JUDGMENT Newaskar J.- 1. Only 'question raised by this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is whether the Board of Revenue had erroneously refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law under section 5 of the Limitation Act to the appeal filed before them under section 29 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, No. 28 of 1951. 2 The Board of Revenue held that there is no provision in the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act for condoning delay caused in presenting an appeal to them within the period allowed by law and that in the absence of specific provision in the said act principle of section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied. 3. The petitioner contends that by thus holding the Revenue Board has refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. The learned counsel in this connection referred to section 30 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act as also to section 149 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. 4. In order to appreciate the contention it will be useful to refer to relevant provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, those of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act and the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. 5. Sections 5 and 29 (2) of the Limitation Act which are material are as follows:- "Any appeal or application for 'a review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the' appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that be had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." Section 29 (2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were' prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any snit, appeal or application by any special or local law: (a) The provisions contained in section 4, section 9 to 18, and sections 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and the remaining provisions of this, Act shall not' apply," 6. It will be clear from these, provisions that excepting the provisions section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply in the case' of appeals under any special or local law, Does this mean that section 5 of the Limitation Act which is not one of the aforesaid section will not apply in any case or it will be applicable if it has been specially made applicable by the special or local Act. 7. The answer is afforded by a number of decisions of almost all the High Courts in India. They hold that the words in section 29 (2) (b) "shall not apply" only mean that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply by virtue of that Act and are not meant to prohibit any local or special law from making those provisions applicable by express reference or necessary implication. Vide ILR 1941 Allahabad 356 Chheda Lal Vs. Com. Officer Merut Cant, AIR 1942 Bombay 131 Keshav Krishna Vs. Bhagwan Sambhu, ILR (1939) I Calcutta 452 Amal Chandra Banerji Vs. Ram Swarup Agarwal, AIR 1929 Nagpur 85 (189) Kawdu Vs. Berar Ginning Co. and AIR 1946 Madras 351 Venkataramayya Vs. Nenkata Subbavya. 8. Next question to be considered is whether the special law namely Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act which provides for appeals in question has expressly or by necessary implication made section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable. 9. Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act and section 149 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy 'Act are material for answering this question. 9. Section 30 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act and section 149 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy 'Act are material for answering this question. The provisions aforesaid are as follows- Section 30 "The Jagir Commissioner, or any other officer conducting an enquiry under this Act, and the Board of Revenue and the Collector hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tahsildar, as the case may be shall follow the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, so far as may be and shall have the same powers, in relation to proceedings before them as a Revenue Officer has in relation to original or appellate proceedings, as the case may be, under the said Act" Section 119 (2). "Except where it is otherwise specially provided the general principles of law of limitation for the time being in force in the United States regarding extension of the principles of limitation shall apply to claims made under this Act before a Revenue Officer." 10. It will be clear from section 30 quoted above that the Board of Revenue dealing with appeals under the Act including the present appeal against the order under section 13 of the Act, have same powers, in relation to such appeals as they have as Revenue Officers in relation to an appeal before them. Section 149 (2) confers power upon 'a Revenue Officer to apply the principles of law of limitation for the time being in force regarding extension of period of limitation. The words 'extension of the principles of limitation', clearly appears to be the result of unskilful drafting or an error arising out of accidental slip and read in the entire context the word 'principles' really ought to have been 'period'. The provisions has been so read and applied, I am told, by the Revenue Courts right from the time the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act came into force. 11. The question which confronts is whether this is permissible having regard to the well established cannons of construction of a statute. 12. In AIR 1947 Nagpur 45 Provincial Government C.P. & Berar Vs. 11. The question which confronts is whether this is permissible having regard to the well established cannons of construction of a statute. 12. In AIR 1947 Nagpur 45 Provincial Government C.P. & Berar Vs. Habib Mohammad, their Lordships Niyogi and Bose, JJ., were required to consider whether the Notification dated 9-12-1944 issued by the Provincial Government of C. P & Berar under Clause 23 of the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1943, was inoperative by reason of its defective phraseology in authorising certain named authorities to sanction prosecutions under the Said order when in fact the order did not provide for punishment for contravening any of the provisions of the order. In fact punishment was provided for contravention of any of the provisions of that Older not by the provisions contained in that order but by Rule 81 (4) of the Defence of India Rules. Their Lordships posed the question whether it was open to the Court to read the notification leaving out the east cause in the notification which was meaningless or to add to it certain words which would invest it with meaning in view of the intention clearly conveyed by the earlier part of the notification. Their Lordships referred in this connection to the decision of the House of Lords in (1857) 6 HLC 61 Grey Vs. Pearson, and particularly the observations in the speech of Lord Wensleydale: at page 106 that in order to avoid absurdity or inconsistency, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used in a Statute may be modified. They also referred to the decision in the case of Salmon Vs. Duncombe, in 11 AC 627 (634), wherein it was held that where the main object and intention of the Statute are clear they ought not to be allowed to be nullified by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of law. 13. In Rex Vs. Vasey (1905) 2 KB 748 (752) Wills, J. has pointed out that if the intention of the statute is clear and unmistakable it is permissible to cast aside some words in order to make sense of the enactment. 14. In AIR 1949 Federal Court 135 Rai Ram Taran Vs. Mrs. Mill, their Lordships referred to the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1945 Privy Council 108 Renula Vs. 14. In AIR 1949 Federal Court 135 Rai Ram Taran Vs. Mrs. Mill, their Lordships referred to the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1945 Privy Council 108 Renula Vs. Manmotha Nath, in which it was held that even when the drafting of a provision is unfortunate and obscure the Court can ascertain the true meaning by referring to the object and intention and other provisions of the statute. 15. Having regard to the principles thus stated it is clear that the word 'principle' used a second time in section 149 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act is unfortunate and obscure and What was meant was to use the word 'period'. Even if we omit the word 'principle' used after the words 'extension of the' altogether the provision will express the real object though substituting the word 'period' for principle will convey the exact meaning. 16. Thus construing the provision in section 149 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue & Tenancy Act and reading it with section 30 or the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act it is clear that the Revenue Board could exercise power similar to those exercisable under section of the Limitation Act. 17. We are not called upon to consider whether the present is a fit case for exercising the said power. That is the function of the Board of Revenue. 18. We therefore hold that the Revenue Board in holding that it could not exercise power of condonation of delay even in appropriate cases has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. 19. We would therefore in exercise of our powers under Article 227 of the Constitution set aside the said decision and send the case back for disposal in accordance with law in light of observations made above. The petitioner is entitled to costs of this petition. Counsel's fees shall be taxed at Rs. 50.