Judgment The point involved in the Revision Proceeding is a short one, and it is a question of law with regard to the interpretation of section 488 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts are admitted, and not in dispute. The revision petitioner, one S.A. Ibrahim, had been directed by an order of Court to pay maintenance to his minor daughter, Jalina Bi, under section 488 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, as the minor was a ‘child’ unable to maintain herself in terms of that section. The minor attained majority on 2qth September, 1962, and became sui juris. Thereupon, the revision petitioner sought, by means of an application, to the learned Fifth Presidency Magistrate, under section 489, Criminal Procedure Code, to cancel the earlier order on ground of proof of change in the circumstance. It is not denied before me by the learned Counsel for the respondent, the erstwhile minor daughter, that the situation, will be the same as if that person had now sought to obtain orders of Court directing maintenance to be paid to her, by means of an application. The only question is whether, with regard to the interpretation of section 488 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, a person ceases to be a ‘child’ on attaining majority and becoming sui juris. The matter was considered in all its relevant aspects, by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Subbamma v. Venkata Reddi1, as far as this Court was concerned. Obviously there are only two possible alternatives to the interpretation of the word ‘child’. The first is that a person is a ‘child’ within the meaning of section 488 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, so long as that person, who may be of any age up to majority, has not attained legal majority and is not sui juris. For, it would clearly be doing violence to the concept of a ‘child ‘itself, to hold that a person capable of entering into contracts in his or her own right, and capable of exercising all the volitional acts of a free citizen, must still be considered to be a ‘child’ for the purpose of particular provision of statute, unless there is a special definition embodied as part thereof. The only alternative interpretation would be, that any person., who is unable to maintain himself or herself, of whatever age, without limit, would be a ‘child ‘under section 488 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. The only alternative interpretation would be, that any person., who is unable to maintain himself or herself, of whatever age, without limit, would be a ‘child ‘under section 488 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., pointed out the absurd consequences of such a view, carried to its logical conclusion. As he observed, a man of over 70 years, unable to maintain himself owing to senile infirmities, could sue his father over 90, for maintenance, as a ‘child’ under section 488, Criminal Procedure Codes. There is one other reported decision of this Court, that of Lakshmana Rao, J., in Kanniah v. Rajammal1, which apparently expressed a different view. But, as Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., pointed out, the ruling is extremely brief, and the facts are not fully indicated either in the head-note or in the decision itself. It may very well be that, in the particular cast, the concerned respondent, one Rajammal, might have been above 18 years and below 21 years, unable to maintain herself owing to some mental infirmity. Nor does the decision discuss the legal connotation of the word ‘child ‘as occurring in section 488 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, which would essentially involve the idea of some limit. Therefore, since Kanniah v. Rajammal1, has been distinguished by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., himself, I would ordinarily be bound to follow the decision in Subbamma v. Venkata Reddi2, unless I was convinced upon some powerful ground or consideration, that the view of the learned Judge (Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.) was erroneous. On the contrary, I am convinced that that is the only reasonable interpretation that could be applied to this provision of the statute. The matter is not bare of authority, as far as other High Courts are concerned. In Ranchhoddas Narottamdass v. Emperor3, a Bench of that Court took the view though a ‘child’ had rot been defined in the Code, for purposes of the section, the construction should be that a person is a ‘child’ until he or she attains the age of majority. This approved and followed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Hemanta Kumar Benerji v. Manorama Debt4, in which a angle Judge of that Court was of the view than a child, as defined in section 488, is a person who is incompetent to enter into any contract or enforce any claim under the law. This approved and followed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Hemanta Kumar Benerji v. Manorama Debt4, in which a angle Judge of that Court was of the view than a child, as defined in section 488, is a person who is incompetent to enter into any contract or enforce any claim under the law. A person, who has not attained the age of majority, would, therefore, be a ‘child’ for purposes of section 488, Criminal Procedure Code, notwithstanding the fact that that person, might be 12 or 14 or 15 or 16, ages with reference to which terms like ‘boy’ and ‘girl’ would be more appropriate than ‘child’. It might appear, at the first blush, as if a contrary view was expressed by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Purnasashi Devi v. Nagendra Nath5. But, when the facts of that decision are carefully scrutinised, it will at once be clear that what the learned Judges were pointing out was that the word ‘child’ had been deliberately used to leave the Courts free to order maintenance for such sons and daughters as are unable to earn a livelihood for themselves, without the strict connotation of that word which is current in popular parlance. No doubt, the learned Judges observed that the son may be “17 or 18 or 19”; this itself shows that the limit of majority was not in their minds, for the first of these ages is within the legal majority while the other two ages are not. I do not think that this passage implies that a person unable to maintain himself or herself is a ‘child irrespective of age and up to any age, that a major was attempting to obtain maintenance as a child. I do not think it is necessary to refer to any other authorities. I do not think that this passage implies that a person unable to maintain himself or herself is a ‘child irrespective of age and up to any age, that a major was attempting to obtain maintenance as a child. I do not think it is necessary to refer to any other authorities. The logic appears to me to be irrefutable that, where a person is legally capable of entering into contracts and instituting suits, that person cannot any longer be considered a ‘child’, though a person who has not attained that status might be a child for the purpose of section 488 (1) , Criminal Procedure Code, ever, if that person is of such an age as to be ordinarily termed a ‘boy’ or ‘girl’ and not a ‘child’ 1 leave open the question whether a person who may be theoretically above 18, but still not merely incapable of taking care of himself or herself, but also not sui juris because of any defect, such as mental infirmity etc., would or would not be a child for the purpose of section 488, Criminal Procedure Code. That has no relation to the facts of the present case. On the terms of the sections, it is certainly essential mat a person should both be a child, and incapable of taking care of himself or herself; fulfilment of one qualification will not entitle that person to maintenance. The Revision has accordingly to be allowed, and the original order set aside under section 489, Criminal Procedure Code, in view of the admitted alteration in the status of the erstwhile minor. I may add that since the minor has now married, and become the wife of a person fully capable of supporting and maintaining her, the point is really academic and relates to alleged arrears for a limited period. K.L.B.-----Revision allowed.