Ramachandra lyar, C.J.:-This is an application for grant of leave toappeal under Article 133 of the Constitution. The judgment of this Court is notone of affirmance of that given by the learned Judge sitting on the OriginalSide of this Court. It is admitted that the subject-matter in controversysatisfied the requirement of Article 133 (1) (a) (b). But the point taken beforeus against the grant of leave is that as the jurisdiction of this Court topronounce upon the construction of the settlement deed was more or less in thenature of an advisory one our judgment could not be regarded as a judgment orfinal order within the terms of Article 133. No authority is however shown insupport of the contention. Under Order 13 of the Original Side Rules it will beopen to any person claiming to be interested either as a devisee, legatee, heiror legal representative, or a cestui que trust under the trust of anydeed or instrument, to apply to the Court for determination without anadministration of the estate or trust of any question affecting the rights andinterests of the persons claiming, and, or, any question arising in theadministration of the estate or trust etc. In the instant case the petitioner applied under the provision for theconstruction of deed of trust executed on 30th September, 1920, by PayaniandiPillai. GanapatiaPillai, T., determined the question in favour of thepetitioner. That view has not been accepted by us. There can be little doubtthat this adjudication is final so far as this Court is concerned and will bebinding on the parties Nothing is left outstanding for determination on theOriginating Summons. We are therefore of opinion that our judgment will be onecoming within Article 133 of the Constitution. We find that in the case reported in Lal Behary Dhur v. The Administrator-Generalof Bengal1, there was an appeal against the judgment in an Originating Summons taken out for the construction of a document and the same has been reported in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary Dhur2. Although we do not have any indication as to the precise nature of the order by which leave was granted in this case, we can take it as an instance where leave has been granted on the footing that a judgment on an Originating Summons would be a final judgment. Although we do not have any indication as to the precise nature of the order by which leave was granted in this case, we can take it as an instance where leave has been granted on the footing that a judgment on an Originating Summons would be a final judgment. The very terms of Order J 3 of the Original Side Rules provide that in the cases specified therein, of which the present is one, the procedure to be followed is that of a suit and that on a judgment being delivered, a decree follows. Further it is on the footing that it is a judgment that an appeal has been entertained in this Court itself under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to certain passages in Seton on Judgment, Volume I, Chapter 1. We think that it is unnecessary to consider whether the practice of the English Court can properly be applied to the construction of the provisions we have now to consider. As indicated earlier, we are of opinion that the present case will satisfy the requirements of Article 133, being a judgment. A certificate under Article 133 (a) and (b) will therefore issue. K.S. ----- Certificate issued.