JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Plaintiff is the Appellant. Originally the suit was filed against the State of Orissa as the sole Defendant. Plaintiff?s case is that she is the owner of most of the lands in village Vaidy anathpur commonly known as Kamapalli situate in Berhampur municipality. The State of Orissa issued Notification No. 2757-S-73/47 R, dated 11th March 1948 in the Orissa Gazette ordering survey and preparation of record-of-rights of that village. In pursuance of the said notification, survey and preparation of record-of-rights of the suit village were commenced and a preliminary record-of-rights was actually prepared under the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The said survey was not conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act (No. VIII of 1923) as it was not a survey authorised by law. The suit village is not an estate within the meaning of the word "estate" as defined in Section 3(i) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, nor is it an estate by the Orissa Amendment Act 17 of 1947. The notification dated 11.3.1948 is ultra-vires, illegal and contrary to the provisions of law and the proceedings taken so far under the said notification are illegal and in valid. The Plaintiff filed a petition before the Board of Revenue against the said notification. It was finally disposed of on 11-9.1954 with the finding that the suit village is an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) and the Board directed that the settlement operations, which had been held in abeyance, should be resumed according to law. The area comprising in the suit village was originally a jungle tract when it was granted by Sri Trivikramma Narendra Deo, Rajah of Mohiri Raj, in Fasli 1143. His descendant Harihar Narendra Deo, the ruling zamindar, was murdered about 8th December 1782. Mohiri zamindary was escheated to the Government and was never dealt with under Madras Regulation 25 of 1802. The jungle tract comprised in the suit village was granted in Inam in Fasli 1143. There was no village in existence nor any habitation at the time of the grant. The said grant was not of a "village" or of a whole village and much less of a "named village". The jungle tract comprised in the suit village was granted in Inam in Fasli 1143. There was no village in existence nor any habitation at the time of the grant. The said grant was not of a "village" or of a whole village and much less of a "named village". Subsequent to the said grant, the grantee or his heirs cleared the jungle, brought, the lands under cultivation and in their turn granted small portions to others from out of the area originally granted, constructed a temple and installed a deity by name Shri Vaidyanath Swami, after whom the village, as it stands, has been named. In the circumstances set forth above, the suit village is not an estate and the Plaintiff filed the suit for a declaration that the suit village is not an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, and for setting aside the decision of the Board of Revenue dated 11-9-1954 and for an injunction restraining the State of Orissa from proceeding with the settlement operations. 2. The State of Orissa filed a written statement refuting the averments in the plaint and contending that the suit village was an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. 3. Defendants 2 to 29 were not originally parties to the suit. No relief has been claimed against them in the plaint. They have, however, been added a parties on their own application by Order No. 26, dated 7-11-1955 by the trial Court holding that they are proper parties and that in their presence question whether the suit village is an estate or not should be decided. The trial court further made it clear that the question of existence or non-existence of occupancy rights in Defendants 2 to 29 is not a matter arising for determination of the controversy in the suit even if the inam grant was of an estate. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit after recording the following findings: (i) Village Vaidyanathpuram is an estate meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates 1908, as amended by Orissa Act, 17 of 1947. (ii) The suit village is admittedly an inam and comes within the definition of estate within the meaning of Orissa Estates Abolition Act. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit after recording the following findings: (i) Village Vaidyanathpuram is an estate meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates 1908, as amended by Orissa Act, 17 of 1947. (ii) The suit village is admittedly an inam and comes within the definition of estate within the meaning of Orissa Estates Abolition Act. (iii) Defendants 2 to 29 have occupancy rights in respect of the lands in their cultivation inasmuch as the village comes within the Land Act, within the definition of the estate within the meaning Section 3(2)d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. 5. It has now been authoritatively held in Mahanta Sankarshan Ramanuj Das Goswami v. 1962 S.C.D. 137. The State of Orissa that the definition of the word 'estate' in the Orissa Estates Abolition Act is wide enough to include any inam. Their Lordship observed that after a notification was issued under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act in respect of any inam, the consequences of Section 3 of the Abolition Act that the estate would vest in the State of Orissa free from all encumbrances must follow. Admittedly the suit village is an inam grant and it comes within the definition of an estate under the Abolition Act. There was Notification issued by the State of Orissa whereby this village vested in the State of Orissa on 15-5-1960. The estate having been vested in the State of Orissa, Plaintiff?s title to the estate has been extinguished and consequently the right to sue for a declaration that it is not an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act and the right to consequential relief of injunction cannot be granted after the date of vesting. A suit of such nature becomes infructuous from after date of vesting. 6. Mr. Ramdas however, contends that he wants to canvass the question as to whether the suit village is an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act for the purpose of getting compensation on account of the abolition of the estate under the Abolition Act. We are not concerned with the question of grant of compensation. That does not come within the scope of this suit. We are not concerned with the question of grant of compensation. That does not come within the scope of this suit. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the question whether the suit village was an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act for the disposal of this appeal It would be sufficient to my that the various reliefs prayed for have become infructuous subsequent to the vesting of the suit village under the notification issued. Mr. Ramdas relies on Section 49(i)(i) is as follows: any proceedings pending on the date of vesting with respect to the Survey and Settlement operations under any of the tenancy laws and any other proceedings pending before any Court or Tribunal on the aforesaid date under any of the said laws; and all such proceedings shall continue as if this Act had not come into force: It merely relates to pending proceedings on the date of vesting with respect to survey and settlement operations under any of the tenancy laws and other proceedings pending before the Court. This has absolutely nothing to do with the question in issue. By the vesting there has been a devolution of the interest. There is no substance in this contention. 7. Under issue No. 5 the learned Subordinate Judge declared that Defendants 2 to 29 had occupancy rights in respect of the lands under their cultivation. This finding is wholly without jurisdiction and illegal. Plaintiff never made any prayer in the plaint in this regard. As a matter of fact, by Order No. 26 dated 7-11-1955 the learned trial Court had clearly mentioned that the question of existence or non-existence of occupancy rights in the newly added Defendants 2 to 29 was not a matter arising for determination of the controversy in the suit which was if the inam grant was of an estate. I am satisfied that the declaration of occupancy rights in favour of Defendants 2 to 29 was foreign to the scope of the suit and the learned Subordinate. Judge illegally exercised jurisdiction in granting such a relief. This finding is accordingly set aside. 8. It appears that Respondent No. 3 died during the pendency of the suit. I am satisfied that the declaration of occupancy rights in favour of Defendants 2 to 29 was foreign to the scope of the suit and the learned Subordinate. Judge illegally exercised jurisdiction in granting such a relief. This finding is accordingly set aside. 8. It appears that Respondent No. 3 died during the pendency of the suit. On 1-8-1961 a Bench of this Court had passed an order as to how far the decree would be affected as having been passed against a dead man would be considered at the time of hearing. Respondents have not made out any point on the basis of this death. As in fact the suit is being dismissed against the State of Orissa on the finding that the suit village is an estate within the purview of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, this point has no further importance. 9. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, parties are to bear their own costs through out. Das, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed