JUDGMENT Mithan Lal, J. - This second appeal filed by the plaintiff arises out of the dismissal of his suit for possession of the land in dispute. The plaintiff borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,000/- from the defendant-respondent under a simple money bond dated 18th June, 1948 agreeing to pay interest at annas six per cent per month. In lieu of payment of interest the plaintiff gave possession of the land mentioned in list A of the plaint to the defendant on 25th June, 1948. It was agreed between the parties that the plaintiff will be entitled to take back possession of these plots as soon as the plaintiff paid the principal and the interest to the defendant. The plaintiff executed another bond for Rs. 1,000/- on 27th May, 1951 agreeing to pay the same interest as agreed in the earlier bond and in lieu of payment of interest of this bond, the plaintiff gave possession of the property mentioned in list B of the plaint. It was again agreed that as soon as the plaintiff paid the principal and the interest of the bond the defendant will give over possession of the property of list B to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was a mere licencee and as the licence was revokeable at any time and the plaintiff was prepared to pay the money due to the defendant the licence was revoked and so the plaintiff brought the suit for possession of the plots in dispute. The defence was that the defendant was not a licencee but was a sub-tenant and so he had become an Adhivasi. Alternatively adhivasi rights were claimed by virtue of his cultivatory possession in 1339F and also by virtue of his being a recorded occupant in 1356F. 2. The adhivasi issue was sent to the revenue court for a finding and that court held that the defendant had become an adhivasi by virtue of his cultivatory possession in 1359F. This finding of the revenue court has been accepted by both the courts below and so the plaintiff's suit has been dismissed. That is how the plaintiff has come in appeal. 3. Sri A.P. Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the defendant has been in possession of the land in dispute in lieu of interest and so his position was that of a licencee or akin to a mortgagee. That is how the plaintiff has come in appeal. 3. Sri A.P. Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the defendant has been in possession of the land in dispute in lieu of interest and so his position was that of a licencee or akin to a mortgagee. If he was a licencee the licence was revokeable at the option of the plaintiff and as the plaintiff has made the offer to make the payment the defendant could not acquire adhivasi rights as his possession was not in his own rights but was on behalf of the plaintiff. It is also his submission that by virtue of Explanation to Section 3 of Act XXXI of 1952 the defendant could not become an adhivasi by cultivatory possession in 1359F. Sri G. P. Bhargava, learned advocate for the respondent, has on the other hand contended that Explanation to Section 3 has no application as its scope is limited to a mortgagee in possession or a thekedar or a sajhidar and the defendant being none he could acquire adhivasi rights under Section 3 of Act XXXI of 1952. In the alternative he has contended that if the defendant is treated to be a licencee and the plaintiff is held to be entitled to take back possession a conditional decree on payment of loan should be passed. 4. On the admitted or proved facts of the case the defendant is in possession of the property of list A in lieu of interest of a simple money bond for Rs. 3,000 while he is in possession of the property in list B in lieu of interest of another simple money bond for Rs. 1000. The amount due to the defendant under the two bonds, that is a sum of Rs. 4,000, has not yet been paid and the defendant has been appropriating the usufruct of the land only in lieu of interest. The question is what is the position of the defendant, whether he is a mortgagee or a sub-tenant or a licencee. 5. The word 'mortgage' or its two derivatives 'mortgagor' and 'mortgagee' have not been defined in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Therefore a transaction in order to amount to a mortgage must comply with the requirements of general law or the definition of the word 'mortgage' given in the Transfer of Property Act. 5. The word 'mortgage' or its two derivatives 'mortgagor' and 'mortgagee' have not been defined in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Therefore a transaction in order to amount to a mortgage must comply with the requirements of general law or the definition of the word 'mortgage' given in the Transfer of Property Act. In this case no mortgage-deed as envisaged by the Transfer of Property Act was executed. There was an oral agreement between the parties that the defendant shall remain in possession of the property in lieu of interest, that is the agreement was that the plaintiff who was the owner of the land shall get no rent and the amount of rent shall be appropriated in lieu of interest. Such an oral agreement, in the absence of a document required to be written and registered and signed by the executant and attested by two witnesses, could not amount to a mortgage within the meaning assigned to the word 'mortgage' under the general law. This view is supported by case of Smt. Kawal Patti v. Ram Joklian Upadhya, 1955 A. L. J. 825. That was a case under Section 14 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and Roy J., who decided that case, held that if towards payment of interest of a pronote or for payment of the principal debt the creditor is put into possession of certain property under an oral agreement, such a transaction cannot amount to a mortgage. I with respect agree with the above view and consequently the transaction did not amount to a mortgage. 6. The position of such a creditor who is in possession in lieu of interest is also not that of a sub-tenant, but that of a mere licencee. Such a view has been expressed in the Full Bench case of Mahabal Singh v. Ramraj, 1950 A. L. J. 713. That was of course a case of usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding by a tenant. But it was held that though such a mortgage was voidable yet the possession of such a mortgagee is a permissive possession. Such a view has been expressed in the Full Bench case of Mahabal Singh v. Ramraj, 1950 A. L. J. 713. That was of course a case of usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding by a tenant. But it was held that though such a mortgage was voidable yet the possession of such a mortgagee is a permissive possession. In another case of Ajodhya Singh v. Data Din, 1952 A. L. J. 80 Agarwala, J. expressed the view that a mortgagor of an occupancy holding could institute the suit under Section 180, U. P. Tenancy Act, by revoking the licence and such a licence shall be deemed to have been revoked by instituting a suit under Section 180, U. P., Tenancy Act. It was also a case in which a conditional decree on payment of the mortgage money was passed. In another Division Bench case of Barhu Singh v. Kharpattu, 1956 A. L. J. 87 the position of a mortgagee of an occupancy holding was held to be that of a licencee and the cause of action for recovery of possession was deemed to accrue on demand of possession by the mortgagor and on payment of the mortgage money. In the present case there is no question of entering into any transaction of mortgage by transferring any non-transferable property, but there is the question of transferring possession of the property to the creditor under an agreement which did not amount to a mortgage. The position of such a creditor, who has been put in possession in lieu of interest, is similar to a mortgagee of an occupancy holding which is forbidden by law. On the principles laid down in the aforesaid three authorities the defendant occupied the position of a mere licencee and the licence could be revoked by the debtor at any time either by instituting a suit for possession or by making a demand for possession on payment of money and the refusal of the creditor to deliver back the possession. In this case a suit for possession having been instituted it should be deemed that the plaintiff revoked the licence and could recover possession, but such a possession could only be recovered by making payment of the money due to the creditor which is Rs. 4,000 in the present case. A conditional decree for possession on payment of Rs. In this case a suit for possession having been instituted it should be deemed that the plaintiff revoked the licence and could recover possession, but such a possession could only be recovered by making payment of the money due to the creditor which is Rs. 4,000 in the present case. A conditional decree for possession on payment of Rs. 4,000 would also adjust the equities between the parties. 7. The only other point which remains for consideration is whether a creditor put in possession in lieu of interest under an oral agreement could acquire adhivasi rights by virtue of his cultivatory possession in 1359F. under Section 3 of Act XXXI of 1952. To my mind he could not acquire such rights for the simple reason that the possession of such a creditor cannot be deemed to be possession in his own rights and he being a mere licencee and the licence being a revokeable one he could be ejected under other provisions of the Act. In order that a person may acquire adhivasi rights by-virtue of his cultivatory possession in 1359F it is necessary that he should cultivate the land on his behalf and in his own rights, but such a right is not possessed by a licencee. Much reliance was placed upon the explanation given under that section and it was contended that if a creditor in possession in lieu of interest is not a mortgagee and is not covered by the explanation he should be deemed to have acquired adhivasi rights under the main body of the section, but I am unable to accept this contention. Because the purpose of the explanation is to exclude persons who are not in possession in their own rights and the three categories which have been mentioned in the explanation, that is mortgagees, thekedars and sajhidars appear to be only illustrative. Technically a creditor in possession of the land in lieu of interest is not a mortgagee but to all intents and purposes, that is in spirit, his position is that of a mortgagee though on account of the provisions of law he occupies the position of a licencee. Technically a creditor in possession of the land in lieu of interest is not a mortgagee but to all intents and purposes, that is in spirit, his position is that of a mortgagee though on account of the provisions of law he occupies the position of a licencee. In order that a person may acquire adhivasi rights under Section 3 of Act XXXI of 1952 it is necessary that his possession must be in his own rights and as a creditor in possession in lieu of interest is not in possession in his own rights he cannot acquire rights under Section 3 of the said Act. Moreover, if the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted it would mean giving such a licencee a better position than a real mortgagee. Under Section 3 of Act XXXI of 1952 a mortgagee becomes a mere asami and is liable to ejectment under the relevant provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act while a licencee, if he were to become an adhivasi, will become a sirdar and will not be liable to ejectment. Such could not have been the intention of law and a licencee who is in possession of debtor's land in lieu of interest cannot be given a better status than that of a mortgagee. His licence is revokeable as stated earlier. 8. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that the respondent should beemed to have become an adhivasi under the provisions of Section 20(b) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. But this case appears to have been pressed for the first time in second appeal. Such a case does not appear to have been argued in any of the two courts below. This * argument of the learned counsel cannot also be accepted because even though the name of the defendant-respondent may have been recorded in 1356F yet his possession was not in his own rights and as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil Ul Rahman, A.I.R. 1961 S. C. 143=1961 A. L. J. 27, the defendant-respondent cannot be treated to be an adhivasi even under Section 20(b) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 9. 9. I am, therefore, of the view that the position of a creditor in possession of debtor's land in lieu of interest of a loan is that of a mere licencee and the licence being revokeable at the option of the debtor such a person cannot acquire adhivasi rights by virtue of either being a recorded occupant in 1356F under Section 20(b) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or by virtue of his cultivatory possession in 1359F under Section 3 of Act XXXI of 1952. The courts below were, therefore, wrong in holding that the defendant-respondent had become an adhivasi and could not be ejected. 10. For the reasons given above the appeal must succeed and a conditional decree must be passed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 11. The appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside. The plaintiff's suit for possession over the land in dispute is hereby decreed with costs throughout on payment of a sum of Rs. 4,000/- due under the two bonds executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant, within a period of six months from today. 12. Leave prayed for is refused as there is no question of leave now after H.C. Abolition of L.P. Appeals Act.