Srinivasan, J.:- Three buses belonging to the petitioner were found not running for certain periods during the year 1956-57. The Regional Transport Authority took action against the petitioner under section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act. A notice issued to the petitioner called upon him to show cause why the permits of all the 15 vehicles belonging to the petitioner should not be suspended or cancelled. After an enquiry, the Regional Transport Authority made an order directing the cancellation of the permit of three vehicles which were not being used for more than 45 days. Against this order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 21st January, 1958, an appeal was taken to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which confirmed the order of cancellation by its older, dated 28th April, 1958. These orders were the subject-matter of W. P. No. 365 of 1958. That petition failed and a further Writ Appeal was also dismissed on 31st January, 1962. Thereafter, the petitioner moved the Regional Transport Authority praying that in lieu of cancellation of the permits, the petitioner might be permitted to pay a monetary penalty under section 60(3) of the Act. The Regional Transport Authority examined the contention of the petitioner that no opportunity had been given to him to compound the offence. He held that the wording of section 60(3) did not confer a right upon the permit holder, but that it was within the discretion of the authority alone to compound the offence. He thought that no provision existed under section 60(3) of the Act for the grant of an opportunity to show that that provision should be invoked. He observed that the expression “instead of cancelling or suspending the permit”, appearing in section 60(3) of the Act, would apply only if the permit had not already been cancelled ; but that if the permit had already been cancelled, the authority which cancelled the permit must be deemed to have exercised its discretion. In this view, he held that there was no provision to enable the authority to re-open the matter and consider the applicability of section 60(3) of the Act. Against this order, a revision was taken to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. In this view, he held that there was no provision to enable the authority to re-open the matter and consider the applicability of section 60(3) of the Act. Against this order, a revision was taken to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal referred to certain decisions of this Court and took the view that the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had become functus officio after the disposal of the proceedings before them; that is to say, when once these authorities dealt with a proceeding under section 60(1) and directed the cancellation of the permit and such cancellation had also been confirmed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, no power survived to these authorities to reconsider the matter of compounding the offence under section 60(3) of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal also thought that if the question were to be considered at the stage of implementing the order of the Regional Transport Authority cancelling the permit, it would amount to a review of its earlier order. Finally, the Tribunal observed that the right to compound was impliedly negatived by the Regional Transport Authority and that, therefore, the application for compounding now made could not be sustained. These orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Tribunal are canvassed in this writ petition, the principal ground urged by the petitioner being that the power of the authority to compound in terms of the section arose only on the determination that the permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended; that is to say, only after the appropriate authority gives a finding that the petitioner has contravened any of the provisions of the Act set out in section 60(1), clauses (a), (b) or (e). According to the petitioner, the authority is bound to examine the question in the light of section 60(3) of the Act only after it reaches the conclusion that the permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended. There is no limitation, so it is contended, in sub-section (3) which would detract from the scope of the exercise of the power. According to the petitioner, the authority is bound to examine the question in the light of section 60(3) of the Act only after it reaches the conclusion that the permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended. There is no limitation, so it is contended, in sub-section (3) which would detract from the scope of the exercise of the power. It is claimed that the provision for compounding is intended to avoid the inconvenience to the public by the stoppage of the service and that it lays a duty upon the appropriate authority to consider whether in any particular case the order of cancellation or suspension of the permit should be replaced by an order imposing a monetary payment. It is accordingly urged that the authorities below have not adverted their attention to the specific terms of the section, which authorised the exercise of power to compound only at the stage when the cancellation or suspension is decided upon. That, according to the petitioner, has not been done, and the view taken by the authorities that they are functus officio and the matter cannot be re-opened is a clear error of law. In the counter-affidavit of the respondents, the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the facts are set out. It is claimed that the orders were validly and legally made and are not vitiated in any manner. In paragraph 6, it is suggested that when the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal were seized of the question under section 60(1) of the Act, the question which they considered was whether the cancellation of the permit was proper and not excessive, and that being so, the orders made by them should be deemed to have refused compounding of the offence under section 60(3) of the Act. It is further averred that since the offences took place prior to the introduction of section 60(3) of the Act by Central Act C of 1956, this provision will not apply to> the facts of the present case. Even otherwise, it is claimed that the request for compounding should be made at the time of passing the order and not after it has become final. The permission to compound, it is said lies within the absolute discretion of the Regional Transport Authority, and the question cannot be canvassed in the present proceedings. Even otherwise, it is claimed that the request for compounding should be made at the time of passing the order and not after it has become final. The permission to compound, it is said lies within the absolute discretion of the Regional Transport Authority, and the question cannot be canvassed in the present proceedings. One fact appears to be clear ; it is that at the time the Regional Transport Authority passed the order finding the petitioner guilty of contravening section 60(1) of the Act, he did not consider expressly the question whether in the circumstances of the case the cancellation should or should not be replaced by an order imposing a monetary penalty. Nor did the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in its order deal with that question. What was canvassed by the petitioner before those officers; and before this Court in the petition and the Writ Appeal was apparently the finding that the petitioner’s permits were not liable to be cancelled. The petitioner was all the time contending that no offence was committed which rendered the permits liable to be cancelled. No question arose in those proceedings with regard to the application of section 60(3) of the Act, and as I have stated, the authorities did not consider whether a monetary penalty should be substituted for the order of cancellation. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the petitioner principally contends that while he is not claiming that the Regional Transport Authority should on the facts of the case have made a direction to compound, there has been a total failure on the part of the authority to consider whether action under section 60(3) of the Act should or should not be taken. If the authority who has to consider that question has failed to do so, it is urged that it is open to the petitioner to come to this Court and seek for the proper direction. If the authority who has to consider that question has failed to do so, it is urged that it is open to the petitioner to come to this Court and seek for the proper direction. Section 60(1) of the Act confers power upon the Transport Authority to cancel the permit or to suspend it for such period as it thinks fit on the breach of any conditions specified in sub-section (3) of section 59 or of any condition contained in the permit, or if the holder of the permits uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit or if the holder of the permit not being a private carrier’s permit fails without reasonable cause to use a vehicle or vehicles for the purposes of which the permit was granted. There are other classes of offences which invite the penalty of cancellation or suspension of the permit. But we are at present concerned with the last of the clauses set out. The proviso to this sub-section requires an opportunity to be given to the holder of the permit to furnish his explanation before a permit can be cancelled. Sub-section (3) of section 60 was inserted by Central Act C of 1956 and was in force in the year 1957 and onwards. This section reads thus: "Where a permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (e) of sub-section (1) and the transport authority is of opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case, it would not be necessary or expedient so to cancel or suspend the permit if the holder of the permit agrees to pay a certain sum of money, then, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Transport Authority may, instead of cancelling or suspending the permit, as. the case may be, recover from the holder of the permit the sum of money agreed upon.“ This section would accordingly come into play where (i) the liability to cancellation or suspension of the permit is incurred; (2) the Transport Authority finds it not necessary or expedient to cancel the permit; and (3) the holder of the permit agrees to pay a sum of money; then, "instead of cancelling or suspending the permit"; the Transport Authority can recover the sum of money agreed upon. The learned Advocate-General points out that the liability of cancellation or suspension of the permit cannot possibly be incurred till the proceeding under section 60(1) of the Act is completed, when after considering the charge and the explanation of the permit-holder, the Transport Authority finds that the permit-holder, has been guilty of one or the other of the offences mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (e) no liability can come to exist till such, a finding is recorded by the Transport Authority. It should therefore follow, according to the learned Advocate-General, that the discretionary power vested in section 60(3) can be exercised only after the finding mentioned has been given. It is claimed that so long as the matter has not been considered under sub-section (3), it is open to the petitioner to ask that it should be considered, though he cannot obviously insist that the cancellation or suspension should be replaced by the imposition of a monetary penalty. The analogy of section 345 of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to the compounding of offences is pointed out. Section 345 permits the compounding of offences even before a conviction has been recorded. Sub-section (5) of section 345 permits the compounding of offences even after conviction, Out during the pendency of an appeal and with the leave of the appellate Court. Under section 55 of the Forests Act also, compounding is permissible to avoid prosecution, that is to say, even before the charge-sheet is laid before the Magistrate. Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act has also been referred to where the Collector of Customs is required at the time of ordering confiscation of the offending goods in certain cases to impose a monetary penalty That power is especially required . to be exercised at the time the order of confiscation is made. On the analogy of this provision, the learned Advocate-General asks that in a case where the liability to cancellation or suspension of the permit is determined by the appropriate authority in a proceeding under section 60(1) of the Act, it is the duty of that authority to consider whether the circumstances of the case are such that the statutory discretion under section 60(3) of the Act should or should not be exercised. In any event, it is urged this discretion cannot come into play before a finding is recorded under section 60(1) of the Act. In any event, it is urged this discretion cannot come into play before a finding is recorded under section 60(1) of the Act. If that is so, the mere fact that the decision of the Authority under section 60(1) of the Act has been challenged does not prevent the exercise of the discretion under section 60(3) of the Act at a subsequent stage. There are a few decisions of this Court to which reference has to be made. In W.P. No. 551 of 1959, the petitioner was found to be guilty of two charges of overloading the bus, and the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, made an order suspending the permit for a period of one week. On appeal, the appellate authority found only one of the charges proved and reduced the suspension to three days. Following that order, the petitioner applied to the Regional Transport Authority for compounding the offence under section 60(3) of the Act. That Authority declined to do so on the ground that it had no power to do so. A revision against that order also failed. The question thereafter came to this Court by way of a writ petition. Ramachandra Iyer, J. (as he then was) took the view that section 60(3) itself indicated the stage at which the Regional Transport Authority is to decide whether it would be expedient to suspend or cancel the permit or to agree that the holder of the permit should pay a certain sum of money in lieu thereof. He stated: "Under the section, the question of compounding, to use that expression, can arise only when the Regional Transport Authority is to decide about the punishment. That cannot therefore arise after that Authority has decided and inflicted the punishment. In the present case, the Regional Transport Authority has passed its order suspending the permit as early as 22nd May, 1958. That order was confirmed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal as early as 16th August, 1958 and it had become final. There would, therefore, no longer be any question of considering whether in the circumstances of a particular case there should be a cancellation or suspension of a permit or, in the alternative, payment of money by the holder of the permit, the first of the two alternatives having been already decided upon and ordered. There would, therefore, no longer be any question of considering whether in the circumstances of a particular case there should be a cancellation or suspension of a permit or, in the alternative, payment of money by the holder of the permit, the first of the two alternatives having been already decided upon and ordered. I am therefore of opinion that the Regional Transport Authority was right in its conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to compound the offence under the provisions of section 60(3) at the stage at which it was approached." In W.A.No. 153 of 1960 against the decision in W.P. No. 551 of 1959, the learned Judges observed that on a proper construction of section 60(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, once an order of cancellation or suspension is passed, then there is no power in the Transport Authority to recover from the holder of the permit any sum agreed upon instead of cancelling or suspending the permit. The learned Chief Justice said that the appellant did not make any application to be permitted to pay any money before the actual order of suspension, and proceeded to say: "If the appellant had, in the first instance pleaded in the alternative that he may be permitted to pay a certain sum of money instead of his permit being cancelled or suspended, then the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority should have referred the matter to the Authority to deal with the particular prayer of the appellant. Admittedly this was not done by the appellant. After the order of suspension had been passed, he filed an appeal.................." and finally the learned Judges held that the Regional Transport Authority had no Jurisdiction to compound the offence, so to say, under the provisions of section 60(3) of the Act. These decisions appear to suggest that the invoking of section 60(3) of the Act should be at the instance of the permit-holder. Indeed W.A. No. 153 of 1960 suggests that even at the time when the petitioner is called upon to submit an explanation, he should plead in the alternative that he might be permitted to pay the monetary penalty. In W.P. No. 267 of 1960 decided by me, a proceeding under section 60(1) of the Act went through all the usual stages of appeal against suspension of the permit, a Writ Petition and a further Writ Appeal. In W.P. No. 267 of 1960 decided by me, a proceeding under section 60(1) of the Act went through all the usual stages of appeal against suspension of the permit, a Writ Petition and a further Writ Appeal. The offence itself had been committed in 1956 and the order of the Regional Transport Authority suspending the permit appears to have been made before section 60(3) of the Act was introduced. After the dismissal of the Writ Appeal on 30th November, 1959, an application to have the offence compounded was made, which was refused. This refusal was brought before this Court in that Writ Petition. I stated then that the discretion under section 60(3) of the Act was entirely that of the Transport Authority and that it was not for the permit-holder who had been punished to demand that in lieu of the suspension of the permit, the monetary penalty should be accepted. I took the view that in effect the order of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, refusing the application made by the petitioner in 1959 amounted to an exercise of the discretion contained in section 60 (3) of the Act. This decision did not examine when or how the discretion conferred by section 60(3) should be exercised. In R.A. Natarajan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (W.A. No. 73 of 1962)1 against the above decision a Bench of this Court again took the view that the proper stage at which the offer to compound must be made is the stage when the matter is under investigation either by the First Authority or at least when the appeal was being heard by the Appellate Authority, and that thereafter, it would not be correct to hold that the Authorities would be bound to entertain the offer for compounding. The principal complaint of the learned Advocate-General is that in these decisions there appears an underlying implication that the petitioner should make an offer even before a finding of guilt has been recorded. He urges again that the liability to cancellation or suspension can arise only after the finding has been recorded and that the discretion vested in the appropriate authority is one for him to exercise on his own volition and that an application from the permit-holder is neither competent nor contemplated by the section. He urges again that the liability to cancellation or suspension can arise only after the finding has been recorded and that the discretion vested in the appropriate authority is one for him to exercise on his own volition and that an application from the permit-holder is neither competent nor contemplated by the section. According to him, the procedure that should be adopted is more on the lines of section 183 of the Sea Customs Act where the Collector passes an order imposing a penalty in lieu of confiscation at the time he makes the order of confiscation. He relies in this regard upon a Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ramamurthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh1. In dealing with a similar case, where, for an offence of overloading, suspension of the permit of the stage carriage was ordered by the Regional Transport Authority, followed by a Further infructuous appeal to the State Transport Appellate Authority and a revision to the Government, the matter came by way of a Writ Petition before the High Court. The learned Judges proceeded to consider whether after the matter had gone through all of these stages, the Regional Transport Authority should now be called upon to permit the appellant to compound the offence. They observed thus: “It is immediately plain that the power to require the holder of the permit to compound the offence should be exercised by the Transport Authorities only at the time of deciding whether the punishment should be imposed or whether some amount of money should be recovered in lieu of punishment from the permit-holder. This discretion could be exercised by the Transport Authority only at that time if it feels that the circumstances of the case warrant it. It may be mentioned that such power cannot be exercised by the Transport Authority or an Appellate Authority or Government exercising revisional jurisdiction long after the imposition of the punishment. It may also be mentioned that this section does not confer any right on an operator to compound the offence. He cannot demand that he should be permitted to pay a sum of money in lieu of cancellation or suspension of the permit. It may also be mentioned that this section does not confer any right on an operator to compound the offence. He cannot demand that he should be permitted to pay a sum of money in lieu of cancellation or suspension of the permit. It is entirely a matter for the Tribunal concerned to consider that question at the time of imposing the punishment.” This decision accordingly lays it down that the discretionary power vested in the Tribunal should be exercised at the time it holds the petitioner to be guilty of the offence, when alone whether the cancellation or suspension should be ordered or whether, instead of cancellation or suspension, monetary penalty should be imposed could properly arise for examination. While it is true that the decision lays down that the power cannot be exercised, the decision is still in support of the position that the question of substitution of monetary penalty cannot precede the determination of the finding of guilt. If the petitioner has no right to insist upon the substitution of a monetary penalty, equally so the request that a monetary penalty, should be imposed in the alternative of suspension or cancellation even at the time the explanation is called for would appear to be futile prayer. In any event, it seems to me that there is a conflict of view between the decisions of this Court and the Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court regarding the stage at which the exercise of the discretion under section 60(3) of the Act should be brought into play. If I may express my view, I am of opinion that it is only after the Authority records a finding of guilt and holds that the permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended that the application of section 60(3) of the Act would arise. Whether or not to exercise that discretion in the circumstances of the case is matter for the exclusive determination, of the Transport Authority. Though it may be invoked by the permit-holder, the latter has no right to insist that a monetary penalty should be imposed instead of cancellation. It is for the Regional Transport Authority on recording a finding of guilt to proceed to consider whether the circumstances of the case would warrant the imposition of a monetary penalty instead. He is expected by the statute to do so. It is for the Regional Transport Authority on recording a finding of guilt to proceed to consider whether the circumstances of the case would warrant the imposition of a monetary penalty instead. He is expected by the statute to do so. The scheme of section 60 is to my mind a close parallelled to section 183 of the Sea Customs Act, in this regard. The failure of the Regional Transport Authority to exercise that power at the stage I have indicated would certainly invite the writ jurisdiction of this Court. I am of opinion that the conflict of authority that I have refened to should be resolved in an appropriate manner. The papers will be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for making suitable directions in that regard. In pursuance of the above Oder of reference the petition came on for hearing before a Bench (Jagadisan and Venkatadri, JJ.). V.K. Thiruvenkatachari (The Advocate-General), G. Ramaswami, for Petitioner. The Additional Government Pleader (V. Ramaswami), for Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Jagadisan, J.- This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Central Act C of 1956, hereinafter referred as the Act. The problem to be solved is as regards the scope of section 60, sub-section (3) of the Act. Srinivasan, J., who heard the Writ Petition in the first instance, was apparently not inclined to agree with, some of the decisions of this Court relating to the interpretation of the said provisions, and was also of the opinion that there is a conflict of authority on the subject. On this expression of opinion, the papers were placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, and the Writ Petition has been directed to be posted before a Division Bench. The matter is certainly of some importance to transport operators, and it must be said that the point involved for decision is of frequent occurrence. Even at the outset, the learned Advocate-General appearing for the petitioner pressed for reference to a Full Bench, as, in his submission, the view taken by the Division Bench consisting of Rajamannar, Chief Justice, and Venkatadri, J., in Writ Appeal No. 153 of 1960 required reconsideration. Even at the outset, the learned Advocate-General appearing for the petitioner pressed for reference to a Full Bench, as, in his submission, the view taken by the Division Bench consisting of Rajamannar, Chief Justice, and Venkatadri, J., in Writ Appeal No. 153 of 1960 required reconsideration. It was also pointed out to us that the decision of another Division Bench of this Court in R.A. Natarajan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal W.A. No. 73 of 19621 (Ganapatia Pillai and Kailasam, JJ.) has expressed a view which is somewhat contrary to the view taken in W.A. No. 153 of 1960. After careful consideration of all the decisions on the subject to which our attention has been drawn and to the relevant statutory provisions, we do not think that there is any necessity for the matter being referred to a Full Bench. The undisputed facts giving rise to the Writ Petition are as follows. The petitioner is a transport operator in Salem district. He held stage carriage permits, one permit in each of the three routes: (1) Edappadi to Velur (via) Kenganapuram, (2) Salem to Jalakandapuram (via) Atayampatti, and (3) Namakkal to Nangavally (via) Rasipuram. On charges of failure to perform the services regularly, the Regional Transport Authority, Salem, asked the petitioner to show cause why the permits in the three routes should not be cancelled under section 60, sub-section (1), clause (a) of the Act. The petitioner showed cause, and the Regional Transport Authority heard him through his counsel. The Regional Transport Authority, then, issued an order cancelling the permits, as the Authority was not convinced by the explanation offered by the operator, in the matter of running the service properly. The petitioner filed an appeal from the order of cancellation to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and the Tribunal, by its order dated 28th April, 1958, affirmed the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The petitioner moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order of the Subordinate Tribunals in W.P. No. 365 of 1958. Rule nisi was issued, and stay of operation of the order of cancellation was also granted. The Writ Petition was, however, dismissed, at the final hearing ; and, thereupon, the petitioner filed an appeal in W.A. No. 118 of 1960. During the pendency of the appeal, stay of operation of the order of cancellation continued. Rule nisi was issued, and stay of operation of the order of cancellation was also granted. The Writ Petition was, however, dismissed, at the final hearing ; and, thereupon, the petitioner filed an appeal in W.A. No. 118 of 1960. During the pendency of the appeal, stay of operation of the order of cancellation continued. By judgment dated 31st January, 1962, the appeal also stood dismissed. The petitioner was called upon to surrender the permits. Under rule 194 of the Rules framed under the Act, a permit-holder should surrender the permit, on receipt of a demand in writing by the Transport Authority, and the Transport Authority should record in Parts A and B of the permit the order of cancellation or suspension. Thus, the Authority wanted to give effect of the order of cancellation. At that stage, the petitioner filed an application to the Regional Transport Authority, Salem, for permission to compound the offence, which entitled the cancellation, and this he purported to do invoking the aid of section 60, sub-section (3) of the Act. We shall refer to the terms of the section a little later. The Regional Transport Authority dismissed the application, mainly on the ground that the power to compound cannot be exercised after an order of cancellation is passed. In its view, if the permit had already been cancelled, the Authority which cancelled the permit must be deemed to have exercised its discretion under section 60 (3) against the permit-holder, and that there is no provision for the Authority to reopen the matter and consider the request for composition. The petitioner took up the matter in revision, as no appeal is provided for from such orders, to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which confirmed the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The Revisional Authority recorded its opinion in the following words: “In my opinion, the application of the petitioner for compounding (when the right to compound was impliedly negatived by the Regional Transport Authority in its orders dated 9th December, 1957 and 10th February, 1957), which orders have been confirmed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the High Court was rightly rejected by the Regional Transport Authority.” It is to quash these orders that the present Writ Petition has been filed. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the petitioner raised the following contentions: (i) The Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal were in error in holding that the power to order composition under section 6o (3) became extinct after the order of cancellation or suspension of the permit. (2) The terms of section 60, sub-section (3) of the Act necessarily imply that the right or benefit of composition can be invoked only after the authorities hold that the permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended for violation of the provisions in clause (a), (b) or (e) of sub-section (1) of section 60, and that it would not be a proper construction of the Act to deprive a permit-holder of the remedy of composition, merely because he bona fide pleaded that there was no case against him to justify cancellation or suspension, and failed. (3) The section does not prescribe any formality like making an application or request, orally or in writing, by the permit-holder for composition, and that the Authority can, in the exercise of its discretion, pass such an order suo motu. Therefore the view that composition cannot be had after an order of cancellation or suspension is not tenable. (4) If the section were to be construed as meaning that the option of compounding has to be exercised before the Authority adjudicates on the charge, it would operate as a coercion on the operator to plead guilty without a fair chance to defend himself, and would also, effectively take away his right of appeal from revocation or suspension of permit under section 64(1)(6) of the Act. These contentions need not be considered individually or separately. They set out several aspects which have a bearing on the question of the proper interpretation of section 60, sub-section (3). The essential and the only point that arises is, whether it is open to the Transport Authority to levy composition, in lieu of cancellation or suspension of permit, after the order of such cancellation or suspension is passed. If it is so open, it would imply a power in the Authority to modify or rescind its previous order. It would also mean that it can be done at any time till perhaps the order is implemented. If it is so open, it would imply a power in the Authority to modify or rescind its previous order. It would also mean that it can be done at any time till perhaps the order is implemented. The acceptance of the position that the composition is only an aftermath of the punishment by way of cancellation or suspension would necessarily enable the delinquent operator to have two rounds of fight the first in which he occupies himself in defending the charge, and the second in which he claims composition, not by throwing himself on the mercy of the Authority, but in exercise of a statutory privilege. Is that the true scope of section 60(3)? The answer of the learned Advocate-General is in the affirmative, and this he has sought to support with his characteristic vigour, great learning and erudition. At the outset, we wish to point out that the writ of certiorari prayed for in this case does not seem to be quite appropriate. When a Tribunal declines jurisdiction, be it on the ground of lack of power, the aggrieved suppliant should, if so advised, move this Court for the issue of a madamus to direct the Tribunal to hear and determine The scope of certiorari is to wipe out the offending order. Certiorari may, in some cases, have the effect of restoring the application, from out of which the writ arose to the file of the Tribunal, but the failure of the Tribunal to restore and deal with it can only be corrected by issuing a mandamus. Article 226 of the Constitution does not comprise only of the prerogative writs of the Crown in England. It is of wide amplitude and overflows the bounds of such prerogative writs, and it is designed to be elastic, to enable the Court to do justice in its essential and most comprehensive sense, justice of course in the concrete and not in the abstract. This jurisdiction of the Court ought not, however, to be whittled down by too much adherence to forms and labels or be transmuted by technical considerations. This jurisdiction of the Court ought not, however, to be whittled down by too much adherence to forms and labels or be transmuted by technical considerations. To quote the observation of Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in Hart Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others1: “Looking at the substance of the matter, when once it is held that the intention of the Constitution was to vest in the High Court a power to supervise decisions of the Tribunals by the issue of appropriate writs and directions, the exercise of that power cannot be defeated by technical considerations of form and procedure.” This Court can, therefore, ignore the form of relief sought by the petitioner, and grant him necessary redress by issuing the appropriate writ, if the facts and circumstances would warrant and justify it. We are, therefore, proceeding to dispose of this petition, as if the prayer is one for the issue of mandamus, to direct the Regional Transport Authority, Salem, to hear and dispose of the application under section 60, sub-section (3) in conformity with law. Section 60, sub-section (3) is the section that has to be construed. That reads: “Where a permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (e) of sub-section (1) and the Transport Authority is of opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case, it would not be necessary or expedient so to cancel or suspend the permit if the holder of the permit agrees to pay a certain sum of money, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Subsection (1), the Transport Authority may, instead of cancelling or suspending the permit, as the case may be, recover from the holder of the permit the sum of money agreed upon.” Section 60(1) provides that the Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit, for any one or the other of the following reasons contained in clause (a), (b) or (c) referred to also in sub-section (3): “(a) on the breach of any condition specified in sub-section (3) of section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit, or (b) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit, or * * * * (clauses (c) and (d) omitted). (e) if the holder of the permit, not being a private carrier’s permit, fails without reasonable clause to use the vehicle or vehicles for the purposes for which the permit was granted ;..........” For certain of the breaches of the provisions of the Statute, the holder of a permit, in respect of a transport vehicle, incurs the liability of cancellation or suspension of the permit. Cancellation deprives a holder permanently of the permit, while suspension will only prevent him from operating the vehicle for such period as the Authority may think fit. The Authority cannot inflict the punishment of cancellation or suspension, unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to furnish his explanation in respect of the charge on charges against him. The proceedings under section 60(1) of the Act are certainly of a quasi-judicial nature. A permit is a valuable right, more or less in the nature of a property light, and any proceedings calculated to affect such a right cannot be described as administrative in character. Now, section 60, sub-section (3) enables the Authority to cancel or suspend a permit in the circumstances mentioned therein. The ingredients of this sub-section are: (1) The permit should be liable to be cancelled or suspended tor contravention of clause (a), (b) or (c) of sub-section (1) of section 60 (Be it noted that contravention of the other sub-clauses in section 60(1) would not attract section bo subsection (3); (2) The Transport Authority should be of the opinion that, in the circumstances of the case, it would not be necessary or expedient to cancel or suspend the permit, if the permit-holder agrees to pay a certain sum of money; and (3) if the Transport Authority decides not to direct cancellation or suspension of the permit in view of the agreement of the operator to pay money, it may, instead of cancelling or suspending the permit, recover from the holder of the permit an agreed sum of The foundation of this section is the guilt of the operator inviolating certain of the provisions of the Statute. The normal punishment which should follow the establishment of the guilt against the operator is cancellation or suspension. But this punishment need not be awarded, the matter being left to the discretion of the Transport Authority, if two conditions are present. The normal punishment which should follow the establishment of the guilt against the operator is cancellation or suspension. But this punishment need not be awarded, the matter being left to the discretion of the Transport Authority, if two conditions are present. The first condition is that the Authority should be of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case (triviality of the offence or the consistent good conduct of the operator for over a large number of years or other facts may be a few such circumstances), it would not be necessary or expedient to cancel or suspend the permit. The second condition is that the operator must agree to pay a sum of money. If any of these conditions is not present, the sub-section cannot operate. The agreement on the part of the operator to suffer money payment, instead of cancellation or suspension, is certainly the most vital part of the sub-section, and, at any rate, it is not less important than the opinion which the Transport Authority might entertain as regards the necessity for or expediency of imposing the punishment by way of cancellation or suspension. The language of the Statute seems to indicate that there can be no question of compelling the operator to pay any amount instead of cancellation or suspension. The Statute prescribes the modes of punishment against an operator found to be guilty of the charges under clause (a), (b), or (c) of sub-section (1) of section 60. The punishment may be either what may be termed an extreme punishment by way of cancellation, or a medium punishment by way of suspension, or the least rigorous punishment of levying something in the nature of a fine. The last punishment cannot be inflicted without the concurrence and consent of the transport operator. Ex necessitate rei, the levy of composition, by which an operator undertakes to pay a certain sum of money, can only arise at the stage of awarding punishment in respect of a proved charge. Otherwise, the whole scheme of section 60 of the Act would become impractical and unworkable. We are unable to construe section 60(3) as clothing the operator with a subsequent fresh and independent right to have a previous punishment by way of cancellation or suspension commuted into a punishment of money compensation. Otherwise, the whole scheme of section 60 of the Act would become impractical and unworkable. We are unable to construe section 60(3) as clothing the operator with a subsequent fresh and independent right to have a previous punishment by way of cancellation or suspension commuted into a punishment of money compensation. We are not impressed with the argument of the learned Advocate-General that such a construction would be harsh or oppressive. By adopting the construction that a composition arrangement should precede the penalty of cancellation or suspension, the operator is not between the horns of dilemma of confess and pay composition or los that privilege and take the risk of action against the permit. It is certainly open to him to defend himself against the charges levelled against him, and he can do so not merely before the Transport Authority, which decides the matter in the first instance, but also in appeal provided for under the statute before the prescribed Authority. He can certainly take up the matter further by way of Writ Petition to this Court, and, by way of appeal, to the Supreme Court of India. The Statute does not deprive him of such redress as he may have against what he may feel to be an unfounded charge. But it is, however, clear that, if he wants to avail himself of the provisions of compounding under section 60(3), he must do so before actually the punishment is imposed upon him, and the fact that he agrees to composition, which would amount to a practical confession of the guilt, would not really affect the question. The benefit can be had only by an operator, who is frank and bona fide, and who pleads for the imposition of a lesser punishment than the one by way of cancellation or suspension. We see nothing strange or anomalous in such a construction of the statute, though we must observe that the phraseology of the sub-section is neither precise nor felicitous. The learned Advocate-General relied upon rule 194-A framed under the Act, and submitted that there is a fair indication in it that the compounding was intended to be made only after the imposition of punishment by way of cancellation or suspension of the permit. The learned Advocate-General relied upon rule 194-A framed under the Act, and submitted that there is a fair indication in it that the compounding was intended to be made only after the imposition of punishment by way of cancellation or suspension of the permit. The rule reads: "194-A. Compounding of offence-Procedure.-The Transport Authority shall, indetermining the sum of money to be recovered in lieu of cancellation or suspension of different classes of permits, have regard to the following, namely:- (a) Nature, gravity and frequency of the offence committed. (b) The quantum of punishment that would otherwise have been imposed. (c) Carrying capacity of the vehicles with reference to the nature of the route and passenger capacity in the case of stage carriages, and average daily mileage of the vehicle and hire-charges, if any, in respect of other classes of transport vehicles, Provided that the amount so recoverable in lieu of suspension shall in no case be ess than the minimum or more than the maximum specified in the table below: Class of vehicles. Minimum per day of suspension. Maximum. Rs. Rs. 1. Stage carriages- (a) For plying without tax or permit or for overload .. 50 3,000 (b) For other offence .. .. 1,000 * * * * Items 2 and 3 omitted." The argument is that, because the minimum and maximum of amount is fixed as recoverable in lieu of suspension, there can be no commutation unless the period of suspension is known which means that there must be an order of suspension before there can be a compounding. We do not think that that would be a proper interpretation of the rule. The rule itself provides that the Transport Authority should have regard to "the quantum of punishment that would otherwise have been imposed”. The process, therefore, is that, where a stage is reached when the Transport Authority thinks that the matter is one for compounding, and the operator agrees to pay a certain sum of money, the amount of compensation has to be fixed taking into account the punishment which the Authority would have inflicted in the absence of composition. For example, if the Authority would have suspended the permit for one month, that circumstance could be regarded as a relevant criterion for fixing the amount of composition. The proviso to the rule would only cover cases where the punishment contemplated would be suspension and not cancellation. For example, if the Authority would have suspended the permit for one month, that circumstance could be regarded as a relevant criterion for fixing the amount of composition. The proviso to the rule would only cover cases where the punishment contemplated would be suspension and not cancellation. We do not think that it would be proper to draw the inference from this rule that a composition order could be passed after an order of cancellation or suspension. Stripped to its essence, the argument of the learned Advocate-General would lead to the anomaly that the Authority would have jurisdiction to exercise the power under section 60(3) only after imposing the general and normal punishment. But, to be fair, this extreme contention was not advanced by him. His limited submission was that the doors are not closed against composition merely because the operator did not volunteer for it even during the enquiry in to the charges against him. In our opinion, the section cannot be construed in that way. The learned Advocate-General posed the question, what would happen, if the period of suspension is reduced by the Appellate Authority, or if a cancellation is set aside and suspension is awarded? Inasmuch as the composition amount must conform to the punishment imposed by the Appellate Authority, it would be unreasonable to hold that the power to compound is extinguished after the adjudication under section 60(1); so the argument. We do not think that this argument has any solid foundation. This proceeds on the assumption that the claim for composition survives an order of cancellation or suspension. This cannot be relevant in construing section 60(3). We shall now refer to the relevant decisions of this Court construing section 60, sub-section (3). In W.P. No. 551 of 1959, Ramachandra Iyer, J. (as he then was) observed as follows: “Under the section, the question of compounding, to use that expression, can arise only when the Regional Transport Authority is to decide about the punishment. That cannot therefore arise after that Authority has decided and inflicted the punishment. In the present case the Regional Transport Authority had passed its order suspending the permit as early as 22nd May, 1958. That order was confirmed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal as early as 16th August, 1958 and it had become final. That cannot therefore arise after that Authority has decided and inflicted the punishment. In the present case the Regional Transport Authority had passed its order suspending the permit as early as 22nd May, 1958. That order was confirmed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal as early as 16th August, 1958 and it had become final. There would therefore no longer be any question of considering whether in the circumstances of a particular case there should be a cancellation or suspension of a permit or in the alternative payment of money by the holder of the permit, the first of the two alternatives having been already decided upon and ordered.” The learned Advocate-General relies upon the words, “decided and inflicted the punishment” and submits that inflicting a punishment would really cover a case where the punishment has taken effect. That, however, does not seem to be the proper meaning of the words used. The learned Judge, in substance, held that . once a punishment by way of cancellation or suspension had been imposed, the Authority had no longer any jurisdiction to modify that punishment and substitute in its stead a punishment by way of collecting any amount from the operator. This decision went up on appeal before a Division Bench (Rajamannar, Chief Justice and Venkatadri, J.), in W.A. No. 153 of 1960, but was dismissed. The learned Judges observed as follows: “We are quite clear that on a proper construction of section 60(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, once an order of cancellation or Suspension is passed, then there is no power in the Transport Authority to recover from the holder of the permit any sum agreed upon, instead of cancelling or suspending the permit..........If the appellant had in the first instance, pleaded in the alternative that he may be permitted to pay a certain sum of money instead of his permit being cancelled or suspended, then the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority should have referred the matter to the Authority to deal with the particular prayer of the appellant.” In W.A. No. 73 of 1962, a Division Bench (Ganapatia Pillai and Kailasam, JJ.)1 stated thus: “The offer to compound could be made to the Appellate Tribunal as well. But we see no justification for holding that the appellant was entitled to hold back the offer till the appeal is disposed of and then call upon the appellate Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction to direct composition of the offence. In one sense after the appeal is disposed of, the Appellate Tribunal is functus officio. The proper stage at which the offer to compound must come is the stage when the matter is under investigation either by the first authority or at least when the appeal was being heard by the Appellate Authority. Thereafter it would not be correct to hold that the authorities would be bound to entertain the offer for compounding”. The observation of the Bench that composition can be effected at the stage of appeal was no doubt obiter. All the same, it seems to be well-founded. , The Appellate Authority is seized of the entire matter and it can do what the original authority could have done. There is nothing in section 60(3) which confines the exercise of power only to the first authority. The appellate Jurisdiction of the Tribunal over the Regional Transport Authority is co-equal to the powers and discretion of that Authority, and so, if the Regional Authority could have effected composition the Tribunal also would be in a position to do so. This does not mean that the operator can seek composition at any time till the punishment is given effect to. A Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Ramamurthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh1, has taken the view that the Regional Transport Authority has no power to direct composition, after the matter of the guilt of the operator had gone through all the stages. The learned Judges observed thus: “It is immediately plain that the power to require the holder to compound the offence should be exercised by the Transport Authority, only at the time of deciding whether the punishment should be imposed or whether some amount of money should be recovered in lieu of punishment from the permit holder. This discretion could be exercised by the Transport Authority only at that time if it feels that the circumstances of the case would warrant it. This discretion could be exercised by the Transport Authority only at that time if it feels that the circumstances of the case would warrant it. It may be mentioned that such power cannot be exercised by the Transport Authority or an Appellate Authority or Government exercising revisional jurisdiction long after the imposition of the punishment.” This is practically in line with the decision of this Court in W.A. No. 153 of 1960 referred to above, with winch we respectfully agree. The learned Advocate-General referred us to analogous provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code, Forests Act, and the Sea Customs Act, which also provide for compounding in certain circumstances. The provisions in those statutes are not in pari materia, and we do not think that any useful purpose will be served by referring to them. Section 345 of the Criminal Procedure Code would certainly operate only before a conviction is recorded. Sub-section (5) of section 345 permits compounding of an offence even after conviction but during the pendency of an appeal and with leave of the appellate Court. Under section 55 of the Forests Act, composition is permissible to avoid presecution. This implies that even before the charge sheet is laid before the Magistrate, the delinquent can compound the offence. Section 183 of the Sea Customs Act requires that, at the time of ordering confiscation of the contraband goods, a penalty of payment of money can be levied instead of confiscation. As stated already, the scheme of composition in each of those cases has no parallel to section 60 sub-section (3) of the Act, with which we are now concerned. We are of opinion that the Regional Transport Authority rightly declined jurisdiction to accede to the request of the petitioner to have the previous punishment of cancellation compounded. The impugned orders are, therefore, correct. In the result, the Writ Petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel’s fee Rs. 150. P.R.N. ----- Petition dismissed.