Jagadisan, J. — These are two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In W.P. No. 1023 of 1961, the petitioner prays for the issue of a Writ of prohibition to forbear the Wealth-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle ‘A’ Madras, from taking further proceedings, pursuant to the notices issued by him on 15th of June, 1960 and 18th of August, 1961. The petitioner in W.P. No. 1060 of 1961 also prays for a Writ of prohibition for restraining the Expenditure-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle ‘A ‘Madras, from taking further proceedings, in pursuance of his notice dated 24th of August, 1960. The main attack of the petitioners in these two petitions is levelled against the validity of the charging provision of the Wealth-tax Act and the Expenditure-tax Act. The petitioner in W.P. No. 1023 of 1961 states that he is the manager of a Hindu undivided family consisting of himself and his sons, and that he is an assessee on the file of the Wealth-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle ‘A ‘Madras. The Wealthtax Officer issued a notice dated 15th June, 1960 under section 14 (2) of the Wealthtax Act, 1957, calling upon the petitioner to file a return of his wealth, for the purpose of making an assessment under that Act, for the assessment year 1960-1961. This petitioner submitted his return. The Wealth-tax Officer next issued a notice dated 18th of August, 1961 requiring the petitioner to furnish certain information necessary for making the assessment. Without furnishing that information, the present petition has been preferred, on the ground that the charging section of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, section 3, is invalid and unconstitutional. The petitioner alleges that section 3 violates the equality clause of the Constitution. The point of attack is . that section 3 is discriminatory inasmuch as it singles out only the Hindu undivided family, leaving out from its ambit Marumakkattayam tarwads, particularly the Mappilla tarwads governed by Mappilla Marumakkattayam Act, 1939. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon a decision of the Kerala High Court in C.K.Mammad Keyi v. Wealth-tax Officer1, in which it has been held that the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, denies equal protection of the laws to Hindu undivided families, as such families have been singled out by the Act from other similar joint families. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon a decision of the Kerala High Court in C.K.Mammad Keyi v. Wealth-tax Officer1, in which it has been held that the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, denies equal protection of the laws to Hindu undivided families, as such families have been singled out by the Act from other similar joint families. The Department has filed a counter affidavit stating that section 3 is not in any way discriminatory, that all persons owning wealth fall within the category of individuals or Hindu undivided families, that, if Marumakkattayam tarwads. or Mappilla tarwads could not be comprehended within the expression Hindu undivided family, they would yet come within the description of ‘individuals’ So the only question in W.P. No. 1023 of 1961 is whether section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 offends Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner in W.P. No. 1060 of 1961 states that he is the manager of a Hindu undivided family consisting of himself and his sons, and that he is an assessee on the file of the Expenditure-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle ‘A’ Madras It is alleged that the Expenditure-tax Officer issued a notice on 24th of August 1960 under section 13 (2) of the Expenditure-tax Act (XXIX of 1957), calling upon the petitioner to file a return of his expenditure in connection with the proposed assessment under that Act for the assessment year 1960-61, and that the petitioner has filed a return. The Officer issued a further notice on 27th October, 1960 making a provisional demand for payment of a sum of Rs. 17,002-40 nP. alleged to be the expenditure-tax payable by the petitioner for the year ending 31st March, 1960 relevant to the assessment year 1960-61. The petitioner submits that section 3 of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957, which authorises the levy of expenditure-tax on every individual or Hindu undivided family violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The ground of attack is thus set out in paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support of the petition: “I submit that, to the extent to which section 3 authorises the levy of an expenditure tax on Hindu undivided families, it is discriminatory in that such a tax could not be levied on other joint families such as Marumakkattayam tarwad, etc. I, therefore, submit that the provisions of the Expenditure-tax Act, in so far as they relate to the levy of an expenditure-tax on Hindu undivided families, are discriminatory against Hindu undivided families, and, thereby infringe the provision of equal treatment guaranteed to every person under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.” The petitioner’s contention is again based upon the decision of the Kerala High Court rendered under the Wealth-tax Act, holding that the Hindu undivided families have been discriminated against by the Legislature omitting tarwads Hindu or Muslim, governed by the Marumakkattayam Law. It may at once be stated that section 3 of the Expenditure-tax Act uses the expression ‘Individuals or Hindu undivided family’, the same as in Wealth-tax Act and whichever view we take regarding the vires of section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act would equally govern the charging provision in the Expenditure-tax Act. We do not propose to discuss the question of the vires of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957 separately. We shall now take up for consideration the question whether section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, is unconstitutional, on the ground that it is repugnant to the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution under Article 14. Section 3 which is the target of attack, reads: “Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged for every financial year commencing on and from the first day of April, 1957, a tax (hereinafter referred to as wealth-taxi in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual Hindu undivided family and company at the rate or rates specified in the Schedule.” (By a subsequent amendment, ‘companies ‘have been removed from the ambit of this charging section.) The ‘net wealth’ of an assessee, as defined by section 2 (m) of the Act, means, the amount by which the aggregate value of the assets, as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, is in excess of the aggregate value of the debts, excluding those of specified categories, owed by the assessee. ‘Valuation date ‘means the last day of the previous year as defined in section 2 (ii) of the Income-tax Act. ‘Assets ‘mean property of every description, movable or immovable, subject to specified exceptions. Sections 4, 5 and 6 indicate the manner in which the computation of the net wealth is to be made. ‘Valuation date ‘means the last day of the previous year as defined in section 2 (ii) of the Income-tax Act. ‘Assets ‘mean property of every description, movable or immovable, subject to specified exceptions. Sections 4, 5 and 6 indicate the manner in which the computation of the net wealth is to be made. Section 7 (1) of the Act provides that assets have to be valued according to the market price prevailing on the ‘valuation date’ Then follows other provisions, which lay down the machinery for assessment, levy and collection of the tax. The rates of tax are specified in Parts I and II of the Schedule. The rates for individuals and for Hindu undivided family are different. In the case of an individual there is no tax on the first two lakhs of rupees of net wealth while the Hindu undivided family is tax-free for the first four lakhs of rupees. The Schedule prescribes a progressive graduated tax, according to the quantum of the net wealth owned by the assessee. The general scheme of the Act, therefore, is to assess to tax wealthy persons, who happen to own wealth beyond a particular limit fixed by the Statute. It seems to be quite clear that the charge is against the wealth to be found in the hands of persons, who may be described either as ‘individuals’ or as ‘Hindu undivided families.‘ Mr. M. K. Nambiar, learned Counsel for the petitioners, did not contend that the Act was discriminatory, because ‘individuals ‘suffered more tax than ‘Hindu undivided families. ‘It must be noted that ‘individuals ‘are exempt only for the first two lakhs, while a Hindu undivided family is more favourably treated because of the exemption up to four lakhs of rupees. He fairly conceded that the classification adopted by the Parliament in dividing the assessees into three broad categories as they originally stood, namely, ‘individual, Hindu undivided family and company’ would be reasonable and proper. His contention, however, was that there was discrimination against the Hindu undivided families, by reason of the omission of the Mappilla tarwads, and Nambudri illoms or any other Marumakkattayam tarwads, which are spread over large extents of territory in the State of Kerala. His contention, however, was that there was discrimination against the Hindu undivided families, by reason of the omission of the Mappilla tarwads, and Nambudri illoms or any other Marumakkattayam tarwads, which are spread over large extents of territory in the State of Kerala. The argument was developed thus: The Malabar tarwads, Hindu or Muslim, are also institutions akin to Hindu undivided families, and there is no reason why these institutions should not be placed on a par with the Hindu undivided families, which, in contrast with the individuals, occupy a more favourable tax position. According to the learned Counsel, Malabar tarwads are wholly outside the Act, as they could not be comprehended within the expression ‘individual’ or ‘Hindu undivided family’, and such an omission, learned Counsel pointed out, amounts to a manifest discrimination. The further argument was that, if Malabar tarwads could be brought within the expression of ‘individuals ‘, then there was no rationale or reasonableness why these tarwads should not enjoy the same privilege concessions the Parliament has shown to the Hindu undivided families. It is now well-settled that a taxing enactment is not outside the scope of the equality clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has made it quite clear in its decision, Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala1, that, whatever may be the subject-matter of legislation by the Union or the State, the cardinal rule is, ‘equality amongst equals ‘. The Government should hold the scales even as between subjects similarly placed, without preference or favoured treatment or invidious discrimination. Confining ourselves to taxing measures, as we are now concerned only with such an Act, we can state without hesitation that the equality provision does not compel the Government to tax all or none. The subject of taxation and the persons to be taxed are matters within the exclusive domain of the Legislature, but it cannot discriminate dealing with unequal hands. It can ‘classify ‘rationally and intelligibly with due regard to the object and purpose of the Act, but it cannot wield omnipotency to deny equal treatment to equals. This power to classify, it has been repeatedly held, is not any arbitrary selection for vagary cannot go by the name of classification. It can ‘classify ‘rationally and intelligibly with due regard to the object and purpose of the Act, but it cannot wield omnipotency to deny equal treatment to equals. This power to classify, it has been repeatedly held, is not any arbitrary selection for vagary cannot go by the name of classification. “A classification for tax purposes is in effect nothing more than a legislative determination as to how that burden is to be distributed and it is wholly proper that a Court should measure the reasonableness of that determination by generally accepted theories as to the proper bases for distributing that burden.” (Rottschafer on American Constitution, pages 665-666). It is no violation of the equality rule in respect of tax law that the incidence of tax upon particular tax-payers results in payments of unequal amounts. Progressively graduated tax on income or wealth based on the quantum does not offend Article 14. The tax must be uniform upon the same classes of subjects. Dissimilar treatment of similar tax subjects would be unconstitutional. When different classes of tax-payers are subject to different systems of tax in connection with a single type of tax, it cannot be said that the Statute manifests a difference in treatment. Nor can it be said that every little unevenness should be dubbed as inequality to condemn the heavier imposition. Willoughby in his Constitutional Law of the United States (second edition) observed thus at page 836: “....................while the Legislature may, within its discretion, determine freely what occupations, or classes of property, or persons are to be taxed, it may not select out from the general mass of property, or general citizen body, particular pieces of property or particular individuals to bear the burden of the tax. When therefore, a tax is laid upon certain classes of property or of persons, there must be some reasonable basis for the classification adopted. When therefore, a tax is laid upon certain classes of property or of persons, there must be some reasonable basis for the classification adopted. By this is meant, that there must be some substantial reason why the units, whether of property or of individuals, should be treated as distinct groups.” The American Supreme Court has always been of the view that, though the guarantee of equal protection extends to taxing laws, the Legislature would not be offending the fundamental right of a citizen by not taxing every person equally, so long as the persons under the same circumstances or property of the same character are taxed by the same standard (see, for example, Megoun v. Illinois Bank1. As has been stated in Great Atlantic Co., v. Grosican2. “The Legislature is not required to make meticulous adjustments in an effort to avoid incidental hardships.” The touchstone of constitutionality as regards the equality clause is stated thus in Colgoate v. Harvey3. “Does the Statute arbitrarily and without genuine reason impose a burden upon one group of tax-payers from which it exempts another group, both of them occupying substantially the same relation towards the subject-matter of the legislation.” Cases on the subject of Article 14 are quite a legion. There is a long catena of decisions by the Supreme Court starting from Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India4, in. which the scope and reach of Article 14 have been, if we may say so with respect, elaborately considered. It is needless to refer to these decisions herein, as the guiding principles have been plainly indicated and sharply outlined. The legal position may be summed up as follows: “No law including a tax law, can deny equal protection to all citizens.” A tax is not an assessment of benefits. “Equal protection” does not prohibit the enactment of laws based on reasonable classification having regard to the objects of the legislation or of the person whom it affects. The classification must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. Narrow distinction and superficial disparities are not per se sufficient discriminations to attract the mischief of inequality. The rule of equality permits many inequalities, (vide Broodlove v. Suttles5, and Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co6. The classification must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. Narrow distinction and superficial disparities are not per se sufficient discriminations to attract the mischief of inequality. The rule of equality permits many inequalities, (vide Broodlove v. Suttles5, and Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co6. A classification is not a legislative division or an irrational grouping but a categorisation germane to the object and purpose of the Act. There should be no taint of arbitrariness in the alleged classification. But a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any state of facts that would sustain it can reasonably be conceived. If on the face of the statute, discrimination is manifest and clear and there can be no justification on the ground of classification, the attack on the constitutionality must succeed. The aggrieved subject need not establish that the discrimination was intentional or was a result of hostile animus. Discrimination in the context only means difference in treatment, and unjustified difference would be a difference whether it be by design or by accident, or whether it is caused wilfully or inadvertently. It is not the state of mind of the Legislature but the piece of legislation and its operational effect that determines the constitutional validity. What satisfies equality has not been and probably never can be precisely defined. Magaun v. Illinois Trust.l The power to make distinctions exists with full vigour in the field of taxation ; there is no iron rule in the matter, Government being free to exercise a wide discretion in relating the subjects of legislation. Inequality or hardship resulting from tax burden, provided the standard is uniform, is not a mischief of unequal treatment of similar subjects, but something which is inherent in Government by law instead of Government by edict (vide Fox v. Standard Oil Company)2. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the Department, cited a decision of the Judicial Committee in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving3, and submitted that the degree of incidence of taxation would not have a bearing on the question of the constitutionality of the enactment. It seems to us that this citation is very apposite. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the Department, cited a decision of the Judicial Committee in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving3, and submitted that the degree of incidence of taxation would not have a bearing on the question of the constitutionality of the enactment. It seems to us that this citation is very apposite. We wish to refer to the following passage from the judgment at page 367: "The grant of such an exemption was therefore said to be a discrimination between the states within the meaning of the Constitution, and it was added that whatever might be said about the excise duties, to grant an exemption for previous payment of customs duties was arbitrary and lndefensible. Their Lordships cannot accede to this argument..........The rule laid down by the Act is a general one, applicable to all the States alike, and the fact that it operates unequally in the several States arises not from anything done by the Parliament, but from the inequality of the duties imposed by the States themselves." We may at this stage make mention of an argument of the learned Advocate-General, based upon a passage in the judgment of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., (as he then was) in Adhi Chettiar v. State of Madras4, that there must be a deliberate hostile treatment or discrimination by the Legislature to render the law obnoxious to Article 14. The passage is at page 705 and it reads: "The essence of the freedom guaranteed by Article 14 and the evil which the Article seeks to guard against is the avoidance of designed and intentional hostile treatment or discrimination on the part of the law-making authorities or of those entrusted with administering them.. ..We have been unable to discover any decision of the American Courts where a law has been declared unconstitutional or violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, merely because of its partial operation or where this was unintended or was due to fortuitous circumstances." This, in our opinion, is not to be understood as meaning that the vice of discrimination is cured by showing, if it can be shown at all, that Legislature was not actuated by any bias but merely nodded. The learned Judge merely pointed out, as can be seen from his other observations at the same page, that the consequence resulting from the working of the Act, like evasions or escape through the meshes of the Act, cannot brand it with discrimination, if there is none on the face of it. Patent discrimination manifest in the impugned Act does not lose its constitutional defect, on the assumption that it was not intended. The following observation of Mukerjee, J., in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali5, deals with this aspect of the matter. "If it is established that the person complaining has been discriminated against as a result of legislation and denied equal privileges with others occupying the same position, I do not think that it is incumbent upon him, before he can claim relief on the basis of his Fundamental rights, to assert and prove that in making the law the Legislature was actuated by a hostile or inimical intention against a particular person or a class." We are, therefore, unable to agree with this contention of the learned Advocate-General. The Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution reads so far as it is material in the present context, as follows: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Article 14 of the Indian Constitution states: "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." Though the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution is a composite provision inhibiting the deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law and prohibiting denial of equal protection of laws, American cases dealing with the subject of equal protection of laws are of great value and assistance, in discussing the constitutionality of enactments challenged in this country, as being repugnant to Article 14. We find that the following passages from some of the leading text books on the American Constitution give a clear picture and cogent analysis of the American Law. We find that the following passages from some of the leading text books on the American Constitution give a clear picture and cogent analysis of the American Law. Pritchett in his book on the American Constitution observes at page 615 as follows: " .........equal protection does not prohibit legislative classification, provided the classification is reasonably related to the public welfare and all within the class are treated equally...... The decided cases are full of warnings against judicial interference with legislative classifications. The difference between persons or things on which the classification is based need not be scientific. or marked, so long as there are some practical distinctions. A classification must be clearly and actually arbitrary to be held invalid, and not merely possibly so. Every presumption as to facts which could conceivably justify the legislative classification will be assumed. The State may do what it can to prevent what it deems an evil, and stop short of those cases in which the harm to the few concerned is thought less important than the harm to the public that would result if the rules laid down were made mathematically exact." Weaver in his Constitutional Law at page 397 states: "Class legislation is that which makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons, arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the privileges granted and between whom and the persons not so favoured no reasonable distinction or substantial difference can be found justifying the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other from such privilege....A classification must not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive and there must be a reasonable natural and substantial distinction in the nature of the class or classes upon which the law operates." "In respect to such distinctions, a legislative body has a wide discretion and an Act will not be held invalid unless the classification is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. That the law will work a hardship is not enough. That the law will work a hardship is not enough. Many laws have that effect and the greater part of all legislation is discriminatory in the extent to which it operates, the manner in which it applies or the objects sought to be attained by it..........What classification is reasonable natural or substantial rests in the discretion of the legislative body in the first instance and it is the province of the Courts to adjudicate when it should be classed as arbitrary, artificial or evasive." Willis in his book on Constitutional Law observes as follows at page 587: "A State does not have to tax everything in order to tax something. It is allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably." Now the question is whether the omission of the Mappilla Marumakkattayam tarwad, as an entity to be taxed would amount to an undue preference to such tar-wads resulting in discrimination against the Hindu undivided families such as to violate the equality clause of the Constitution. Though at the commencement of. the argument Mr. M. K. Nambiyar submitted that the Act discriminated Hindu undivided families as against Malabar tarwads in general including Nair tarwads and Nambudiri illoms, he practically confined his arguments, at the later stages of the case, only as regards the alleged discrimination of Hindu undivided families as against Mappilla tarwads. We have therefore, to examine the position of Mappilla tarwads as regards their right to property both before and after the Mappilla Marumakkattayam Act, 1939. We may state in general that the Marumakkattayam law itself was based only upon ancient usages and custom. Sundara Aiyar, in his book on Malabar Law, observes that in Malabar more than anywhere else, it is still an age of usage and not of written law. Marumakkattayam law prevails amongst a large section of the people on the west coast of South India. This system of law is known as Aliyasanthana Law in South Kanara. Literally, the meaning of the word ‘Marumakkattayam ‘is inheritance through nephews and nieces. This system is followed by the Nair Community and by other Non-Brahmin Hindus, Thiyas and to some extent by the Muslims of North Malabar. The word ‘tarwad ‘signifies a joint family consisting of males and females, all descendants in the female line from a common ancestress. Literally, the meaning of the word ‘Marumakkattayam ‘is inheritance through nephews and nieces. This system is followed by the Nair Community and by other Non-Brahmin Hindus, Thiyas and to some extent by the Muslims of North Malabar. The word ‘tarwad ‘signifies a joint family consisting of males and females, all descendants in the female line from a common ancestress. Mayne in his text book of Hindu Law, at page 973 describes the constitution of a tarwad in these terms: “A tarwad is a family corporation, and every member of a tarwad has equal rights in the property by reason of his or her birth in the tarwad” Kalliani Amma v. Govinda Menon1, and Katankandi Koma v. Siva Sankaran2. “On the death of any member, his or her interest in the tarwad property devolves on the other members of the tarwad by survivorship.” The customary law or the Marumakkattayam Law prevalent in Malabar has been very materially altered by the enactments of the Madras Legislature, and also by the Regulations of Indian States, Travancore and Cochin, in their respective jurisdiction. The Madras Acts are, the Malabar Marriage Act (IV of 1896) the Malabar Wills Act (V of 1898), the Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932 (XXII of 1933) the Mappilla Marumakkattayam Act (XVII of 1939) and the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949 (IX of 1949). Referring to Mappillas, Lewis Moore, in his book on Malabar Law and Custom (Third. Edition.) at page 323 states as follows: “The Mappillas of North Malabar follow the Marumakkattayam system of inheritance, whilst the Mappillas of South Malabar, with some few exceptions, follow the ordinary Muhammadan Law. Amongst those who profess to follow the Marumakkattayam Law, the practice frequently prevails of treating the self-acquisitions of a man as descendible to his wife and children under Muhammadan Law. Among those who follow the ordinary Muhammadan Law, it is not unusual for a father and sons to have community of property and for the property to be managed by the father and, after his death, by the eldest son.” In Assan v. Pathumma3, Subramania Ayyar, J., took the view that, even in the case of Mappillas of North Malabar, the Muhammadan Law was their general law, the Marumakkattayam rules, in regard to Mappillas who followed them being rules of later adoption. In support of this view, the learned Judge referred to a passage in Mr. Logan’s Malabar Manual. In support of this view, the learned Judge referred to a passage in Mr. Logan’s Malabar Manual. Sundara Aiyar in his book on Malabar Law at page 231 states: “The Mahomedans of North Malabar also mostly follow the Marumakkattayam law of inheritance and adopt the rule of non-division. This was due to the fact that a large portion of the Sudara Community following Marumakkattayam Law embraced Mohammadanism en masse. Mr. Logan is not correct in his statement that the Mohamadans settled in North Malabar, changed the rate of inheritance previously prevalent among them and adopted the Marumakkattayam rule. This seems to be prima facie extremely improbable. On the other hand it is very natural and very probable that when a large section of a community adopts a new religion the converts should retain the rules of inheritance to which they were previously subject, and it is also extremely likely that the heads of the new religion should encourage conversion by making the change as easy and agreeable as possible to the new converts.” The learned author observes that Marumakkattayam is the prevalent system of inheritance in most of the Mohammadan families north of Calicut, and that even in Calicut and further south, one occasionally finds the adoption of the Marumakkattayam rule, though the instances are rare. Mr. Sundara Aiyar discusses the question whether the separate acquisitions of a member of the Mappilla tarwad would descend by the Marumakkattayam rule or by Muslim Law. In his opinion, the dominant system being Marumakkattayam (as regards the Mappillas of North Malabar and others who follow that system) the presumption should be that the Mappillas are governed by the rules of property of the Marumakkattayam law unless the contrary is established. Reference is made to the decision in Kunhimbi Umma v. Kandi Moithin4, in which a Division Bench of this Court (Subramania Iyer and Benson, JJ.), observed that Assan v. Pathuma3, should not be understood as laying down that in every case between Mahommedans in North Malabar, even when they were members of a Marumakkattayam tarwad, the devolution of selfacquired property was governed by Mahomedan law unless the contrary was shown, and that the presumption would often be in favour of the Marumakkattayam rule of devolution. In support of the view that Muslim families who were governed by the Marumakkattayam law as regards the tarwad property, should be presumed also to be governed by that law even as regards acquisition to their separate property, the following observations of the Judicial Committee in Murtaza Husain Khan v. Muhammed Yasin Khan1, is quoted by Sundara Aiyar: “The Muhammadan Law makes no distinction between ancestral and self-acquired property and recognises no principle of difference in the matter of lineal and collateral succession as is the case under the Mitakshara which divides inheritance into ‘unobstructed and obstructed heritage. ‘Alt’ classes of property, whether ancestral or self-acquired follow one rule of devolution. If a custom governs the succession to the ancestral estate, the presumption is that it attaches also to the personal acquisitions of the last owner left by him on his death ; and it is for the person who asserts that those properties follow a line of devolution, different from that of the taluqa to establish it.” What is to happen if a Muslim husband comes from a family governed by ordinary Mohammaden Law and the wife belongs to a family governed by the Marumakkattayam system or vice-versa? Then the property of the father would descend to his children and others according to the Mohammadan Law. It is therefore clear even from a cursory examination of these Mappilla tarwads in North Malabar, governed by the Marumakkattayam law that there was no one system of devolution of property or inheritance which would govern them. Sometimes it was the Muslim law and sometimes it was the Marumakkattayam law. That depended upon the question whether the adult male of the tarwad was himself a Marumakkattayee or a follower of Muslim law. It must be noted that as regards marriage and divorce, even the Marumakkattayam Mappilla tarwad was governed only by the rule of Mahomedan Law. Sundara Aiyar, J., observes at page 236: “The recognition of the Marumakkattayam rule of inheritance and at the same time of the Mahomedan rule as to marriage has led to the growth among Mappillas of certain customs. Sundara Aiyar, J., observes at page 236: “The recognition of the Marumakkattayam rule of inheritance and at the same time of the Mahomedan rule as to marriage has led to the growth among Mappillas of certain customs. For instance, in Bappan v. Mukki2, it was found that among the Mappillas of North Malabar there existed a custom according to which the junior members of Mappilla tarwards were entitled to maintenance from the tarwad when living in the houses of these consorts and also to a higher rate of maintenance when living with their consorts than when living single. There is also the practice for the relations of the wife to make what is called a Stridhana gift to the husband to enable him to maintain her.” In short, before the advent of the Mappilla Marumakkattayam Act, even the so-called Mappilla tarwads in North Malabar and a few portions of South Malabar had no uniform or single system of succession to property, and were governed practically by usage and custom. There cannot be any comparison between a Hindu undivided family and a Mappilla tarwad, and, in our opinion, it would be very anomalous to place them together on the same par, merely because it can be said that both a Hindu undivided family and a tarwad can be conveniently described as ‘family corporations‘. What is the similarity between a Mappilla tarwad and Hindu undivided family is really the crux of the question before us. If the alleged similarity is only apparent and nominal and does not extend to the substance of the rights enjoyed by these two bodies, it cannot be said that they are similar institutions normally entitled to be treated alike by the Legislature. Mr. M. K. Nambiar was at pains to point out that both are ‘corporations ‘, and that they have many features in common. He referred to the following observations of Srinivasayyangar, J., in Chakkara Kannan v. Kunhi Pokker3: “In India it is not uncommon for group of persons, though not incorporated to hold properties as if they were corporately entitled.....Instances of such groups in Southern India are the Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law, the Nambudri Illom governed by the Marumakkattayam Law, the Nayar tarwad governed by Marumakkattayam Law, and the Aliyasantana family of South Canara. The Mappillas of North Malabar generally follow the Marumakkattayam system. The Mappillas of North Malabar generally follow the Marumakkattayam system. The incidents of such group holding are now well-settled. In the case of Malabar tarwards such incidents include the impartibility of the property, the right by birth of persons born in the tarwad, the management of the properties by the senior male member of the tarwad who is styled the karnavan.....The constitution of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law furnishes a very close parallel.” In Moithiyan Kutty v. Mammali1, Chakkara Kanna’s case2 was followed. Venkatasubba Rao, J., observed: “the Marumakkattayam Law recognises a tarwad as a unit and a tavazhi being a sub-division of a tarwad, the Courts have also recognised it as a legal entity.” The nature of a Hindu joint family was considered by the Supreme Court in Bhagawan Dayal v. Reoti Devi3. His Lordship Subba Rao, J., observed at page 304 as follows: “The legal position may be stated thus. Coparcenary is a creature of Hindu Law and cannot be created by agreement of parties except in the case of re-union. It is a corporate body or a family unit, whether the larger one or the subordinate one, can acquire, hold and dispose of family property subject to the limitations laid down by law.” The expression ‘corporate body ‘with reference to a Hindu joint family, was used by Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., in Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri4, where the learned Judge observed that the Mitakshara doctrine of joint family was founded upon the existence of an undivided family as a corporate body. It is on this data that a Hindu joint family and a Malabar tarwad are corporate or quasi-corporate bodies that Mr. Nambiar mainly rests his arguments that they should be similarly treated. A Hindu joint family is certainly a creature of Hindu law, and it is well settled that it cannot be constituted by agreement between parties. A, B, C and D cannot combine and enter into an agreement that they should hold certain properties with community of rights, just like a Hindu Mitakshara family. It has not been suggested that the joint family as such is a distinct entity or a legal person like a company or a municipal corporation or other corporate bodies created by statutes. It has not been suggested that the joint family as such is a distinct entity or a legal person like a company or a municipal corporation or other corporate bodies created by statutes. If the family were to be treated as something apart from the members of the family, then that would mean that the members have no right or interest in the property held by it. But that is not the case with a Hindu joint family. There is a unity of ownership and possession as regards the family properties, and each member has got an undefined right or interest in the properties. That interest cannot be ascertained unless and until there is a division in status or by metes and bounds. But the joint family manager is the accredited representative of the family, and is clothed with certain rights, in the matter of administration and enjoyment of the properties. The status of the family can be disrupted by any member seeking to get his share. Indeed even before there can be a division by metes and bounds a coparcener can get himself divided by unequivocal or unambiguous indication of intention to separate himself from the family and to enjoy his share in severalty. “Once the decision has been unequivocally expressed, and clearly intimated to his coparceners, his right to obtain and possess the share to which he is admittedly entitled, is unimpeachable; neither the co-sharers can question it, nor can the Court examine his conscience to find out whether his reasons for separation are well-founded or sufficient.” (Mayne’s Hindu Law, 11th edition, page 580.) A minor coparcener can get himself divided from the family through the medium of his natural guardian or the Court guardian provided he is able to convince the Court that partition would be in his welfare and interest. It is really unnecessary to dwell longer on the character and nature of a Hindu undivided family, as in fact there is no dispute now before us, as regards the nature of such families. Comparing the Mapilla Marumakkattayam tarwad with the Hindu undivided family, it seems to us that the word ‘corporation’ is sometimes used to describe the tarwads with as much appropriateness as that word has been used as regards the Hindu undivided families. It is only a convenient description of grouping all persons. Comparing the Mapilla Marumakkattayam tarwad with the Hindu undivided family, it seems to us that the word ‘corporation’ is sometimes used to describe the tarwads with as much appropriateness as that word has been used as regards the Hindu undivided families. It is only a convenient description of grouping all persons. Mappilla Marumakkattayam tarwad is, of course, not an institution or corporate body, having a separate legal existence or having the attribute of a ‘legal person ‘, distinct from the members of the tarwad. We have already pointed out that these Mappilla tarwads occupied the same position as the Nair tarwad in the Malabar area. We have to take it that, prior to the enactment of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932, and the Mappilla Marumakkattayam Act, 1939, the Mappilla tarwad and the Nair tarwad stood more or less in the same position except as regards marriage, divorce, succession to separate property etc. One distinction between a Hindu undivided family and the Malabar tarwad in general, Muslim or Hindu, is that these tarwads are governed by the Marumakkattayam Law, that is the matriarchal system, while the Hindu systems of law are founded upon the agnatic family. In a Mitakshara joint family, the members claim their descent from a common ancestor, but the members of the family constituting a Marumakkattayam tarwad are descended from a common ancestress. The descent according to the Marumakkattayam system, is in the female line. This is a basic structural difference between the two. It is true that a tarwad or a tavazhi cannot be created by act of parties, even as much as a Hindu undivided family cannot be so constituted. But a member of the tarwad could not claim partition and separate possession of his share of the tarwad property without the consent or the concurrence of all the members thereof. This had been laid down by a long course of judicial decisions, and Mayne in his Hindu Law states that it has been accepted as settled law and acted upon till the Marumakkattayam Act of 1932. Certainly the members of the tarwad cannot be equated to a coparcener, who had an undoubted right to get a partition of a his share, as and when he liked and even if the other members would not consent. This again is a marked distinction between a Hindu undivided family and a tarwad. Certainly the members of the tarwad cannot be equated to a coparcener, who had an undoubted right to get a partition of a his share, as and when he liked and even if the other members would not consent. This again is a marked distinction between a Hindu undivided family and a tarwad. Dealing with a Mappilla tarwad, the Judicial Committee, in Sulaiman v. Bivathumma,1 pointed out that in a Mappilla tarwad, there could be no partition, unless all the members consented. In a Hindu joint family partition, each class will take per stirpes as regards every other class, but the members of the class take per capita as regards each other. But that does not appear to have been the position governing the Malabar tarwads. At page 974, Mayne’s Hindu Law, it is stated as follows: “The mode of partition, whether it ought to be per stirpes or per capita, was the subject of conflicting judicial opinion. The accepted view is that partition should be per capita and this has been affirmed by section 40 of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act and also by section 36 of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act. Owing to the absence of a right of compulsory partition, and the consequent increase in the number of members and the impossibility of living together under one roof, instances have often arisen where branches of a tarwad have lived separate for long, enjoying the properties of the tarwad separately.” We find that on important matters like the right of division and the quantum of share, the tarwad, Hindu or Muslim in Malabar, differs substantially from the Hindu undivided family. In fact, the very system of Marumakkattayam having a female propositus or ancestress is wholly foreign to the conception of Hindu Mitakshara family, inasmuch as it is based on a common ancestor. The Hindu family emphasises the agnatic relationship to such a large extent as to postpone even close relations to sapindas and samanodhakas. Agnatic relation of the fourth or the fifth degree is given precedence in the matter of succession to a bandhu like paternal aunt or maternal uncle. Till the Hindu Inheritance Act, 1929, even sister, sister’s son, son’s daughter and a daughter’s daughter only ranked as bandhus and were postponed even to samanodhakas. Agnatic relation of the fourth or the fifth degree is given precedence in the matter of succession to a bandhu like paternal aunt or maternal uncle. Till the Hindu Inheritance Act, 1929, even sister, sister’s son, son’s daughter and a daughter’s daughter only ranked as bandhus and were postponed even to samanodhakas. We are unable to hold that there is anything much in common between a Hindu undivided family and a tarwad, to say that they constitute similar subjects, entitled to equal protection under the equality clause of the Constitution. It will be convenient, at this stage, to refer to the provisions of the Mappilla Marumakkattayam Act, 1939, enacted by the Madras Legislature, which really governed the Mappilla Marumakkattayam, at the time when the Wealth-tax and the Expenditure-tax Acts were enacted. We shall give a brief summary of the salient provisions of the Act. Its Preamble reads: “Whereas it is expedient to define and amend in certain respects the law relating to family management, partition, and succession among the Mappillas following the Marumakkattayam Law, it is hereby enacted...................” The ‘Anandravan’ is a member of a tarwad or tavazhi. The ‘Karnavan’ is the oldest major male member of a tarwad or tavazhi or in his absence the oldest major female member in whom the right to management of its properties vests, ‘Marumakkattayam ‘is defined as the system of inheritance in which descent is traced in the female line. ‘Tarwad ‘means a joint family which includes all its members with community of property governed by the Marumakkattayam Law. ‘Tavazhi ‘means a branch of a tarwad consisting of a female, her children and all her descendants in the female line. The karnavan is obliged to maintain a true and correct inventory of all the movable and immovable properties belonging to the tarwad, and has also to keep true and correct accounts of the income and expenditure of the tarwad. The senior anandravan is entitled to inspect, at the tarwad house in the month of Vrischikam of the following year, the inventory and the accounts of the previous year. He can also take copies of or extracts from the same. If the karnavan would not afford facilities for inspection, the anandravan can move the Court and obtain appropriate orders. Every member of the tarwad is entitled to maintenance consistent with the income and the circumstances of the tarwad. He can also take copies of or extracts from the same. If the karnavan would not afford facilities for inspection, the anandravan can move the Court and obtain appropriate orders. Every member of the tarwad is entitled to maintenance consistent with the income and the circumstances of the tarwad. The surplus income of the tarwad has to be invested by the karnavan by purchase of immovable property for the tarwad or by other investment, to the best advantage of the tarwad. The tarwad properties can be alienated only for necessity or for benefit. The anandravan may institute a suit in a civil Court, for the removal of the karnavan for any malfeasance, misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty, misappropriation or improper dealing with the income or the properties of the tarwad. The karnavan can also be removed for mental unsoundness, physical infirmity or for other reasons set out in section 11 of the Act. Any individual member of a tarwad may claim to take his or her share of the properties of the tarwad. A minor member of the tarwad can also obtain a partition acting through his mother, or in the absence of the mother, by his or her guardian under the Islamic Law. A tarwad house shall not be partitioned and shall be kept undivided for the common use of all the members of the tarwad even if the other members of the tarwad desire it, unless two-thirds of the members of the tarwad desire to the contrary. In case of a division, the individual member or the members of the tavazhi as the case may be, shall be entitled to such share or shares of the tarwad properties as would fall to such member or members, if a division per capita were made among all the members of the tarwad then existing (section 17). Succession to the property obtained by an individual member on partition shall be governed by the Islamic Law of inheritance. There is also a provision for registration of the tarwad as impartible. If within a year from the passing of the Act, not less than two-thirds of the major members of a tarwad present a petition to the Collector of the District, he shall register the tarwad as impartible. There is also a provision for registration of the tarwad as impartible. If within a year from the passing of the Act, not less than two-thirds of the major members of a tarwad present a petition to the Collector of the District, he shall register the tarwad as impartible. On such registration, the tarwad estate would no longer be open to partition by metes and bounds at the instance of any member. If at any time after registration of a tarwad as impartible, not less than two-thirds of the members present a petition to the Collector and desire cancellation of registration, he shall cancel such registration. The Act saves the provisions of the Mappilla Succession Act, 1918, the Mappilla Wills Act, 1928, and also any law or custom or usage governing the Mappillas. After the advent of this Act, the members of a Mappilla tarwad are undoubtedly governed only by the provisions of the Act, except as regards the matters saved under section 27 of the Act. A mere look at the provisions of the Act would be sufficient to distinguish a Mappilla Marumakkattayam tarwad from a Hindu Mitakshara undivided family. The only similarlity, as far as we are able to see, is that the tarwad is described as a joint family and a Hindu Mitakshara family is also called a joint family. The provision for removal of the karnavan and the provision compelling a karnavan to maintain an inventory of the properties and to keep a true account of the income and expenditure of the tarwad are certainly peculiar and they have no parallel. There are no doubt provisions of a similar nature in the Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932, which governs a Nair tarwad. Any coparcener of a Hindu joint family dissatisfied with the manager of the family can only insist upon a partition of the family properties and put an end to the joint family status. That is the only mode by which a fraudulent joint family manager can be got rid off. Removal of a manager of a Hindu joint family and substitution of another in his place is unknown in the Mitakshara Law. There is no duty on the part of a joint family manager to maintain accounts for he is not an agent. That is the only mode by which a fraudulent joint family manager can be got rid off. Removal of a manager of a Hindu joint family and substitution of another in his place is unknown in the Mitakshara Law. There is no duty on the part of a joint family manager to maintain accounts for he is not an agent. His position is analogous to that of a trustee, but this does not involve him in all the duties incumbent on the trustee. Provided that the family funds are used for family purposes, he is not accountable for past transactions. In regard to the disposal of the family income, the manager has a discretion which cannot be called in question, in the absence of fraud or misappropriation. Impartibility, except as regards impartible estates governed by an Act, is not recognised under the Hindu Law. To a limited extent, this has been recognised by the Act governing Mappilla tarwads. In our opinion, there is a vast difference between a Mappilla tarwad and a Hindu undivided family, and it would be a misnomer to equate the two as occupying the same position as a legal entity. We have, therefore, reached the conclusion, after giving our best attention to the matter, that a Hindu undivided family and a Mappilla tarwad are not similar subjects, which are entitled to equal treatment, in the matter of enactment of laws by the Parliament. The next question is whether the wealth of a Mappilla tarwad is altogether outside the ambit of the Wealth-tax Act, or the expenditure of a Mappilla tarwad is beyond the scope of the Expenditure-tax Act. A karnavan of a Mappilla tarwad no doubt, holds the assets of the tarwad in a representative capacity, holding it not merely for himself but for the other members of the tarwad as well. But we do not envisage any legal disability on the part of the wealth-tax authorities or the authorise under the Expenditure-tax Act to deal with the karnavan as an individual, for the purpose of assessment to tax. A karnavan is a certainly an individual, and the properties sought to be assessed to tax are in his hands. But we do not envisage any legal disability on the part of the wealth-tax authorities or the authorise under the Expenditure-tax Act to deal with the karnavan as an individual, for the purpose of assessment to tax. A karnavan is a certainly an individual, and the properties sought to be assessed to tax are in his hands. If the Parliament did not recognise a Mappilla tarwad as a separate legal entity to be taxed like a Hindu undivided family, that would not lead to the inference that the subject-matter of the taxation in the hands of the karnavan of the tarwad was not intended to be taxed. On a plain reading of the charging provisions of the enactments, we are of opinion that a karnavan, whatever may be the capacity in which he or she owns or expends, is certainly an ‘individual ‘within the meaning of the said expression under the two relevant Acts. The only thing that remains is to refer to the decision of the Kerala High Court in C. K. Mammad Keyi v. Wealth-tax Officer1, in which the view has been taken that the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, denied equal protection of laws to Hindu undivided families. The Act was challenged mainly on two grounds. It was contended that the Parliament was not competent under Entry 86 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution to impose a tax called the Wealth-tax on the capital value of the assets of a Hindu undivided family or a Mappilla Marumakkattayam tarwad to the extent that they are or may be deemed to be made up of agricultural income. It was next contended that in any event, the Act fell within the mischief of the equality clause of the Constitution. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held that the Wealth-tax was specifically and in substance covered by Entry 86 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that there was really no conflict between the jurisdiction of the Parliament under Entry 86 and the State Legislature under Entry 49 of the State List, to enact a law levying a tax on lands and buildings. The learned Judges observed that, at any rate, Entry 86 of the Union list conferred a special legislative power which overrides the general power under Entry 49 of the State List. The learned Judges observed that, at any rate, Entry 86 of the Union list conferred a special legislative power which overrides the general power under Entry 49 of the State List. The competency of the Parliament to enact a tax measure was, therefore, upheld. The Act was, however, condemned as being unconstitutional violating the equal protection clause. Velu Pillai, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench, observed thus at page 295: “The term ‘individual ‘as employed in section 3 of the Act in juxtaposition with Hindu undivided families and the other provisions of the Act, which differentiate between these two units of assessment, leave no room for doubt, that whatever be its connotation in Entry 86, the term ‘individual ‘in the Act cannot comprehend a Hindu undivided family ; if so, it cannot comprehend a Mappilla Marumakkattayam tarwad either.” With great respect, we disagree with this view of the learned Judge. We are unable to follow why the term ‘individual ‘should receive a narrow or restricted interpretation, while construing the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act, especially when there is nothing in the context of the charging section to indicate that the term should not receive its ordinary meaning. The expression ‘Hindu undivided family ‘which follows the word ‘individual ‘is not to be read as importing a restriction upon the term ‘individual ‘. The charging section has attempted a classification of the entity to be taxed, and for good and proper reasons, distinguished a Hindu undivided family from an individual. We have already expressed our view that it would be possible to bring the karnavan of a tarwad within the scope and meaning of the expression ‘individual ‘under the Acts. After discussing the question of the constitutionality of the charging section, Velu Pillai, J., has set out his conclusion thus: “We, therefore, come to the conclusion, that Hindu undivided families of wealth have been singled out by the Act from other similar joint families in the country and that the State has thereby denied equal protection of the law to the former. The provisions in the Act relating to Hindu undivided families are severable and to that extent the Act has to be struck down.” Earlier in the judgment, the learned Judge has, however, referred to the argument of Sri K. V. Suryanarayana Iyer, learned Counsel who appeared for the Wealth-tax Officer, in these words: “Shri K. V. Suryanarayana Iyer has been able only to point out, that in certain respects the law governing the member of a Mappilla Marumakkattayam tarwad does not correspond in all respects to the members of a Hindu undivided family, but in our opinion, he has not succeeded in establishing any basis whatever for distinguishing for the purpose of the Act, wealthy undivided families of Hindus from similar families of non-Hindus.” The learned Judge was not apparently inclined to take the view that the entities, Hindu undivided family and Mappilla tarwads are two dissimilar subjects. We do not find any further reference to this aspect of the matter in the course of his judgment. The whole judgment rests upon the assumption that a tarwad and a Hindu undivided family are like subjects, and that the Legislature should not discriminate the one as against the other. With great respect to the learned Judges, we are unable to agree with that view. The more we examine the position, and compare and contrast a Hindu undivided family with a Mappilla Marumakkattayam tarwad, the more we are convinced that the resemblance between the two is so remote that they cannot be recokned or ranked as ‘equals ‘. The essence of similarity between two persons or bodies is that they should enjoy substantially the same rights and be under the same obligations. One need not be the replica of the other, but they must have something more in common than the nomenclature. Even a few common features would not be enough; if the differences far outweigh the things in common the ground for “ being alike” does not exist. If they are not equals, the one cannot complain that the other enjoys certain privileges or concessions. It is no inhibition of the Constitution to treat ‘unequals ‘with inequality. Indeed the constitutional mandate is not to achieve equality where there is none, but is only to prevent the Legislature from favouring one section of the equals and singling out the other section to be a target of attack. It is no inhibition of the Constitution to treat ‘unequals ‘with inequality. Indeed the constitutional mandate is not to achieve equality where there is none, but is only to prevent the Legislature from favouring one section of the equals and singling out the other section to be a target of attack. Discrimination can come in, only when similar subjects are not treated alike. Such discrimination can escape the inhibition of the equality clause under the umbrella of permissible classification. If different entities are not accorded the same treatment by law, the charge of discrimination falls at the outset, and there is no need to justify it on the ground of classification. In our opinion, the charging sections of the Wealth-tax Act and the Expendituretax Act, do not fall within the mischief of the equality clause of the Constitution. In the result, these Writ Petitions fail and are dismissed. The rule nisi issued in each of the petitions is hereby discharged. The petitioner will pay the costs of the respondent in each case ; Counsel’s fee Rs. 250. V.S. ------- Petition dismissed.