JUDGMENT Ramachandra Iyer, C.J. — This appeal raises a question of limitation. In execution of a final decree in a mortgage suit of this Court on its Original Side, dated 11th February, 1936, one Srinivasa Chetty, the husband of the first appellant and the father of appellants 2 and 3, who was a puisne mortgagee of the property involved in the suit, purchased the same in public auction held by the Official Referee. The property so purchased was described as Door No. 20, Gantz Road, Vysarpadi. The area comprised therein was an extent of about three cawnies and 1,719 sq. feet. There were a number of huts on the property. The persons who were in occupation of the huts were also parties to the mortgage suit and there could be no doubt that the purchase would be binding on them. The sale which was on 2nd April, 1937 was duly confirmed, and the sale certificate was issued in favour of Srinivasa Chetty. Shortly after his purchase, he filed Application No. 2660 of 1937 for delivery of possession of the property. Such parts of the property over which there were no superstructures were delivered over to the purchaser. But no delivery was effected in regard to other portions in occupation of the defendants, who had put up huts thereon. By reason of that fact, it can be taken that the application for delivery filed by the auction-purchaser had not been fully disposed of and that the subsequent application for delivery of possession, Application No. 2790 of 1938, was but a continuation of the original application. On that application the Court, while granting the auction-purchaser's prayer, observed that such of the defendants as had put up huts would be entitled to remove the superstructure. But this the defendants were in no mood to do. The persons in occupation of the property being themselves judgment-debtors, it was the duty of the Executing Court to have directed delivery of vacant possession. That was not the order. Yet another application was filed, Application No. 3201 of 1941, for the identical relief. On that application the Master directed the issue of a warrant “ subject to the right of the defendants to remove any superstructure for which purpose a reasonable time may be given by the applicant”. That was not the order. Yet another application was filed, Application No. 3201 of 1941, for the identical relief. On that application the Master directed the issue of a warrant “ subject to the right of the defendants to remove any superstructure for which purpose a reasonable time may be given by the applicant”. It will be noticed, that even this order did not, in terms, give a mandate for delivery of vacant possession to which the auctionpurchaser was entitled by reason of his purchase. It can, therefore, be taken that although several orders had been passed on successive applications for delivery of possession, there has been no effective or complete disposal of the first application for delivery of possession. The auction-purchaser too appears to have become indifferent for a while. Nearly eight years after the previous order, he filed Application No. 4166 of 1949 for obtaining delivery of the remaining properties. On 31st March, 1950 the Master passed an order stating “ Ordered. Warrant to issue in the first week of July”. It is not in controversy that what was intended was that the warrant should issue in the first week of July, 1950. But the auctionpurchaser did not pursue the matter. He failed to pay the necessary charges for taking out the warrant and as the appellants have stated in their present application “warrant for delivery of vacant possession was not executed and it was allowed to lapse”. It is necessary at this stage to advert briefly to the practice obtaining on the Original Side of this Court in regard to such matters. As soon as an order for the issue of a warrant for delivery of possession is made, the execution application is treated as having been finally disposed of. In case where after the order of Court, the warrant is not applied for or taken out, the execution application is kept in the appropriate section for about three or four months to await the payment of the necessary charges by the person applying for the warrant, after which time it is sent to the records without being posted for dismissal or for further orders of Court. This, it is stated, has been the practice which has been followed on the Original Side for a very long time. This, it is stated, has been the practice which has been followed on the Original Side for a very long time. There appears to be no provision, either under the old Original Side Rules or in the new one, for posting for dismissal or final orders the execution applications in which a warrant for delivery of possession or attachment or arrest has been ordered but which warrant had been omitted to be taken out by the party. There is a similar lacuna in regard to warrants issued but not executed for any reason whatsoever. In our opinion, this practice can hardly be regarded as being in conformity with sound rules of procedure. We would suggest that appropriate Rules should be made for putting up execution petitions for final orders before the Court, whenever there has been a default in the matter of taking out the warrants ordered to issue, by reason of non-payment of necessary charges, etc., or where the warrant issued is returned unexecuted. In the present case although the Court directed the issue of warrant for delivery of vacant possession, Srinivasa Chetty did not take any steps to obtain the warrant in order to secure delivery of possession by removing the huts put up on the land. Even some time previously, he had entered into an agreement with certain persons, representing the various occupants of the plots in question, for sale of the entire property and had received an advance. But the latter had repudiated the agreement of sale and instituted O.S. No. 340 of 1953 on the file of the City Civil Court for the return of the advance paid. They were able to obtain a decree. There was also another litigation in regard to the title to the property in C.S. No. 469 of 1950. That ended in a compromise on 30th April, 1954. Srinivasa Chetty died on 19th May, 1955. More than three years thereafter, in September, 1959, his legal representative filed the application, out of which this appeal arises, for delivery of possession of the property. Both the Master as well as Srinivasan, J., on appeal, have held the application to be barred by limitation. Srinivasa Chetty died on 19th May, 1955. More than three years thereafter, in September, 1959, his legal representative filed the application, out of which this appeal arises, for delivery of possession of the property. Both the Master as well as Srinivasan, J., on appeal, have held the application to be barred by limitation. Notwithstanding the fact that the present proceedings arise in execution of a decree passed on the Original Side of this Court, the application for delivery of possession by the auction-purchaser will be governed only by Article 180 and not by Article 183 of the Limitation Act. The latter provision provides for a period of twelve years to enforce a judgment, decree or order of the High Court passed in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. But the decree of this. Court had been executed and it resulted in a sale. The application for delivery consequent on such sale cannot be regarded as an application for execution of the decree, although, if the decree had remained unsatisfied, such application might be held to be an application, as a step-in-aid of execution or one for revivor of the decree, so far as the unsatisfied portion of the decree is concerned. Article 180 will apply to the case of an application for delivery, whether the auction purchaser happens to be a stranger or the decree-holder himself. This has been settled: by the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Abdul Azeem Saheb v. Chockan Chettiar, I.L.R. 58 Mad. 893: (1935) 69 MLJ. 821. That Article provides that for an application for delivery of possession, there will’ be a period of three years from the date when the sale becomes absolute. From what we have stated above, it will be seen that although the auction-purchaser filed four successive applications for delivery of possession, it was only in Application No. 4166 of 1949, that an order for delivery of vacant possession was passed. The orders passed on the previous applications were incomplete and it must, therefore, be held that Application No. 4166 of 1949 was a continuation of the previous applications. Although it was filed nearly twelve years after the date when the sale became absolute, it must in essence be regarded as an application to bring up for orders the first application for delivery. But the order on that application finally disposed of the matter. Although it was filed nearly twelve years after the date when the sale became absolute, it must in essence be regarded as an application to bring up for orders the first application for delivery. But the order on that application finally disposed of the matter. It directed the issue of a warrant for delivery of vacant possession. It cannot thereafter be said that the application for delivery is pending. The auction-purchaser had merely to take out the warrant and obtain delivery of possession from the judgment-debtors. The Supreme Court, in Sahgal v. Maharaj Kishore Khanna, (1959) S.C.J. 1099, observed that if an application for execution was made in a pending execution proceeding, no question of limitation could arise as the right to continue the proceeding, which is pending, will be a right that arises from day to day and there could, therefore, be no bar of limitation with regard to the enforcement of such a right. The application for delivery in the instant case was not one made in a pending application for delivery as the previous application had been finally disposed of by the order dated 31st March, 1950 ; the remedy of the auction-purchaser will thereafter be only to effectuate that order, which was given to him. He did not avail himself of that order but allowed it to lapse. Learned Counsel for the appellants has however, contended that the present application, filed nine years after the final order on the application for delivery of possession, must be regarded as a reminder to the Court to issue the warrant that had been ordered on 31st March, 1950. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on the recent unreported judgment of this Court in A.A.A.O. No. 43 of 1961. In that case an auction-purchaser first filed an application for delivery of possession in time but no effective delivery could be granted, as the demarcation stones on the property had been removed by the judgment-debtors. It became necessary for him to take appropriate steps for identifying the property. Under these circumstances, he did not press the original application for delivery of possession, which was accordingly dismissed. When another application was filed, more than three years after the sale became absolute, a plea of limitation was raised. It became necessary for him to take appropriate steps for identifying the property. Under these circumstances, he did not press the original application for delivery of possession, which was accordingly dismissed. When another application was filed, more than three years after the sale became absolute, a plea of limitation was raised. It was held that although the first application had been dismissed, such dismissal must, in the circumstances, be regarded as not amounting to a final judicial order on the application for delivery of possession, as delivery could not then be effected by reason of the conduct of the judgment-debtors. Thus, an application for execution or for delivery of possession can be regarded as a continuation of the previous application in cases where there has been no complete disposal of the application on the previous occasion, and in cases where there has been a termination of such proceedings, for a reason for which the decreeholder or the auction-purchaser is not responsible. But, where, as in this case, the previous application, namely, Application No. 4166 of 1949, has been disposed of finally by giving to the auction-purchaser the order to which he was entitled under the law, and where such an application was not proceeded with by reason of the default of the auction-purchaser himself, there would, in our opinion, be no scope for the application of the theory of continuation. In Viswasundara v. Paidigadu, (1925) 50 MLJ. 72, a Bench of this Court held that where the Court was unable to give effect to its order by reason of the absence of the petitioner, who was bound to be present in order to take delivery, or owing to causes over which he had control, it was not the duty of the Court to give notice to him to show cause -why that petition should not be dismissed. They also pointed out that such a case should be different from the one where there was obstruction by the judgment-debtor or where owing to causes which were beyond the control of the auction-purchaser the delivary could not be effected. In the latter class of cases the order for delivery or possession would remain in force, and a subsequent application to execute that order would be a continuation of the original application, albeit the second application may have been filed more than three years after the sale became absolute. In the latter class of cases the order for delivery or possession would remain in force, and a subsequent application to execute that order would be a continuation of the original application, albeit the second application may have been filed more than three years after the sale became absolute. This view was accepted in Ramakirshnayya v. Venkatasubba Rao, (1954) 2 MLJ. 89 , where, by reason of the default on the part of the auction-purchaser the application for delivery of possession was dismissed. It was held that the principle of reviving the previous application, not judicially and finally disposed of by the Court, could not be invoked by the auction-purchaser. From what we have stated above, it would be clear that the application out of which this appeal arises cannot be regarded as a continuation of the previous application, namely, Application No. 4166 of 1949, ana it must, therefore, be held to be barred by limitation under Article 180 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Seshadri Ayyangar for the appellants however contends that the appropriate Article of the Limitation Act to be applied in the circumstances of the present case would be Article 183. The order of the Master dated 31st March, 1950 in Application No. 4166 of 1949 being an order of the High Court passed in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Jurisdiction, it is argued that the appellants would be entitled to a period of twelve years for the enforcement of the same. There is a fallacy underlying this argument. The order dated 31st March, 1950 directs the issue of a warrant in the first week of July, 1950. In that form that order could not thereafter be enforced. What the appellants seek is now to obtain a fresh order for delivery of possession, which can be executed now. That as we have pointed out, they cannot get by reason of lapse of time. But it will be open to them to apply to the Master for altering the Gate of the issue of the warrant, which, in the original order, was directed to issue in the first week of July, 1950. The Executing Court has always the inherent power to alter the date of the return of the warrant. But such an amendment of the order can only be obtained by means of a Master's summons, as provided for in the Original Side Rules. The Executing Court has always the inherent power to alter the date of the return of the warrant. But such an amendment of the order can only be obtained by means of a Master's summons, as provided for in the Original Side Rules. The period of limitation for filing an application for such amendment of the order, will be that contained in the residuary provision, namely, Article 181 of the Limitation Act. The right to apply must be held to have accrued the moment the auction-purchaser faile to obtain the warrant in the first week of July, 1950. Although there could be no limit to the number of applications that can be filed for altering the date of issue of the warrant, yet each successive application must be filed within 3 years from the date when the right to apply accrued. In the present case, inasmuch as there has been no application for amendment and re-issue of the warrant within three years after the original date of the order, the appellants cannot obtain the process of Court for effecting delivery by getting the order dated 31st March, 1950 amended. The appeal, therefore, fails and will be dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. P.R.N.-----Appeal dismissed.