JUDGMENT A.P. Srivastava, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal. His suit has been dismissed by the lower appellate court on a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the defendant. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the house in suit and alleged that the defendant No. 1 was its tenant on behalf of the plaintiff on eight annas per month. A notice of ejectment was given to the defendant No. 1 but he replied to it denying the plaintiff's title. The defendant No. 2 was said to be in collusion with defendant No. 1 and was in possession of the house as a result of that collusion. The plaintiff, therefore, sued for possession over the house and also claimed Rs. 18 as arrears of rent. The suit was contested by both the defendants who denied the plaintiff's title and said that they were the owners of the house. The trial court decreed the suit as it accepted the plaintiff's allegations. The defendants went up in appeal to the lower appellate court and raised a preliminary objection that as a result of the abolition of Zamindari the plaintiff had lost his right to sue in respect of the house. They said that under Sec. 9 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the house must be deemed to have been settled with them. This preliminary objection found favour with the lower appellate court and it has, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. It has not gone into any of the other questions raised. 2. In the second appeal on behalf of the plaintiff it is urged that the view of law taken by the lower appellate court is incorrect. The contention appears to be well founded. 3. It has not gone into any of the other questions raised. 2. In the second appeal on behalf of the plaintiff it is urged that the view of law taken by the lower appellate court is incorrect. The contention appears to be well founded. 3. Sec. 9 of which the defendants wanted to take advantage reads as follows: "All wells, trees in the abadi and all buildings situate within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary, tenant or person, as the case may be, and the site of the wells or the buildings, within the area appurtenant thereto, shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government, on such terms and conditions as may he prescribed." According to the plaintiff the building in question belonged to him and was held by him as an intermediary. Under Sec. 9, even after the abolition of Zamindari it was to continue to belong to him and to be held by him and the site was to be deemed to be settled with him. Simply because the plaintiff had let out the house to the defendant, the house did not cease to belong to him. Nor could it be said that the plaintiff had ceased to hold the house because he let it out to some body else. If he was realising the rent from the tenant and was entitled to resume possession by determining the tenancy he could be deemed in law to be holding the property. It cannot, therefore, be said that as result of the abolition of Zamindari the plaintiff necessarily lost all his rights in the house and had no right to sue in respect of it. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent said that Sec. 9 preserved the rights of tenants also and pointed out that it preserved the rights of other persons too provided they owned the building or held it. His contention was that the defendant was a tenant who held the building. The word `tenant' used in Sec. 9 does not appear to have been used to include the cases of persons occupying as tenant the houses belonging to and held by intermediaries. His contention was that the defendant was a tenant who held the building. The word `tenant' used in Sec. 9 does not appear to have been used to include the cases of persons occupying as tenant the houses belonging to and held by intermediaries. The word `tenant' appears to refer to those persons who are tenants in the village but own right. If , therefore a house belonged to an intermediary and was held by him the person who was residing in it as a tenant of the intermediary could not at the same time claim that he was holding the house. In that case two different persons can start claiming the same house both relying on Sec. 9. The intermediary would claim it on the ground that it belongs to him as it is being held by him through his tenant. The tenant would claim it on the ground that he held it as he was occupying it without owing it. This could not be the intention of Legislature. The word `held' used in the section appears to imply a right which can be referred to title and not merely a right of occupation as a tenant. It, therefore, appears to me that the view taken by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff lost his right of suit on the abolition of Zamindari and could not get the benefit of Sec. 9 is not correct. Under Sec. 9 if the house belonged to the plaintiff and was held by him he was to be deemed to hold it and the site of the house was to be deemed to be settled with him. It was, therefore, necessary in this case to go into the question whether as alleged by him the house in suit belonged to the plaintiff and was held by him on the date of vesting or whether it belong to the defendants and was held by them on that date. 5. The ground on which the suit has been dismissed being untenable the decree of the lower appellate court must be set aside. The appeal will now go back to the lower appellate court for reconsideration in the light of what has been said above. Costs hitherto incurred will abide the result.