JUDGMENT 1. - This is an appeal under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against an order of the Election Tribunal, Jaipur, dated 7th July, 1962 for Ajmer City West Assembly Constituency dismissing the Election Petition (No. 229 of 1962) under section 90(3) for non-compliance of section 82(b) of the Act. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows:- 3. The general elections for the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly were held in 1962 wherein from the Ajmer City West Assembly Constituency respondent Pohumal was declared duly elected. One Shri Arjundas, who was then a sitting M.L.A., also contested the election from this constituency but he was defeated by Shri Pohumal. After the result of the election was declared, a voter Shri Vaid Prakash who is an appellant before us, filed an election petition under section 80 of the Act challenging the election of respondent Pohumal on the basis of corrupt practices having been committed by him. For the purposes of the decision of this appeal the allegations made in paras 16 and 17 of the election petition only are relevant which are as follows:- Para 16 That the respondent has incurred expenditure in excess of Rs. 6,000 in contravention of section 77 of the R.P. Act in this election............. The respondent paid Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 1,700 to Shri Arjundas on 6-2-62 and 10-2-62 at Ajmer with a view to induce him to withdraw from election and to support the respondent." Para 17 That the respondent has committed corrupt practise of bribery by paying Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 1,700 on 6-2-62 and 10-2-62 at Ajmer to Shri Arjundas Tulsidas a candidate to withdraw from the election and to support the respondent." 4. For the sake of convenience, we give the following dates which are material for the purposes of this appeal:- 1. 20-1-1962 Last date for filing nomination papers. 2. 25-1-1962 Date for the withdrawal of nomination papers under section 37 of the Act. 3. 21-2-1962 Date for the poll. 4. 6-2-1962-10-2-1962 Dates on which the money as alleged in para 17 was paid to Shri Arjundas. 5. 12-4-1962 Date for filing election petition. 6. 1-6-1962 Date fixed for the first appearance of respondents before the Tribunal. 7. 1-6-1962 Date of the application filed by Arjundas praying that he may be impleaded as a respondent in the petition. 4. 6-2-1962-10-2-1962 Dates on which the money as alleged in para 17 was paid to Shri Arjundas. 5. 12-4-1962 Date for filing election petition. 6. 1-6-1962 Date fixed for the first appearance of respondents before the Tribunal. 7. 1-6-1962 Date of the application filed by Arjundas praying that he may be impleaded as a respondent in the petition. 8. 7-6-1962 Reply filed by Pohumal respondent to the application of Arjundas. 5. The election petition filed by the appellant was referred to the Tribunal for trial by the Election Commission under section 86 of the Act and as stated above the date fixed for appearance of Dr. Pohumal before the Tribunal was 1st June, 1962. On the very first day when the trial of the petition started, Mr. Arjundas submitted an application before the Tribunal stating that there are some references in the election petition about him and, therefore, he my be joined as a party to the election petition under Section 90(4) of the Act. This Application of Shri Arjun Das was contested by Shri Pohumal and it was stated in his reply that Shri Arjundas being in collusion with the petitioner Vaid Prakash, could not be permitted to remedy the defect of the petition of the non-joinder of a necessary party under section 82(b) of the Act by allowing him to be impleaded as a party under section 90(4) after the expiry of limitation. It was also stated by Shri Pohumal that this application was a device engineered by Arjundas to circumvent the consequences that are bound to follow on account of the defect in the petition which is fatal. According to him provisions of Section 82(b) are of mandatory nature and non-compliance thereof attract the application of Section 90(3) of the Act. It was, therefore, urged that in the absence of the name of Shri Arjundas in the array of the parties to it, the election petition suffers from a defect which entails its dismissal under section 90(3) of the Act, as the allegations made in paras 16 and 17 of the petition contain clear assertion of the charge of corrupt-practise against Shri Arjundas also. The Election Tribunal after hearing both the parties, by its order dated 7th July, 1962, dismissed the election petition. It is against this order that Shri Vaid Prakash has come in appeal before us. 6. The Election Tribunal after hearing both the parties, by its order dated 7th July, 1962, dismissed the election petition. It is against this order that Shri Vaid Prakash has come in appeal before us. 6. It may be mentioned at the very outset that Shri Arjundas has submitted an application before this Court also praying that he may be added as one of the respondents to this appeal, but this application was not pursued by him and, therefore, it was dismissed on 7th January, 1963 for want of prosecution. 7. The contention of Mr. U.M. Trivedi on behalf of the appellant is that the Election Tribunal has committed an error in dismissing the election petition on the ground that it suffered from a defect under section 82(b) of the Act. His argument is that whatever allegations are made in paras 16 and 17 of the election petition they are in relation to the commission of a corrupt practise by Shri Pohumal. No charge has, however, been levelled against Shri Arjan Das in the petition and therefore it cannot be said that Shri Arjan Das was a necessary party to the petition. In the alternative it was also contended that even if it is spelled out from the averment made in paras 16 and 17 of the petition that Arjan Das received the amounts from Pohumal, then in the absence of any specific allegation about the motive with which the said money was received by Arjan Das, no charge of corrupt practise could be made out against Arjan Das. Mr. Trivedi has further urged that the learned Tribunal has erred in drawing a distinction between two expressions used in section 123 (1) "withdraw from being a candidate at an election" and (2) "withdraw his candidature", which according to him, carry the same meaning, and in the set up of the election law, no distinction could be drawn between these two expressions used by the legislature in section 123 of the Act. Mr. M.B.L. Bhargava on behalf of Dr. Pohumal supported the order of the Tribunal and contended that charge of corrupt practise against Shri Arjan Das is clearly made out from the bare perusal of the language used in paras 16 and 17 of the petition and, therefore, in the absence of Shri Arjan Das as a party to the petition, no trial was possible under the provisions of the Act. 8. Lengthy arguments were addressed by both the sides. The endeavour of Mr. Trivedi was to show that from the allegations made in paras 16 and 17 no charge of corrupt practise under section 123 of the Act can be spelled out against Arjan Das. His main argument is that receipt of any gratification with a motive or reward for Withdrawing from being-a candidate at an election, no doubt, has been introduced by the legislature as a corrupt practise but such a receipt by a candidate could constitute corrupt practise only up to the time the candidate had a right to withdraw from the contest under the law. If after the date of withdrawal, any amount is paid to a candidate with a view to induce him to withdraw from the contest, then no corrupt practise, within the definition of section 123(1) (b) can be committed, as the candidate has no authority in law to withdraw from the field. The date of withdrawal is always fixed under section 37 of the Act and after the expiry of that date nobody, who has once filed his nomination paper, can withdraw from the contest because the law does not confer any such right on a candidate. Mr. Trivedi's contention is that under the scheme of the election law, a person who files his nomination paper, and crosses the stage of scrutiny becomes a contesting candidate and he remains as such in the contest till the date of poll, unless he withdraws himself in accordance with the provisions of section 37 of the Act, and therefore according to his submission, Shri Arjan Das remained a candidate till the date of poll, and as he was not authorised under the law to withdraw from the election, payment, if any, made or offered to Arjan Das and received by him cannot be said 'to have been made or received with a motive or reward for withdrawing from being a candidate. Under these circumstances, even if the allegations made in paras 16 and 17 of the petition are presumed to be correct, no charge of corrupt practise can be spelled out therefrom against Shri Arjan Das. It was, therefore, in the opinion of Mr. Trivedi an obvious error on the part of the Tribunal to have dismissed the election petition on the ground of non-compliance of the mandatory provision of section 82(b). It was, therefore, in the opinion of Mr. Trivedi an obvious error on the part of the Tribunal to have dismissed the election petition on the ground of non-compliance of the mandatory provision of section 82(b). In his opinion, the petition did not suffer from any defect and it, therefore, required further trial. 9. The Second line of argument of the appellant in this behalf is that the allegations contained in paras 16 and 17 make out a charge of bribery against Shri Pohumal alone. There is no specific allegation about the receipt of the gratification by Arjan Das nor do the averments in these two paras attribute any motive to Arjan Das for receiving the money from Shri Pohumal. It is, therefore, urged by Mr. Trivedi that allegations of corrupt practise in an election petition which are like, a charge of quasi-criminal nature, must be specifically pleaded' and, therefore, in the absence of any specific allegations about the receipt of money by Arjan Das and also about the motive with which the said gratification was received by him from Sbri Pohumal, it was not open for the learned Tribunal to read in the petition any allegation of corrupt practise against Shri Arjan Das. Under such circumstances, Arjan Das could not be deemed to be a necessary party to the petition, and the order of dismissal of the petition for the non-joinder of necessary parties, is therefore, bad in law. 10. Mr. M.B.L. Bhargava on behalf of Shri Pohumal vehemently contested both these points of Mr. Trivedi. His contention is that the word "withdraw" has not been used in section 123 in a narrower sense as pleaded by the appellant. It is in a different context that the term "withdraw" has been used in section 37, and, if the same restricted import of this term is introduced in section 123, then the very purpose of the amendment of the definition of corrupt practise by which receipt of gratification by a candidate is also declared as a corrupt practise will be defeated. Mr. Bhargava while meeting the second point of Mr. Trivedi submitted that the pleadings in election matters should not be construed in a manner different from other civil proceedings. Mr. Bhargava while meeting the second point of Mr. Trivedi submitted that the pleadings in election matters should not be construed in a manner different from other civil proceedings. According to him, whatever allegations have been made in paras 16 and 17 of the petition, are sufficient to bring home a charge of corrupt practise under section 123 of the Act of Shri Arjan Das. The act of bribery being a bilateral act in nature cannot be construed as unilateral simply because in so many words it has not been stated in the election petition that Shri Arjan Das received the amount from Pohumal with a motive with which respondent gave it to Shri Arjan Das. It was further submitted by Mr. Bhargava that the petitioner has clearly alleged that the money was paid by Shri Pohumal to Shri Arjan Das with a view to withdraw from the election contest and it is, therefore, sufficient to construe by implication an allegation of bribery against Shri Arjan Das. 11. Corrupt practise of bribery has been defined in the Act as follows:- "123. The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act:- (1) "Bribery", that is to say:- (A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification to any person whomsoever, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing -. (a) a person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being a candidate at an election, or (b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at any election. or as a reward to - (i) a person for having so stood or not stood or for having withdrawn his candidature ; or (ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting ; (B) the receipt of, or agreement to receive, any gratification, whether as a motive or a reward - (a) by a person for standing or not standing as, or for withdrawing from being, a candidate ; or (b) by any person whosoever for himself or any other person for voting or refraining from voting, or inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or any candidate to withdraw his candidature. Explanation. Explanation. - For the purpose of this clause the term "gratification" is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or gratifications estimable in money and it includes all forms of entertainment and all forms of employment for reward but it does not include the payment of any expenses bona fide incurred at, or for the purpose of, any election and duly entered in the account of election expenses referred to in section 78. 12. While dealing with the scope of section 123(1), learned Tribunal has discussed at length two expressions used in this section, namely, "withdraw from being a candidate at an election" and "withdraw his candidature". It has been laid down in the impugned order that the expression "withdraw from being a candidate at an election" has a wider import and if given its grammatical meaning it would connote recede or draw back from contesting the election. According to it, the two above mentioned expressions used in section 123 have two different meaning and the words "withdrawing from being a candidate'' mean that a candidate can draw back from the contest even after the time for withdrawal under section 37 has expired, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal any gratification paid or received even after the date of withdrawal specified under section 37 would go to constitute a corrupt, practise within the definition of "bribery" as given in section 123(1) of the Act. To repel this finding of the learned Tribunal, reliance has been placed by Mr. Trivedi on a Supreme Court authority in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and others, A.I.R. 1954, S.C. 749 and it has been strenously argued that the Tribunal should not have been led away by the spirit of election law while interpreting the expression "withdrawing from being a candidate" and should have given to it its plain grammatical and ' natural meaning. It is further urged that the word "withdraw" as used in the said expression cannot have a wider meaning than what the legislature had given to it in section 37 of the Act. Mr. Bhargava in order to meet this argument urged that the word "withdrawal" as used in section 37 has meaning different from the one which the use of this word connotes in the definition of "bribery" as given in section 123 of the Act. Mr. Bhargava in order to meet this argument urged that the word "withdrawal" as used in section 37 has meaning different from the one which the use of this word connotes in the definition of "bribery" as given in section 123 of the Act. His contention is that the words used in technical sense, must be given their ordinary meaning in the context in which they are used and, therefore, the term "withdraw" in section 123 must be read as getting out of the contest at any stage of the election. Reliance has been placed on certain excerpts from 'Interpretation of Statutes' by Maxwell (11th Edition) which lay down certain principles for the interpretation of a statute. They are as follows:- "The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and, otherwise, in their ordinary phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar." (See page 3). "The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view." (See page 51). "In dealing with matters relating to the general public, statutes are presumed to use words in their popular sense; uti loquitur vulgus." (See page 53). "It is said to be the duty of the Judge to make such construe" tion of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy." (See page 66). 13. Mr. Bhargava has also laid stress in his arguments on the aspect of the purity of election and submitted that the element of purity should not be lost sight of while construing the definition of corrupt practise as given in the Act. He further 'submitted that it would tend to open the floodgates of corruption if Mr. Trivedi's contention is accepted by the court, which would go to nullify the very purpose of the legislature which prompted it to bring the receiver of the gratification within the mischief of the definition of "bribery". 14. He further 'submitted that it would tend to open the floodgates of corruption if Mr. Trivedi's contention is accepted by the court, which would go to nullify the very purpose of the legislature which prompted it to bring the receiver of the gratification within the mischief of the definition of "bribery". 14. We have carefully considered and weighed the arguments advanced by both the parties and we are of opinion that we cannot accept the construction of the definition of "bribery" in the Act as suggested by Mr. Trivedi. No doubt, it is correct, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and others , (Supra) that the spirit of the law may hot always be a safe guide to interpret the plain language of the section and, therefore, the provision of a statute should be construed according to the ordinary grammatical and natural meaning of the language but the object of the legislature for enacting the statute cannot altogether be ignored. 15. Supreme Court in Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar and another v. The District Magistrate, Thana and others, A.I.R. 1957 Supreme Court 23 has laid down:- "It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act. This rule of construction is only one element in deciding what the true import of the enactment is to ascertain which it is necessary to have regard to the purpose behind the particular provision and its setting in the scheme of the statute. The presumption that the same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight, and it is proper if sufficient reason can be assigned to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of an Act." 16. Keeping in view the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court for the construction of a statute, we have to see whether gratification paid for the withdrawal of a candidate for the purpose of section 37 of the Act alone would constitute corrupt practise, and gratification paid with a view to seek the withdrawal of a candidate after the expiry of the time fixed under section 37 would not amount to corrupt practise of bribery under this Section. 17. 17. Section 37 appears in Chapter I of part V of the Act which deals with the conduct of election. In order to correctly appreciate the meaning of the word "withdraw" we shall have to see that the scheme and the setting of section 37 in that chapter. The chapter starts with section 30 that empowers the Election Commission to fix the election programme. In pursuance of that programme public notice is issued under section 31 by the Returning Officer by means of a notification. Prospective candidates desirous of contesting election file their nomination papers under sections 32 and 33 after the issue of notification under section 31. Then the Returning Officer has to notify under section 35 the nominations received by him and under that provision he has to fix the time and place for their scrutiny, which is done by the Returning Officer under section 36 and it is after this scrutiny that the persons whose nomination papers have been accepted by the Returning Officer have a right to withdraw from the contest. After the date of withdrawal is expired, the Returning Officer again publishes the list of the candidates and they are termed in law as contesting candidates. The provision of withdrawal under section 37 in (he above setting has been kept by the legislature obviously for three purposes, namely, that after withdrawal a clear picture emerges out as to who will remain in the arena of actual contest and it is then that the constituency definitely knows the names of the persons from amongst whom it has to choose its representative. Secondly, it is at that stage that the candidates know their rivals in the field of election and thirdly the officers who are entrusted with the task of conducting the election, know the exact number of the contesting candidates, which enables them to make adequate preparations for the conduct of the election. These are the three-fold purposes of section 37. We cannot, however, read in the provisions of section 37 a prohibition for a candidate not to withdraw or drop out of the contest after the due date of withdrawal under section 37 is expired. These are the three-fold purposes of section 37. We cannot, however, read in the provisions of section 37 a prohibition for a candidate not to withdraw or drop out of the contest after the due date of withdrawal under section 37 is expired. The object of the legislature to provide a provision for withdrawal is that in the process of election at some stage, the constituency, contesting candidates and the officers concerned should know the exact number and the true position of the contesting candidates that are left out in the field, as in the democratic set-up where parties contest the election they, by way of abundant precaution set up dummy candidates to cover their real nominees and such dummies are kept in the field till the scrutiny of the nomination papers is not over, and it is thereafter that such covering candidates get out of the arena, but such a provision of withdrawal does not mean that if any contesting candidate chooses to retire from the contest after the date fixed under section 37 he is, in any way, handicapped to do so under the provisions of this law. In order, to drop out from the election after the due date of withdrawal, one has simply to notify one's intention to the constituency and thereafter there is no obligation on him to remain in the contest. Of course, the result of dropping out of contest, after the due date of withdrawal is that in spite of his declaration his name does appear on the ballot paper, and if he does not poll the requisite number of votes prescribed for that purpose, then he forfeits his deposit, but there is no such specific restriction put by the legislature that a person after the duo date of withdrawal is over cannot, even if he so wishes, retire from the arena of contest. It, therefore, brings us to an important question whether in election law a candidate has a right to withdraw from the contest even after the opportunity to file his withdrawal before the due date fixed under section 37 is lost to him. Mr. It, therefore, brings us to an important question whether in election law a candidate has a right to withdraw from the contest even after the opportunity to file his withdrawal before the due date fixed under section 37 is lost to him. Mr. Trivedi's stand is that after scrutiny if a candidate does not withdraw and remains in the field then he becomes a candidate and he cannot drop out of the election process as there is no such right given to him under the provisions of the Act to withdraw from the scene of election. According to him, there is no inherent right vested in a candidate who has passed the stage of withdrawal under section 37 of the Act, to drop out from the election if he has once equivocally exercised his electoral right to stand in an election without permitting him to withdraw under section 37 of the Act. Mr. Bhargava vehemently disputed this position as advocated by Mr. Trivedi and while relying on decisions of a few Tribunals, he contended that section 37 of the Act Provides a procedure of formal withdrawal only. Candidate is always free to drop out of the election process any moment by mere declaration. In a case of withdrawal by a contesting candidate who did not exercise his right under section 37 of the Act, mere declaration of his will to drop out of election by the candidate is sufficient. He tried to gather support for his contention from one of the fundamentals of democracy that in a democratic set-up, an unwilling person cannot be forced to represent a constituency. If a person who, for one reason or the other, filed his nomination paper but failed to withdraw his candidature under section 37 of the Act, he cannot be compelled to contest the election and represent the constituency against his will. There is force in this argument of Mr. Bhargava. In our opinion, it is inherent in the very nature of exercising the electoral rights to stand as candidate that he can drop out from the contest from any stage of the election. Reliance has been placed on an authority of a Tribunal in the election of Lyallpur and Jhang General Constituency. Case No. 2 in Mr. Daveshwar Verma v. Mr. Der Raj Sethi , The Indian Election cases 1935 to 1950 by H.S. Doabia Vol. Reliance has been placed on an authority of a Tribunal in the election of Lyallpur and Jhang General Constituency. Case No. 2 in Mr. Daveshwar Verma v. Mr. Der Raj Sethi , The Indian Election cases 1935 to 1950 by H.S. Doabia Vol. II wherein it has been held:- "There is no provision that the withdrawal would be effective only if it is exercised in the manner and within the time specified in the rule, and that it will not be effective if it is exercised in any other manner and at any other time. If the legislature wanted to provide for shutting out withdrawal at a stage earlier or later than that specified in the relevant rules, it would have specifically provided for that, but no such provision has anywhere been made. A candidate has, according to the definition of electoral right, the right to withdraw and if a candidate chooses to take that action even before the last date for nomination of candidates, there is nothing as to why he should be prohibited from taking that action and should be compelled to continue as a candidate till a day after the date of scrutiny and thus inflict unnecessary labour on the returning officer in scrutinising his nomination papers." 18. The learned members of the Tribunal while pronouncing their judgment relied on a case of Bombay City South Non Mohammadan Urban Constituency in Tricumdas Dwarkadas v. Sir Vasantrao A. Dabhokar, and others , The Indian Election Cases 1864 to 1953 by H.S. Doabia Vol. I, wherein it was held on page 250:- "It is-necessary to state that 4th of August was the date fixed for nomination of candidates and 7th August the date for the scrutiny of nominations under rule 11(3) and (7). It is urged that a withdrawal to be an effective withdrawal should take place under rule 11(8) before 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the date succeeding that appointed by the local government for the scrutiny of the nominations. The date in this case would be 8th August and the hour 3 p.m. Mr. Bhatta's withdrawal at 11-10 a.m. on the 18th September was not an effective withdrawal at all, in fact it is urged that, under the rules, there is no provision for withdrawal after the stage in the elections mentioned in rule 11(8) and hence even if it be found that Mr. Bhatta's withdrawal at 11-10 a.m. on the 18th September was not an effective withdrawal at all, in fact it is urged that, under the rules, there is no provision for withdrawal after the stage in the elections mentioned in rule 11(8) and hence even if it be found that Mr. Bhatt withdrew from the election as a result of the promise made in Ex. A, there would be no corrupt practise under rules. Respondent's contention is that the withdrawal was ineffective at that stage, and that inducing a candidate to resort to such an action by offer of a gratification would not come under rule 1, part 1 of schedule 5. In support of this contention attention is drawn to the scheme laid down by the rule of holding elections which scheme is to the effect that where the number of candidates who are duly nominated and who have not withdrawn their candidature in the manner and within the time specified in sub-rule (8) of rule 11 exceeds that of the vacancies, a poll shall be taken. It is argued that any withdrawal of candidature thereafter does not effect the necessity for taking a poll, and a polling has to go on whatever the number of candidates, once the taking of the poll has commenced, the polling has to go on till the last minute fixed for its closing. We are of opinion that the definition of the word "electoral right" does not support the respondent's contention. The words "electoral right" mean the right of a person to stand or not to stand, or to withdraw from being a candidate, or to refrain from voting at an election. Now in terms of this definition, if a person has a right to stand as a candidate, he has also a right to withdraw from being a candidate, unless that right has been taken away by the rules ; and the rules nowhere take away that right. Rule 11(8), on which reliance has been placed, is to be read along with rule 12(2). If a candidate by whom a deposit of Rs. 250/- is made under rule 12(1) withdraws his candidature in the manner and within the time specified in sub-rule (8) of rule 11, his deposit is returned to him, otherwise not. Rule 11(8), on which reliance has been placed, is to be read along with rule 12(2). If a candidate by whom a deposit of Rs. 250/- is made under rule 12(1) withdraws his candidature in the manner and within the time specified in sub-rule (8) of rule 11, his deposit is returned to him, otherwise not. This is not to be read to mean that any other manner of withdrawal or withdrawal at any other time is prohibited. This amount of Rs. 250/- taken as deposit is to provide for the expense of polling in accordance with rule 14(1) where the number of candidates duly nominated exceeds the number of vacancies and if a candidate withdraws after it has been decided to take a poll, he forfeits the deposit. But thereby his right to withdraw later, if he so desires, is not taken away. It is to be noted that this definition of "electoral right" occurs in part 7 of the rules, and rule 30 of which the definition forms part runs as follows:- "In this part and in schedule 5, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject matter or context, 'electoral right' means right of a person to withdraw from being a candidate at an election." It will be observed that no restriction whatever is placed on his right to withdraw. It is not provided that if it is exercised in the manner and within the time specified in sub-rule (8) of rule 11, then only would it be effective and not if exercised in any other manner and at any other time. If the legislature wanted to provide for shutting out withdrawal at a stage later than that as specified in sub-rule (8) of rule 11, it would have specifically provided for that. This very word is used in schedule 5, part I, rule 4 and it cannot be said that it is used in any restricted sense as contended by the respondent as it would lead to absurd results. If the object of the legislature was to preserve the purity of franchise and the purity of elections, then, reading the word in a restricted sense defeats that object. If the object of the legislature was to preserve the purity of franchise and the purity of elections, then, reading the word in a restricted sense defeats that object. Because it would be open to any candidate or any person to offer bribe to a candidate at the time when the polling is actually in progress, to withdraw from the election, and thereby facilitate the election of the remaining candidates, as they would have to face one rival less, and still it would not be corrupt practise. 19. In connection with an election of a municipality under", similar circumstances, their lordships of the Allahabad High Court, Mears C.J. and Piggot J. observed in Sultan Baksh and others v. Abdul Hamid, A.I.R. 1924 Allahabad 134. "Where for one seat there are two candidates and one ' of them withdraws during the progress of polling, and immediate declaration that the other candidate is duly elected is valid. It is quite clear that just as a candidate can withdraw before the time for polling arrives, so he can withdraw during the polling, so also can he withdraw as soon as he is elected or he can withdraw at any time after the election." 20. We are in complete agreement with the opinion expressed by the members of the Tribunal in Bombay City South Case, The Indian Election Cases 1864 to 1953 by H.S. Doabia Vol. I and we feel that if no time is fixed by the statute after which the withdrawal of a candidate is specifically prohibited, then a person who chooses to stand for the election can withdraw his candidature at any time before the constituency goes to poll and finally expresses its choice. After the election is over, the candidature of a candidate is also finished and he, if he does not want to represent the constituency, may resign his job as a representative. In our opinion, the right to drop out of the election, which is technically known in the election law as a right of withdrawal, is inherent in the very act of standing for election and can be exercised by a candidate at any stage unless it is prohibited by any specific provision of the statute. In our opinion, the right to drop out of the election, which is technically known in the election law as a right of withdrawal, is inherent in the very act of standing for election and can be exercised by a candidate at any stage unless it is prohibited by any specific provision of the statute. In this view of the matter, we feel that the expressions "withdraw" used in section 123 simply means dropping out as a candidate for the election, no matter whether he chooses to do so before or after the date of withdrawal under section 37. From the above discussions, we are of opinion that any gratification paid to a candidate to secure his withdrawal from the contest whether before or after the date of withdrawal fixed under section 37 would constitute corrupt practise. The purpose and meaning of the terms "withdraw from being a candidate" and "for having withdrawn his candidature" would mean to drop out of the election contest at any stage of the election. In view of the above discussions, contention of Mr. Trivedi that the corrupt practise of bribery can be committed only up to the time when the date of withdrawal is not over is misconceived. 21. Now we go to the second contention of Mr. Trivedi. His argument is that averments made in paras 16 and 17 of the petition do not contain any allegation of corrupt practise against Shri Arjan Das. He laid stress on the fact that it should be specifically stated in the petition that Arjan Das had received the amounts which are said to have been given by Shri Pohumal and that they were received by him with a motive to withdraw from the election. We are constrained to observe that the point raised by Mr. Trivedi is too technical in its aspect. It has been alleged that Pohumal paid Rs. 1,000/- and Rs. 1,700/- on 6th and 10th February, 1962, at Ajmer, to Shri Arjan Das Tulsidas to withdraw from the election and to support the respondent. The object with which the money was advanced has been clearly stated in the allegation. It has also been stated that the gratification was paid to Arjan Das himself. When one says that he paid a particular amount to some individual that is implicit in it that the said amount is received by that person. The object with which the money was advanced has been clearly stated in the allegation. It has also been stated that the gratification was paid to Arjan Das himself. When one says that he paid a particular amount to some individual that is implicit in it that the said amount is received by that person. The object for payment in this case is a motive for receipt of the gratification unless otherwise stated or proved. The question of examining the point at this stage is whether from the allegations made in the election petition any charge of corrupt practise is spelled out against Arjan Das or not. If it is held that the language used in the petition is sufficient to make out a clear charge of corrupt practise then immediately the question of impleading Mr. Arjan Das as a respondent in the petition would follow. 22. Mr. Trivedi has drawn our attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Bajpai and another v. Triloke Singh and another, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 444 where their Lordships have said:- P. 456:- "It should not be forgotten that charges of corrupt practices are quasi-criminal in character, and that the allegations relating thereto, must be sufficiently clear and precise to bring home the charges to the candidates ; and judged by that standard, the allegation in para 7 (c) is thoroughly worthless. The contention of the respondent that the appellants understood the allegation as meaning that they had committed corrupt practices, is not borne out by the record.................." 23. In that case, allegations made by the appellant; in the election petition, as given in para 4 of the judgment, were couched in such a vague language that no reasonable man could say that a charge under section 123(8) of the Act of procuring, the assistance of the Government servants for furtherance of the election prospects spelled out of it. The Tribunal, however, assumed that the petition as presented did make out a charge under section 123(3) which was not borne out from the allegations made in the election petition and it was under those circumstances that their Lordships were of opinion that the assumption made by the Tribunal was erroneous and if was under such circumstances that the finding of the Tribunal in the opinion of their Lordships, was vitiated. In this case, the facts alleged in the election petition clearly indicate by necessary implication that the illegal gratification was received by Arjan Das with a motive to withdraw from the contest. It was perhaps in that background that Arjan Das had applied on the very first day of the trial before the Tribunal to be made a party to the petition. In this court, also, Shri Arjan Das had applied to be impleaded as a respondent to this appeal, which shows his interest in the election petition. No doubt, the pleadings in this case are not very happily worded and it appears that the petition has been drafted by a person who is not fully conversant with the election Law, but the perusal of the allegations made in paras 16 and 17 make it clear, beyond any manner of doubt, that a charge of bribery is levelled therein against Shri Arjan Das for receiving the gratification with a motive to withdraw. Learned counsel for the appellant also drew our attention to the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jagan nath v. Jaswant Singh and others, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 210 :- "The general rule is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a-suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the court possesses no common law power." 24. In view of these observations, Mr. Trivedi tried to persuade us that unless specifically pleaded by the parties, it is not open for the Tribunal to read a thing in an election petition which could be discovered by implication from the language of the averments made therein. It is note worthy that Mr. Bhargava also relied on certain observations in the same authority and laid stress on the following:- "It is always, to be borne in mind that though the election of a successful candidate is not to be lightly interfered with, one of the essentials of that law is also to safeguard the purity of the election process and also to see that people do not get elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt practices." 25. On the basis of these observations, it was further urged by Mr. On the basis of these observations, it was further urged by Mr. Bhargava that purity must be maintained in the process of election at all costs and it is with this background that the Court should judge the conduct of the parties during the course of election and if there Has been some looseness in the drafting of an election petition, that should be over-looked by the courts. We agree with the contention of Mr. Bhargava and we feel that such a strict view of the pleading in an election petition, cannot be taken by the courts which would have the effect of condoning the malpractices employed by the candidates in the process of election and thereby deviate from the established principles as laid down by their lordships in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and others , (Supra). 26. Section 82 of the Act has been amended by Act 27 of 1956 and a revolutionary change has been brought about in the structure of this section. In the present form section 82(b) provides that the petitioner shall join as respondents 'to this petition any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practise are made in his petition. Non-compliance of the provisions of this section entails a dismissal of the petition under sub-section (3) of section 90 which makes the provision of section 82(b) mandatory in nature. There is, however, no dispute on this question that the non-compliance of the provisions of section 82(b) would result in the dismissal of the election petition, but Mr. Trivedi has urged that if somehow the petition crossed the stage of section 85 of the Act and the Election Commission, in spite of this defect, did not dismiss it and has referred the petition to a Tribunal, then the provision of sub-section (4) of section 90 would be available to a candidate against whom allegations of corrupt practices have been made in the petition and he has not been joined as a party thereto. Mr. Trivedi has tried to take advantage from an analogy of a case where from a Judgment appeal has not been filed by the aggrieved person and the time for filing an appeal is over, but when the opposite party files an appeal then the aggrieved party who failed to invoke the appellate jurisdiction within limitation, can as of right file cross-objections. Mr. Mr. Trivedi canvassed before us to take the provision of section 90(4) of the Act analogus with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which confer the right to file cross-objections in an appeal. On the basis of this example, Mr. Trivedi proceeded to submit that in an election petition also a candidate who had a right to file an election petition, if failed to do so, or if a defective election petition is filed by some one else to which under the provisions of the law, he ought to have been joined as a necessary party in the election petition then he can remedy the defect, if any, by making application under sub-section(4) of section 90 of the. Act. Mr. Trivedi further contended that the application of Shri Arjan Das made on the very first day when the trial of the petition commenced, remedied the defect of the petition of non-compliance of section 82(b) and under the circumstances the prayer of Mr. Arjan Das should have been accepted by the Tribunal. In his opinion, the Tribunal has erred in rejecting the application of Shri Arjan Das and, therefore, he prayed that if there is any defect of non-joinder of a necessary party then it may be remedied at this stage by permitting Shri Arjan Das to be joined as a respondent to the election petition for which he filed an application on the very first day of the trial. We gave our careful consideration to the argument advanced by Mr. Trivedi, but we regret we cannot help observing that the reasoning of Mr. Trivedi i? faulty. Under section 90(4) a candidate has a right by making an application to be impleaded as a party to a petition but this right is not conferred to remedy the defects of the petition. If the petition suffers from some such defect that goes to the root of the matter and it is not capable of being tried by the Tribunal, then in that event no resort can be allowed by the Tribunal to be taken to the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 90 to remedy the defect which renders the petition liable to be dismissed under sub-section (3) of section 90. Analogy given by Mr. Analogy given by Mr. Trivedi is fallacious and the fallacy lies in the fact that he presupposes that the appeal filed by the opposite party, which entitled an aggrieved person to file cross-objection, is a valid appeal. When the appeal filed is defective and cannot be entertained, then we doubt if the provision permitting the aggrieved party to file cross-objection would be available to any party. If such an appeal is itself time barred then filling of cross-objection within the specified period would not be permitted to remedy the defect of limitation of the appeal itself. 27. In view of our above discussions, we feel that there is no force in this appeal and, therefore, it fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. The appellant shall pay Rs. 200/- as costs to the opposite party."Appeal dismissed. *******