ORDER Bhargava J This is a Letters Patent Appeal fpm a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court overruling the objection of the judgment-debtors (appellants) and holding that the right of the decree-holders (respondents) to proceed against the property attacked was not affected by section 165 (7) (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, (hereinafter called the 'New Code'). 2. The facts of the case may briefly be stated. In execution of a money decree, the decree-holders (respondents) got an absolute occupancy field of the judgment-debtors (appellants) having an area of 2.29 acres attached on 24-11-1956. The judgment-debtors from time to time raised various objections which held up the course of execution. On 8-10-1958, application for execution was dismissed but the attachment was ordered by the Court to continue on 9-10-1958, another execution application was made seeking to have the decree satisfied by the sale of the attached field. The sale notice was served on the judgment debtors (appellants) on 24-10-1958. The judgment-debtors again filed an application for postponement of the execution of the decree which was dismissed by the executing Court. Ultimately, the Court fixed 26.12.1559 (for holding the auction sale. On 2.10.1959, the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, had come into force. On 5.12.1959, the judgment-debtors filed an objection contending that their absolute occupancy land which had become their bhumiswami land under the provisions of section 146 (1589) of the new Code, could not be sold in execution due to the bar created by Section 165 (7) (a) of the new Code which provides that "only that part of a holding of a bhumiswami shall be liable to attachment or sale in execution of any decree or order as is in excess of five acres of irrigated or ten acres of un-irrigated land". The attached land was irrigated land. It is conceded that when the land was actually attached, there was no law which prohibited the decree-holders from getting the said field attached of getting the attached property sold. 3. The attached land was irrigated land. It is conceded that when the land was actually attached, there was no law which prohibited the decree-holders from getting the said field attached of getting the attached property sold. 3. The learned Single Judge held that the provisions of Section 165 (7) (a) of the new Code had no retrospective operation so as to apply to pending cases; that the provisions contained in Section 261 of the new Code amounted to a provision to the contrary which meant that the repealing Act did not effect pending cases and, therefore, those cases had to be decided according to the provisions of the repealed Act; and that the attachment, though it did not create any interest in the property in favour of the attaching decree-holders; yet their right to executed the decree being a vested right, remained unaffected by the subsequent enactment of the new Code. 4. It has been contended on behalf of the decree holders that retrospective effect could not be given to the provisions made in Section 165 (7) (i) of the new Code. It was urged that if those provisions wire intended to apply not only to future proceedings but also the pending ones, that could be plainly said. 5. It is a well known rule of construction of statutes that no statute, unless it be a statute dealing with procedure, only, should be construed as having retrospective effect unless the statute expressly makes its provisions retrospective or that retrospective effect must be given by necessary implication. [see: The Colonial Sugar Refining Company, Limited VS Irving, 1905 AC 369, Delhi Cloth Mills Vs. Income-Tax Commr., AIR 1927 PC 242, United Provinces Vs Atica Begum, AIR 1941 FC 16 Peoples Bank Vs. Wahid Bux, AIR 1943 Lah. 170 FB, Beading Vs. Goll, (1922) 39 TLR 128 and HK Dada (India) Ltd. Vs. State of MP], AIR 1953 SC 221 . 6. We may usefully here refer to a passage from the Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell (10th Edition) at page 221:- "In general when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when then the action was begun. unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights: [see: Hutchinson Vs. unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights: [see: Hutchinson Vs. Jauncey, (1950) 1 KB 574 CA Jonas vs Rosenberg,]" (1950) 2 KB 50 CA, 7. In Moon Vs. Durden, (1948) 2 Ex, 22, where there was an action to recover a sum of money which was alleged to have been found won upon a wager, the action was commenced in June 1845; in August 1845, the Gaming Act was passed which provided that "no suit shall be brought or maintained in any Court of law or equity for recovery of any sum of money." The question was whether that enactment was retrospective so as to defeat an action already commenced. It was held by Park J. that it was not retrospective. In Henshall Vs. Porter,(1923) 2 KB 195, Mecardie J., went further and held that the Gaming Act, 1922, (which prohibited all Courts from entertaining such suits did not apply to cases where the cause of action had arisen before the passing of the, Act, though no suit had been instituted) did not prevent the bringing of an action under the repealed section 2 of the previous Act after this date when the repealing Act came into force in respect of a cause of action which had arisen before that date. 8. Though these case make it clear that the uniform rule of construction of statutes which applies in India & England is that the law leans against giving retrospective effect to statutes and a substantive statutory right would not be affected by statute passed subsequent to its accrual nor would the statute affect the transactions which have become complete before its enactment, yet there is something in the language; context and object of the newly enacted section 165. (7) (a) of the new Code due to which it must be held that the section applies to pending proceedings in which the attachment made before the new Code came into force and sale was sought to be made after it came into operation. 9. The learned Single Judge has relied on Firm Radhe Sham Vs. Kundan Lal, AIR 1956 Punj. 193. 9. The learned Single Judge has relied on Firm Radhe Sham Vs. Kundan Lal, AIR 1956 Punj. 193. In that case, it has been held that the right to execute a decree is a vested right as also the right to raise an objection to a decree; that the right of the judgment-debtor to plead that a certain decree is a nullity cannot by any at retch of meaning be described as a procedural matter; and that it being a vested right in the judgment-debtor cannot be taker away by a provision of law which is not retrospective. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided that case, we are of the view that possib1y the proposition of law has been too widely enunciated therein. We are unable to see as to how the mere passing of a money-decree creates a vested right in all the procedure that may be required to be followed subsequently for achieving the fruits of the decree. It is clear law that the money-decree does not ipso facto result in the creation of any lien or charge. It is, therefore difficult to agree as to how even before the attachment was made, it could be said that as against any particular property, the decree-holder would be able to claim a vested right in him. In Naraini Devi Vs. Durga Devi, AIR 1959 Punj. 324, it appears that the rigour of the pronouncement was not maintained and the learned Single Judge took the position: "Such being the case for the application of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the matter must be viewed only from the date of execution application and from no other date. The rights of the parties can also be seen only from that date for that date alone is relevant under section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 10. Shri A. Razak then contended that the attachment made on 24-11-1956 did not create any right, title or interest in the attached property in favour of the decree-holders. It was merely an inchoate or a negative type of right which did not amount to a substantive or vested right and was merely procedural in its nature. He relied upon the decisions in Seth Bansilal Vs. Pandit Kashinath 29 NLR 303; Motilal Vs. Karrabuldin, ILR 25 Cal. 179 and Krishtaswamy Mudaliar Vs. Official Assignee of Madras, ILR 26 Mad. It was merely an inchoate or a negative type of right which did not amount to a substantive or vested right and was merely procedural in its nature. He relied upon the decisions in Seth Bansilal Vs. Pandit Kashinath 29 NLR 303; Motilal Vs. Karrabuldin, ILR 25 Cal. 179 and Krishtaswamy Mudaliar Vs. Official Assignee of Madras, ILR 26 Mad. 673, to show that the attachment did not create any right in the nature of a charge over the property attached in favour of the attaching creditors. He further relied on Bhu a Vs. Saddulal, ILR 1942 Nag. 691, to show that the attachment gave no other right to the decree-holders except the negative right which precluded the judgment-debtors from alienating the property at his own desire. 11. Shri R.K. Pandey, on the other hand, laid great stress on behalf of the respondents on the principles decided by the Lahore High Court in the following cases: (i) Peoples Bank Vs. Wahid Bux, AIR 1943 Lah. 170 (DB) and Rewati Vs. Chiranji Lal, AIR 1944 Lah. 29 (FB). In Peoples Bank Vs. Wahid Bux (supra), it has been held that exempting property from sale is not a mere matter of procedure. It is a matter affecting the rights of the decree-holder and the obligations of the judgment-debtor. This observation was made in the context of Cl. (ccc) introduced by Act 12 of 1940 which exempted the residential house of a non-agriculturist from attachment or sale. Harries C.J. in his opinion, observed:- "In my view, the decision in Sidhuram & others Vs. Nur Mohammad & others, AIR 1937 Lah. 740, is a very cogent decision in favour of the appellant in this case. Holding as I do that the appellant had acquired substantive and vested rights in this case, when he attached the residential house of the respondent, I must hold that Act 12 of 1940 could not affect those rights unless the Act clearly takes away such rights." In Rawati Vs. Chiranji Lal (Supra), it has been held that an attachment is a necessary preliminary to sale and must inevitably lead to that result. If an objection could not be raised against the attachment it could not equally be raised against the sale ability of the property either. Chiranji Lal (Supra), it has been held that an attachment is a necessary preliminary to sale and must inevitably lead to that result. If an objection could not be raised against the attachment it could not equally be raised against the sale ability of the property either. If no objection can be validly raised to the attachment and it continues to subsist, the sale would follow as a matter of course. Consequently when the property could be and was legally attached long before Punjab Act 6 of 1942 came into force, the property remains liable to be sold and the plea that the property cannot be sold under S. 60 (1) (ccc) as amended cannot be sustained. Shri Pandey also referred to the decision in Santu Vs. Sohanlal, AIR 1951 Pepsu 33 FB. The case of Peoples Bank Vs. Wahid Bux (supra) was followed in this Pepsu Case. 12. In our opinion, the view expressed in these cases in support of the contentions of the respondents appears to have been considerably shaken by the recent pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ahmad Hefiz Khan Vs. Mohd. Hasan Khan, 1963 JLJ 657 = 1964 RN 374 (SC). In that case, the attachment of a specified share in Mouza Kumhari, Tehsil Sakti, along with the Sir and Khudkasht land appurtenant there to was made in September 8, 1950, about six months before the coming into force of the Abolition Act. The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act 1950, (No. 1 to 1951) (hereinafter called the "Abolition Act") came into force on 31-3-1951. The contention raised by the appellant judgment-debtor in that case before the Supreme Court was that the cultivating rights in the Sir lands could not be the subject-matter of sale in execution of the decree in view of section 43 of the Abolition Act. The contention raised by the appellant judgment-debtor in that case before the Supreme Court was that the cultivating rights in the Sir lands could not be the subject-matter of sale in execution of the decree in view of section 43 of the Abolition Act. Section 43 of the said Act provides as under:- "Any land which immediately before the date of vesting, was held in absolute occupancy or occupancy-right or recorded as Sir land, shall not be liable to attachment or sale in execution of a decree or order for the recovery of any debt incurred before the date of vesting except where such debt was validly secured by mortgage of or a charge on the absolute occupancy or occupancy land or the cultivating right in the Sir land." It was held by the Supreme Court that the section barred attachment and sale of the cultivating rights in Sir lands unless there was mortgage of or charge on the cultivating rights and the section applies to decrees in respect of debt prior to the vesting in the State. Their Lordships said:- ''In the present case, the attachment was before, and the sale after the date when the Abolition Act came into force in this area. There was no mortgage of or charge on the cultivating rights in Sir. The decree-holder Mohd. Yuruf had only a money-decree and the attachment cannot be said to have created a charge on the attached property so as to make it a secured debt within the latter part of S. 43. There being so secured debt and the cultivating rights not having been mortgage or charged there could be no sale of these lands after the Abolition Act came into force. The sale was, therefore, without jurisdiction, and thus illegal." It was argued before the Supreme Court in that case that if the attachment could subsist on the home-farm, then the borne-farm could also be sold but their Lordships repelled the argument observing that in Govinda Prasad vs. Pawim Kumar, ILR 1955 Nag. 698, which was relied upon by the respondent, the question whether a sale of the cultivating rights in the home-farm could take place after the Abolition Act came into force was not considered at all. 698, which was relied upon by the respondent, the question whether a sale of the cultivating rights in the home-farm could take place after the Abolition Act came into force was not considered at all. Their Lordships remarked that in the said case, it was not noticed that the attachment would be useless if the sale could not take place and the attention of the Bench did not appear to have been drawn to the provisions of section 43 of the Act. It was emphasized by their Lordships: "In any event, the words of S. 43 are quite clear and the cultivating rights in the sir khudkasht land which became under the Act the home-farm of the proprietor are protected against sale except where those cultivating rights were the subject of a mortgage or a charge created by the proprietor. That condition does not exist in the present case and the sale, therefore, must be declared to be without jurisdiction and ordered to be set aside." The language of section 165 (7) (a) of the Code to which we have adverted to above closely follows the pattern of section 43 of the Abolition Act and, therefore, the view taken by their Lordships in Ahmad Hafiz Khan's case (supra), in our opinion, is on all fours with this case. 13. It was also urged that the use of the words "attachment or sale" in the provision under consideration was clear to show that the provision applied to that case also where only 'sale' remained to take place subsequent to the enactment of the new Code. It was argued that that were not the meaning, the Legislature would have used the word "attachment only. In our opinion, the argument has great force. It is axiomatic that in interpreting a section enacted by the Legislature each word has to be given its due weight and not a single word can be held to be superfluous because the Legislature cannot be expected to have said what it did not mean. If this test is applied with its full force, the only reasonable way of construing the section would be to apply it to pending actions in which 'sale' is ye to take place. 14. If this test is applied with its full force, the only reasonable way of construing the section would be to apply it to pending actions in which 'sale' is ye to take place. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents then referred to the provisions of section 261 of the Code and urged that if section 165 (5) (a) of the new Code was applicable to pending proceedings, there was no necessity of providing in section 261 of the new Code that the repeal shall not affect (a) the previous operation of any law so repealed or anything duly done of suffered there under, or (b) any right privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any law so repealed. We are unable to agree with this submission. In our opinion, getting the property sold in pursuance of an attachment cannot be described as a right vesting in the decree-holder under the old law, and even if that view could be taken, that right is wholly taken away by the clear language of section 165 (7) (a) of the new Code which prohibits all sales to be made in future of the land covered by that section after that came into force. The language used does not make any distinction in respect of a sale which is asked to be made in pending proceedings and a sale, which may be desired to be made in an execution application filed after the coming into force of the new Land Revenue Code. On a plain reading of the section, the process of sale is hit by the express language of section 165 (7) (a) of the new Code. Without holding the section to be retroactive, we may say that sale in pending execution proceedings appears to us to be within the prohibition enacted by the section. 15. For all these reasons, differing from the learned Single Judge, we allow this appeal and set aside the sale of the field measuring 2.29 acres, above referred to in view of the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ahmad Hafiz Khan's case (sup. cit.) on which we have mainly based our findings we delivered actuary on 4-3-1963, sometime after the arguments in this case were concluded, we leave the parties to bear their costs as incurred throughout.