Ramakrishnan, J.- This appeal, under the Letters Patent, is filed by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 98 of 1122 M.E. on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court of Nagercoil, against the decision of Jagadisan, J., in Appeal No. 198 of 1958. It is not necessary to set out the facts at any great length, for the purpose of this appeal, because the points in controversy have now become limited. The suit was filed by one Thavazhi of a Tarward in Kanyakumari District governed by the Nanjinad Vellala Regulation of 1101 M. E. which applies to Nanjinad Vellalas governed by the Marumakkathayam Law of succession. This Thavazhi com. prised of Arumugham Amma, the eldest daughter of Umayamma (second defendant) and her four children. The first defendant Valliamma Paradesi Pillai is the common ancestress of the Tarwad. At the earlier stages there were issues about the shares to which the plaintiffs were entitled and other issues set down for decision, but we are now concerned only with the claims by the appellants: “(1) The claim made by the plaintiffs, in addition to partition, for past maintenance for a period of three years prior to suit at 52 kottas of paddy and 700 fanams per annum; and (2) The plaintiffs claim for their share in the cash of Rs. 10,000 belonging to the tarwad.” Regarding the claim to the last mentioned amount of cash, the learned Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiffs had not adduced satisfactory proof that the cash remained in the hands of the defendants. After that, it incurred various items of expenditure like expenditure on litigation and expenditure on the maintenance of the fourth defendant at Karaikudi, where he had gone for his higher studies. Therefore this part of the claim was disallowed and the learned Judge, in appeal also confirmed the decision. Though the appellants before us purported’ to contest this decision, at the time of the hearing of the arguments, it was conceded that there was no substantial ground for differing from the conclusion of the two Courts. Therefore the appeal in respect of this claim will be dismissed. We will take up next the claim for arrears of past maintenance. Though the appellants before us purported’ to contest this decision, at the time of the hearing of the arguments, it was conceded that there was no substantial ground for differing from the conclusion of the two Courts. Therefore the appeal in respect of this claim will be dismissed. We will take up next the claim for arrears of past maintenance. In paragraph 19 of the plaint it was alleged that the first plaintiff got married in 1114 M.E. (1938-39) that from that time she was residing along with her husband separate from the tarwad, and that on requisition made to defendants 2 and 3 to pay annually the maintenance due to be paid to the plaintiffs they had not given the same. But defendants 2 to 11 in their common written statement denied the above allegations, and alleged that though the first plaintiff went away from the tarward and married, money, cocoanut, paddy, rice and vessels were given to the first plaintiff as and when she required, and that the allegation made, that maintenance was claimed by the plaintiffs and had been refused, was false. Exhibit P-4 is a notice issued by P.W. 1 on 9th May, 1121 M.E. demanding partition, but no claim was made in that notice which is the earliest notice issued by the first plaintiff, that she had any grievance regarding non-payment of past maintenance. It is in this contest, that the specific allegation of the defendants in their written statement that though the first plaintiff, for her convenience, stayed with her husband in another house, she was getting from the tarwad various articles for her maintenance from time to time and thereby the tarward effectively discharged its obligation to maintain her, was made. It is only subsequently when a notice, Exhibit P-5, was issued by the plaintiffs on 6th October, 1121 through a lawyer that the claim was made for the first time that the plaintiffs had not been provided maintenance from 1114 M.E. In his evidence D.W. 1 swore that till 1122 M.E. (the year when the present suit was filed) the tarwad had maintained the daughters, though they had lived in different houses, and that they used to come to the family house for delivery. The first plaintiff is the eldest daughter of Umayamma D-2 and it is common ground that though she left the tarwad house, she lived in the same village. The first plaintiff is the eldest daughter of Umayamma D-2 and it is common ground that though she left the tarwad house, she lived in the same village. Therefore it was quite possible, in the ordinary circumstances in which such families live in this part of the country that she had received continuous help from the tarwad for her maintenance by supplies of rice or condiments or oil or even cash from time to time. The learned Subordinate Judge repelled the plaintiff’s claim to past maintenance on a curious ground that the plaintiffs deliberately refrained from filing a suit for partition expecting that the first plaintiff would get a larger share by the addition to the number of children which would be born to her, and that thereby it should be inferred that she had waived the claim for past maintenance. The learned Judge Jagadisan, J., disallowed the claim for past maintenance on the ground that the right to maintenance in favour of a member of the Marumakkathayam tarwad was recognised only because of his inability to obtain a share in the tarwad properties as long as the tarwad stood impartible in law, but such a right must be deemed to have been effectively abolished and superseded by the conferment of the right to share under the statute. We are not prepared to agree with the proposition stated in the above broad form by the learned Judge. The appellants point out that there were different Marumakkathayam enactments passed more or less at the same time in Kerala, and which conferred on junior members of a tarwad the right to obtain partition. These are Regulation II of 1100 M.E. for Nayar tarwads. The Travancore Ezhava Act, (III of 1100) M.E. for Ezhava tarwads and Regulation VI of 1101 M.E. for Nanjinad Vellala tarwads. All these Regulations have an important saving clause which in the Nanjinad Vellala Regulation of 1101 M.E. reads: “34. Saving.- Nothing in this Regulation shall- (a) affect rights which have accrued according to custom before the date on which this Regulation comes into force ; or (b) affect the existing rules of law, custom or usage except to the extent hereinbefore expressly-provided for.” It is necessary to find out what these pre-existing rights are and whether the Regulation has modified that right in any way. The right to maintenance is. an individual right. The right to maintenance is. an individual right. Every member of the tarwad possesses it himself or herself, and not merely as a joint right in combination with other members. (Vide page 135-A treatise on Malabar and Alaysanihana Law by P. R. Sundara Aiyar 1922 edition). The same learned author at page 134, after referring to the view of the Bombay High Court in Himmal Singh Becharsingh v. Ganpat Singh1, which held that a junior member having right to partition must enforce that right and cannot sue for maintenance only, commented that there was no reason for denying to a person who has two distinct rights the choice of determining which of them he would enforce. Regulation VI of 1101 M.E. confers an absolute right to obtain partition under section 30 to every member of a tarwad. But it cannot be postulated that after getting a right to obtain a partition in this absolute manner, a member of a tarwad cannot choose the alternative remedy which the pre-existing law conferred on him of a right to sue for maintenance. Nor can it be urged that when a member of a tarwad has chosen the remedy of filing a suit for partition it would automatically deprive him of the relief for arrears of past maintenance, if there was an adequate and supportable claim in regard to it under the preexisting law or custom. The pre-existing law or custom conferred a right to maintenance on all members out of the income from the tarwad property. As pointed out by Sundara Aiyar, J., in Marwadi v. Pamakkar2 “To go out of the tarwad house for living with the husband is a good ground for claiming separate maintenance. If a member lives away from the tarwad house for an improper purpose, that would be a good ground for refusing separate maintenance. In a suit for past maintenance, waiver during any portion of the period for which maintenance is claimed may no doubt be inferred. It may be sufficient to show that the conduct of the party was such as to lead to a reasonable inference of waiver.” That decision dealt with a suit filed for arrears of maintenance. In a suit for past maintenance, waiver during any portion of the period for which maintenance is claimed may no doubt be inferred. It may be sufficient to show that the conduct of the party was such as to lead to a reasonable inference of waiver.” That decision dealt with a suit filed for arrears of maintenance. The question for consideration in this suit is how far a claim for arrears of maintenance should be allowed for the period when a member of the tarwad has been living in a house different from the tarwad house, for reasons of her own, like marriage or increase in the number of children. We may consider the position of a Hindu wife and a Hindu widow. A Hindu wife cannot leave her husband’s house when she chooses and require him to provide maintenance for her elsewhere. But a Hindu widow is not bound to reside with her husband’s family, and she does nor forfeit her right to maintenance out of her husband’s estate by going to reside eleswhere e.g., her parents house. Thus there is a similarity between a member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad and a Hindu widow in regard to the right to live apart from the family house, without forfeiting the right to claim maintenance. The general rule regarding recovery of arrears of maintenance is that it is necessary to prove that there was a wrongful withholding for the period for which the arrears are claimed. Mere non-payment of maintenance does not constitute proof of wrongful withholding. But it constitutes prima facie proof of wrongful withholding and if it is coupled with a denial of the plaintiffs right to maintenance it may constitute sufficient proof of wrongful withholding to entitle the plaintiff to arrears of maintenance (Mulla’s Hindu Law, page 727-12th edition). A member of the tarwad who lives apart from the tarwad could show by her conduct that when she went to live apart, she still expected the tarwad to provide for her maintenance. A member of the tarwad who lives apart from the tarwad could show by her conduct that when she went to live apart, she still expected the tarwad to provide for her maintenance. But if without going to any distant place, she has lived in the same village, and if she had been on visiting terms with the tarwad had partaken the amenities of the tarwad, and had got benefits from its income on all appropriate occasions, including social functions and religious festivals, it would be consistent with her living apart of her own choice after waiving a claim to maintenance. Further, there may be several circumstances which would justify the inference that a junior member of the tarwad, living apart for reasons of her own, or for reasons of convenience, had waived the claim for arrears of maintenance. The tarwad might be burdened with heavy liability like the illness of a member or costly education of another member in whose welfare the member living apart is as much interested as the karnavan himself. For the aforsaid reasons, the member might have waived the claim for maintenance. Again a member living apart may feel that the tarwad had provided substantial help for his education and as a result he may desist from claiming separate maintenance. In such circumstances it will be important to find out if there had been a demand, followed by a refusal to pay maintenance. No doubt it may not be necessary to prove a demand for each year’s maintenance when it becomes payable. When in a suit for partition filed several years after a member of a tarwad had left the tarwad, a substantial claim for arrears of maintenance accumulated over a considerable period is superadded, it will be a heavy burden on the karnavan. The burden will become even more heavy if several junior members, who had with the passage of years left the tarwad and gone to different places, suddenly join together, and press besides a relief for partition, a relief of cash payment in a substantial sum for arrears of past maintenance. No doubt there is always a discretion in the Court in such cases to make an appropriate reduction in the amount of claim for past maintenance. No doubt there is always a discretion in the Court in such cases to make an appropriate reduction in the amount of claim for past maintenance. Apart from this, where the conduct of the members who claim such past arrears of maintenance is clearly inconsistent with their desire to keep such a claim a live, and is more consistent with their having waived the claim, it would be clearly not proper to grant relief for past arrears without proof of a demand for maintenance followed by a refusal. In the present case, the earliest notice issued by the plaintiffs makes no reference at all to the claim for any arrears of maintenance but only asks for partition. It was only five months later, after consulting a lawyer, that the claim for arrears of maintenance was urged for the first time. In the above context, it would appear that the plea put forward by the defendants, that the plaintiffs had received in fact, by way of maintenance substantial quantities of the income both in cash and kind during the period before the suit, appears to be extremely probable. The only evidence contra is the interested evidence of the first plaintiff’s husband. This is therefore a case where, in our opinion, the claim for arrears of past maintenance has been rightly negatived by the trial Court and also by Jagadisan, J., in the appeal. In view of the above, we dismiss the appeal with costs. R.M. ---------- Appeal dismissed.