Judgment :- 1. The plaintiffs are the appellants. The appeal is from a decree in a suit for partition and recovery of the plaintiffs' share in the plaint schedule properties. The properties originally belonged to one Ammad Haji, deceased. Plaintiffs and defendants 4 and 5 are his children, the 3rd defendant is his widow and the 1st defendant, his mother. Before his death, Ammad Haji had sold the plaint properties to the 1st defendant and had taken the same back on kanom. On 2110 1942, when the plaintiffs and the 5th defendant were minors, the 3rd and 4th defendants executed a release of the kanom right in the properties to the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant thereafter made a gift of the properties to the 2nd defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that the release of the kanom right executed by the 3rd defendant as guardian of the plaintiffs who were minors was void and sued for the reliefs mentioned above. The 1st defendant died before entering appearance and no legal representatives were impleaded. 2. The 2nd defendant contended that Ammad Haji had sold the properties by a registered deed dated 10-6-1937 to the 1st defendant, & thereafter had taken back the properties on kanom, that the 3rd defendant acting for herself and as guardian of her minor children along with the 4th defendant, had transferred the rights under the kanom on 2110 1942 to the 1st defendant and that the 1st defendant made an oral gift of the properties to the 2nd defendant. Therefore the 2nd defendant contended that he had become the full owner of the properties and was in possession, and that even if the release of the kanom right was void, the 1st defendant and himself were in possession adversely to the plaintiffs and had acquired title to the property by prescription and that the suit was barred by limitation. 3. The court below found that the release deed executed by the 3rd and 4th defendants was void as the 3rd defendant had no capacity under the Muhammadan Law to represent the minor plaintiffs & the 5th defendant, that the 3rd plaintiff was a minor on the date of suit but as plaintiffs 1 and 2 attained majority more than three years before the date of the suit the whole suit was barred. 4. 4. As plaintiffs 1 and 2 became major more than three years before the date of the suit, it is admitted that, so far as they are concerned, the suit would have been barred, but for the fact that the 3rd plaintiff was a minor on the date of the suit. 5. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is whether the suit was barred at all or whether it was barred only as against plaintiffs 1 and 2. 6. Counsel for the appellants relied upon S.7 of the Limitation Act and contended that the plaintiffs being jointly entitled to institute the suit and one of them being incapable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the minor plaintiff, the whole suit was saved from the bar of limitation. S.7 is as follows: "Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such persons, time will run against them all; but where no such discharge can be given time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased." The argument of counsel was that the plaintiffs being some of the legal representatives of Ammad Haji they inherited his estate as tenants-in-common, but they were jointly entitled to sue for partition and recovery of their shares of the kanom right in the properties, as 2nd defendant having got the rights of the 3rd and 4th defendants under the release was in possession only as a co-sharer. Counsel contended that the words 'jointly entitled to institute a suit' occurring in the section mean only that the plaintiffs must be entitled to institute a suit jointly and not that they should be entitled to the substantive right jointly, and as some of the co-heirs of a deceased Muhammadan can jointly sue for partition and recovery of their shares in the kanom right from a person in possession under a transaction in part void and in part valid, the whole suit was within time so long as one among them was under a disability. He relied on Ikkanda Warrier v. Parameswaran Elayath (38 Cochin 379) where a Full Bench of that Court held that the words 'persons jointly entitled to institute a suit' occurring in the corresponding section of the Cochin Act mean persons jointly entitled under the procedural law to institute a suit and to determine who are the persons who are jointly entitled to sue, one must have recourse to Order I, R.1 of the Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly it was held that if several persons can join together in a suit under that rule, they are persons jointly entitled to institute a suit within the meaning of S.7 although their substantive rights in the properties may be distinct and separate and although they could bring separate suits and obtain reliefs, as in the case of Muhammadan co-heirs who take the property of the deceased as tenants-in-common. 7. S.7 provides for cases where the claim of the several persons entitled to sue or apply is a joint claim i. e., where several persons have got one and the same right or cause of action, and one of them cannot institute a suit on behalf of all or give a discharge binding on the persons under disability. In a case where the rights of persons joining together as plaintiffs are several and distinct, and separate suits could be brought to obtain the reliefs without any objection as to non joinder of necessary parties, it is difficult to understand how the section can be applied. In U. N. Mitra on Limitation, seventh edition, Vol. I, page 93 it is stated: "The second part of S.7, enacts that when one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under a disability, and when a full discharge of the whole debt or claim cannot be given by any of the others without the concurrence of the first, viz., the person who is labouring under a disability, the exemption grand by S.6 shall be enjoyed by all of them until one of them acquires the legal capacity to give a full discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased. The second part of the section thus extends the provisions of S.6 to some of the cases in which one of the joint plaintiffs or applicants is under a disability. The second part of the section thus extends the provisions of S.6 to some of the cases in which one of the joint plaintiffs or applicants is under a disability. If the co-obligees of a money-bond may be treated as tenants-in-common of the debt, each obligee (as held in Steeds v. Steeds 1889-L. R.22 Q B. D. 537) can give a discharge in respect of his own share only and S.7 does not affect such a case. The minor co-obligee will be protected by S.6 only so far as his share is concerned. The second part of S.7 protects the minor as well as the other obligees if they are joint. For instance, where a joint right of redemption vests in the heirs of a Muhammadan mortgagor, until every one of these heirs attains majority, the right to redeem is not barred by limitation." The view taken by the Full Bench in the aforesaid Cochin case and followed in AIR. 1950 T. C. 57 and in A. S.817 of 1958 by a learned single judge of this Court can be best expressed in the language of Krishnaswami Iyengar C. J. "Such being the rule of joinder, it is only necessary to point out that S.8 of the Limitation Act lays emphasis on the liberty of joinder implied in the word entitled. The distinction to be kept in mind is that the several persons are entitled to sue together if they choose and not that they are under an obligation to do so. Of course, where they are compilable to join all the persons of the group, it will be an a fortiori case of their being jointly entitled to do so." We do not think that it is possible to construe the section in the manner suggested. Order I, R.1 of the CPC. is an enabling provision. It gives liberty to several persons to join together as plaintiffs, provided the two conditions specified in that rule are satisfied viz., that the right of relief claimed by them arises from the same act or transaction either jointly, severally or in the alternative and where if such persons brought separate suits, common questions of law or fact would arise. It gives liberty to several persons to join together as plaintiffs, provided the two conditions specified in that rule are satisfied viz., that the right of relief claimed by them arises from the same act or transaction either jointly, severally or in the alternative and where if such persons brought separate suits, common questions of law or fact would arise. It does not follow that because certain persons are permitted to join in one suit by the procedural law of the land all those persons are persons jointly entitled to institute a suit within the meaning of S.7 of the Limitation Act. Under O. T, R.1 not only persons jointly entitled in the cause of action but also persons entitled severally or alternatively . are allowed to join together as plaintiffs if the right to relief arises out of the same act or series of acts. Persons jointly entitled to a right are certainly entitled to join together to bring an action under Order I, R.1, for the vindication of the joint right, but the persons jointly entitled to institute a suit under S.7 of the Limitation Act are not the only persons permitted to sue jointly under Order I, R.1. The marginal note to the Rule indicates its scope. It speaks of persons who may join together as plaintiffs in one action. We do not think that the expression 'persons jointly entitled to institute a suit' occurring in S.7 was intended by the legislature to mean all persons who may join together as plaintiffs under Order I, R.1. 0.1, R.1. does not make it obligatory to implead all persons jointly entitled to sue, in the sense of being jointly entitled either in the primary right or in the sanctioning right flowing from the infringement of the primary right. 8. The reason why a plurality of persons in whom a right vests jointly are bound to sue only jointly is that there is only one obligation to be enforced. In such a case, the obligation, if we may use the term in the sense in which the Roman Lawyers used it, is from the creditor's point of view single, whether there is only one debtor or more. It is not necessary to enter into all the ramifications of solidary obligations from the point of view of the debtor. In such a case, the obligation, if we may use the term in the sense in which the Roman Lawyers used it, is from the creditor's point of view single, whether there is only one debtor or more. It is not necessary to enter into all the ramifications of solidary obligations from the point of view of the debtor. It is sufficient for our purpose if we confine our analysis from the creditor's point of view. Look at the consequence which would follow from the acceptance of the interpretation suggested by the appellant. If we are to hold that all persons who have the liberty to join together in one action under Order I, R.1 are persons jointly entitled to sue within the meaning of S.7, the minority of one in the group would save the separate rights of every individual in the group from limitation, a result which we do not think the legislature could have intended even by the amendment. Take, for instance, a case where A and B are injured by the same negligent act of C. Both A and B can maintain separate actions against C; they can also institute a joint suit under Order I, R.1 for recovery of compensation for the infringement of their separate rights, as their rights to sue arise out of the same act and common questions of law and fact would arise. They are certainly persons jointly entitled to sue under Order I, R.1, but they are not jointly entitled in the cause of action. The obligation incurred by the tortfeasor to A is different and separate from the obligation incurred to B, although they may be similar in character. Does it mean therefore that the minority of A would save a suit by A and B even if a separate suit by B would be barred? If it is admitted that both A and B could file separate suits as they are not jointly entitled in any cause of action, the fact that A is a minor is immaterial in reckoning the period of limitation so far as B is concerned. If it is admitted that both A and B could file separate suits as they are not jointly entitled in any cause of action, the fact that A is a minor is immaterial in reckoning the period of limitation so far as B is concerned. As the obligation incurred by C to A is different and separate from the obligation incurred by G to B, the fact that A is minor cannot and should not affect the period of limitation for a joint suit by A and B and save it from the bar of limitation so far as B is concerned if B's separate suit would have been barred by limitation. It is not necessary to multiply instances. We need refer only to the illustrations given in Mulla's CPC. 10th Edn., at p. 448: 1. In Alridge v. Barrow (1907-34 Cal. 662), the defendant, the editor and proprietor of a newspaper, published articles which referred to the "Calcutta Police", without naming individuals. The plaintiffs, six of the members of the Calcutta Police Force, jointly sued the editor for damages, alleging that the articles were directed against them, and that they constituted a libel. Here the libel was in the same words, and in the same documents, but of different persons. It was held that the plaintiffs could not all be joined in one suit. The Court said: 'It is true that the injury may have been caused by one act of the defendant as for instance in the case of a railway accident causing injury to several passengers, or, as is here alleged, of a collective libel on several individuals. The causes of action of the persons injured will none the less remain separate and distinct. There cannot in such cases be said to be one or the same cause of action." 2. In Varajlal v. Ramdat (1902-26 Bombay 259), A and B were assaulted by C at an interview in C's house. A and B jointly sued C for damages for assault. It was held that the assaults on A and that on B constituted two distinct causes of action, and the suit was therefore bad for misjoinder of plaintiffs. In Varajlal v. Ramdat (1902-26 Bombay 259), A and B were assaulted by C at an interview in C's house. A and B jointly sued C for damages for assault. It was held that the assaults on A and that on B constituted two distinct causes of action, and the suit was therefore bad for misjoinder of plaintiffs. The Court said: 'We may go further and say that as the blows on each plaintiff were inflicted at the same time and place and must be proved by the same evidence, it would be more convenient if the law permitted the trial of the two suits together than that it should be necessary to try them separately. But this is a matter for the consideration of the Legislature. 3. In Ali Serang v. Beadon (1885-11 Cal. 524) thirteen firemen, who were engaged on board a steamer, were all arrested under one warrant on a charge of desertion, and they were all tried together and sentenced to one month's imprisonment. The term of imprisonment expired on the 5th May, but they were not released on that date. Thereupon all the thirteen brought a suit against the superintendent of the jail for damages for wrongful detention. It was held that the causes of action were distinct and separate and could not be joined in one suit. 4. In Ramanuja v. Devanayaka (1885-8 Mad. 361), several trustees of a temple were removed from the office of trustees by the District Temple Committee. A suit by the trustees for a declaration that their removal was without just cause was held to be bad for mis joinder, on the ground that the dismissal of each trustee gave rise to a distinct cause of action." 9. Although under the old Code (Code of 1882) the persons mentioned in each of the above cases could not have joined together and filed a suit, under the new Code they can join in one suit and obtain relief. It does not mean that the disability of one of the persons mentioned in the group would save the joint suit from the bar of limitation so far as those who were under no disability and who could have instituted separate suits and obtained reliefs. 10. It does not mean that the disability of one of the persons mentioned in the group would save the joint suit from the bar of limitation so far as those who were under no disability and who could have instituted separate suits and obtained reliefs. 10. Now let us look at the reason for the rule why a suit instituted by a plurality of persons is saved from the bar of limitation, if one or more of the persons comprehended within that class is or are labouring under a disability. The reason is that one or more of them could not have instituted a suit on behalf of them all, as the obligation or the cause of action is only single or joint. If the obligation is single or the cause of the action joint and if only one suit could be maintained and that only by all the persons, it stands to reason that one of them should not be compelled by law to file a suit as he could not obtain any relief either for the whole or for his individual share. 11. In Ahinsa Bibi v. Abdul Kader Saheb (ILR. 25 Madras 26) Bhashyam Ayyangar J. has considered the scope of S.7 and 8. There he quotes the observation made in the course of the judgment in Decharms v. Horwood (10 Bing., 526 at p. 529). The quotation is as follows: "The authorities all agree that whatever be the number of parceners, they all constitute one heir. They are connected together by unity of interest and unity of title; and one of them cannot distrain without joining the others in the avowry. If they cannot distrain separately, how can they separately claim a portion of the rent from a person who has received it in the character of a trustee? It would be a great hardship on him to be exposed to three actions instead of one..." At page 35 the learned judge has observed as follows: "In other words, the claim which was possessed by one individual is now possessed jointly by a number of individuals, who are his legal representatives and all must therefore join in a suit to enforce that claim. If one or more of such joint claimants do not join as plaintiffs, the course to be pursued in India, according to long-established course of decisions, is for the claimants bringing the suit to join, as party defendants, those who do not join as plaintiffs... The law of limitation operates in favour of the obligor and if the obligation which is sought to be enforced against him is single and indivisible it is perfectly immaterial, so far as he is concerned, whether the co-relative right is possessed by a single person, or by several persons jointly and whether, as between those several persons, the right is a joint one with right of survivorship or a several one according to their respective interests. S.7 of the Limitation Act applies to cases in which the right of suit resides either in one person singly or in several persons jointly. In the former case, only one individual has to bring the suit, but in the latter case, the suit has to be brought by all the persons who possess that right except that in those cases in which one or more of them refused to join as plaintiffs, they may be and ought to be joined as party defendants; and for the purposes of S.7, all such persons have to be regarded as plaintiffs ..." and then he summarises his conclusion at page 38 as follows: "The combined operation of S.7 and 8 in cases in which the right of suit resides jointly in a plurality of persons is, in my opinion, as follows: (a) such suit cannot be barred in part, in respect of some, and not barred in part, in respect of the others; (b if any one of several joint creditors or claimants is under a disability and a full discharge could be given without his concurrence by all or any of the other joint creditors or claimants, the suit will be governed by the ordinary law of limitation and time will run against all; (c) but where no such discharge can be given, time will not run against any of them until all have ceased to be under disability; (d) if all were affected by disability, time will not run against any of them until all have ceased to be under disability, unless one of them, who. in the meanwhile, has ceased to be under disability becomes capable of giving a complete discharge without the concurrence of the others, in which latter case, time will run against all from the time when one of them has thus become capable of giving such discharge." 12. The foundation for the rule therefore is the inability of one or more of the persons in a class to institute a suit where the cause of action vests jointly in the class either because the obligation is single and therefore joint or because under the substantive law, only one suit could be instituted for the enforcement of the light vesting in the class, whether separate or otherwise. Though the equity of redemption vests as tenants-in-common in the heirs of a deceased Muhammadan in distinct and separate shares, the right of redemption could be enforced under the substantive law only by a single action by all of them, and until everyone of them attains majority, the right to redeem will not be barred. Therefore unless there is some sort of jointness either in the cause of action sued or in the obligation to be enforced, or some provision in the substantive law, which makes it obligatory for persons having separate rights to join together in one action to enforce those rights, there is no reason why the disability of one should provide an exemption for the other or others from the ordinary law of limitation for instituting the suit within the time prescribed. If that be the reason underlying the section, one fails to understand why the mere fact that certain persons are enabled to join together to institute a suit under Order I R.1 should provide an exemption from the ordinary rule of limitation for enforcing their separate and distinct causes of action. No doubt, it would have been more apt if the legislature had used the expression 'bound' instead of the word 'entitled' in S.7. In the foot-note of his lectures on limitation, Vol. I page 93, U. N. Mitra has observed: "Would not 'bound' be more appropriate than'entitled' " 13. In spite of the amendment of the S.7 by the legislature, we do not think that the reason for or the basis of the section has been altered. In the foot-note of his lectures on limitation, Vol. I page 93, U. N. Mitra has observed: "Would not 'bound' be more appropriate than'entitled' " 13. In spite of the amendment of the S.7 by the legislature, we do not think that the reason for or the basis of the section has been altered. The amendment was intended not to do away with the limitation inherent in the rule, that there must be some sort of jointness in the cause of action in order that the section may be applicable. 14. In 36 MLJ.184 it was held that the Muhammadan co-heirs have distinct and separate shares in the property inherited and one of them is entitled to sue for his share of the property and if he does not sue within the time prescribed, his cause of action would get barred. In Kandastvami v. Irusappa (ILR. XLI Madras 102) at page 107, Sadasiva Ayyar J. has made the following observation which if we may say so with respect appears to be unexceptionable: "The mere fact that under Order 1, R.1, Civil Procedure Code, the second defendant suing for himself and praying for one particular remedy could have joined in that same suit another cause of action vesting in the third defendant for whom he (second defendant) could have acted as next friend will not bring such a suit within the ambit of S.7 of the Limitation Act which contemplates the existence in two or more persons of a joint right and joint cause or joint causes of action in support of a single suit." 15. The substantive prayer in this case was for partition of the kanom right of the deceased Ammad Haji and for recovery of possession of the shares of the plaintiffs from the 2nd defendant. The fact that the 2nd defendant had acquired the right of the 3rd and 4th defendants does not make any difference in the character of the suit. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 could have instituted the suit within three years of their attaining majority as there was no bar to their instituting separate suits, claiming their separate shares. The plaintiffs in this case were not bound to sue in one action. They were not joint tenants with only a single cause of action to prosecute. As they were tenants-in-common, each of them could have instituted a separate suit. The plaintiffs in this case were not bound to sue in one action. They were not joint tenants with only a single cause of action to prosecute. As they were tenants-in-common, each of them could have instituted a separate suit. In law the position of the 2nd defendant is only that of a co-sharer who has acquired the shares of the 3rd and 4th defendants. We, therefore, hold that the suit is barred so far as plaintiffs 1 and 2 are concerned and that it is not barred so far as the 3rd plaintiff is concerned. 16. We, accordingly, set aside the decree of the lower court so far as the 3rd plaintiff is concerned and pass a preliminary decree for partition of his share in the plaint properties. The rest of the decree of the lower court is confirmed. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The parties will bear their costs in this Court and in the court below. Allowed.