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1963 DIGILAW 508 (MAD)

S. K. M. Muhammad Rowther, Managing Partner of S. K. M. Muhammad Rowther v. Senthatti Kalai Pandia Chinnathambiar

1963-12-12

P.RAMAKRISHNAN, S.RAMACHANDRA IYER

body1963
JUDGMENT Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.— This appeal has a chequered history. It arises out of a claim by a creditor of the late Zamindar of Sivagiri, Varagunarama Pandian. Sivagiri estate was taken over by the Government under the Abolition, Act (Madras Act XXVI of 1948) in the year 1951. The appellant who has a cloth shop at Srivilliputhur had supplied cloths on credit to the zamindar (1) for the purpose of the marriage of his daughter, Duraichi Ammal and (2) for presentation to the deity Srivinayagar on the occasion of the Kumbabishekam ceremony and during the Panguni Uttiram festival at the temple in Sivagiri. There can be little doubt and indeed this matter has not been controverted before us that the purposes for which cloths were purchased were proper ones. The appellant filed his application for payment out of the amount due to him out of the compensation amount paid by the Government. Even earlier, he had obtained a decree against the zamindar personally in O.S.No. 7 of 1939 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tirunelveli. The Tribunal originally accepted his claim but when the matter came up to this Court by way of appeal, in S.T.A. No. 44 of 1955, the order of the Tribunal was set aside with a direction to reconsider the matter to see whether the debt evidenced by the decree would be one binding on the assets of the zamin estate so as to sustain a claim under section 45 (3)of the Abolition Act. The Estates Abolition Tribunal, Tirunelveli on remand has come to the conclusion that none of the purchases made for the amounts borrowed will be binding on the assets of the zamindari and that, therefore, the creditor was entitled to be paid only out of the resultant share of the zamindar in the compensation amount and that he could not be deemed to be a creditor of the estate. The Tribunal reached this conclusion on the finding that the purchases by the late zamindar were for his personal benefit made according to his own whims and fancies and that they could not be deemed to be for the benefit or necessity of the estate. The Tribunal reached this conclusion on the finding that the purchases by the late zamindar were for his personal benefit made according to his own whims and fancies and that they could not be deemed to be for the benefit or necessity of the estate. This conclusion was sought to be based on two reasons one of which was that the zamindar's daughter was not married immediately after the purchase of saris and so there was no justifiable occasion for the purchase at the expense of the family. The second reason was that the temple for whose Kumbabishekam cloths were purchased from the appellant's shop was a public one with sufficient resources which could enable it to obtain the necessary cloths. Yet another reason was that the income of the zamindar amounted to nearly three lakhs of rupees per year and that there was, therefore, no need for the zamindar to purchase cloths on credit. We are unable to agree with the Tribunal that the purchases made by the zamindar can be regarded as only for his personal benefit. With his position as zamindar he was certainly entitled to make presentations to the deity on the occasion of the Kumbabishekam ceremony in the temple in his zamin. Similarly small presentations of cloths on other festive occasions to the deity in the temple will also be within his powers. The purpose itself is a highly meritorious one and the occasions on which such presents were made are considered very sacred by Hindus: the action of the zamindar was quite consistent with the dignity of his position. Indeed such charities are expected to be done by rich persons. We cannot agree with the Tribunal that time lag between the date of the purchase of saris for the daughter's marriage and the actual date of the marriage would prevent the purchase from being one for necessity. It not unoften happens that saris are purchased in anticipation of the celebration of marriages ; sometimes it happens that they get postponed for one reason or another. There is no suggestion in the present case that the purchase was not made for the benefit of the daughter of the zamindar. The cost of saris amounted to only Rs. 169 and it cannot be said that the amount was in excess of the powers of an ordinary manager in a joint Hindu family. There is no suggestion in the present case that the purchase was not made for the benefit of the daughter of the zamindar. The cost of saris amounted to only Rs. 169 and it cannot be said that the amount was in excess of the powers of an ordinary manager in a joint Hindu family. As regards the other reason that the zamindar could have met these obligations out of the income from the estate, is without substance. Purchase of necessary articles on credit is a normal thing with the affluent and almost a habit with some. It cannot be said that such purchases will not be binding on the zamindari. The zamindar himself might have expected to pay off the amounts due out of his future income ; but the income stopped to come in on the zamin being taken over. Mr. Natesan who appears for the respondents has however sought to support the conclusion reached by the Tribunal on another line of argument namely, that as the liability in the case could not support a charge on the estate, the creditor would not be entitled to payment out of compensation amount. That however is not the proper way of approach. The question is one of the authority of the zamindar to contract a debt for the purposes mentioned and not one of judging whether an alienation of property under these circumstances could be justified. section 45 (3)of the Abolition Act says: “The Tribunal shall next determine which creditors, if any, are lawfully entitled to have their debts paid from and out of the assets of the impartible estate and the amount to which each of them is so entitled ; and only the remainder of the aggregate compensation shall be divisible among the sharers and maintenance-holders as hereinafter provided.” In Navaneethakrishnaswami Devasthanam v. Rukmani & Co., (1955) 2 MLJ. 339 , a Bench of this Court had to consider the meaning of the phrase “Out of the assets of the impartible estate” occurring in the above section and it came to the conclusion that if the debt can bind the estate under section 4 of the Impartible Estates Act, it would come within the operation of section 45 (3) of the Abolition Act. section 4 (1)of the Impartible Estates Act can now be usefully referred to. section 4 (1)of the Impartible Estates Act can now be usefully referred to. It runs: “The proprietor of an impartible estate shall be incapable of alienating or binding by his debts, such estate or any part thereof beyond his own lifetime unless the alienation shall be made, or the debt incurred, under circumstances which would entitle the managing member of a joint Hindu family, not being the father or grandfather of the other coparceners, to make an alienation of the joint property, or incur a debt, binding on the shares of the other coparceners independently of their consent.” What one has therefore to see in this connection is whether the debt incurred is of such a character that it will be legal for the manager of the joint family to incur. The manager is the accredited representative, of a joint Hindu family. That on proper or justifiable occasions he can incur debts that will bind the family is well settled. We may in this connection refer to the passage in Mayne's Hindu Law at page 437 (11th Edition) where it is stated: “His authority to incur expenditure and contract loans and enter into transactions is one which is determined by family necessity or family benefit. Within those limits, his discretion is unfettered. If a decree is passed against him in respect of a liability properly contracted for the necessities of the family, the binding character of this decree upon the interests of the other members depends, not upon their having or not having been parties to the suit, but upon the authority of the manager to contract the liability. So if the manager has borrowed money for family necessities upon his personal security, he will have a right to contribution from the other members which will arise at the time when he expends the money for their benefit.” From the above, it will be clear that neither the purchase of clothing in anticipation of the marriage of a daughter in the family nor of similar purchase for presentation to the deity in the temple on festive occasions would be beyond the zamindar's authority. It is almost a necessary thing for a person in the position of a Varagunapandian to make such presents. The spiritual benefit that the maker of the gift believes in will also come to the whole family of which he is the head. It is almost a necessary thing for a person in the position of a Varagunapandian to make such presents. The spiritual benefit that the maker of the gift believes in will also come to the whole family of which he is the head. Considerations that weigh with the Court in the matter of upholding alienations by holders of impartible estates cannot be applied in all their rigour for the determination of the question whether a particular debt contracted by the zamindar is one binding on the family, where the only question is as regards his authority to contract the debt and whether the purpose of the debt is for the necessity or benefit of the family. As we have stated, both the amount of the loan as well as the purpose thereof are reasonable and proper. Such a liability will be binding on the estate. The appellant will be entitled to be paid out of the compensation amount that is legitimately due to him. The appeal will be allowed with costs. K.L.B.-----Appeal allowed.