ORDER-This revision petition under section 111 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the New Tenancy Act) is an outcome of the proceedings under section 10 (1) of the Act initiated in the Court of the Naib. Tahsildar, Murtizapur, by non-applicant No.1 Badriprasad in respect of the following fields belonging to non-applicants 2 and 3 (Vithalrao and Krishnarao) :- Mauza S. No. Area A.G. Chikhali½1-24 "12/610-38 "1321-08 Kadvi 2 2-23 " 7/211-28 Total 48-01 The case of Badriprasad was that though he was a tenant of these fields from 1952-53 to 1954-55, he was dispossessed in June, 1955 by obtaining a surrender deed under pressure and the fields were leased out to the applicants (Vithal, Pundlik, Namdeo, Maroti and Ramrao) and non-applicant No.4 (Rama). After enquiry, the Naib-Tahsildar passed an order restoring possession of all the fields to non-applicant, Badriprasad. As the order of the Naib. Tahsildar has been maintained in appeal by the Sub• Divisional Officer, Murtizapur, the applicants, who are all subsequent lessees, have come up in revision, 2. It is contended by Shri. C. S. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the applicants, that the Courts below have wrongly assumed that Badriprasad was a protected lessee, though, being a lessee of more than 50 acres at the relevant time, be could not claim that status by reason of his failure to make a selection as required by section 4 (2) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Berar Leases Act). In this connection the authority cited was Mohanlal v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (1). It was also pointed out that since this was a case from Berar, non-applicant Badriprasad could not avail himself of his former status of a "tenant" for the purpose of claiming relief under section 10 (1) of the New Tenancy Act. It was also contended that Badriprasad has failed to prove that there was any surrender or that there was any exercise of fraud or undue pressure, there being no evidence. On the point except his bare statement. According to Shri Dharmadhikari mere abandonment of the fields did not amount to surrender within the meaning of section 10 (1) of the New Tenancy Act. 3. As against these contentions it was argued by Shri Manohar that this Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, was precluded from interfering with the concurrent finding of the Courts below. According to Shri Dharmadhikari mere abandonment of the fields did not amount to surrender within the meaning of section 10 (1) of the New Tenancy Act. 3. As against these contentions it was argued by Shri Manohar that this Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, was precluded from interfering with the concurrent finding of the Courts below. It was also contended that the non-applicant Badriprasad was without doubt a “tenant” in which capacity he could claim relief under the terms of section 10 (1) of the New Tenant Act in which the expression used was “tenant or protected lessee". As regards surrender, it was pointed out that there need not have been a regular surrender deed in writing since even oral surrenders or abandonment’s were within the purview of section 10 (1) of the New Tenancy Act. In reply, it was contended by Shri Dharmadhikari that in any case, the burden to prove the nature of surrender and the exact circumstances in which it was brought about Jay on the non-applicant Badriprasad but he has failed to discharge that burden as was clear from the fact that there was nothing on record except his bare statement. 4. I consider that Shri Dharmadhikari is right in saying that Badriprasad was not a protected lessee. Even in his application under section 36 (1) he describes himself as & mere "Pattedar". In his oral statement also there is no reference to the fact that he was a protected lessee. Besides this, it is clear from the crop statements on record that he cultivated as a tenant survey No. 22/1 of Goregaon measuring 5 AS. -29 Gs. in 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55 in addition to the suit fields with a total area of 48 As.-1 G. It is, therefore, obvious that the case is governed by section 4 (2) of the Berar Leases Act and it must be held that [Ramchandra v. Bhamrao (1)] fallow Lands cannot be excluded for purposes of section 43 of the Berar Leases Act. 5. So the position is that Badriprasad was an ordinary tenant. But even as an ordinary tenant he falls within the purview of section 10(1) of the New Tenancy Act as the words used in the section are "tenant or protected lessee” and there is nothing to indicate that the word "tenant" is meant only for the old C. P. districts. So the position is that Badriprasad was an ordinary tenant. But even as an ordinary tenant he falls within the purview of section 10(1) of the New Tenancy Act as the words used in the section are "tenant or protected lessee” and there is nothing to indicate that the word "tenant" is meant only for the old C. P. districts. In fact, the Bombay High Court has held in Panchfulabai v. Maharashta Revenue Tribunal (2), that the word "tenant" includes a large class of tillers of soil who were on land in different capacities in different areas, namely, occupancy tenants in the Central Provinces and also ordinary tenants under section 166 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, which was applicable to the whole of Madhya Pradesh including Berar. 6. The next question is whether it could be held in this case that Badriprasad was "dispossessed by a surrender of tenancy" within the meaning of section 10 (1) of the New Tenancy Act. In Punchjufabais case (2) referred to above, it is held that the surrender of tenancy means giving up of possession or giving up the right of tenant, which is followed by dispossession. The instant case surely answers this test since it is clear that Badriprasad gave tip possession of the fields, arid that was followed by leases in favour of new lessees. There is thus no doubt that the requirements of section 10 (1) of the New Tenancy Act have been satisfied in this case. 7. It is next to be seen if the requirements of section 10 (2) of the New Tenancy Act have been satisfied. There is thus no doubt that the requirements of section 10 (1) of the New Tenancy Act have been satisfied in this case. 7. It is next to be seen if the requirements of section 10 (2) of the New Tenancy Act have been satisfied. This section reads thus : "10 (2) On receipt of such application the Tahsildar shall enquire into the circumstances in which and the procedure under which such dispossession took place and if he is satisfied that such dispossession took place as a result of surrender and the consent of the tenant was procured by fraud, deceipt, false representation or undue influence or pressure of any kind whatsoever of was otherwise in contravention of the provisions of the law applicable for the time being; he shall order the restoration of the possession of the land and the tenancy thereof to the tenant." It is clear from this section that in order to get relief the tenant must prove that- (1) his consent to the surrender was procured by fraud, deceipt, false representation, undue influence or pressure of any kind whatsoever, or (2) the surrender was in contravention of the provisions of the law applicable for the time being. 8. It is clear from the Naib-Tahsildars order that h~ has not given any findings on the first issue. His finding is that dispossession was by way of surrender and that it was otherwise in contravention of the provisions of law for the time being. The lower appellate Court had made only a general observation as follows :- "1 see from the records that the second contention does not hold good because I am fully convinced that the dispossession of Badriprasad of the suit land was illegal and he was made to surrender the land under a threat of beating by respondent No.2 Vithalrao Jamadar: It is therefore, obvious that it was not a fair deal in the form of valid surrender but the bargain was unfair and not a plain one as it ought to be under the law. The intention of respondent No.2 to lease out the suit land to the appellants after ousting respondent No. 1 Badriprasad is therefore clear and at the outset, I must further say here that it is not necessary for a protected lessee to put in an application under section 19 (2) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, within one year from the) date of dispossession of the suit land as per recent ruling of the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur, if the dispossession is brought by fraud or coersion. The instant case is the glaring example of this type and Badriprasad was rightly put into possession of the suit land by the lower Court. I support the finding of the lower Court m this respect…….” It is to be seen if these general remarks were at all justified having regard to the evidence on record. The allegation actually made in the application under section 36 (1) of the New Tenancy Act is as follows :- Hindi Matter "mm~ ••. Cll~ ~l1GT f~<n?:f ~ The allegation is obviously too vague. The only evidence in corroboration of this vague allegation is the bare statement of the applicant, which is as follows:- " 811lfqr ~cfi ~ ••. m "T@ a~ l1T<:TlR"T ~11..rr f~~T " " Badriprasad has, however, led no evidence to prove this slightly improved version of his original case. It is the normal rule of evidence that a person desiring any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts, which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. In this case however the statement of the alleged facts is itself too vague to be capable of any proof and further, in the absence of any independent corroborative proof, it is difficult to hold that the allegations made are true. It is also clear from the evidence on record that Badriprasad kept quiet for well over 5 years before the application in the instant case was made. It must, therefore, be held that there is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that Badriprasads consent to the surrender deed was obtained by fraud, false representation, pressure, etc. within the meaning of the first part of section 10 (2) of the New Tenancy Act. It must, therefore, be held that there is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that Badriprasads consent to the surrender deed was obtained by fraud, false representation, pressure, etc. within the meaning of the first part of section 10 (2) of the New Tenancy Act. The Sub-Divisional Officers finding, which is based on no evidence, cannot be upheld as being contrary to law. 9. The case does not also fall within the mischief of the second part of section 10 (2). It is obvious that Badriprasad was an ordinary tenant under Section 166 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. The tenancy was, therefore, governed by section 167 of the Code, according to which it was liable to be terminated by efflux of time and under section 108(4) of the Transfer of Property Act Badriprasad was bound to put the landlords intension of the fields after the expiry of the lease for the year 1954-55. It was not necessary to surrender the fields by executing any surrender deed so it cannot be said that there was any contravention of any law for the time being in force if the non-applicant was required to give up the fields after the expiry of the lease. The protection to ordinary tenants in such cases was introduced 2 years dated 1957 by Ordinance No. IV of 1957. 10. I, therefore, consider that though the requirements of subsection (1) of section 10 of the New Tenancy Act have been fulfilled in this case, the application of non-applicant Badriprasad was liable to be rejected on the ground that the requirements of section 10 (2) were not satisfied. This application for revision is, therefore, allowed and the orders of both the Courts below set aside. The result is that the application of the non-applicant Badriprasad under section 36 (1) of the New Tenancy Act stands rejected. Revision application allowed