This is judgment-debtors' appeal. Mainly the point raised by the judgment-debtors is that the application for execution is barred by time. (2) The facts are that the predecessor-in-interest of the present decree-holders obtained a decree against Mohlal Das the predeceshor-in-interest of the present judgment-debtors on the nth August, 1943 for ejectment of the defendant. The execution application numbered as execution case No. 54 of 1945 which was filed in the year 1945, was dismissed on 8-8-45. Another execution was taken out which was numbered as Execution Case No. 60 of 1947 and was dismissed on the 1st October, 1947. Thereafter another application was filed for execution which was registered as Execution Case No. 79 of 1947. During the pendency of the execution case a third party brought a suit for declaration that he was the owner of the plot. In view of that suit, the execution was stayed by the order of the execution Court dated 2nd December, 1949. This title suit brought by the third party was dismissed on i6th Jan. 1951. An appeal was filed which was finally disposed of on nth April, 1955. On the 7th November, 1956 the present application was filed by the decree-holder pointing out to the Court that the stay order no longer stands and thus he should proceed with the execution. It was contended by the judgment-debtor that this application was barred by time. Both the original decree-holder and the judgment-debtor are dead. The present appellants are the heirs of the original judgment-debtor. (3) Another point was taken by the original judgment-debtor in the first execution case that the structures being permanent he is not liable to. be evicted. However in the present case, as pointed out by the Munsiff, that point was not taken up and thus none of the Courts gave any finding whether the structure was permanent and the judgment-debtor was entitled to protection from ejectment in the execution proceeding. Mr. Gupta for the appellants has strenuously argued that the nature of the structures should have been determined by the execution Court. This Court cannot in second appeal go into that question now and remand the case to the execution Court for determination when the parties did not raise the point before them. (4) The main question is of limitation. Mr. Gupta for the appellants has strenuously argued that the nature of the structures should have been determined by the execution Court. This Court cannot in second appeal go into that question now and remand the case to the execution Court for determination when the parties did not raise the point before them. (4) The main question is of limitation. The Munsiff held that the application was within time as the final order will be deemed to have been passed on the nth April, 1955, when the appeal in the title suit was disposed of. The Court below in my opinion has rightly held that the order of the appellate Court of nth April, 1955, cannot be treated to be a final order within the meaning of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The final order contemplated under various clauses of Article 182 is either the order passed on an appeal in which the decree was obtained or the final order passed on the first execution application. Any final order passed in a suit filed by a third party cannot be regarded for the purposes of Article 182 as a final order. But the Court below has held that Article 182 is not attracted in the present case. The present application is not a fresh application for execution and thus Article 182 will not apply. (4a) Mr. Gupta has cited the cases of (1) Pingle Venkata Rama Reddy v. Kakaria Buchanna, reported in AIR 1963 Andh Pra 1 (FB); (2) Rameshwar Prasad v. Parmeshwar Prasad, reported in AIR 1951 Pat I (FB); (3) A. S. Subba Iyer v. Metal Corporation of India Ltd., reported in AIR 1954 Cal 169 , (4) Haris Chandra v. Dines Chandra, reported in AIR 1946 Cal 375 and (5) Bhawanipore Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Gouri Shankar, reported in AIR 1950 SC 6 , in support of his contention that once the limitation starts, an appeal filed by a third party will not interrupt that limitation unless there was a stay order passed by the appellate Court. As I have said, these cases were all cases where the Courts have interpreted various clauses of the column 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. Thus these cases have no application to the facts of the present case. In my opinion thus Article 182 is not attracted. As I have said, these cases were all cases where the Courts have interpreted various clauses of the column 3 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. Thus these cases have no application to the facts of the present case. In my opinion thus Article 182 is not attracted. The application also cannot be barred by Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code as the present application is not a fresh application. The prayer in this application is to proceed on the old application. The execution case started in 1947 was not struck off and was not finally disposed of. It was still pending and thus the present application was only to draw the attention of the executing Court that the application is still pending. There is no bar to its proceeding and the executing Court proceeded on the old execution application and not any fresh execution. Thus neither Section 48, Civil Procedure Code not Article 182 of the Limitation Act is attracted in this case. (5) The next point urged is that there was an obstacle to the execution and that has been removed as soon as the trial Court passed a final order on the title suit. The application thus for revival should have been filed within three years of that order and the decree-holder should not have waited till final decision in appeal. In short the argument is that Article 181 is attracted and the present application is beyond limitation. Article 181 will not be attracted in the present case. There was no obligation on the decree-holder to go and apply. No final orders have been passed on the previous application for execution and the execution was still pending. The Court had to pass some orders on that execution and the decree-holder can only draw the attention of the Court that the execution is still pending. In this view of the matter the application cannot be treated to be one under Section 181, Indian Limitation Act. In the case of Bhan Dutta Upadhia v. Mt. Tulsa Kuer, reported in AIR 1940 All 151 the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held as follows:- "When execution of decree is stayed by the Court under Order 21 Rule 29, Civil Procedure Code, pending disposal of judgment-debtor's suit and execution application is thereupon consigned to record room, this does not terminate execution proceedings. Tulsa Kuer, reported in AIR 1940 All 151 the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held as follows:- "When execution of decree is stayed by the Court under Order 21 Rule 29, Civil Procedure Code, pending disposal of judgment-debtor's suit and execution application is thereupon consigned to record room, this does not terminate execution proceedings. When the stay order has ceased, to operate it is not incumbent on the decree-bolder to make an application to set execution proceeding in motion. If he makes such an application it is not governed by Article 181, Limitation Act and cannot be barred even if made more than three years after the disposal of judgment-debtor's suit." I am in complete agreement with the law laid down in this Full Bench decision. The present application is neither a fresh application for execution, nor an application governed by Article 181, Limitation Act. It is an application in continuation of the old execution application which is still pending and has not been finally disposed of. In this view of the matter the application is not barred by limitation. There is no force in this appeal and it to rejected. But the costs of this appeal will be borne by the parties. AH/P/D.V.C. Appeal rejected. -----------------------