This matter has come up before me on a difference of opinion between my Brother Judges, Menrotra, C.J. and Dutta, J. (2) The facts of the case are briefly as follows: Respondent No. 3 to this petition, by name Shri P. K, Konger, was the Mohurer incharge of the weighment of the green leaves plucked by the women labourers in the peti­tioner's tea garden. As the manager of the petitioner's tea estate, Mr. W. G. B. Nicholetts, received a letter from the Excise Department that the ratio of green leaf to that of made tea was poor, he instructed Shri P. Barua, the Labour Officer of the Company, who was on a visit to the garden, and the Assistant Manager of the tea garden, shri P. Dasgupta, to check the leaf weighment and find out the number of persons that actually weighed in Shri Konger's challan. Accordingly Shri Barua and Shri Dasgupta stood at some distance from the Respondent No. 3 in different places and counted the number of baskets that were weighed on the scale by the Respondent No. 3. Shri Barua had marked on a sheet of paper with small lines whenever a basket was weighed and the total figure amounted to 179. Similarly Shri Dasgupta also counted the baskets but without marking on a piece of paper as was done by Shri Barua. Shri Dasgupta also counted the number of baskets weighed as 179. Thus the figures arrived at by both having tallied, they went up to the Respondent No. 3 and asked him to snow the book that was maintained by him as the weighment was in progress indicating the number of persons who had weighed their baskets and the weight of each basket, this book v being known as the green-leaf book. The entries made by the Respondent No. 3 in that book showed that 199 bas­kets had been weighed. Thus a discrepancy of 20 baskets in excess was noticed. Thereupon Shri Barua and shri Dasgupta submitted their statements to the Manager, marked as Exts. 9 and 10 before the Labour Court. The entries made by the Respondent No. 3 in that book showed that 199 bas­kets had been weighed. Thus a discrepancy of 20 baskets in excess was noticed. Thereupon Shri Barua and shri Dasgupta submitted their statements to the Manager, marked as Exts. 9 and 10 before the Labour Court. On the basis of these statements, the Manager gave a chargesheet to the Respondent No. 3 on 19-8-59 wherein the check and observations made by the Assistant Manager and the Com­pany's Labour Officer, Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua, res­pectively, were mentioned and the discrepancy between the figures arrived at by them and that noted by the Respon­dent No. 3 in the green-leaf book was pointed out. " It was also indicated in the chargesheet, marked as Annexure 'C' to the proceedings before the Manager, that this discrepancy between the actual number of pluckers, whose green leaf was weighed, and that shown in the green-leaf book amounted to defrauding the tea company and the falsification of account amounting to gross mis­conduct according to the standing orders of the Company. "Having thus mentioned the particulars of the charges against the Respondent No. 3, the Manager called upon him to explain in writing by 22-8-59 at 10 A. M. why he should not be dismissed or otherwise punished. It was also indicated in the chargesheet served on the Respondent No. 3 that his written explanation to the charge would be -considered by the Manager who would also give him a personal hearing. By the same order the Respondent No. 3 was suspended pending final disposal of the matter. To this the Respondent No. 3 submitted his explana­tion on 22-8-59, which is appended as Annexure 0' to the Manager's proceedings. In that explanation the Respon­dent No. 3 denied the charge and claimed that the figure representing the number of pluckers that day, whose tea baskets were weighed at the relevant time, was 199 and not less. He also questioned the correctness of the figure arrived at by Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua. He further claimed that as there were some obstructions to the view of these two persons, such as leaf-house posts, chungs etc., it was most likely that some of the pluckers that came for weighing their baskets were not counted by Shri Uasgupta and Shri Barua. He further claimed that as there were some obstructions to the view of these two persons, such as leaf-house posts, chungs etc., it was most likely that some of the pluckers that came for weighing their baskets were not counted by Shri Uasgupta and Shri Barua. In his explanation the Respondent No. J apparently assumed that both Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua counted the individual pluckers and not the baskets as •they were placed on the scales for weighment. (3) On receipt of the explanation of the Respondent 'No. 3, the Manager proceeded to hold what is called the Court of Enquiry on 22-8-59. At that enquiry the charge letter addressed to the Respondent No. 3 dated 19-8-59 as well as the explanation of the Respondent No. 3 dated 22-8-59 were read over in the presence of the Respondent No. 3. The Manager also explained to the Respondent No. 3 that Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua were instructed by him to stand at ground level but approximately in the middle of leaf house No. 2 that is the left house nearest the office, and count up the number of pluckers who came to weigh in at the leaf weighment scale of the Respondent No. 3, and that "they were to observe the scale as unconstructively as possible standing several yards apart so that a completely separate count could be taken. The Manager further informed the Respondent No. 3 that on the comple­tion of the weighment Shri Dasgupta had enquired of Him as to the total number of pluckers noted by him and the total amount of leaf weighed, and on account of the discre­pancy the green-leaf book was impounded by Shri uasgupta. Having thus explained the background, the Manager then read out to the Respondent No. 3 the signed state­ments of Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua and the Respon­dent No. 3 was asked to comment on them, particularly with reference to the number of pluckers weighing on that day and the fact that there was a difference of 20 baskets between the figure noted in the weighment book By the Respondent No. 3 as 199 and that counted both by Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua as 179, was pointed out. (4) Thereupon the Respondent No. 3 stated before the Manager at the enquiry that Shri Dasgupta and Shri tiarua had been at the far end of the leaf house from where it was impossible to count the number of pluckers weignmg in. On this the Manager pointed out to the Respondent No. 3 that the two officers had pointed out in their state­ments that they had moved down to approximate middle of the leaf house before the weighment began. On this the Respondent No. 3 reiterated that the actual number 01 pluckers that day was 199 and not 179 as stated by Snri Dasgupta and Shri Barua. After this a statement was re­corded by the Manager of what the Respondent No. 3 stated before him, and this statement is marked as Ext. 6 Before the Labour Court. (5) After this the Manager decided to inspect the scene of the incident referred to in the original charge with particular reference to the position of the weighment table and scales and the seat of Respondent No. 3 in relation to the position where Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua were taking the count, presumably in view of the insistence 01 the Respondent No. 3 that the two officers could not have properly noticed the pluckers coming to the scales to weigh their baskets. The Manager noticed that the Res­pondent No. 3 might possibly have been able to see the officers taking the count if he looked down the line or pluckers as contended by the Respondent No. 3, but that it appeared improbable unless he actually turned round fully. (6) After this the Respondent No. 3 stated that he wished witnesses to be called who could certify that the two officers, Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua, were actually at the far end of the leaf house and not in the middle as stated by them. Thereafter apparently the Respondent No. 3 stated that he was unable to get anyone who could Witness to this effect. Having satisfied himself by the local inspection that both Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua could properly see the baskets that were being weighed on the scales from the respective positions taken up by them and that the count­ing made by them was satisfactory, the Respondent No. i was questioned by the Manager if he had any further que­ries. Having satisfied himself by the local inspection that both Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua could properly see the baskets that were being weighed on the scales from the respective positions taken up by them and that the count­ing made by them was satisfactory, the Respondent No. i was questioned by the Manager if he had any further que­ries. Thereupon the Respondent No. 3 wanted to nave witnesses called in to testify on his behalf and he was advised that it was his duty to bring the witnesses to prove and corroborate the statement that the two officers, Shri Dasgupta and Shri Barua, were at the far end of the leaf house and that they could not count all the baskets. There­upon the Respondent No. 3 stated that he had no Witness whom he could bring forward. On this, the enquiry was closed and the Manager in his view of the proceedings, marked as Annexure 'F' of the Court of inquiry, where in haying taken into consideration the written explanation given by the Respondent Ho. 3 on 22-8-59 as also the verbal explanations given by him in the course of the per­sonal hearing granted to him on 22-8-59, held that the explanation was unsatisfactory. The Manager in what appears to be a carefully written decision stated that the contention that the Assis­tant Manager and the Company Labour Officer were not to a position to count all the pluckers weighing on the Respondent No. 3's scale as they were standing at the far end of the leaf house, was unacceptable; that the Respondent No. 3 himself had admitted during the personal hearing that he saw both the officers standing in the middle of the leaf house, the fact stated by both Shri Uasgupta and Shri Barua and the Manager had no reason to doubt the correctness of their statements, and that having also personally inspected the spot accompanied by the Respon­dent No. 3 and the two witnesses Shri Oasgupta and shri Barua, he was satisfied that the two officers were counting the pluckers as and when the baskets were being placed on the scales. The Manager also rejected the contention of the Res­pondent No. 3 that child mothers and other old women coming from the other side might not have been counted by the officers, in view of the fact that even they had to place their baskets on the weighing scale, and, therefore, could not be missed. The Manager further pointed out in his order that the Respondent No. 3 had been found previ­ously to show an excess of 11 pluckers in the books main­tained by him some time in December 1958 and that on that occasion he was let off with a severe warning only. The Manager further referred to another warning issued to the Respondent No. 3 on 21-5-58 and also on 23-5-59. Having thus taken all the matters into consideration, the Manager came to the conclusion that the Respondent No. 3 was guilty of the charge laid against him and accordingly decided to dismiss him from the service. (7) On this an industrial dispute was raised by the Assam Chan Kannacliari Sangha, which took up the cause of Respondent No. 3, the Mohurer, and accordingly a refer­ence was made by, the Government to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, under which the Labour Court was asked to adjudicate on the following points (1) Whether the dismissal of Sri P. K. Konger, Head Women Mohurer of Langharjan Tea Estate is justi­fied? (2) If not, is he entitled to re-instatement or any other relief in lieu thereof? (8) On this reference the Labour Court proceeded to record evidence and accordingly recorded the evidence OT the Manager of the Tea Estate, who ordered the dismissal of the Respondent No. 3, and Shri Dasgupta, the Assistant Manager on behalf of the Management, and further record­ed the evidence of five witnesses for the labour union, the detailed reference to which evidence would be made later. Thereafter the Labour Court gave an award setting aside the order of dismissal passed by the Manager against the Respondent No. 3 and directed his reinstatement. The two main grounds on which the Labour Court based its decision are (1) that the management acted mala fide in ordering the dismissal of the Respondent No. 3 and (2) that the domestic enquiry held by the Manager did not conform to the principle of natural justice. The two main grounds on which the Labour Court based its decision are (1) that the management acted mala fide in ordering the dismissal of the Respondent No. 3 and (2) that the domestic enquiry held by the Manager did not conform to the principle of natural justice. (9) It is against the adjudication by the Labour court that the present petition under Article 228 of the Consti­tution has been filed in his Court. (10) After the matter was heard by a Division Bench of this Court, Mehrotra, C. J. took the view that toe the query conducted by the Manager was violative of the prin­ciples of natural justice, in that no Witness was examined in the presence of the Respondent No. 3 and that do oppor­tunity was afforded to him to cross-examine the witnesses and that the opportunity contemplated by the Standing Orders to be given to a person charged with gross misconduct included an opportunity to have the evidence recorded in his presence and to cross-examine the Witness, the other ground on which the Labour Court based its decision, namely, mala fides, was not discussed and definitely consi­dered by the learned Chief Justice although an observation appears in the judgment as follows. "It may be even difficult to say on the circumstances that the finding with regard to mala fides by the Labour Court is not based on any evidence and that this count-should, therefore, substitute its own judgment to that of the Labour Court." Accordingly Mehrotra, C. J. held that the adjudication W the Labour Court did not call for any interference by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. (11) On the other hand, Dutta, J. held that the Labour Court was wrong in thinking that the opportunity to cross-, examine the two witnesses, Shri Dasgupta and Shri Kama, was refused to the Respondent No. 3, as the Respondent No. 3 never demanded that he should be given an oppor­tunity to cross-examine them, and that not affording an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, which was not ask­ed for, did not amount to any violation of the principles of natural justice; that even if there had been any SUM objection, it was rectified by the enquiry conducted by the Labour Court wherein the Respondent No. 3 had the oppor­tunity of cross-examining Shri Dasgupta and that, conse­quently, there was no violation of the principle of natural justice, in the enquiry conducted by the Manager, Dutta. J. also rejected the finding of the Labour Court that the action of the management in dismissing the Respondent No 3 was mala fide. The learned Judge pointed out that there was no material on the record to support the finding, of the Labour Court. In the result, Dutta, J. held that the petition should be allowed, the order of the Labour Court should be quashed as being without jurisdiction and that the order of the Manager should be restored. (12) It was contended by Mr. P. K. Goswami, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this case, that the domestic enquiry in this case was in full conformity With the standing orders governing the management as well as the employees and that, therefore, no exception could be taken to the decision reached in that enquiry, which' was-in accordance with the standing orders. He further con­tended that domestic tribunal is manned by persons who are not legally qualified for they do not possess the expe­rience of the courts of law nor are they governed 67 the* strict rules of evidence; nor can they exercise the ordinary powers of a court of justice, such as, swearing in Witness, summoning them etc. He accordingly pointed out that the same principles of natural justice which could be applied to courts of law and justice cannot to an equal measure or to the same degree be applied to domestic tribunals which are so differently constituted. He accordingly pointed out that the same principles of natural justice which could be applied to courts of law and justice cannot to an equal measure or to the same degree be applied to domestic tribunals which are so differently constituted. He further claimed that even according to the normal concepts of the principles of natural justice, the enquiry made in this case sufficiently conforms to those princi­ples, in that the Respondent No. 3 was made fully aware of what be was being charged with and was informed on the evidence against him and was given the opportunity of offering his explanation to the charge as well as to me statements made by the two officers whose statements were read over to him and explained. He further pointed out that the Manager took additional care in this case of making a local inspection in the pre­sence of the Respondent No. 3 to satisfy himself as to the correctness of the statements made by the two officers, on the question whether they were at the time of taking their count in a position to watch the baskets of we pluckers that were .being weighed on the scales. He also gave a personal hearing to the Respondent No. 3 and toe; down what he bad to state! It was further pointed out by Mr. Goswami that at no stage of the enquiry did the Res­pondent No. 3 request or demand that the two officers should be examined in his presence or that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining them. He pointed out that if a person did not choose to cross-examine witnesses who were available at the enquiry and whose state­ments were before the Respondent No. 3, it obviously cannot amount to any denial by the Manager of an oppor­tunity to cross-examine the witnesses. (13) On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. He pointed out that if a person did not choose to cross-examine witnesses who were available at the enquiry and whose state­ments were before the Respondent No. 3, it obviously cannot amount to any denial by the Manager of an oppor­tunity to cross-examine the witnesses. (13) On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Lahiri, the (earned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3, that we fundamentals of the principles of natural justice require that any evidence which is sought to be used against a per­son should be taken in his presence, that he should be afforded an opportunity of testing the evidence by cross examination and that it was the duty of the management to inform the Respondent No. 3 of his rights and to offer to him these opportunities, and, as this was not done, the enquiry cannot be said to have answered the principles of natural justice and therefore should be set aside, and that the Labour Court has rightly done so. (14) On the question of mala fides, Mr. Goswami conten­ded that there is absolutely no evidence on record to indi­cate that the Manager acted vindictively or without justly and fairly considering the case against the Respondent No. 3 and that the only fact on which the plea of mala fides is sought to be raised by the Respondent Mo. 3 is that one Shyam has been appointed to succeed him and that Shri Dasgupta was very much interested in Shyam and that it was this that has resulted in the dismissal of the Respon­dent Ro. 3, which circumstance, according to him, could not support any inference of mala fides. It was sought to be contended by Mr. Lahiri on the other hand that the whole scheme of affairs is to employ Shyam in the establishment and it is for this purpose and with this object that the proceedings have been initiated against the 'Respondent No. 3, so that a vacancy could be created and Shyam could be provided in place of the Respondent No. 3. (15) I shall first take up the question of mala tides, the second ground OB which the Labour Court based its decision. Before I do this, it may be necessary to consider and examine the scope of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to interfere with the decision of a domestic tribunal in such matters. (15) I shall first take up the question of mala tides, the second ground OB which the Labour Court based its decision. Before I do this, it may be necessary to consider and examine the scope of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to interfere with the decision of a domestic tribunal in such matters. The leading case on the subject is that of the Supreme Court M/J. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130 wherein at page 138, S. K. Das, J. summarised the legal position as follows: "Undoubtedly, the management of a concern has power to direct its own internal administration and discipline; but the power is not unlimited and when a dispute arises, trial Tribunals have been given the power to see whether the termination of service of a workman is justified and to give appropriate relief. In cases of dismissal o« mis­conduct the Tribunal does not, however, act as a Court it-appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere (i) when there is a want OT good faith, (ii) when there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, (iii) when the management has been guilty it-a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials, the finding is completes baseless or perverse." This statement of law has been followed by successive Supreme Court decisions, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to refer to them. Hence, the jurisdiction of an industrial Tribunal to interfere with the decision of a domestic tenures or an action taken by the management could only be confined to the four aspects indicated in the above extras! from the Supreme Court decision. If the case did not tan within one or the other of them, any interference by We Labour Court would be without jurisdiction and would necessarily justify and require the intervention by this Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 225 of the Constitution. In the instant case, the Labour Court, as already pointed out, has sought to bass its decision on the tirer'1 and the third heads, namely, one of want of good faith and violation of principles of natural justice. (16) I shall first deal with the question whether the order of dismissal in this case was made without good-faith. In the instant case, the Labour Court, as already pointed out, has sought to bass its decision on the tirer'1 and the third heads, namely, one of want of good faith and violation of principles of natural justice. (16) I shall first deal with the question whether the order of dismissal in this case was made without good-faith. The only suggestion in the evidence before the Lanour Court adduced by tile labour union is to the elect that one Shyam was provided for and employed in the tea estate-in a hurry without applications having been called WT, without scrutiny and without proper interview and taking the usual steps, and that it was accordingly fiintad that it was to provide Shyam that the Respondent No. 3 was sought to be got rid of. A careful consideration of the evidence adduced before the Labour Court will show that there was absolutely no foundation for this suggestion. Even according to the evidence of the labour union, all that is stated in that Shyam had served for about six months only, mat he was not appointed in place of the Respondent No. 3 as seen from the evidence of Durgeswar Gogoi, one of the witnesses for the union, who added that while the Respon­dent No. 3 was suspended, Sri P. C. Deb wrote the pay book and Shyam did the work of Deb. He also deposed that Shri J. C. Bora was brought from the factory to work in the pay book while the Respondent No. 3 was suspendea. Strangely, there is nothing worth noticing in tire evidence-of the Respondent No. 3 himself who makes no mention of Shyam having been appointed in his place or that it was to get a place for Shyam that he was sought to be dismissed. On the other hand, the evidence of the Respondent No. 3 is that he has no grudge either against Shri Dasgupta or Shri Barua, that he had good relationship with the Manager, and that after the Respondent No. 3 Shri Deb did his work. On the other hand, the evidence of the Respondent No. 3 is that he has no grudge either against Shri Dasgupta or Shri Barua, that he had good relationship with the Manager, and that after the Respondent No. 3 Shri Deb did his work. (17) Unless it is established that on account of the unusual interest which the management had in Shyam and in order to m3Ke a provision for him, they sacrificed the interest of the Respondent No. 3 by getting rid of him somehow or other, there can be no question of any lack of good fait., that could be said to have been established. Obviously, there is no such evidence in this case. Hence, in my con­sidered opinion, the ground of mala fides, on, which the Labour Court has based its decision, is utterly untenable and grossly perverse and calls for interference. (18) The other ground on which the Labour court has 'based its decision, as already pointed out, is that the domestic enquiry by the Manager violated the principles of natural justice, and, that, therefore, any action taken on the 6 of such an enquiry cannot be upheld. (19) In considering what are the principles of natural jus­tice that could be applied to a domestic tribunal of this nature, we would have to bear in mind not only the limita­tions on the capacity and ability of the tribunal to decide a legal issue but also the circumstances of each case and the rules and orders that govern the duties of the domes­tic tribunal. I cannot do better than by making a reference 'to the observations of the Privy Council, in the case of Lennox Arthur Patrick O'Reilly v. Cyril Cuthbert Gittens, AIR 1949 P. C. 313 at page 316: "The jurisdiction of the Courts in regard to domestic tribunals - a phrase which may conveniently be used to in­clude the committees or the councils or the members OT ;the trade unions, of members' clubs, and of professional bodies established by statute or Royal Charter while acting in a quasi-judicial capacity - - is clearly of a limited .nature. Parenthetically I may observe that 1 am not con­fident that precisely the same principles will apply in an these cases; for it may be that a body entrusted with important duties by an Act of Parliament is not in the same position as, for example, the executive committee in the present case. Speaking generally, it is useful to Dear in mind the very wide differences between the principles .applicable to Courts of justice and those applicable to •domestic tribunals. In the former the accused is entitled to be the by the judge according to the evidence legally adduced and has a right to be represented by a skilled legal advocate. All the procedure of a modern trial including the examination and cross-examination of the witnesses and the summing up, if any, is based on these two cir­cumstances. A domestic tribunal is in general a tribunal composed of laymen. It has no power to administer an oath and, a circumstance which is perhaps of greater importance, no party has the power to compel the atten­dance of witnesses. It is not bound by the rules of evidence; it is indeed probably ignorant of them. It may act, and it sometimes must act, on mere hearsay, and in many cases the members present or some of them (like an English jury in ancient days), are themselves both the witnesses and the judges. Before such a tribunal counsel have no right of audience and there are no effective means for testing by cross-examination the truth of the statements that may - be made. The members of the tribunal may have been dis­cussing the matter for weeks with persons not present at the hearing, and there is no one even to warn them of the danger of acting on preconceived views. It is apparent and it is well settled by authority that the decision of such a tribunal cannot be attacked on the ground that it is against the weight of evidence, since evidence in the proper sense there is none, and since the decisions of the tribunal are not open to any sort of appeal; unless the rules provide for one." (20) Referring to the normal' requirements of the procedure that should be followed by a domestic tribunal, it is observed by Bowen L.J. in Leeson v. General Council or Medical Education and Registration, (1889) 43 Ch. D. 366 : "There must be due inquiry. The accused person must . have notice of what he is accused. He must have an oppor­tunity of being heard, and the decision must be honestly arrived at if he has had a full opportunity of being heard." Maugham J., as he then was, in the case of Maclean v. The Workers' Union, 1929-1 Ch. 602, referring to the above quoted judgment further observed: "To my mind that statement of the case mutatis mutandis is applicable, apart from any special rule, to an such cases as I am considering, and it follows exactly the same lines as the well known decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Dawkins v. Antrobus, 1881-17 Ch. u., 615: (21) Their Lordships in AIR 1949 PC 313 have set out these passages because they accepted the principles thus laid down as being applicable to the case before them. Applying them they were unable to reach a conclusion that the proceedings at the Court of inquiry could be set aside on the grounds stated by the learned Judge." (22) Dealing with the procedure followed by a do­mestic tribunal in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk. 1949-1 All ER 109, the Court of appeal observed as follows-. "Throughout this inquiry he was, at every stage, u seems to me, given an opportunity of presenting his case and of asking any questions which he desired to ask. It is true that he was not in terms asked. "Have you got any witnesses? Do you want an ad-journment?" A layman at an inquiry of this kind is, of course, at a grave disadvantage compared with a , trained advocate, but that is a necessary result of these domestic tribunals which proceed in a some­what informal manner...........The require­ments of natural justice must depend on the circum­stances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting,, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth,. Ac­cordingly, I do not derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice which have been from time to time used, but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case. Ac­cordingly, I do not derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice which have been from time to time used, but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case. I think from first to last the plaintiff did have such an opportunity." (23) In 1915 AC 120 (Local Government Board v. Alridge), at page 138, it is observed as follows . "The words 'natural justice' occur in arguments and sometimes in judicial pronouncements in such cases. My Lords, when a central administrative board deals with an appeal from a local authority it must do its best to act justly, and to reach just ends by just means. If a statute prescribes the means it must employ them. If it is left without express guidance it must still act honestly and by honest means, in: regard to these certain ways and methods of judicial procedure may very likely be imitated; and lawyer-line methods may find especial favour from lawyers, c that the judiciary should presume to impose its own methods on administrative or executive officers is a usurpation. And the assumption that the methods of natural justice are ex necessitate those of Courts of justice is wholly unfounded. This is expressly appli­cable to steps of procedure or forms of pleading, in so far as the term 'natural justice' means that a result or process should be just, it is a harmless though it may be a high-sounding expression; in so far as it attempts to reflect the old just natural it is a confused and unwarranted transfer into the ethical sphere of a term employed for of her distinctions; and, in so far as it is resorted to for of her purposes, it is vacuous." (24) Considering the English decisions bearing on the subject, the Supreme Court, in the case of the New Prakasn Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., (S) AIR 1957 SC 232 , observed at page 237 as follows: "In our opinion, the High Court has made a number of assumptions in making those observations which do not appear to be justified by the scheme of the legislation we are dealing with or By any a priori considerations of what has been characterized as 'natural justice'. Ltd., (S) AIR 1957 SC 232 , observed at page 237 as follows: "In our opinion, the High Court has made a number of assumptions in making those observations which do not appear to be justified by the scheme of the legislation we are dealing with or By any a priori considerations of what has been characterized as 'natural justice'. The tribunal in question was not administering justice as a court of law, though while deciding as between the 'rival claims of the applicants for a permit it had to deal with them in a fair and just manner. But a tribunal even acting -judicially is not obliged to grant an adjournment suo motu without any application on behalf of any of the parties interested." (25) Referring to the cases of (1889) 43 Ch. D. 366, and Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration, (1894) 1 QB 750, their Lordships made the following observations with reference to the evidence of a Medical Council: "They had, therefore, to function, not exactly as Courts of law, but as domestic tribunals created by the statute to function according to the statutory rules in a fair and just manner, that is to say, that they should have no personal interest in the controversy and should have given a full and fair opportunity to the person proceeded against to place his case before the tribunal." (26) In Dr. V. Ramakamath v. Surgeon General, AIR 1951 Mad 227 , Rajamannar, C. J. of the Madras High Court, dealing with the domestic or quasi-judicial tribunals observed as follows: "But it is now well established that the strict rules of procedure applicable to Courts of law need not be followed by domestic and quasi-judicial tribunals. V. Ramakamath v. Surgeon General, AIR 1951 Mad 227 , Rajamannar, C. J. of the Madras High Court, dealing with the domestic or quasi-judicial tribunals observed as follows: "But it is now well established that the strict rules of procedure applicable to Courts of law need not be followed by domestic and quasi-judicial tribunals. In an enquiry held by such Tribunal all that it should do is to give an opportunity to the parties to state their case and to act judicially and not arbitrarily." (27) A consideration of the above decisions leads us to the conclusion that an action taken by a domestic tri­bunal cannot be called into question if the following re­quirements have been satisfied by it in reaching its deci­sion : (i) the charge on which the person or the employee is sought to be proceeded against is stated and explained to him, (ii) the employee is informed of the materials on which the charge is sought to be based, (iii) the em­ployee is given an opportunity to be heard in his defence of the charge, and (iv) the tribunal acts justly and fairly. The decision reached by the domestic tribunal in the instant case has got therefore to be judged in the light of the above. At the outset it would be necessary to make reference to the standing orders that are in force in the tea estate of the petitioner. These standing orders were made under Sec. 9(c) of the Industrial employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 as amended by an Act of 1956, which requires that the standing orders should be prepared, published and submitted after scrutiny of the Labour Com­missioner, the prescribed authority, and that on such certi­fication they become the standing orders governing the management as well as the employees in the establishment. Standing order 9(c) is extracted below which applies to the instant case : "9. Termination of employment and notice thereof to be given by the employer and workmen. Notice of termination of employment, whether by .Manager or by worker shall be given equal to the wage-period of the worker concerned. Standing order 9(c) is extracted below which applies to the instant case : "9. Termination of employment and notice thereof to be given by the employer and workmen. Notice of termination of employment, whether by .Manager or by worker shall be given equal to the wage-period of the worker concerned. Provided that - (a) * * * * * * * * (b) ** ** ** * (c) The Manager may dismiss without notice any worker who is guilty of gross misconduct but such worker must be informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and be given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. (d) ** ** ** ** (e) ** ** ** **'» Standing 0. 10 deals with acts or omissions which consti­tute misconduct. Standing 0. 10(a)(2) is as follows: "10(a) The following acts and omissions shall con­stitute gross misconduct:- (1) ** ** ** ** (2) Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the company's business or property. ******* *•• (28) It is seen from the above standing orders that what is alleged against the Respondent No. 3 in the charge-sheet served on him, if proved, amounts to gross miscon­duct within the meaning of Standing 0. 10(a)(2). As re­gards the conditions to be complied with in ordering the dismissal of an employee for gross misconduct, an analysis of Standing 0. 9(c) shows that the Manager may dismiss without notice any worker found guilty by him of gross misconduct after (i) informing him in writing of the al­leged misconduct and (ii) giving him an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. These condi­tions, in my considered opinion, have been more than fulfilled in this case, in that the Respondent No. 3 in this case has been given a chargesheet in writing where, the facts and materials available against him were set out and he was given an opportunity to submit his explanation in writing. The action of the Manager in dis­missing the Respondent No. 3 could be supported under the standing orders as there was compliance of the above two conditions. The action of the Manager in dis­missing the Respondent No. 3 could be supported under the standing orders as there was compliance of the above two conditions. But, in the instant case, not only was the Respondent No. 3 served with a chargesheet and given an opportunity to submit a written explanation, which was I taken into consideration, but he was also explained the background of the case, the material evidence available in support of the charge and further an opportunity was' given to him to offer his explanation to the same. In addition, he was also given a personal hearing and the opportunity of making a further statement in writing. These, in my opinion, are quite sufficient to support the action taken by the Manager under the standing orders. (29) Observing that even applying the principles of natural justice, as laid down by the Supreme Court, it I is enough if the domestic tribunal had followed the re­quirements of the standing orders governing its action and procedure, and, in this case, as this is satisfied, and: as there is nothing to indicate that the action taken by, the Manager was neither just nor fair, the dismissal order by the Manager, of the Respondent No. 3, cannot be questioned either by the Labour Court or for the matter of that by any of her Court of law or justice. (30) Even if it is open to the Labour Court to have gone into the merits of the charge, which obviously it is not, inasmuch as the Labour Court, as laid down by' the Supreme Court, cannot be regarded as a Court of. appeal against the domestic tribunal's judgment, there is adequate evidence and material in this case to support i the finding, of the Manager. Two responsible officers had been deputed by him to make an observation in view of the complaint by the Excise Department that the made-tea was found to be less' in weight compared to the weight of the green leaves shown in the accounts. There was absolutely no reason for disbelieving the statements or the two witnesses. Two responsible officers had been deputed by him to make an observation in view of the complaint by the Excise Department that the made-tea was found to be less' in weight compared to the weight of the green leaves shown in the accounts. There was absolutely no reason for disbelieving the statements or the two witnesses. Even assuming that the Respondent No. 3 had a right to demand that they should be examined once again before the Manager and in his presence, and, to cross-examine them, such a request was not made, and, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in (S) AIR 1957 SC 232 , it would not be open to the Respondent No. 3 not having, made such a request to turn round and make a point out OF the fact that he did not make a request and therefore he was not given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses. In my considered opinion, the Respondent No. J had many more opportunities than are provided by the standing orders to meet the case against him and he did avail himself of those opportunities. If, in addition, he did not care to ask for the two officers, whose evidence is against him, to be either examined in his presence or that he- should be. given an opportunity to cross-examine them, he has only to thank himself, and there is no ques­tion of the domestic tribunal not having followed the normal principles of natural justice which would govern its procedure, (University of Ceylon v. Fernando, 19BU-1 All ER 631 at pages 64142). I m, therefore, clearly of opinion that in the instant case, the Respondent No. 3 knew what he was being charged with. He was given an opportunity to offer his explanation to the charge, the evidence of the witnesses was read over to him and he was given an opportunity to comment and meet that evi­dence and he had also made statements on different oc­casions in regard to and to meet the charge against him, and the evidence in support thereof, in addition to the personal hearing that was granted to him. Hence the four requirements pointed out earlier in this judgment have been complied with in the procedure followed and the decision reached by the domestic tribunal in the instant case. Hence the four requirements pointed out earlier in this judgment have been complied with in the procedure followed and the decision reached by the domestic tribunal in the instant case. Therefore, there can be no question of the principles of natural justice having been violated in this case. I am satisfied that the proceeding conducted by the Manager in the domestic enquiry was not only just and fair but fully conformed even to the normal requirements of the principles of natural justice that would be applied to quasi-judicial tribunals. Further, in my opinion, on the materials available before him, the Manager was fully justified in making the order of dismissal in this case. The Labour Court was, therefore, not justified in setting aside the order of dismissal of the Respondent No. 3 passed by the domestic tribunal. Interference with that decision by the Labour Court being, therefore, not justi­fied on any of the grounds on which the Labour Court could so interfere, according to the Supreme Court deci­sions, the order of the Labour Court must be regarded as having been made without jurisdiction, and, therefore, must be quashed. (31) I accordingly agree with the conclusion reached By my learned Brother, Dutta, J. and hold that this peti­tion should be allowed. DG/R.G.D Petition allowed.