Order The petitioner was elected a member of the Sivanthipuram Panchayat. He was later elected also as a President of that Panchayat. His election as a member was on 24th May, 1959. The validity of his election was questioned by the respondents 2 to 4 herein, who moved the District Munsif of Ambasamudram, the appropriate authority for determining that question. The petition was dismissed on the 10th November, 1960. The disqualification alleged was that the petitioner had been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. The Tribunal took the view that the petitioner, having been convicted of specific offences under the Indian Penal Code, could not be said to have been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. Against the order of dismissal, the respondents 2 to 4 brought the matter before this Court in C.R.P. No. 1005 of 1961, and this Court quashed the order of the Tribunal and directed the matter to be re-heard and disposed of in the light of the observations contained in the judgment. Thereafter, the Tribunal took up the question and reached the conclusion that the offences for which the petitioner had been convicted were offences which involved moral turpitude and declared that the petitioner herein had ceased to be a member of the Panchayat Board. It is to quash the order of the Tribunal that the present Writ Petition has been filed. It is unnecessary to traverse the contents of the affidavit accompanying the petition. For, the question has been argued only on a solitary ground, and it is that the Tribunal misunderstood the scope of the decision of this Court in C.R.P. No. 1005 of 1961 in holding that the question had been more or less decided by this Court whether the offences under section 120-B read with section 109 or section 121, Indian Penal Code, were offences involving moral delinquency. It is urged accordingly that the Tribunal, which misunderstood the law as laid down by this Court, has committed an error apparent on the face of the record. Though other grounds were set out in the petition, they have not been pressed. Section 16 (1) sets out certain disqualifications of candidates for election to Panchayats. It is urged accordingly that the Tribunal, which misunderstood the law as laid down by this Court, has committed an error apparent on the face of the record. Though other grounds were set out in the petition, they have not been pressed. Section 16 (1) sets out certain disqualifications of candidates for election to Panchayats. A person who has been sentenced to a criminal Court toimprisonment for a period of more than six months for any offence other than an offence not involving moral delinquency, shall be disqualified for election as a member while undergoing the sentence and for five years from the date of the expiration thereof. Learned Counsel concedes that, if it should be held that the offences for which the petitioner were convicted was offences involving moral delinquency, then the election having been made within the period of five years, the petitioner was not competent to stand for election within that period and that the election in the instant case was within such period. Under section 19 (1) of the Act, the impugned disqualification of any member under section 16 can be adjudicated upon by the District Munsiff having jurisdiction over the Panchayat. It is not in dispute in this case that the petitioner was convicted of the offences referred to. In the decision of this Court in C.R.P. No. 1005 of 1961, Anantanarayanan, J., observed that, while the expression ‘moral delinquency’ has not been defined “it is clear enough that all technical and formal offences, and offences not involving mens rea would be automatically excluded” from that expression. But, where a person has the guilty intention of transgressing law and commits the act with full knowledge that he is offending the law, it could certainly come within the scope of the expression ‘moral delinquency’. The learned Judge observed: “After a careful consideration of this aspect, I am inclined to feel that any grave criminal offence which involves an element of guilty knowledge, and which thus transgresses the majesty of the law of crimes, will necessarily involve also an element of ‘moral delinquency’ because of its anti-social content.” In a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Balashwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras1 a similar question arose under the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act. The learned Judge therein observed that though the expression ‘moral turpitude ‘is not defined any where, it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals and that if the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. In the instant case, the petitioner was one of the 76 persons tried for various offences of criminal conspiracy to set fire and blow up railway bridges and the like and with the violation of the Explosive Substances Act for the purposes indicated. In the light of the observations in C.R.P. No. 1005 of 1961 and the other judgment that I have referred to, it seems clear that these offences must be regarded as offences involving “moral delinquency”. The conclusion reached by the Tribunal below is certainly not erroneous in law, and if that ground, which is the only one pressed in this petition, fails, the petition has to be dismissed. The rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. K.S.-----Rule discharged.