MEHROTRA, C.J.- These three appeal's arise out of a common judgment passed by the Subordinate Judge, lower Assam Districts, Gauhati. (2) The facts necessary are that the three appellants were given notice under Rule 18 of the Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation to remove the encroachment made by them on the Strand Road, Gauhati. The appellants made the drain adjoining the Strand Road pucca and also made certain constructions over that land. In 1948 they were asked to remove these constructions. They put objections and the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup by his order dated the 3oth March, 1948, held that they had made constructions under the purported permission granted by the Municipal Board, Gauhati and thus they should be asked to apply for settlement of the land. The Deputy Commissioner held that he would pass final orders after the Executive Engineer is consulted if he had any serious objection to the settlement. After hearing from the Executive Engineer he ordered that steps will be taken to settle the land according to rules with the three appellants. Thereafter the Executive Engineer and the Public Works Department sent a report and the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup by his order dated the 25th August, 1948, directed that the proceedings should be struck off as the appellants had improved the road and' had not caused any inconvenience to the public. It appears that subsequently some letter was received from the Government presumably rejecting the prayer of the appellants for settlement of the land. Thereupon the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup further issued orders against the appellants to remove the constructions and further directed that in case they failed to remove the constructions, they would be fined Rs. 200/- each and a daily fine of Rs. 50 each. The three appellants filed appeals before this Court which was competent to hear revenue appeals at that time. The single Judge of this Court modified the order of the Deputy Commis­sioner and in other respects dismissed the appeal. 200/- each and a daily fine of Rs. 50 each. The three appellants filed appeals before this Court which was competent to hear revenue appeals at that time. The single Judge of this Court modified the order of the Deputy Commis­sioner and in other respects dismissed the appeal. (3) It is necessary to refer to the operative portion of the order passed by this Court in appeal, which reads as follows:- "I accordingly direct that the order of the Deputy Commissioner be modified to this extent that the appellants in each case be given three months' time for establishing their claim of right with respect to the encroached lands in a properly framed suit in a Civil Court and in default of obtaining any stay order or decree in their favour, the order of the Deputy Commissioner will be put into operation forthwith after expiry of three months from to-day. The final result will therefore depend on the Civil suit in each case if brought within time and in case of any of the parties establishing a right to possess the encroached roadside land or drain the order of eviction and fine shall automatically lapse. With this modification in the orders appealed against I dismiss the appeal * * * *.” The substance of the order passed by this Court was that the order of the Deputy Commissioner was in the first instance suspended for a period of three months to enable the present appellants to file suits in the civil court for declaration of their right to remain in possession of the land. If after filing the suit they got stay order, the order of the Deputy Commissioner was to remain suspended. In case of their not filing suits within three months the order was to come in operation forthwith. If however the suit had been filed the final order was to be made in accordance with the decision of the Civil Court. The order further provides that if in the Civil Court the appellants get a declaration in their favour, then automatically the order of the Deputy Commissioner will stand cancelled. Otherwise it necessarily follows that the order will be a valid order and an operative order. In effect the order of the Deputy Commissioner is substituted by the order of this Court in appeal. Otherwise it necessarily follows that the order will be a valid order and an operative order. In effect the order of the Deputy Commissioner is substituted by the order of this Court in appeal. (4) In pursuance of the order of this Court the three appellants filed suits in the Court below. Title Suit No. 47 of 1952 was filed by Messrs. Sewnarayan Onkermal against the State of Assam. Appeal No. 29 of 1958 arises out of the decree in suit No. 47. Title Suit No. 48 of 1952 was filed against the State of Assam by Mirzamall Agarwalla and others and appeal No. 30 of 1958 arises out of the decree in suit No. 48. Appeal No. 28 of 1958 arises out of the Title Suit No. 49 of 1952 filed by Ramjidas Ganpatrai against the State of Assam. The reliefs claimed in these three suits are identical and are as follows:- (i) that the orders of the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup dated the i8th November, 1949 and 4th January, 1950, in Encroachment Case No. 137 of 1947-48 of Gauhati directing the removal of the alleged encroachment of the Strand Road side drain at Fancibazar, Gauhati town and an imposition of a fine thereof are declared illegal, ultra vires, inoperative and without any jurisdiction, (ii) that a perpetual injunction be issued on the State of Assam the defendant and also on the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup and other Revenue Officers of that district against giving effect to the said or any such other order or orders and alternatively to decree that the defendant state shall be liable to compensate the plaintiffs with certain amounts as a condition precedent to giving effect to the said orders of the Deputy Commissioner. The trial Court dismissed the suits and the present appeals have been filed against the orders of the Subordinate Judge passed in those suits as already stated above in this judgment. (5) The first contention of Mr. The trial Court dismissed the suits and the present appeals have been filed against the orders of the Subordinate Judge passed in those suits as already stated above in this judgment. (5) The first contention of Mr. Lahiri for the appellants in Suit No. 49 is concerned, the appellant made constructions in pursuance of the permission granted by the Municipal Board to the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellant in the year 1908, and as at that time the Strand "Road vested is the Municipal Board, the Municipal Board had every right to grant permission and the appellant was in possession of the land in the assertion of the bona fide claim of right and thus the order under Rule 18 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation was without jurisdiction. As regards the other two suits Nos. 47 and 48 admittedly the permission was granted in the year 1947, not by the Municipal Board but by the Executive Officer. It is an admitted fact that the Municipal Board was suspended in the year 1947 and thus there was no Municipal Board which could grant permission to the appellants to make constructions on this land. The contention, however, is that so far as the drains are concerned, they are continued to be property of the Municipal Board and the suspension of the Municipality does not take away the right of the proper authority to grant permission to make constructions on the Municipal land. Next it is contended that in any view of the matter the appellants under the mistaken belief that they had right to make these constructions spent money in making the constructions and thus the authorities are estopped from enforcing their right to eject the present appellants. In substance the plea is a plea of acquiescence and estoppel. (6) At the first instance it is clear that the relief claimed is not a proper relief at all. After the order of the Deputy Commissioner was appealed against, the order of the Deputy Commissioner merged into the appellate order of this Court and thus there was no order of the i8th November, 1949 and 4th January, 1950, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, which could be set aside by this Court. After the order of the Deputy Commissioner was appealed against, the order of the Deputy Commissioner merged into the appellate order of this Court and thus there was no order of the i8th November, 1949 and 4th January, 1950, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, which could be set aside by this Court. It is also significant to note that this Court in its order has directed the appellants to bring a suit for declaration of their right to the property and not for a declaration that the order of the revenue Court was invalid and without jurisdiction. In effect the order of this Court was that the revenue Court's order being final, will be passed in accordance with the decision of this Court and in view of the order of this Court the appellant had no right to ask for an injunction restraining the Deputy Commissioner from enforcing the order passed under Rule 18 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. The only relief which the appellants were granted by the order of this Court was to ask for a declaration of their right to the property and that relief has not been claimed by the appellants. But as the merits of the cast; have been argued, it is not necessary to dispose of the appeals on this preliminary ground. (7) The contention in substance of Mr. Lahiri is that under Rule 18 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation if a bona fide claim of right is asserted, the jurisdiction of the revenue Court is ousted and thus the order under Rule 18 will be without jurisdiction. The Senior Government Advocate, however, contends that the only point which this Court has to decide in the present case is that the order under Rule 18 was then (sic) not without jurisdiction. If it is held that the land belongs to the Government, then the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction to pass the order and it cannot be set aside by this Court. The main question thus to be considered is whether the drain belonged to the Municipal Board or to the Government. (8) So far as the permission granted in the year 1947. is concerned the State counsel contends that the permission and the filing of the applications have not been proved. But without going into that question the case can be examined on the merits itself. (8) So far as the permission granted in the year 1947. is concerned the State counsel contends that the permission and the filing of the applications have not been proved. But without going into that question the case can be examined on the merits itself. In 1947 the plaintiffs in the two suits - Nos. 47 and 48 - had applied for permission to make drains pucca and were to put up certain constructions. The permission was granted by the Assistant Executive Officer, Gaunati Municipality to the appellants to construct the front verandah of the building on the Strand Road with four reinforced concrete pillars and the drain covered with reinforced concrete removable slabs as per plan submitted. There was thus permission granted in these two cases by the Assistant Executive Officer to make the necessary constructions. The contention however of the State is that by virtue of Section 294 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1923 (Assam Act I of 1923) as the municipality was superseded, the property which vested in the municipality vested in the Government and thus this drain and the land ceased to belong to the Municipal Board and the Municipal Board had no authority to grant any permission to the appellant to make the constructions. Section 294 of the Municipal Act provides: "294. When an order of supersession shall have been passed under the last preceding section, the following consequences shall ensue:- * * * * (c) all property vested in such Board shall, during the period of supersession vest in the Government for the purposes of the Province. * * * *” Only the relevant provisions of the section have been quoted above. Mr. Lahiri contends that Section 294 (b) is attracted in the present case which provides that when the order of supersession shall have been passed under the last preceding section, all the powers and duties which under the said Act may be exercised and performed by the Board, whether at a meeting or otherwise, shall, during the period of supersession, be exercised and performed by such person or persons as the Provincial Government may direct. He contends that after the supersession by the Board the powers and duties which are to be exercised and performed by the Board can be performed by an officer and as the Municipal Board was suspended, the Executive Officer may have been authorised by the Government, to grant sanction which was the duty of the Municipal Board. The question of the exercise of the power to grant sanction would only arise in respect of the land which vests in the Municipal Board and if the effect of sub-section (c) of Section 294 is that the property no longer vests in the Municipal Board. The question of the exercise of the Municipal Board's power to sanction making constructions on these lands, does not arise and if the Municipal Board by virtue of file vesting of the land to Government lost its right to grant sanction, the question of this power being exercised by any of the delegated officers would not arise and thus the sub-section (b) of Section 294 is not attracted in the present case. If sub-section (c) is attracted, then it being an admitted fact that in the year 1947 the Municipal Board was superseded, the land vested in the Government and thus the appellants cannot now say that they got any bona fide right to make constructions on the land which vested in the State. As regards the suit No. 49 the contention is that on the date when the sanction was granted in the year 1908, the land vested in the Municipal Board. It is not disputed that by a notification issued in the year 1930 under Section 55 (2) of the Assam Municipal Act the Strand Road, Gauhati ceased to vest in the Municipal Board, Gauhati and thus the contention of the State is that the property no longer belonged to the Municipal Board. It is contended by the State that the constructions made are without jurisdiction inasmuch as the permission granted to the plaintiff in Suit No. 49 was only to make the drains pucca and not to make the constructions. The order granting permission is to be found at page 79 of the paper-book and is marked Exts. 1, 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c). The order granting permission is to be found at page 79 of the paper-book and is marked Exts. 1, 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c). After the application was made by Sri Narang Roy Agarwalla wherein he had asked for permission to make the drains in front of his oil mill and the drain near the Brahmaputra pucca with a good verandah of C. I. sheet roof over it, the order was passed in the specific terms allowing him to make the drains pucca according to the plan suggested. The order is passed on the application itself which contains two specific prayers and the order specifically relates to one of the prayers. Thus it cannot be said on the plain reading of this order that it granted permission to the predecessor in interest of the appellant to make constructions on the drain. It only allowed him to make the drains pucca and thus the constructions made by the appellant's predecessor were unauthorised constructions over the drain. If the constructions were unauthorised, then so long as they remain on the land a right accrued to the Government in which the land vested to evict the appellant for making the unauthorised constructions. Rule 18 was thus attracted in this case. (9) The only question is whether the notification took away the drains also from the Municipal Board. The contention is that unless the notification by which the property notified is taken, out of the possession of the Municipal Board mentions the drains specifically, it cannot be said that the drain ceased to vest in the Municipal Board under the notification. Section 55 which is the relevant section runs as follows:- "55. The contention is that unless the notification by which the property notified is taken, out of the possession of the Municipal Board mentions the drains specifically, it cannot be said that the drain ceased to vest in the Municipal Board under the notification. Section 55 which is the relevant section runs as follows:- "55. (1) Subject to any special reservation made by the Provincial Government, all property of the nature hereinafter in this section specified and situated within the municipality shall vest in and belong to the Board, and shall with all other property of whatsoever nature or kind which may become vested in the Board, be under its direction, management and control, that is to say:- (a) all public roads including the soil, the pavements, stones and other materials thereof, and all drains, bridges, trees, erections materials, implements and other things provided for such roads; * * * * (2) The Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any property which has vested under sub-section (1) in the Board shall cease to be so vested, and thereupon the property specified in the notification shall cease to be so vested, and the Provincial Government may pass such orders as it thinks fit regarding the disposal and management of such property." The other portions of the section are not material for the purposes of the appreciation of the points raised in the case. It is contended that clause (a) contains several properties. 'Road' including the soil is an item of property distinct from the drains and if the notification wanted that the drains ceased to vest in the Municipal Board, that should have been specifically mentioned in the notification itself. Our attention has been drawn in this connection to the definition of the words 'drain' and 'road'. It is contended that in the definition of the word 'road' drain is not included and thus the notification which deals with Strand Road cannot mean to include dram attached to that road. Our attention is further drawn to sub-section 1(c) of Section 55 which mentions - 'all public sewers and drains and all works, materials and things appertaining thereto and other conservancy works'. Section 55(1) clauses (a) to (f) mentions the different classes of property which vest in the Municipal Board. Our attention is further drawn to sub-section 1(c) of Section 55 which mentions - 'all public sewers and drains and all works, materials and things appertaining thereto and other conservancy works'. Section 55(1) clauses (a) to (f) mentions the different classes of property which vest in the Municipal Board. Clause (a) deals with all public roads-including the soil, the pavements, stones and other materials thereof, and all drains, bridges, trees erections, materials, implements and other things provided for such roads. Thus even though in the definition of the word 'road', the road does not include the drains but for the purposes of Section 55(1)(a) the word 'road' includes the drains and other things provided for such roads. Thus the drains which are adjoining the road are included in the word 'public road'. All public sewers and drains and other materials are dealt with in a separate clause. If, therefore, drains which are appurtenant to the road are included in the 'public road' as a distinct class of property given in clause (a) of Section 55(1), when a notification is issued under Section 55(2) in respect of the Strand Road which is a public road, it necessarily include the drains which appertain to that road. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction of Section 55(1)(a) will be that a 'public road' which vests in the Municipal Board under Section 55(1)(a) includes the drains appertaining to that road and if such a road ceases under a notification under Section 55 (2) to vest in the Municipal Board, then the drain which was included in such a road also ceases to vest in the Municipal Board and thus the drain ceased to vest in 1930 and onwards in the Municipal Board and the Deputy Commissioner could act under Rule 18 of the Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. (10) The only question is whether the appellants have succeeded in proving their bona fide claim of right to the property. The contention of Mr. Lahiri is that the bona fide claim of the right not necessarily mean a right to the property itself. It only means a right to remain in possession of the property. (10) The only question is whether the appellants have succeeded in proving their bona fide claim of right to the property. The contention of Mr. Lahiri is that the bona fide claim of the right not necessarily mean a right to the property itself. It only means a right to remain in possession of the property. Even accepting that contention, the permission granted to the appellants was only for making constructions and by that they do not acquire any right to remain in possession of the property and thus the bona fide claim to right contemplated by Rule 18(2) of the rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation does not relate to any right in the property. It necessarily means a right either of ownership or to remain in possession of the property. Apart from it, the contention of the appellants that by estoppel the Government cannot ask for the ejectment of the appellants, also cannot be accepted. What will constitute estoppel is no longer in dispute. If one of the parties by its representation makes the other party to change his position, then the party which makes the representation cannot be allowed to affect the right of the other party which it has acquired in the land by the representation made by the other party. There may also be a case of estoppel where one of the parties stands by and allows the other party to change its position, in that case also the first party is estopped from evicting the other party. There may be a case where the other party in the mistaken belief of its right to the property makes certain constructions on the other land. In that case the other party cannot be evicted from the land. It is not a case where the Government can be said to have made any representation which led the other party to make the constructions. The permission was not granted by the Government. There was no action of the Government which can be said to amount to a representation on the art of the Government on which the appellants are said to have made the constructions. It is not a case in which the appellants can be said to have acted in the mistaken belief of right oyer the property. There was no action of the Government which can be said to amount to a representation on the art of the Government on which the appellants are said to have made the constructions. It is not a case in which the appellants can be said to have acted in the mistaken belief of right oyer the property. Admittedly the appellants have based their case on the permission granted to them by the Municipal Board and thus at no stage of the case they rightly or wrongly believed that they are the owners of the land. The only case set up by Mr. Lahiri is that if the appellants believed by mistake in view of the permission granted by the Municipal Board that they had a right to make the constructions and in that mistaken belief they made constructions investing large sums of money and the respondent stood by without asserting their right and allowed the appellants to make the constructions, the res­pondent is estopped from challenging the right of the appellants. (11) There are two points which are essential in the circumstances of the case to be examined. Firstly, even assuming the case of the appellants to be correct, the only right which they assert was that they were grafted permission to make constructions. They can only say that the respondent is estopped from denying the right which was claimed by the appellants. But it cannot be said that the authorities are estopped from asking the ejectment of the appellants. The right which is asserted by the appellants is that they were granted permission to make constructions and if the question was only the case of a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from asking the present appellants to demolish their constructions, different considerations may have arisen. But in a case where the appellants are saying that the order of the Deputy Commissioner is without jurisdiction inasmuch as they have got a bona fide claim of right to the property, the mere fact that they have got permission to make construction, cannot be said to be even a bona fide assertion of their right to the property and the question of estoppel does not arise. (12) Apart from that it is also clear that so fax as the two plaintiffs in title Suits Nos. (12) Apart from that it is also clear that so fax as the two plaintiffs in title Suits Nos. 47 and 48 are concerned, steps were taken to evict them in the year 1948, the permission itself was granted in the year 1947 and if the plaintiff appellants knew that the Municipal Board was superseded in the year 1947, they could not have had even a bona fide belief that the executive officer had a right to grant permission. The bona fides does not mean only that there should be absence of mala fides. If any act is done without the authority of law and if the person knowing, as he is supposed to know, the law as it should be, takes permission from the authority which is not entitled to give permission, it cannot be said that he believed bona fide that he had a right to make the constructions. The same point will apply to the case where the permission is granted in the year 1908. If under the law the Municipal Board had no authority to grant permission and if the constructions were admittedly unauthorised inasmuch as the permission which was granted did not relate to the constructions, then it cannot be said that the appellants had a bona fide belief that they had a right to make constructions. On the face of it the permission which was granted to the appellants was a right to make the drain pucca and if on the face of that permission the appellants made constructions, it cannot be said that they had bona fide believed that they had a right to make constructions. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to examine the authorities cited by Mr. Lahiri. He has frankly admitted that his contention will prevail on the assumption that in the mistaken belief of their right the appellants made constructions and if in the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the ap­pellants bona fide believed that they had a right to make the constructions, the question of the estoppel will not arise at all. (13) Reference may, however, be made to the following cases cited by Mr. Lahiri- (i) Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Lab reported in ILR 20 Cal 296 at p. 311 (PC). (13) Reference may, however, be made to the following cases cited by Mr. Lahiri- (i) Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Lab reported in ILR 20 Cal 296 at p. 311 (PC). (ii) Attorney-General to Prince of Wales v. Collom reported in (1916) 2 KB 193; (iii) A. H. Forbes v. L. E. Ralli, reported in AIR 1925 PC 146. It is contended that in the Privy Council case above referred to, there was no registered lease and yet by the principle of estoppel the principal landlord was estopped from evicting the defendant. The finding in that case was that from the representation and the conduct of the landlord it appeared that a permanent tenancy was conferred on the tenant and in that view of the matter it was held in this case that now the landlord could not be permitted to evict the tenant. (14) In the alternative the appellants have also claimed compensation. It is very difficult to appreciate the alternative relief of compensation. What damages have been caused to the appellants can only arise after the constructions have been actually demolished. The amount of compensation cannot be assessed at this stage and the cause of action even for making compensation will only arise after the constructions have been demolished. (15) In the result the appeals fail. But in view of the fact that the appellants have invested large sums of money, the parties will bear their own costs of this appeal. KG/R/D.V.C. Appeals dismissed. ---------------------