This second appeal is direct­ed against the judgment and decree of the Sub­ordinate Judge's Court, Cachar at Silchar, re­versing the judgment and decree of the Munsiff at 'Silchar dismissing the plaintiffs' suit. (2) The facts of the case may be briefly noticed: The plaintiffs, who figure as the respondents in this appeal, brought the suit for a declaration that the land described in the schedule to the plaint constituted accretion to their land of Dag No. 157 of R. S. Patta No. 33 of village Berabak Part If, district Cachar, and that the plaintiffs' title as periodic settlement holder be declared in respect of the said land, and for khas possession. It-was also prayed that the first defendant, who is the State of Assam, be directed to assess revenue on the suit land treating it as accretion to the .plaintiffs' land. (3) On the findings of both the Courts below, it is clear that the suit land constituted an ac­cretion to the land of the plaintiff from the view which abutted the plaintiffs' land. But the learned Munsiff held that as there were proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code as the possession had been declared in the second defendant, in those proceedings, and as the suit had not been brought within three years thereof, such suit was barred under Article 47 of the Limitation Act. So holding, he dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by this decision, the plaintiffs took the matter up in appeal to the Subordinate Judge's Court Silchar, and the learned Subor­dinate Judge on a consideration of the evidence in the case came to the conclusion that although there were proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the present suit was for a declaration of plaintiffs' title, Article 47 of the Limitation Act had no application, and instead Article 142 of the Limitation Act -applied, and as he found that the plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest, namely Chaitanya and Nitai, had mutation in the Annual Patta up to 1946, the suit could not be regarded as barred by time. The learned Subordinate Judge further held that the suit land was contiguous to Dag No. 157, which belonged to the plaintiffs; that it consti­tuted the accreted land formed by the river; and having appointed an Amin to survey the land, accepted the report of the Amin which was to the effect that the suit land constituted an accretion to Dag No. 157 to the extent of 7 Kathas 4 Chataks; and that according to Explanation of Section 3 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, such accreted land shall be deemed to be the part of the land to which it has accreted, and so holding, the learned Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiffs' suit only to the extent of 7 Kathas 4 Chataks, as found by the Amin. Hence the present second appeal. (4) The only question of law that has been urged before me in this. second appeal is whether the suit brought by the plaintiffs could be said to be barred by limitation under Article 47 of the Limitation Act. Article 47 is as follows: - "By any person bound by Three years. The date of an order respecting the the final possession of immov order in able property made the case." under the Code of Cri­minal Procedure, 1898(V of 1898).....or by any one claiming under such person, to recover the property comprised in such order. (5) It is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that as the second plaintiff and the second defendant were parties to the proceed­ings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code, and as there was an order against the second plaintiff made therein confirming the possession of the second defendant, the case fell within Arti­cle 47 of the Limitation Act. To this, the learn­ed Counsel for the respondents replied pointing out that the present suit had been brought by a number of persons, none of whom except the se­cond plaintiff were be nominee parties to the pro­ceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. The second plaintiff could not and did not represent the of her plaintiffs who included some minors and the order therein cannot bind the plaintiffs in the present proceedings, and that, therefore, the first condition that is required for the application of Article 47 is not complied with. The second plaintiff could not and did not represent the of her plaintiffs who included some minors and the order therein cannot bind the plaintiffs in the present proceedings, and that, therefore, the first condition that is required for the application of Article 47 is not complied with. It is further contended that there is no material on record to show that the land in res­pect of which the present proceedings had been taken is identical with the land involved in those proceedings. It is also contended that it being not a suit based on possession or a claim for pos­session but on title, and being a suit for declara­tion of title, and recovery of possession being con­sequential and incidental thereto, Article 47 could not be applied, and that as the only cor­rect article to apply is Article 142, and as the lower appellate Court has found that the plain­tiffs were in possession of the land within 12 years before the suit, the suit was in time. (6) In answer to this, the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the second plaintiff did represent all the of her plaintiffs; but, unfor­tunately, no material has been placed on record to indicate this. Further, it is not that every suit in respect of immoveable property is covered by Article 47, and as correctly pointed out by the learned Subordinate Judge, the present suit being for a declaration based on title, the plaintiffs would be entitled to the declaration on their esta­blishing that title. On the question of title, both the Courts below have found that accretion to the land of the owner becomes part of his land under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. In this connection reliance is placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court, in the case of Boroji Munipurini v. State of Assam, AIR 1958 Assam 34. In that case it was laid as follows: - "It is therefore clear that it is an universal law, recognised by all that a land which gradually and imperceptibly come out of the river bed and added to the land of a riparian owner becomes part of the land belonging to him and is to be considered as his property. In that case it was laid as follows: - "It is therefore clear that it is an universal law, recognised by all that a land which gradually and imperceptibly come out of the river bed and added to the land of a riparian owner becomes part of the land belonging to him and is to be considered as his property. This, in some cases, is based on the specific provisions of the Bengal Regulation or of her enactments, in some on cus­tom, and in some cases on the principles of jus­tice, equity and good conscience." (7) Explanation to Section 3 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation runs as follows: - "Any land gained by alluvion or by derelic­tion of a river to any estate as here denned, which under the laws in force is considered an increment to the tenure to which the land has accreted, shall be deemed to be part of that estate." (8) The finding reached by the lower appellate Court on the question of the plaintiffs' title to the property in question cannot be canvassed before me in this second appeal, as the said find­ing is binding on this Court. In am not satisfied that adequate material is placed on record to justify the application of Article 47 of the Limi­tation Act to this case. (9) In my considered opinion, the lower ap­pellate Court was quite correct in holding that the article in question has no application. (10) In the case of Namar Ali v. Khalwan Goala, AIR 1957 Assam 99, it was held by Sarjoo Prasad, Chief Justice, that the order in the proceeding under Section 145 Criminal Procedure ' Code did not confer any unqualified right of pos­session on the mortgagee; that the order simply meant that it recognised' the possession of the mortgagee in respect of the lands or restored the mortgagee's possession if the mortgagee was out of possession; that it could not confer any higher title on the mortgagee; that the relationship of the mortgagor and mortgagee which admittedly existed between the parties continued to subsist even after the order in the proceeding under Sec­tion 145 Criminal Procedure Code; and therefore it was wrong to assume that the period of limita­tion provided by Article 148 for redemption of the mortgage was cut down by the operation of Article 47 of the Limitation Act. (n) I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the judgment under appeal is perfectly sound and no exception could be taken to the same. The second appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. (12) The leave prayed for is refused. Appeal dismissed.