MEHROTRA, C. J.: Sri K. C. Das opposite party No. 3 to this petition was appointed as a Sfores Account Clerk in 1953 at Maijan Tea Estate. In 1959 the Management alleges that they found that Sri Das could not cope with his regular duties and was always in arrears with his work. The Management ter­minated his services by a notice under Clause 9(a) of the Stand­ing Orders. Thereupon an industrial dispute was raised by the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha and the workmen of the Maijan Tea Estate. The State Government by its notification dated the 27th May I960 referred the follow­ing two questions to the Labour Court for adjudication : 1. Whether the termination of the services of Shri K. C. Das, sfore account clerk of Maijan T. E. is justi­fied? 2. If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof ? (2) Before the Labour Court the case of the Union was that the store in charge of Sri Das was very big and in the past all along Sri Das was given helpers. In 1959 when Mr. Wilson was the Manager of Nagaghuli T. E. he came to Maijan as its Manager. He refused to provide Sri Das with any helper. The work-load on Mr. Das was thus increased and he was in arrears. He gave his expla­nation. But the Management refused to provide him with any helper and terminated his services under clause 9 (a) , of the Standing Orders. Mainly before the Labour Court the ground taken was that the termination of his services was unjust as there was neither any proper inquiry made, he was not given an opportunity to show cause for the arrears of work and further that the termination was not bona fide. The point taken by the Management was that the services were properly terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders. The termination of his services was due to his in­efficiency and Standing Orders in the case of inefficiency did not require any inquiry. The services could be terminated by giving notice. (3) The Labour Court held that the termination of the services of Sri Das was punitive that is, by way of punish­ment and as such a domestic inquiry was necessary. As no domestic inquiry was held the Labour Court held that the termination of services of Sri Das was not justified. The services could be terminated by giving notice. (3) The Labour Court held that the termination of the services of Sri Das was punitive that is, by way of punish­ment and as such a domestic inquiry was necessary. As no domestic inquiry was held the Labour Court held that the termination of services of Sri Das was not justified. The Labour Court further held that there was mala fides on the part of the Management in terminating the services of Sri Das. On these findings the Labour Court gave en order directing the reinstatement of Sri Das with all back wages with continuity of service. (4) By means of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the Management has challenged the award. The Management has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the award. Mainly the contention-of Mr. Goswami for the petitioner is that the Labour Court has a limited jurisdiction in interfering with the powers of the Manage­ment terminating the services of its employees. The condi­tion precedent for the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is the existence of mala fides, unfair practice, victimisation and violation of the principles of natural justice in passing an order of termination. If these facts do not exist, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the exer­cise of the managerial power of termination of the services. As tine grounds stated above are condition precedent for the exercise of the Labour Court's jurisdiction, any finding by the Labour Court on these facts is examinable by this Court. The facts on the existence of which the Labour Court's jurisdiction depends, are jurisdictional facts and the finding of the Labour Court can be examined by this Court. On a proper examination it will appear that the Labour Court was not right in holding that the principles of natural justice were violated in the present case. Nor the finding o? the Labour Court that the order of termination was mala fide is justifiable. It is contended that the inefficiency is not a gross misconduct as contemplated under the Standing Orders and thus clause 9 (c) of the Standing Orders was not attracted in the present case. Nor the finding o? the Labour Court that the order of termination was mala fide is justifiable. It is contended that the inefficiency is not a gross misconduct as contemplated under the Standing Orders and thus clause 9 (c) of the Standing Orders was not attracted in the present case. There was thus no viola­tion of the principles of natural justice in the present case and the Management was justified in terminating the ser­vices of the opposite party No. 3 by giving him notice under clause 9 (a) of the Standing Orders. (5) It is not disputed that the services of the respon­dent have been terminated under clause 9 (a) of the Stand­ing Orders. Clauses 9 and 10 of the Standing Orders read as follows: "9. Termination of employment and notice thereof to be given by the employer and workmen. Notice of termination of employment, whether by Manager or by worker shall be given equal to the wags-period of the worker concerned. Provided that- (a) the Manager may terminate the employment of a worker forthwith and pay his wages for the wage-period (equivalent to his average earnings over the preceding period of three months) in lieu of notice. (b) Notice of termination of employment shall be necessary only in case of permanent workers and not in the case of outside or temporary workers except in so far as is laid down in any agreement entered into between the Manager and such outside or temporary workers. (c) The Manager may dismiss without notice any worker who is guilty of gross misconduct but such worker must be informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and be given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleg­ed against him. (d) Where the employment of any worker is terminat­ed the wages earned by him and other dues, if any, shall be paid before the expiry of the second working day en which his employment is terminated. (e) The Manager may, when a worker is charged with misconduct, direct that such worker be suspended pending investigation by the Manager into the charge of misconduct and during the period of suspension the worker shall be' entitled to receive an allowance of not less than one-half of his wages provfded that if the charge of misconduct is not proved the worker shall be entitled to receive the full wage for the period of suspension." 10. Acts or omissions which constitute misconduct, (a) The following acts and omissions shall constitute gross misconduct: (1) Wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether alone or in combination with another, or others of any lawful and reasonable order of a superior. (2) Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the company's business or property. (3) Taking, giving, offering or soliciting bribes or any illegal gratification whatsoever. (4) Habitual absenteeism without leave. (5) Habitual late attendance. (6) Collection of monies within the estate for ob­jects (other than for bona fide trade union purposes) not sanctioned by the Management. (7) Riotous conduct. (8) Inciting others to disturbance or violence. (9) Smoking in the Factory. (10) Habitual breach of rules or instructions for the maintenance and running of any department or the mainten­ance of cleanliness of any portion of the estate premises or Factory compound. (11) Wilful destruction of or damage to garden pro­perty. (12) Repeated disregard of safety rules in Factory, (b) The following acts and omissions shall constitute misconduct, for which offences the Manager reserves the right to fine any worker to the extent permitted by the Payment of Wages Act: (1) Gross misconduct as defined in Standing Order No. 10 (a). (2) Committing an indecency or an act prejudicial to public health on or near any roads, work sites or build­ing within a plantation. (3) Neglect or default causing the quality or quantity of material produced by the worker to be under the average quality or quantity produced by other workers. (4) Late attendance or absenteeism without leave. (5) Quarrelling, fighting or causing disturbance pre­judicial to good order. (6) Drunkenness whilst at work. (7) Sleeping on duty. (8) Repeated commission of offences included under 10 (b) shall constitute gross misconduct." Clause 9 (a) gives power to the Manager to terminate the employment of a worker forthwith and pay his wages for the wage-period (equivalent to his average earnings over the preceding period of three months) in lieu of notice. Under Clause 9 (cj the employee before he is dismissed for gross misconduct, is to be given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. It is contended by the counsel for the Management that the requirement of giving an opportunity to explain the circumstances is attract­ed only if an employee is dismissed for gross misconduct. Otherwise the employee's services can be terminated by giving him one month's notice. It is contended by the counsel for the Management that the requirement of giving an opportunity to explain the circumstances is attract­ed only if an employee is dismissed for gross misconduct. Otherwise the employee's services can be terminated by giving him one month's notice. In the present case it is urged that the Labour Court was not right in holding that the ground of inefficiency constituted a gross misconduct as defined under Clause 10 and thus any inquiry as contem­plated under Clause 9(c) was not necessary. In my opinion the Labour Court has not held that the ground of inefficiency constitutes gross misconduct as de­fined under Clause 10. What the Labour Court meant was that the termination of the services was by way of punish­ment and not simply in the exercise of the Management's contractual right and as the termination was by way of punishment an inquiry was essential. In my opinion clause 9 (a) does not give power to the Management to terminate the 'services of an employee by way of punishment without making an inquiry into the charges made against the employee. When the services of an employee are terminated and an industrial dispute is raised by the workers of the concern, the State Government can refer for adjudication the dispute under Section 10. The Management cannot say that be­cause the Management acted under the terms of certain Standing Orders and terminated the services after giving a month's notice, no dispute can be raised before the Labour Court and the Labour Court is not competent to go into the dispute. (6) Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') provides that the appropriate Government may by notification in the official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial dis­putes relating to any matter specified in the Second Sche­dule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act. Section 10 (1) (b) of the Act lays down that where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is appre­hended, it may at any time, by order in writing refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry. Section 10 (1) (b) of the Act lays down that where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is appre­hended, it may at any time, by order in writing refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry. Section 10 (4) provides that where in an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Govern­ment has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal as the case may be shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto. A perusal of Sections 7 and 10 of the Act clearly shows that the limit to the powers of the State Government to refer is only the existence of an industrial dispute. Once a dispute is an industrial dispute, the Government is com­petent under Section 10 to refer it to a Labour Court and once a dispute has been referred to the Labour Court, the Labour Court acquires full jurisdiction to decide the dispute and matters ancillary thereto. It cannot, therefore, be said that if a dispute is an industrial dispute and has been refer­red to the Labour Court, the Court cannot adjudicate upon the dispute as the termination of the services of a workman has been brought about by the exercise of the powers given to the Management under the Standing Orders. (7) The counsel for the Management has contended that the powers of the Labour Court to interfere with the exercise of the Management's power to terminate the services is-not unlimited and the limitations which have been placed on the powers of the Court by the decisions of the Supreme Court are conditions precedent for the exercise of the juris­diction by the Labour Court. (8) The Labour Court in its award has summarised the case of the parties with regard to the termination of the services as follows: "The case for the union is that the termination of services of Sri Das really amounted to dismissal for mis­conduct resulting from some alleged inefficiency. As such, the union maintains that the management cannot terminate his services under the Standing Orders only by giving him one month's notice. As such, the union maintains that the management cannot terminate his services under the Standing Orders only by giving him one month's notice. It is argued that the management have violated the principles of natural justice in not giving Sri Das an opportunity to defend himself. The management on the other hand assert that the services of Sri Das were property terminated in conformity with the Standing Orders. It is to be examined now whether the management could have taken shelter under the Standing Orders in termi­nating the services of Sri Das in the present case." This quotation from the award of the Labour Court shows that the stand taken by the Management was that as the services have been terminated in accordance with the terms of the Standing Orders by giving a month's notice, the Labour Court could not question the termination and adjudi­cate whether the termination was or was not justified. (9) In the case of Assam Oil Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, reported in AIR 1960 SC 1264 the following observations at pages 1267-68 of the report will make it abundantly clear that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not barred to decide the point referred to it simply because the management has terminated the services of its employee under the terms of the Standing Orders: "In other words, the jurisdiction of the industrial tribu­nal to direct reinstatement of a discharged or dismissed employee is no longer in doubt. That being We nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal it is too late now to contend that the contractual power of the employer to discharge his employee under the terms of the contract cannot be questioned in any case. If the contract gives the employer the power to termi­nate the services of his employee after a month's notice or subject to some other condition it would be open to him to take recourse to the said1 term or condition and terminate the services of his employee; but when the vali­dity of such termination is challenged in industrial adjudica­tion it would be competent to the industrial tribunal to t enquire whether the impugned discharge has been effected in the bona fide exercise of the power conferred by the contract. If the discharge has been ordered by the em­ployer in bone fide exercise of his power then the industrial tribunal may not interfere with it; but the words used in the order of discharge and the form which it may have taken are not conclusive in the matter and the industrial tribunal would be entitled to go behind the words and the form and decide whether the discharge is a discharge simpliciter or not. If it appears that the purported exer­cise of the power to terminate the services of the employee was in fact the result of the misconduct alleged against him then the tribunal will be justified in dealing with the dis­pute on the basis that despite its appearance to the contrary the order of discharge is in effect an order of dismissal. The exercise of the power in question to be valid must always be bona fide. If the bona fides of the said exercise of power are successfully challenged then the industrial tribunal would be entitled to interfere with the order in 'question. It is in this context that the industrial tribunal must consider whether the discharge is mala fide or whe­ther it amounts to victimisation or an unfair labour practice, or is so capricious or unreasonable as would lead to the inference that it has been passed for ulterior motives and not in bona fide exercise of the power conferred by the contract. *** **** it may also appear in some cases that though the order of discharge is couched in words which do not impute any misconduct to the employee, in substance it is based on misconduct of which, according to the employer, the employee has been guilty; and that would make the impugned discharge a punitive dismissal. In such a case fair play and justice require that the employee should be given a chance to explain the allegation weighing in the mind of the employer and that would necessitate a proper enquiry. Whether or not the termination of services in a given case is the result of the bona fide exercise of the power conferred on the employer by the contract or whether m substance it is a punishment for alleged misconduct would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Whether or not the termination of services in a given case is the result of the bona fide exercise of the power conferred on the employer by the contract or whether m substance it is a punishment for alleged misconduct would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. ******* Therefore we are not prepared to accede to the argument urged before us by the learned Additional Solicitor-General that whenever the employer pur­ports to -terminate the services of his employee by virtue of the power conferred on him by the terms of contract, industrial tribunals cannot question its validity, propriety or legality." In this case the dispute related to the termination of services of Miss P. Scott, one of the employees of the Assam Oil Company. The Industrial Tribunal directed her reinstate­ment and the validity of that order was challenged. The ground taken by the management in terminating her ser­vices was that in the course of her employment Miss Scott did not give satisfaction to the Company and on many occasions she was verbally warned to improve her work and not to repeat her lapses. She was told to strive to improve her work and mend matters failing which the company would have to consider whether she was suitable to continue in the appellant's employment and thereafter her services were terminated on the ground that she had failed to correct herself and that her performance during her service had not matched up to the standard required. The points raised by the Additional Solicitor-General on behalf of the management in appeal were two-fold, firstly that the services terminated in pursuance of the terms of the contract and the order of discharge passed strictly according to the contract could not be questioned before the industrial tribunal and secondly that even if the discharge was found to be unjust because no inquiry was held, the whole evidence relating to the alleged misconduct of Miss Scott had been led before the tribunal and in the light of the evidence the order of discharge should not have been interfered with and reinstatement should not have been ordered. On the first point the Supreme Court did not accept the contention of the Additional Solicitor-Genera) and I have already referred to the observations of the Supreme Court. On the first point the Supreme Court did not accept the contention of the Additional Solicitor-Genera) and I have already referred to the observations of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further held on the facts of that case that there was no doubt that the order of discharge passed against Miss Scott proceeded on the basis that she was guilty of a misconduct. Mr. Gowan communicated to her what he thought were grave defects in her work and in the letter of discharge itself the same, allegations were made against her. That being so, it must be held that the discharge in the present case was punitive. It amounts to a punishment for alleged misconduct and so the tribunal was right in holding that the appellant was not justified in discharging Miss Scott without ho/ding a proper enquiry. These observations by the Supreme Court also show that the misconduct contemplated is not misconduct as de­fined under the Standing Orders. Even in this case although the dismissal was on the ground of inefficiency and un­satisfactory discharge of the duties, still it was regarded as a punitive discharge and it was held that the want of inquiry was sufficient to vitiate the order of termination. Two things clearly emerge out of this decision. Firstly that the jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal when an indus­trial dispute is raised regarding the termination of the ser­vices of its employee, is very wide and the tribunal can go into the question of the propriety, legality or validity of the order. The tribunal naturally will not hold the order of termination as invalid or improper unless it is not a bona fide exercise of the power under the contract. II the termination is not termination simpliciter but with a view to punish the employee for not discharging his duties properly, it is essential that an inquiry should be made be­fore the service is terminated and failure to hold an en­quiry will obviously vitiate the order of termination of services. The tribunal can also hold the order as improper and mala fide if it is prompted by ulterior motive and is unfair labour practice or victimisation. These are however, not facts in which the exercise of the jurisdiction of the tribunal depends. They are not jurisdictional facts and any decision by the tribunal cannot be examined by this Court under Arti­cle 226 of the Constitution. These are however, not facts in which the exercise of the jurisdiction of the tribunal depends. They are not jurisdictional facts and any decision by the tribunal cannot be examined by this Court under Arti­cle 226 of the Constitution. These are facts in issue be­fore the tribunal and form part of the very matter which the tribunal has to decide. What is referred to the tribu­nal is the question of the validity or otherwise of the order of termination and not the question as to whether an em­ployee was or was not efficient, which was the ground on which the services are alleged to have been terminated. Whether the termination was justified or not and whether it was made without making any inquiry are matters which are relevant for determining the validity or otherwise of the order of termination and as such it cannot be said that they are jurisdictional matters. In cases where the management has terminated the services of its employee under the Standing Orders by giving one month's notice the circumstances pointed out above are not jurisdictional facts. But they form part of the issue before the tribunal. (10) The jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of certiorari is no longer in doubt. If a quasi-judicial tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction or in the exercise of its juris­diction violates any principles of natural justice or has committed any manifest error of law, this Court can issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. The contention of the management is that the facts whether there has or has not been any inquiry, whether the principles of natural justice have or have not been violated in the present case and whether the order was mala fide or not are conditions precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and as such any finding by the Labour Court on these facts cannot be conclusive and is examinable by this Court. As I have already pointed out, these are not jurisdictional facts. They are the facts in issue and the observations of the Supreme Court referred to above do not go to show that they are conditions prece­dent for the exercise of the power by the tribunal. As I have already pointed out, these are not jurisdictional facts. They are the facts in issue and the observations of the Supreme Court referred to above do not go to show that they are conditions prece­dent for the exercise of the power by the tribunal. (11) The law has been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 11 at page 142 as fol­lows : "Where the inferior tribunal has acted without jurisdic­tion certiorari to quash the proceedings may be granted. Want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the sub­ject matter; so that the inferior tribunal had no authority to enter on the inquiry, or upon some part of it. It may also arise from the absence of some essential preliminary proceeding. Thus, although the inferior tribunal may have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the inquiry, it may be a condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction that the proceedings should be begun within a specified time, or that some step should have been previously taken by the person who institutes proceedings before the tribunal. Under various statutes certain notices are requisite before the commencement of proceedings; and the omission to serve such notices deprives the inferior tribunal of jurisdic­tion and affords ground for certiorari. The case is more difficult where the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal depends, not upon some preliminary .proceeding, but upon the existence of some particular fact. .If the fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try, that tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to it, give itself jurisdiction which I* would not otherwise possess, unless by statute the interior tribunal is given power to determine conclusive questions relating to its own jurisdiction. .If the fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try, that tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to it, give itself jurisdiction which I* would not otherwise possess, unless by statute the interior tribunal is given power to determine conclusive questions relating to its own jurisdiction. The inferior tribunal must, indeed, decide as to the collateral fact, in the first instance^ but the superior Court may upon certiorari inquire into the correctness of the decision, and may quash the proceedings in the lower Court if such decision is erroneous On the other hand, if the fact in question is not collateral, but a part of the very issue which the lower Court has to inquire into, certiorari will not be granted, although the lower Court may have arrived at an erroneous conclusion with regard to it." (12) In the case of T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, re­ported in AIR 1954 S C 440, ths principle on which the writ of certiorari can be issued by this Court is set out as follows: "One of the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of a writ of certiorari, is, that the writ can be availed of, only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts. The expression 'judicial acts' includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such func­tions and is used in contrast with what are purely ministe­rial acts. The second essential feature of a writ of certio­rari is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting a writ of certiorari the superior Court does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. ******* The supervision of the superior Court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. These two heads normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of certiorari could be demand­ed. These two heads normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of certiorari could be demand­ed. Certiorari may and is generally granted when a Court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the sub­ject-matter of the proceeding or from the absence of some preliminary proceeding or the Court itself may not be legally constituted or suffer from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances. When the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the existence of some collateral fact, it is well settled that the Court cannot by a wrong decision of the fact give it jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess." There is no -doubt about the principles on which a writ of certiorari can issue. The difficulty arises in the application of the principles to the facts of the case. Main­ly it is urged by the management that whether an inquiry has or has not been held is a collateral fact and further whether the termination of service has been done in the bona fide exercise of the powers under the standing orders or not, is also a collateral fact. The decision on these two facts can be examined by this Court. In my opinion these are not collateral facts. Once the matter has been referred to it, the Labour Court has got a very wide juris­diction. In exercising that jurisdiction the Labour Court may consider certain facts and on a finding that there was no inquiry or that the exercise of the power is not bona fide it may hold that the termination is not justified. But the facts whether there has or has not been an inquiry and whether the exercise was bona fide or not, are matters in issue before the Labour Court and are not collateral facts. It will be convenient at this stage to refer to some of the authorities cited at the bar. (13) The first case relied upon is Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, reported in AIR 1958 SC 130 . It will be convenient at this stage to refer to some of the authorities cited at the bar. (13) The first case relied upon is Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, reported in AIR 1958 SC 130 . The following passage at page 138 has been relied upon by the Management in support of the contention that there are certain limits to the power of the Industrial Tribunal and those are in the nature of collateral facts on the existence of which the jurisdiction of the tribunal depends: "Undoubtedly, the management of a concern has power to direct its own internal administration and discipline; but the power is not unlimited and when a dispute arises, Indus­trial Tribunals have been given the power to see whether the termination of service of a workman is justified and to give appropriate relief. In cases of dismissal on mis­conduct, the Tribunal does not, however, act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere (i) when there is a want of good faith (ii) when there is victimisation or unfair laboui practice, (iii) when the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials, the finding is completely baseless or perverse." This passage to my mind clearly shows that when a f dispute has been referred to the Industrial Tribunal, it has got a very wide power to see whether the termination is justified. In cases however, where the management .has dismissed an employee on misconduct after holding proper inquiry, the Tribunal will not sit as a Court of appeal against the order of termination of service by the management, unless there is want of good faith, there is victimisation or unfair labour practice and the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of the principles of natural justice and the findings on the materials are baseless. Cases where the management has dismissed an employee for mis­conduct and has not made any inquiry, the question of the Tribunal interfering with the exercise of the managerial func­tion would not arise at all and the passage quoted above does not lay down -that even in cases where the management has terminated the services purporting to be in the exercise of its powers under the Standing Orders, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the order of termination will arise only if the four conditions mentioned above exist. Even though the tribunal may not ordinarily hold that the termination is unjustified, unless some of the conditions mentioned therein are found to exist, but the four conditions cannot be said to be collateral facts on the existence of which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal depends. (14) Th1 next case is Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation, re­ported in AIR 1960 SC 160 . The following observations of their Lordships at page 171 of the report were relied upon by the counsel for the management in support of his conten­tion :- "In cases where an industrial dispute is raised on the t ground of dismissal and it is referred to the tribunal for adjudication, the tribunal naturally wants to know whether the impugned dismissal was preceded by a proper enquiry or not. Where such a proper enquiry has been held in accor­dance with the provisions of the relevant standing orders and it does not appear that the employer was guilty of victimisation or any unfair labour practice, the tribunal is generally reluctant to interfere with the impugned order. The limits of the tribunal's jurisdiction in dealing with such. industrial disputes have been recently considered by this Court in 1958 SCR 667 : AIR 1958 SC 130 and it has been held that the powers of the tribunal to interfere with cases of dismissal are not unlimited because the tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment fe: that of the management. In this judgment this Court has indicated the classes of cases in which the tribunal would be justified in interfering with the impugned order of dis­missal. In this judgment this Court has indicated the classes of cases in which the tribunal would be justified in interfering with the impugned order of dis­missal. It would and should interfere when there is want of good faith, when there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, when the .management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of the principle of natural justice, or when, on the materials, the finding of the management is completely baseless or perverse.” This passage, to my mind, does not lay down that the so-called limits of the powers of the tribunal laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 130 , are collateral facts on the existence of which the jurisdiction of the tribunal depends. They are generally the grounds on which the tribunal will interfere with the decision of the management in cases of dismissal. If the case does not come under any one of those conditions the tribunal will be reluctant to interfere with the dismissal order passed by the manage­ment This result flows from the fact that the tribunal does not sit as a Court of appeal against the decision of the management. Before however, these conditions are attract­ed, the dismissal must be preceded by an inquiry and the management must have purported to exercise its managerial function and inquire into the charges against the employee. Cases where the dismissal has been in the exercise of its powers under the standing orders, the same principle ma, not be attracted. At page 173 of the report the following passage is apposite : "It is true as we have already pointed out that if the employer holds a proper enquiry, makes a finding in respect of the alleged misconduct of the employees and then passes an order of dismissal the tribunal would be slow to interfere with such an order and would exercise its jurisdiction with­in the limits prescribed by this Court in AIR 1953 SC 130. But it follows that if no enquiry has in fact been held by the employer, the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal is at large before the tribunal and on the evidence adduced before it, the tribunal has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved, and if yes, what would be proper order to make. In such a case the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all." (15) In the case of Pure Drinks (Private) Ltd. v. Kirat Singh, reported in 1961-2 Lab LJ 99 (SC) before the order of termination there was an enquiry held and their Lord-ships of the Supreme Court have once again affirmed the limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in interfering with-the dismissal by the Management on the ground of mis­conduct. It was held that: "If a proper charge has been framed and a proper enquiry has been held by the employer, the industrial tribunal can interfere with the findings or conclusions reach­ed by the enquiry officer at the domestic enquiry if, for instance, the conclusion is perverse and is not supported by any evidence. Similarly, if the trial has been conducted unfairly in violation of the principles of natural justice, interference by (he industrial tribunal would be justified, but, it is not open to an industrial tribunal to sit in appeal over the conclusions of fact recorded by the domestic en­quiry." On the facts of that case it was laid that the tribunal acted like a Court of Appeal and there was thus an obvious infirmity in the approach adopted by the tribunal in dealing with that case. The Supreme Court was hearing the appeal by special leave and this case does not lay down that the face whether there was or was not an inquiry is a jurisdictional fact. The Tribunal had observed in this case that the inquiry was not bona fide but the Supreme Court held that there was no basis for the said observation. (16) The next case is 'Ritz Theatre (Private) Ltd., Belhi v. Its Workmen', reported in 1962-2 Lab LJ 498 : ( AIR 1963 SC 295 ). This case does not support the contention of the petitioner that the existence of bona fide inquiry is a collateral fact. It further reiterates that where the tribunal is dealing with a dispute relating to the dismissal of an industrial employee if it is satisfied that no enquiry has Seen held or the enquiry which has been held is not proper or fair or that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are perverse, the whole issue is at large before the tribunal. This position held good before the Tribunal. This position held good before the Tribunal. (17) In the case of Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Their Workers and Staff, reported in 1962-2 Lab LJ 227 : ( AIR 1963 SC 569 ) the question which came up for decision was whether there was a bona fide closure or lockout. It was pointed out that in the case of a closure, the employer does not merely close down the place of business, but he closes the business itself; and so, the closure indicates the final and irrevocable termination of the business itself. Lockout on the other hand, indicates the closure of the place of business and not the closure of business itself. What was decided in that case was that if it was a bona fide closure it will not be an industrial dispute at all. If it was, how­ever, a case of lock-out, it will constitute an industrial dis­pute and thus the fact whether it is a closure or a lock-out is a collateral fact on the determination of which the juris­diction of the tribunal depends. The jurisdiction of the Gov­ernment to refer under Section 10 of the Act and of the tribunal to adjudicate arises only if a dispute is an indus­trial dispute and thus the question whether there is or is not an industrial dispute is a collateral fact. This case thus is distinguishable on the facts. (18) The analysis of all these cases leads to the con­clusion that once the termination of service of an employee is made the subject-matter of an industrial dispute, the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court has been given very wide power to see whether the termination of service of a workman is justified, proper and legal, even though the termination may have been in the exercise of the powers under the Standing Orders. If the termination of service is punitive, it has to be preceded by a domestic inquiry. If the termination of service is punitive, it has to be preceded by a domestic inquiry. If on a domestic inquiry the management comes to the conclusion that the charges have been proved against the employee, the finding of the management will be interfer­ed with by the tribunal only (i) when there is a want of good faith (ii) when there is victimisation or unfair [about practice, (iii) when the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials, the finding is completely baseless or perverse. These conditions flow from the fact that the tribunal does not sit as a Court of appeal against a decision of the management. But they are not collateral facts on the existence of which the jurisdiction of the tribu­nal depends. The jurisdiction of the tribunal depends only on the existence of an industrial dispute. If the conditions set out above do exist, the tribunal can either hold that the termination was not justified or i the whole issue becomes at large and the tribunal can en the evidence before it come to its own conclusion whether the charges have or have not been proved against the -employee. In cases however, where there has been no domestic inquiry and the services have been terminated in the exercise of the power conferred under the standing orders, the question of the Tribunal sitting as a Court of appeal against the decision of the management in a domes-tic enquiry would not arise and the entire issue is at large before the Tribunal. The Tribunal can on the facts before it come to its own conclusion whether the termination is or is not justified. In considering the propriety, legality or justification of the termination of service the tribunal will be reluctant to interfere with the order of the management, unless it finds that there has been no inquiry or that the order Is not in the bona fide exercise of the power. These are, however, not collateral facts. They are the issues for determination before the tribunal and this Court will not sit as a Court of appeal against the decision of the Tribunal on these facts. If the decision of the Tribunal is manifest­ly erroneous on a question of law, it may be a different ground for this Court to issue a writ of certiorari. They are the issues for determination before the tribunal and this Court will not sit as a Court of appeal against the decision of the Tribunal on these facts. If the decision of the Tribunal is manifest­ly erroneous on a question of law, it may be a different ground for this Court to issue a writ of certiorari. But under no circumstances can these facts be regarded as col­lateral facts. (19) It was very strenuously contended by Mr. Goswami for the petitioner that the Labour Court has erroneously held that the ground on which the services have been terminated constitutes misconduct and in that view of the matter the Labour Court has committed a manifest error of law. He has relied upon the following passage in the . award: "I have examined the facts and circumstances in this case very carefully and I should think that in the instant case the order (Ext. 1) terminating the services of Sri Das proceeds on the basis that he was guilty of miscon­duct." In my opinion the Labour Court only held that the termina­tion of service of Sri Das was punitive and consequently a domestic inquiry was necessary in this case. It was not a case where the Labour Court can be said to have wrongly interpreted the terms of the Standing Orders so as to in­clude the ground of inefficiency into misconduct. The Labour Court has not held that as it constituted a mis­conduct under the Standing Orders, clause 9 (c) of the Standing Orders was attracted, and there was a violation of the provisions of the said clause. (20) It was then contended that the principles of natural justice were followed in the present case. It Was, urged that the principles of natural justice vary according to the nature of the tribunal and the subject-matter of inquiry. No rules of evidence are to be followed. No exhaustive definition can be given of the principles of natural justice. Reliance was placed on several authorities in support of this contention. No objection can be taken to this broad proposition. But the question of violation of the principles of natural justice will only arise if there has been a domestic inquiry. It may be open to the manage­ment to show that no principles of natural justice are violated in the domestic inquiry. No objection can be taken to this broad proposition. But the question of violation of the principles of natural justice will only arise if there has been a domestic inquiry. It may be open to the manage­ment to show that no principles of natural justice are violated in the domestic inquiry. But when the contention is that the termination was done in the exercise of the powers under the Standing Orders and not as a result of,, any domestic inquiry, the question of observing or violating' the principles of natural justice in the course of the inquiry does not arise. (21) Our attention was drawn to a number of letters sent to the employee by the management asking him to im­prove his work and to explain the arrears and it is contend­ed that ample opportunity was given to the employee to ex­plain his conduct. As I have already indicated, the question is not one whether the principles of natural justice were or were not observed in the domestic inquiry. The question is whether there has or has not been a domestic inquiry. It was nobody's case that any domestic inquiry was held in this case. Before the Labour Court even the management based its case on the ground that the termination has been done in the exercise of the powers under the Standing Orders and not as a result of any domestic inquiry. (22) Lastly it was contended that the considerations on which the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the termination was not bona fide, are irrelevant. As I have already indicated, the main ground was that the fact whe­ther the inquiry was or was not bona fide is a collateral fact and the finding of the Labour Court is examinable by this Court. As I am of opinion that it is not a collateral fact, the decision of the Labour Court en this issue unless said to be based on erroneous interpretation of law or without any evidence, cannot be said to be manifestly erroneous on the question of law. The finding is based on evidence and it is not open to this Court to sit as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment to that of the Labour Court on the questions of fact. The finding is based on evidence and it is not open to this Court to sit as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment to that of the Labour Court on the questions of fact. In the result therefore, in my opinion there is no force in this petition and it must be rejected with costs. Hearing fee is fixed at Rs. 100A. (23J C. S. NAYUDU, J.: I agree. Dutta, J.: (24) I have had the advantage of reading the judg­ment of my ford the Chief Justice. With due respect I am unable to agree with it and hence write my own judgment. (25) The petitioner is the management of a tea estate Known as the Maijan Tea Estate situated in the Dibrugarh Sub-division of the Lakhimpur district. Opposite Party No. 3 Sri K. C. Das (hereinafter called the employee) was employ­ed as the Stores Account Clerk in the said estate till 1959 when his service was terminated. The petitioner's case is that the service of the employee was terminated under the Standing Orders which were in force in the tea estate as the management found that he could not cope with his regular duties and was always in arrears. It is pointed out that the terms of employment also provided that the service of the employee could be terminated by either side on one month's notice. Thus according to the manage­ment the termination of the service of the employee was in bona fide exercise of powers conferred by the Standing Orders and the contract. The management contends that although no inquiry in case of termination of service simpliciter was necessary, an inquiry was in fact held and the employee was given ample warnings and also opportunity to explain the reasons of his arrears but no satisfactory explanation could be given by him. The contention of the opposite party No. 3 is that it was a case of punitive dis­missal for misconduct and the dismissal was illegal and im­proper. An industrial dispute was raised and the case of the employee having been taken up by the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha it was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Assam, on the following points: “ (1) Whether the termination of service of Sri K. C. Das, Stores Account Clerk of Maijan Tea Estate is justified ? An industrial dispute was raised and the case of the employee having been taken up by the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha it was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Assam, on the following points: “ (1) Whether the termination of service of Sri K. C. Das, Stores Account Clerk of Maijan Tea Estate is justified ? (2) If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof ? (26) The Labour Court gave its award on 20-5-61 which was published in the Assam Gazette dated 19th July, 1961. it held that there was mala fide and unfair labour practice on the part of the management in terminating the service of the employee and hence it was not justified. It further held that the said termination was punitive and as such a domestic inquiry was necessary. It was ordered that the employee must be reinstated with all back wages and with continuity of service. (27) It is submitted before us by Mr. Goswami, appear­ing on behalf of the management, that the whole approach of the Labour Court to the case was wrong. The contention of the management is that under Standing Order No 9(a) and the terms of the contract of appointment with the employee the Manager could terminate the employment on due notice or on payment of wages of the wage period in lieu of notice. It was only in case of dismissal for gross mis­conduct that a domestic inquiry had to be made as laid down in clause (c) of the above Standing Order. The Labour Court was not justified in holding that this was a case of dismissal and that any domestic inquiry was necessary when the management took action under Standing Order 9 (a) and the terms of the contract. It is pointed out that the management decided to terminate the service of the em­ployee only for his inefficiency. The employee did not com­mit any misconduct as defined in Standing Order No. 10 and as such the question of domestic inquiry into any such misconduct could not arise. It is submitted that the Labour Court was wrong in saying that the termination of service of the employee was punitive and accordingly a domestic inquiry was necessary. In fact it was termination of ser­vice simpliciter under Standing Order 9 (a) and terms of the contract of service with the employee. It is submitted that the Labour Court was wrong in saying that the termination of service of the employee was punitive and accordingly a domestic inquiry was necessary. In fact it was termination of ser­vice simpliciter under Standing Order 9 (a) and terms of the contract of service with the employee. (28) If is argued on behalf of the opposite party that when the Labour Court has held that the action of the management was mala fide and amounted to unfair labour practice, this Court in a writ petition has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness of this finding. The first ques­tion that arises therefore is the scope of the power of the Labour Court when the management terminates the ser­vice of an employee under Standing Order 9 (a) and the terms of the contract of employment. Standing Orders 9 and 10 which are in force in the tea estate read as fol­lows : (After quoting the Standing Orders His Fordship conti­nued .-) (29) The scope of the power of a Labour Tribunal to interfere with the order of the management terminating the service of an employee according to Standing Orders or the terms of a contract of employment came for consideration by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. In Chartered Bank, Bombay v. Chartered Bank Employees' Union, AIR 1950 SC 919 it was contended on behalf of the Bank, that the Bank was entitled to terminate the service of an employee under paragraph 522 (1) of the Bank Award and that the Tribunal could not inquire into or examine the reasons for such a termination. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court which accepted the view expressed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Workers of Company, 1952 Lab AC 490 that even in case of termination of service simpliciter "the requirement of bona fides is essential and if the termination of service is colourable exercise of the power or as a result of victimisation or unfair labour practice the industrial tribunal will have the jurisdiction to intervene and set aside such termination." (30) Another case is that of AIR 1960 SC 1264 . In that case one Miss Scott was appointed as Lady Secretary in the Delhi office of the Assam Oil Company in 1954 on terms offered to and accepted by her. In that case one Miss Scott was appointed as Lady Secretary in the Delhi office of the Assam Oil Company in 1954 on terms offered to and accepted by her. One of the terms was that the appointment could be teiminated on one month's notice on either side. Miss Scott's work was not found satisfactory by Mr. Gowan, who was the Delhi represervative of the company and she had to be warned several times. In 1957 the service of Miss Scott was termi­nated by the company and she was paid one month's pay in lieu of notice. Thereafter an industrial dispute was rais­ed and this was referred to the industrial tribunal for ad­judication. The tribunal held that the termination of the service of Miss Scott amounted to dismissal and since no inquiry was made it was illegal and unjustified. It also considered the punishment of dismissal to be unduly severe and observed that in dismissing her Mr. Gowan was also influenced by the consideration that Miss Scott became a member of the Union and this was substantially responsible for her dismissal. The tribunal ordered reinstatement of Miss Scott. An appeal to the Supreme Court by the com­pany was dismissed. It was argued by the Additional Solicitor-General before the Supreme Court that whenever the em­ployer purported to terminate the services of his employees by virtue of the power conferred on him by terms of con­tract, industrial tribunals could not question its validity, propriety or legality. This argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court which gave its finding as follows: "The evidence given by Mr. Gowan on the whole ap­pears to be straightforward and it leads to two conclusions, (1) that Mr. Gowan was thoroughly dissatisfied with the work of Miss Scott and (2) that he did not approve of Miss Scott's conduct in joining the union. Since the latter cir­cumstance has at least partially weighed in the mind of Mr. Gowan on the whole ap­pears to be straightforward and it leads to two conclusions, (1) that Mr. Gowan was thoroughly dissatisfied with the work of Miss Scott and (2) that he did not approve of Miss Scott's conduct in joining the union. Since the latter cir­cumstance has at least partially weighed in the mind of Mr. Gowan in terminating the services of Miss Scott it roust be held that the said termination is not justi­fied." (31) From the above decision it is quite clear that the Supreme Court found the termination of the services of Miss Scott to be unjustified as she was victimised for joining the Union and from the discussion below regarding what is an 'unfair labour practice', it will be clear that any interference with the right to join an Union is such a prac­tice. Thus even in the case of termination of service simpliciter, a Labour Tribunal can interfere if there is mala fide or unfair labour practice in the exercise by the manage­ment of the right conferred by Standing Orders or a con­tract. (32) In certiorari this Court is restricted to examina­tion whether the inferior Court had jurisdiction and proceed­ed legally and not whether it correctly decided a question of fact. In determining jurisdictional facts, however, this Court in certiorari may review not only the record, but also the evidence itself. I am inclined to hold that when the management terminates the services of an employee ;n ac­cordance with Standing Orders or the terms of a contract, a Labour Tribunal can interfere only if there is mala fide or unfair labour practice. In my view, these are jurisdictional facts and the findings of the Tribunal about their existence cannot be conclusive. But it is not necessary in the present case to discuss whether the existence of mala fide or unfair labour practice is a jurisdictional fact. When the decision of an inferior tribunal is vitiated by an error of law not merely formal or technical, but apparent on the face of the record, it is liable to be quashed by certiorari, even though the tribunal might have acted within ifs juris­diction. In my view in the present case the learned Labour Court committed certain patent errors of law manifest on the record. In my view in the present case the learned Labour Court committed certain patent errors of law manifest on the record. (33) Firstly the learned Labour Court has held that the service of the employee was terminated in fact for misconduct and hence a domestic inquiry was necessary. It observes as fellows: "I have examined the facts and circumstances in this case very carefully and I should think that in the instant case the order (Ex. 1) terminating the services of Sri Das proceeds on the basis that he was guilty of misconduct. It is found from the various exhibits that the management were charging Sri Das every time about his inefficiency and in Ex. 1 also the same allegation is made. It is therefore clear that the termination of services of Sri Das is certainly punitive. Accordingly, I am of opinion that a domestic enquiry was necessary in this case, before the services of Sri Das" could be terminated. I have pointed out already that Sri Das maintained that he used to get a helper every year, although the management denied this. Had there been a domestic enquiry and Sri Das given an opportunity to pro­duce evidence, he might have been able to convince the management that since he entered into the service he got a helper every year; and in that case the management might not have been so harsh against him. Consequently, I have no hesitation to hold that the termination of services of Sri Das cannot be said to be justified." (34) There is no dispute that the employee was in arrears of his work. The management was dissatisfied with his efficiency and there was no secret that this actuated the management to terminate the service. There was no mis­conduct. Misconduct has been defined in Standing Order 10. Inefficiency does not fall within that definition. Standing"" Order 9(c) provides for domestic inquiry in case of gross misconduct. Standing Order 10(b) provides for imposition of fine for misconduct. No action can be taken under these provisions for inefficiency. Standing Order 9(a) empowers the manager to terminate the service of an employee by giving a notice for the wage period. In the present case the Standing Order 9(a) was also incorporated in the conj tract of appointment with the employee. No action can be taken under these provisions for inefficiency. Standing Order 9(a) empowers the manager to terminate the service of an employee by giving a notice for the wage period. In the present case the Standing Order 9(a) was also incorporated in the conj tract of appointment with the employee. Therefore there can be no ground why the management should not be com­petent to terminate the service of the employee under the Standing Order 9(a) or the contract if they were not satis­fied with his work. The Labour Court arbitrarily holds that simply because the management alleged that the employee was inefficient, the termination of service was founded on misconduct. The termination of service could not be founded on misconduct as there was no misconduct as defined in the Standing Orders. The termination was apparently founded en con­tractual right and Standing Orders. The learned Labour Court ignores the statutory definition of misconduct laid down in the Standing Orders. In the ordinary sense also inefficiency is not misconduct. A person may lose his effi­ciency for various reasons e.g. ill health. If the manage­ment terminate. the service of such a person by the exer­cise of contractual right, it cannot be said that such termi­nation is colourable. (35) Secondly the Labour Court finds that one Sri Sonowal who was appointed in place of Sri Das (the employee) was relieved of the task of issuing stationeries. The Labour Court thinks that the work-load of the successor of Shri Das was thus reduced and hence there was discrimination * and this was an unfair labour practice. So the question is what is an unfair labour practice? In Labour laws it means victimisation of a worker for his Union activities or interfer­ence with his right to join a Trade Union. So the question is what is an unfair labour practice? In Labour laws it means victimisation of a worker for his Union activities or interfer­ence with his right to join a Trade Union. Thus unfair practices by employers are laid down in Section 28-K of the Indian Trade Unions Act 1926 which is as follows : "The following shall be deemed to be unfair practices on the part of an employer, namely,- (a) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce his workmen in the exercise of their rights to organise, form, join or assist a Trade Union and to engage in concerned activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection; (b) to interfere with the formation or administration of any Trade Union or to contribute financial or other support to it; (c) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against any officer of a recognized Trade Union because of his being such officer; (d) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against any workman because he has made allegations or given evi­dence in an inquiry or proceeding relating to any matter such as is referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 28-F; (e) to fail to comply with the provisions of Sec­tion 28-f: Provided that the refusal of an employer to permit his workmen to engage in Trade Union activities during their hours of work shall not be deemed to be an unfair practice on his part." (36) In the present case the Labour Court holds that simply because the successor of the employee was relieved j of the task of issuing stationeries there was "unfair labour ^practice". Such a meaning of the term "unfair labour practice" is unknown in any labour law. The Labour Court ignores the fact that the successor of the employee could not start work on a clean slate as the employee left lot of arrears in the preparation of accounts unless the said arrears were first cleared. So it was necessary for the management to see that the new man got sufficient time and help to clear up those arrears first. So no question of discrimination could arise even if Shri Sonowal was given some help and extra facilities to enable him to clear up the arrears left by Shri Das. So it was necessary for the management to see that the new man got sufficient time and help to clear up those arrears first. So no question of discrimination could arise even if Shri Sonowal was given some help and extra facilities to enable him to clear up the arrears left by Shri Das. (37) The Union maintained that the ulterior motive of the Manager was to appoint a favourite of his in the vacancy caused by the termination of the services of Shri Das. Shri Sonowal who was appointed in place of Shri Das was a Store Accounts Clerk in another garden of the same com­pany. He used to draw Rs. 110/- there per month but when he was appointed in place of Shri Das, his salary was fixed at Rs. 150/- per month. Shri Das was receiving a total emolument of about Rs. 250/- at the time of termi­nation of his service. The learned Labour Court gives its finding thus: "So, it appears that the management really showed some unusual favour to Sri Sonowal in raising his pay to Rs. 150 abruptly. This fact also, to my mind, goes to show some mala fides on the part of the management." (38) The learned Labour Court also holds that there was mala fide? on the part of the management as the em­ployee was not given a helper or extension of time to-clear up the arrears. It may however be noted that the employee had to thank himself for this accumulation of arrears. (39) The above findings about mala fides are prima facie perverse. I have already pointed out that it is an admitted fact that Sri Das was in arrear in the preparation of ac­counts. So the person who succeeded Shri Das had natural­ly to be given some facilities to clear up the arrear so that he could start his work on a clean slate. As the arrears were the creation of Shri Das, the question of giv­ing him these facilities could not arise. Moreover if the successor of Shri Das was appointed at Rs. 1507- a month, thereby his salary being raised from Rs. 110/- a month Which he used to draw in another garden, no mala fides against Shri Das could be inferred with any stretch of imagination. Moreover if the successor of Shri Das was appointed at Rs. 1507- a month, thereby his salary being raised from Rs. 110/- a month Which he used to draw in another garden, no mala fides against Shri Das could be inferred with any stretch of imagination. Thus the inference made by the learned Labour Court that there were "some mala fides" on the part of the management, could not have been reached by a person properly instructed in law or acting judicially and as such it was a clear error in law. (40) In the result, therefore, I find that in making its award the learned Labour Court committed errors of law, manifest on the record and hence the said award must be set aside. (41) ORDER: in view of the majority of opinions, these petitions are rejected with costs. Petition dismissed.