Panchayat and that at that time he enjoyed the service land attached to the third membership. At that time, P.W. 2 Naroton Singh was the second member and he was enjoying the suit land as service land attached to the second membership. P.W. 2 enjoyed it for 5 years and then he became the first member and then he began to enjoy the service land attached to the first member and then the first respondent became the second member and began to enjoy the suit land as service land attached to the second membership and the land till then enjoyed by him as third member began to be enjoyed by the person who became third member in place of the first respondent. 4. It may be also mentioned that the evidence disclosed that the appellants paternal grandfather Padma Singh has been continuously in possession of the said land from more than 60 years ago and that he was paying loushal successively to the then second member of the Panchayat. In 1006-7 an attempt was made by the then second member one Tama Singh as disclosed from Ext. C/1 to evict Padma Singh from the said land, but the S. D. C., Manipur dismissed the case. Again, in 1916-17, one Damu Singh who was then second member attempted to evict Padma Singh in Misc. Case No. 87 of 1916-17 before the P. M. S. D., but the P. M. S. D. dismissed the case holding that the second member had no right to make arrangement for cultivation by any other man than the sub-tenant without an order from the Court in view of the previous order - Ext. C/1 forbidding him to turn out the sub-tenant. Thus, the appellants grand-father Padma Singh, his father Thanin Singh and the appellant have been hereditarily in possession of the said land paying loushal to the then second member of the Panchayat. C/1 forbidding him to turn out the sub-tenant. Thus, the appellants grand-father Padma Singh, his father Thanin Singh and the appellant have been hereditarily in possession of the said land paying loushal to the then second member of the Panchayat. The appellate Court laid some stress on the fact that Padma Singh was referred to as sub-tenant to Ext. C/2 and from this he held that the appellants possession was that of a sub-tenant and hence the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the appellant and the first respondent. 5. It is admitted that in 1953, the Panchayat Court was abolished and the first responded ceased to be the second member. The question is whether the said relationship of landlord and tenant continued after the said abolition and after the first respondent had ceased to be the second member. From what I have stated above, it is clear that the land was attached as service land to the second member of the Panchayat. The person holding the post of second member can be said to have any right in the land only so long as he held the said post. When once he ceased to be the second member, he did not have any further right in the land. This was clear from the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. P.W. 1, the first respondent said that he was third member originally and that at that time he did not have any right in the suit land and Narotom Singh (P.W. 2) who was then second member enjoyed the loushal from, the suit land. P.W. 2 also admitted this. Again, both P.Ws. 1 and 2 admitted when P.W. 2 ceased to be the second member he lost his right in the suit land and got right in the and attached to the post of first member as he became first member and that P.W. 1 the first respondent who became second member began to enjoy this land by getting loushal from the person in occupation. Hence, when the Panchayat Court was abolished in 1953 and by the said abolition when the post of second member also ceased, the first respondent cannot be said to have any further right in the land or any further right to claim the loushal from the person in occupation of the land. Hence, when the Panchayat Court was abolished in 1953 and by the said abolition when the post of second member also ceased, the first respondent cannot be said to have any further right in the land or any further right to claim the loushal from the person in occupation of the land. It is not the individual who has any right in the said land to claim loushal, but it is the fact of his being the second member which gives him the claim. This right ceased when the particular individual who was second member ceased to be the second member. This position is clear beyond any doubt. Thus, the appellate Court was wrong in its conclusion that after the post of second member was abolished the first respondent in person continued to be in possession of the land either as trespasser or as tenant holding over under the Government. The real position is that the liability to pay loushal by the person in occupation of the land to the second member of the Panchayat continues and any person who is second member of the Panchayat can still claim loushal from the person in occupation. But no person who was previously second member or who was second member at the time of the abolition of the Panchayat has the right to claim the said loushal. 6. For the first respondent reliance was placed on Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and it was argued that no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenants a title to such, property. It was pointed out that the appellants father Thanin Singh was admittedly the tenant of the first respondent when he was second member and that as the appellant is now claiming through his father, he cannot be permitted to deny the title of the first respondent to the land. This argument is clearly fallacious. The first respondent was never the landlord. Throughout it was the second member of the Panchayet who was the landlord. Padma Singh and after him his son Thanin Singh and after him the appellant were the tenants of the then second member of the Panchayet and never of the individuals who were occupying the position of second member. The first respondent was never the landlord. Throughout it was the second member of the Panchayet who was the landlord. Padma Singh and after him his son Thanin Singh and after him the appellant were the tenants of the then second member of the Panchayet and never of the individuals who were occupying the position of second member. The appellant has not denied the landlord ship of the second member and he is prepared to give the loushal still to any person who is the second member of the Panchayet. Thus, he has not denied the title of the landlord, but has denied the title of the first respondent, who according to him has cased to be the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act will not preclude the tenant from showing that a person who claims to be the landlord in a suit has lost his title as landlord. That is exactly what the appellant has tried to show. It is also admitted by the first respondent that he has ceased to be the second member by the abolition of the Panchayat Court. Thus, Section 116 does not apply to the present case at all. 7. It was next argued for the first respondent that his case was that even after the abolition of the Panchayet Court, the appellant has paid him rent until the end of 1956, and that the appellant refused to pay loushal only in December, 1-957 and he pointed out that though the first respondent let in evidence on this point neither of the Courts below have given any finding there-On and he prayed that the suit may be remanded for giving a finding on this question. It was pointed out that if the appellant had paid rent to the first respondent after the abolition of the Panchayet Court it meant that he had accepted the first respondent as landlord and that therefore Section 115 of the Evidence Act estopped him from claiming that he was not the tenant. It is true that the lower Courts did not give a finding as to whether the appellant or his father had paid rent after the abolition of Panchayet Court. In fact, I find that no issue was raised on that question. It is true that the lower Courts did not give a finding as to whether the appellant or his father had paid rent after the abolition of Panchayet Court. In fact, I find that no issue was raised on that question. No doubt, the first respondent gave evidence about a new lease between him on the one band and the appellant and respondents 2 to 4 on the other. He also spoke about payment of rent by the appellant and respondents 2 to 4 till the end of 1956. He also examined 3 witnesses in support of such plea of whom 2 of the witnesses who spoke about the collection of rent after the abolition of Panchayat Court were his own brothers-in-law. But it is clear that the story of the fresh, lease was false. Thanin Singh, the father of the appellant was alive until about the time when the suit was filed and after Thanin Singhs death only the appellant is in possession of the land. Hence, any fresh lease by the appellant and respondents 2 to 4 must be treated as false and payment of rents spoken to by P.Ws. 4 and 5 at the rate of 3 pots of paddy each by the appellant and respondents 2 to 4 must also be treated as false. 8. We know from the evidence of the first respondent as P.W. 1 and of Naroton Singh (P.W. 2) that after the abolition of the Panchayet both of them have been attempting by applications to the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur, to have the respective lands attached to the service allotted to them personally, but that no orders have been passed by the Deputy Commissioner on such applications. It is clear from this evidence that after the abolition of the Panchayet the first respondent and Naroton Singh have been trying to get the land for themselves by way of pension as spoken to by P.W. 2. The appellant gave evidence that after the abolition of the Panchayet Court, his father applied for settlement of the said land on him and after his fathers death he also applied, but that no orders were passed. Thus when both parties were attempting to get settlement of the land, it is idle to say that the appellant continued to pay rent to the first respondent. Thus when both parties were attempting to get settlement of the land, it is idle to say that the appellant continued to pay rent to the first respondent. It is not necessary to send this case for a finding on this question. 9. What we have to consider in a suit like this is whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted for the year, 1957 for which year the rent is claimed in the present suit. It is clear that long before 1957 the first respondent has lost his title to the said land and that the only person who can claim rent from the appellant is the second member of the Panchayet, if there is any such person in existence. As the first respondent was not the second member of the Panchayet in 1957, he has no right to claim the loushal from the appellant. The finding of the District Judge that the said right still existed in the first respondent is clearly wrong and it is an error of law which has to be corrected in second appeal. 10. The second appeal is, therefore allowed. The decree of the appellate Court is reversed and the decree of the Munsiff dismissing the suit is restored. The first respondent will pay the costs of the appellant in all the Courts. Appeal allowed.