Judgment MUDHOLKAR, J. : The Municipal Council, Palai, the appellant before us passed a resolution on September 12, l958 providing for the use from October 1, 1958 of a public bus stand constructed by it for stage carriage buses starting from and returning to the municipal limits of Palai or passing through its limits. A fee of Re. 1 per day was to be charged on every such bus and 50nP per day on buses which merely pass through the municipal limits. The resolution also prohibited the use after that date of any other public place or the sides of any public street within Palai Municipal limits as a bus stand or a halting place. At the request of the bus operators the Municipal Council, by a resolution dated September 24, 1958 reduced the rates from Re. 1 to 80 nP per day and from 50nP to 40nP per day. By a further resolution dated November 22,1959 the Municipal Council modified the resolution of September 12, 1958 and instead imposed a prohibition on using as a bus stand or halting place a public place or side of public road within a radius of six furlongs from the Municipal bus stand. Some of the operators who were using that bus stand did not pay the charges due from them for the use of the bus stand. Demand notices were, therefore, issued against them. The respondent in this appeal, Joseph, as well as the respondents in the other two appeals, Anthony and Eapen, who were recipients of such notices preferred writ petitions before the High Court of Kerala challenging the validity of the action taken by the Municipal Council and praying for quashing of the demand notices issued against them. 2. It may be mentioned that the various resolutions of the Municipal Council to which we have adverted were passed by it in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Ss. 286 and 287 of the Travancore District Municipalities Act, 23 of 1116 M.E. (which corresponds to A.D. 1941). Those provisions read thus : "286 (1) The municipal council may construct or provide public landing places, halting places and cart-stands and may levy fees for the use of the same. 286 and 287 of the Travancore District Municipalities Act, 23 of 1116 M.E. (which corresponds to A.D. 1941). Those provisions read thus : "286 (1) The municipal council may construct or provide public landing places, halting places and cart-stands and may levy fees for the use of the same. (2) A statement in English and a language of the district of the fees fixed by the Council for the use of such place shall be put up in a conspicuous part thereof. Explanation: A cart-stand shall, for the purposes of this Act include a stand for carriages and animals. 287 : Where a municipal council has provided a public landing place, halting place or cart-stand, the executive authority may prohibit the use for the same purpose by any person within such distance thereof, as may be determined by the municipal council, of any public place or the sides of any public street." The reason given by the Municipal Council for taking action under these provisions is that about 80 stage carriage buses start, halt in, or pass through the municipal limits of Palai and the members of the public using them were being put to serious inconveniences for want of a proper waiting room and other necessary conveniences. Further, the unsystematic manner in which the buses were parked and plied affected the sanitation of the town. In order to improve matters the Municipal Council claims to have utilised a plot of land worth Rs.50,000 located almost at the centre of the town and constructed a bus stand at a cost of Rs. 80,000 wherein, among other things, it has provided separate waiting rooms for men and women, sitting accommodation, electric fans, sanitary conveniences, drinking water etc., as also garages and booking offices free of cost for bus operators using the bus stand. It is claimed on behalf of the Municipal Council that by establishing the bus stand it has not only acted within the scope of the powers conferred by the Act but also in public interest and for preserving the health and sanitation of the town. 3. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the provisions of Ss. It is claimed on behalf of the Municipal Council that by establishing the bus stand it has not only acted within the scope of the powers conferred by the Act but also in public interest and for preserving the health and sanitation of the town. 3. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the provisions of Ss. 286 and 287 of the Travancore District Municipalities Act stood repealed by implication by virtue of the provisions of S. 72 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1125 M.E. (corresponding to A.D.1950) which came into force on January 5, 1950. That section reads as follows : "Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by the Government may, in consultation with the local authority having jurisdiction in the area concerned, determine places at which motor vehicles may and either indefinitely or for a specified period of time, and may determine the places at which public service vehicles may stop for a longer time than is necessary for the taking up and setting down of passengers. Incidentally we may mention that this section continued in force until the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act was replaced partially by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) on its extension to Travancore Cochin by Part B States (Laws) Act of course has no bearing upon the argument advanced before us because if in fact Ss. 286 and 287 were repealed by implication by S. 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act the effect of the partial replacement of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act by the Central Motor Vehicles Act does not fall to be considered. 4. The High Court accepted the contention urged by the respondents in these three appeals and observed : "The T-C Motor Vehicles Act, 1125 was enacted, as the preamble shows, in order to provide a uniform law relating to motor vehicles and we see no reason why sections like 286 and 287 to the extent they militate against such uniformity should not be considered as having been repealed by implication." In support of their conclusion they have placed reliance upon certain decisions. The first of these decisions is Daw v. Metropolitan Board of Works, (1862) 142 ER 1104. The first of these decisions is Daw v. Metropolitan Board of Works, (1862) 142 ER 1104. The High Court quoted the following observations of Erle, C. J. as supporting its conclusion : "I think that where the same power is given in two different bodies to number houses, the exercise of these powers concurrently by both bodies would be entirely destructive of the object for which they were conferred; they cannot, therefore, exist together, and in accordance with general principles, the power more recently conferred overrides that which was conferred by the prior Act." That was a case where action had been brought by a Clerk of the Commissioner of the City of London against the Metropolitan Board of Works for recovery of damages resulting from the defacement of numbers of houses by the Metropolitan Board of Works from houses in Fann Street, Aldersgate. Those numbers had been inscribed by the Commissioners of Sewers by virtue of the powers conferred upon them by the City of London Sewers Act, 1848, with regard to the sanitation and management of the City of London. The Metropolis Local Management Act, (18 and 19 Vict. c. 120) which was passed in the year 1855 was intended to provide for the better sewage, drainage etc., of the whole of the metropolis and S. 141 thereof made a general provision as to naming streets and numbering houses. It is in exercise of this power that the Board effaced the numbers which had been inscribed by the Commissioners of Sewers on certain houses and put differed numbers on them. The Court found that the powers conferred by the two statutes were substantially, though not strictly, the same. It also found that in respect of certain matters the powers conferred by the Commissioners of Sewers of the City of London Act were preserved. But in respect of certain general matters the whole work in the Metropolis was expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Board of Works and S. 141 gave the Board a general authority over the whole of the Metropolis including the City of London. But in respect of certain general matters the whole work in the Metropolis was expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Board of Works and S. 141 gave the Board a general authority over the whole of the Metropolis including the City of London. After stating the general principles of construction, the Court said that as soon as the legislature is found dealing with the same subject matter in two Acts, so as the later statute derogates from and inconsistent with the earlier one, the legislature must be held to have intended to deal in the later statute with the same subject matter which was within the ambit of the earlier one. Upon this view they held that the Metropolitan Board of Works had authority to name streets and number houses in the City of London and that the orders of the Board as to numbering of houses in the City of London override the order of the Commissioner in the same matter. A question was posed before the Court as to whether the Commissioners of Sewers of the City of London had authority to number the houses and buildings in the streets in the City of London under S. 145 of the City of London Sewers Act even after the passing of the Metropolitan Local Management Act. The learned Judges declined to answer that question and Erle C. J. said : "When the metropolitan board of works choose to interfere in a matter which is entrusted to them by the general Act, the city commissioners are subject to the metropolitan board. But, whether a concurrent jurisdiction is given to the city commissioners, where the metropolitan board have not chosen to exercise their powers, is a question upon which it will be our duty to pronounce an opinion when the point is properly presented to us". What has to be noted in this case is that the laws with which the Court was concerned covered more or less the same subject matter and had the same object to serve. What has to be noted in this case is that the laws with which the Court was concerned covered more or less the same subject matter and had the same object to serve. Farther, this decision has kept at large the question whether powers conferred upon one authority by an earlier Act could continue to be exercised by that authority after the enactment of a provision in a subsequent law conferring wide powers on another authority which would include some of the powers conferred by the earlier statute till die new authority chose to exercise the powers conferred upon it. 5. The second decision relied upon is Great Central Gas Consumers Co. v. Clarke, (1862) 143 ER 331. That was a case in which a company incorporated under a private Act was restricted to charge 4 Shillings per 1,000 cft. of gas supplied by it. By a subsequent public Act for the supply of gas to the metropolis an increased standard of purity and illuminating power was required of the companies electing to adopt the provisions of that Act as to price, purity and illuminating power and an increased charge was allowed to be made by them. The question was whether the company was restricted to charge only 4 shillings per 1000 cft. of gas supplied by it. It was urged on behalf of the company that the later Act repealed the earlier one and, that therefore, the company was not restricted to the charge of 4 shillings. After quoting the provision in the private Act containing the restriction the Court observed : "Although that section is not in terms repealed, yet it becomes a clause in a private Act of Parliament quite inconsistent with a clause in a subsequent public Act. That is sufficient to get rid of the clause in the private Act. Looking at the 19th section of the general Act, we think it is impossible to road it otherwise than as repealing the 24th section of the private Act. That is sufficient to get rid of the clause in the private Act. Looking at the 19th section of the general Act, we think it is impossible to road it otherwise than as repealing the 24th section of the private Act. We are bound as well by the plain words of the Act as by the general scope and object of it, and also by the justice of the case." It will thus be seen that the foundation of the decision was that the later statute was a general one whereas the previous one was a special one and, therefore, the special statute had to give way, to the later general statute. 6. We have not been able to trace the third case upon which the learned Judges have relied because the reference which they have given of that case in the judgment is incomplete. They have merely stated "103 LJKB" without stating the page of the report or the names of the parties. Unfortunately all the citations of the High Court suffer from the latter defect. They have, however, given the following quotation from the judgment of Scrutton, L.J. and Maugham, L.J. The quotation from the former is : "I repeal the previous Act also in another way, namely, by enacting a provision clearly inconsistent with the previous Act." The quotation from the judgment of Maugham L. J., is : "It is quite plain that the Legislature is unable, according to our constitution, to bind itself as to the form of subsequent legislation; and it is impossible for Parliament to say that in no subsequent Act of Parliament dealing with this same subject- matter shall there be an implied repeal." 7. The latter observations make it clear that the doctrine of implied repeal was invoked while considering two statutes - one earlier and the other later - the subject-matter of both of which was the same. 8. The High Court then quoted certain observations of Issacs J., in an Australian case Goodwin v. Phillip, (1908-09) 7 CUR 16 which are much to the same effect as those of Maugham, L.J. Finally, they have relied upon the statement of law made in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. I, p. 460. 8. The High Court then quoted certain observations of Issacs J., in an Australian case Goodwin v. Phillip, (1908-09) 7 CUR 16 which are much to the same effect as those of Maugham, L.J. Finally, they have relied upon the statement of law made in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. I, p. 460. The substance of what they have quoted is that the doctrine of implied repeal is well-recognized, that repeal by implication is a convenient form of legislation and that by using this device the legislature must be presumed to intend to achieve a consistent body of law. 9. It is undoubtedly true that the legislature can exercise the power of repeal by implication. But it is an equally well-settled principle of law that there is a presumption against an implied repeal. Upon the assumption that the legislature enacts laws with a complete knowledge of all existing laws pertaining to the same subject the failure to add a repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal existing legislation. Of course, this presumption will be rebutted if the provisions of the new Act are so inconsistent with the old ones that the two cannot stand together. As has been observed by Crawford on Statutory Construction, p. 631, para 311 : "There must be what is often called such a positive repugnancy between the two provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be reconciled and made to stand together . In other words they must be absolutely repugnant or irreconcilable. Otherwise, there can be no implied repeal .... for the intent of the legislature to repeal th For Citation : AIR 1963 SC 1561