JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a revision against the order of the Subdivisional Magistrate of Cuttack (Sadar) dismissing the Petitioner?s application u/s 488 Code of Criminal Procedure for maintenance for, her illegitimate son whose father was alleged to be the opposite party No. (1). 2. The parties are Indian Christians. The Petitioner is the widow of the maternal uncle of opposite party No. 1. Her husband died sometime in 1955 and all her children born through her husband died in infancy. She was thus left a childless widow and opposite party No. (2) Pushpamayee, who is none else but the mother of opposite party No. 1, agreed to keep the Petitioner in her house partly because of the Petitioner?s indigent circumstances and partly because it was thought that the Petitioner would be of help to her in running the household as she herself was employed as a Cypher assistant in the Orissa Secretariat. Pushpamayee?s son (opposite party No. 1 whose full name is Manoranjan Samant Kumar was then a student studying in the local High School. The Petitioner alleged that while they were thus living together in one house in Cuttack opposite party seduced her in consequence of which she became pregnant and in due course gave birth to a boy sometime in December 1957 in the Cuttack General Hospital. The Petitioner was also then earning some money as a bus conductor in the State Transport but subsequently she lost that job. Pushpamayee was transferred to Bhubaneswar and began to live there. It was further, alleged that for sometime after the birth of the child, maintenance was given to her by Pushpamayee on behalf of her son, but that later allowance was stopped altogether. The Petitioner is stated to be now living at Bhubaneswar on the charity of one Mr. Rout. 3. On behalf of the opposite party the paternity of the child was challenged and it was alleged that the Petitioner was a woman who was leading an unchaste life and that the child might have been born through anyone of her innumerable paramours. The Petitioner relied mainly on her own evidence, certain letters written to her by opposite party No. 1 himself (Exts. 3 to 12) and two photographs M.Os. The Petitioner relied mainly on her own evidence, certain letters written to her by opposite party No. 1 himself (Exts. 3 to 12) and two photographs M.Os. I and II showing the opposite party sitting with a child on his lap and containing an endorsement on the reverse side of each photographs to the following effect: 1 and may son' and bearing the signature of the opposite party. She also relied on two postcards, Exts. U and 14 written to her by Pushpamayee (D.W. 2) to prove the paternity of the child. She also relied on the oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 to show that for sometime after the birth of the child she lived as a tenant in their houses and that the opposite party also used to live with her. 4. Opposite party No. 1 has studiously avoided the witness box, but his mother Pushpamayee (opposite party, No. 2) gave evidence as D.W. 2 to show that her son could not possibly have been the father of the child. A clerk of Cuttack General Hospital was also examined to prove that the entries in the Hospital Register dated 24-12-1957 (ext. C) did not show that any child was born on that day to the Petitioner in that Hospital as alleged. 5. The trial court rightly pointed out that evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 who are landlords of the houses where she and opposite party No. 1 were alleged to have lived for some time as husband and wife was not reliable. But his finding regarding the paternity of the child is not clear. He seems to have entertained some doubt about the truth of the Petitioner?s evidence regarding paternity, but instead of discussing the entire evidence, especially the letters and the photographs (M.Os. I and II) he observed that even if it be assumed that the opposite party No. 1 was the father of the child, nevertheless no maintenance could be awarded against him as he was still a student studying in Srirampur College and as such he has no means to pay the maintenance. 6. I and II) he observed that even if it be assumed that the opposite party No. 1 was the father of the child, nevertheless no maintenance could be awarded against him as he was still a student studying in Srirampur College and as such he has no means to pay the maintenance. 6. There are thus two important questions for decision: (i) Whether the Petitioner has established satisfactorily that opposite party No. I is the father of her child; and (ii) Even if she succeeds in establishing paternity is her claim for maintenance liable to be dismissed-on the ground that the opposite party is a student with no means of his own being dependent on his mother. 7. It is true that when a woman comes forward with an allegation that a certain person is the father of her illegitimate child it would be very unsafe to accept her testimony on the question of paternity without adequate corroborate on. 1 am also inclined to agree with the lower court that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 does not inspire confidence mainly because P.W. 2 has several previous convictions to his credit and is not a respectable witness. But here sufficient corroboration of her evidence is found in the photographs (M.Os. 1 and II) the letters written by the opposite party and his mother to the Petitioner (exts. 3 to li) and certain admissions made by the mother of opposite party No. 1. The conduct of opposite party No. 1 in avoiding the witness box altogether though he is obviously the best person to say whether the letters Exts. 3 to 12 were written by him or not and also to explain the circumstances describing himself and the child as I and my son were made, must lead to an adverse inference against him. 8. It is true that in 1957 when the alleged illicit intimacy began between the parties was a middle aged widow aged about 35 years-her date of birth as given in ext. B/4, being 29-11-1919. It is also true that the opposite party No. 1 was then perhaps an adolescent youth of about 15 years as spoken to by his mother Pushpamayee. He is also none else but the Petitioner?s husband?s sister?s son. B/4, being 29-11-1919. It is also true that the opposite party No. 1 was then perhaps an adolescent youth of about 15 years as spoken to by his mother Pushpamayee. He is also none else but the Petitioner?s husband?s sister?s son. But as rightly pointed out by the learned lower court a youth of 15 years is not incapable of procreation and hence former age alone, no conclusive inference that he could not possibly have been the father of the child, can be made. The question ultimately depends on the drawing of reasonable inference from the evidence of the Petitioner, and of Pushpamayee and from the proved facts in this case. 9. From the evidence of Pushpamayee herself it is established that there were ample opportunities for the Petitioner and opposite party No. 1 to carryon illicit intrigue during the period when the child was conceived. The child was said to have been born sometime in December 1957, and hence the conception must have taken place sometime in February or March 1957. Pushpamayee admitted that the Petitioner came to her house in Cuttack by the end of February 1957 that she, her son and the Petitioner all lived together in the same house until April 1957 when Pushpamayee shifted to Bhubaneswar leaving the Petitioner and the boy together in the Cuttack house. Her son came to Bhubaneswar for the Summer Vacation only in Mayor June 1957 and again went back to the Cut-tack house thereafter while continuing his studies. The Petitioner admitted that she got a temporary job in the Transport Department as bus conductor on 28-3-57 and served till 15-2-59. Thus, during the crucial months of February and March 1957 when the child must have been convened, Petitioner and opposite party No. 1 stayed in the same house with Pushpamayee in Cuttack. The Petitioner?s allegation that Pushpamayee herself encouraged illicit intimacy between her and opposite party No. 1 may perhaps be an exaggeration but as Pushpamayee was then serving in the Secretariat as a Chipher Assistant and the Petitioner got a job as bus conductor only on the 28th March 1957, there was ample opportunity for the Petitioner and opposite party No. 1 to carryon illicit intrigue even without the knowledge or connivance of Pushpamayee. The Petitioner?s statement that she was seduced by opposite party No. 1 may also be an exaggeration considering the wide disparity in age between the two. But here we are not concerned with the moral aspect of the question. The only question is whether there were opportunities for access between the Petitioner and opposite party No. 1. 10. The two photographs (M.Os. I and II) should be given great importance. Pushpamayee admitted that they were those of her son. They show the boy keeping a child on his lap. He is obviously the best person to say whose child it was and why he kept it on his lap and got himself photographed in that posture, but he has avoided the witness box. Again on the reverse of the photographs there are the endorsements I and my son. According to the Petitioner they were made by opposite party No. 1 who signed himself sometimes as 'Ranjan' and sometimes as 'H.S. Kumar'. Though Pushpamayee denied the writing on the reverse side of the photographs to be her sons, her denial cannot be accepted especially when the opposite party himself would not come into the witness box to make the denial on oath, Exts. 3 to 12 which, according to the Petitioner, were written by the opposite party no. 1 himself. A perusal of the contents of these letters shows unambiguously the existence of illicit relationship between the two and the birth of the child. It is true that apart from the Petitioner?s uncorroborated testimony there is no other evidence to prove the handwriting and Pushpamayee has denied the handwriting in these letters to be that of her son. But here again due to his avoidance of the witness box to explain the contents of these letters, an adverse inference will have to be drawn against him. In some of these letters he has signed himself as 'Ranjan' and in some as 'H.8. Kumar'. But even while signing as 'H.S. Kumar' he has varied his signature. Thus, in Exts. 3 and 4 the letters H. and S. have been written separately and then the word Kumar has been written while in some other documents (Exts. 6, 7, 8 and 9) the letters 'H' and 8' and 'K' have all been combined. In his admitted signature in the akalatnama (ext. 15) he has written the letters 'H' and 8' separately. 3 and 4 the letters H. and S. have been written separately and then the word Kumar has been written while in some other documents (Exts. 6, 7, 8 and 9) the letters 'H' and 8' and 'K' have all been combined. In his admitted signature in the akalatnama (ext. 15) he has written the letters 'H' and 8' separately. But even to the naked eye the close resemblance between his signature in Ext. 15 and that found in Exts. 3 and 4 is remarkable. I may in this connection read to a decision of the Kerala High Court reported in AIR 1958 Kerala 216 where it was pointed out that where the mother of the child had proved certain letters stating that they were written by its father, the omission on to an adverse inference against him. In that case the letters were unsigned but here the letters were signed and in two of them (exts. 3 and 4) his signature tallies with his admitted signature in ext.15. Moreover the two photographs M.Os. I and II which were admitted by his mother Pushpamayee to be her son?s must be held to be sufficiently corroborative of the evidence of the Petitioner in the absence of any explanation from him. 11. Some importance should also be attached to the two postcards marked exts. 13 and 14. According to the Petitioner these postcards were written by Pushpamayee herself. When Pushpamayee was confronted with these postcards, she had not the courage to deny her handwriting though she admitted guardely that: "Exts 13 and 14 appear to be in my hand". In view of this admission, I must accept the Petitioner?s evidence that they were written to her by pushpamayee. The postal seals on these two postcards show that they were written sometime in December 1958 and January 1959. The contents of these post cards suggest that the parties were on affectionate terms. If as 1; now alleged by Pushpamayee, the Petitioner was leading a grossly immoral life and had begotten this child through one of her paramours, it is highly improbable that she would have allowed the Petitioner to stay in her house in Cuttack with the child and also to look after her son who was then studying in the School She could not then have remained on affectionate terms with the Petitioner as disclosed by these two postcards. 12. 12. An attempt was made to discredit the character of the Petitioner by proving ext. A--(which is a discharge certificate dated 13th March 1959 from the S.C.B. Medical College Hospital) which shows that as late as 18th May 1959 she was pregnant. A certificate from the Secretary of the Baptist Cemetery Board, dated 25th February 1900 (ext. B) was also proved to show that a child (daughter) of the Petitioner which was one month old, died and was buried in the cemetery on the 10th May 1959. This document would undoubtedly show that early in April, 1959 the Petitioner bad given birth to a female child which died within a month and was buried though the Petitioner would not admit either the birth or death the child. It was therefore urged that she was a woman of disreputable character and her evidence should not be accepted. But too much importance should not be attached to this because Pushpamayee herself admitted that the Petitioner lived in her Cuttack house till the 28th February 1959. The child referred to in ext. B expired on the 10th May 1959 when it was one month old, i.e. it must have been born on or about the 10th April 1959. Hence this pregnancy must have been known to everybody-long before the 28th February 1959. It is difficult to believe that Pushpamayee would have allowed the Petitioner to remain in her house as late as February 1959 if she was really leading such a scandalous life as to get pregnant again through some other paramour. But as the second child is dead I need not further discuss the question as to whether the opposite party No. 1 could have been the father of this child also, especially when, on the admission of Pushpamayee herself, he was staying with the Petitioner in Cuttack house during the period when that child was conceived. I am only referring to this to show that it will not render improbable the evidence of the Petitioner regarding the paternity of the boy born in December 1957. 13. Similarly, the evidence of D.W. I the Clerk of the Cuttack General Hospital-will not lead to any conclusive inference. He merely proved the Birth Register which showed that on 24th December 1957, no child was born to the Petitioner in the Hospital. 13. Similarly, the evidence of D.W. I the Clerk of the Cuttack General Hospital-will not lead to any conclusive inference. He merely proved the Birth Register which showed that on 24th December 1957, no child was born to the Petitioner in the Hospital. It is true that the Petitioner admitted, in cross examination, that her illegitimate son was born on 24-12-1957 in that Hospital, but the defence, very cleverly, did not put any question as to the exact time of birth of the boy. Similarly, the Extract from the Hospital Register, for the period 23rd December to 25th December 1957 was not proved. D.W. 1 practically admitted that he could not say whether the Petitioner had been admitted for child birth in 1957. There is thus a probability that as the Hospital authorities were counting the day from midnight to midnight it may be that there was some slight confusion about the exact date of birth of the Child. But this is a trivial discrepancy. If the defence wanted to draw a conclusive inference that no child was born to the Petitioner at about that time they should have proved some other entries in the Birth Register to show that the Petitioner was never admitted for child birth in the Hospital in December (sic) 9,37. This was not done. 14. I should further add that the Petitioner?s allegation that the opposite party is the father of her illegitimate son was not made at a belated stage. I find that in her letter to the Controller of Transport (ext. A-4) proved by the opposite party?s mother there are clear reference to the effect that she had been made illicitly pregnant by the opposite party and also that an attempt was made to cause abortion. This shows that as early as 27-8-1959 she had been making allegations that the opposite party was the cause of her illicit pregnancy. 15. Reviewing the evidence as a whole and having regard to the fact that the opposite party No. 2 has avoided the witness box I must hold that the evidence of the Petitioner has been fully corroborated by the photographs M.Os. I and II the letters exts. 3 to 12, and the postcards 13 and 14, and some admissions made by Pushpamayee. 16. During the hearing of this revision petition Mr. I and II the letters exts. 3 to 12, and the postcards 13 and 14, and some admissions made by Pushpamayee. 16. During the hearing of this revision petition Mr. Murty for the opposite party made a suggestion to the effect that the case may be remanded to the lower court and that his client was now willing to go into the witness box. In my opinion this offer cannot be accepted. This case dragged on in the trial court from 3-5-1960 to 13-9-1962. Counsel for the opposite party examined his mother as D.W. 2 on 1-9-1962 and definitely stated that the defence did not like to cite any more witnesses. Ample opportunities were given to the opposite party no 1 to examine himself. The Petitioner is an indigent widow living practically on the charity of a sympathetic gentleman named Sri Rout at Bhubaneswar. To remand the case now to enable the opposite party to examine himself would mean unnecessary harassment and delay. A proceeding u/s 488 Code of Criminal Procedure is primarily meant to be a summary proceeding, and it is always open to the opposite party to get its effect removed by an appropriate suit in the Civil Court. I am therefore not inclined to remand the case as suggested by Mr. Murty. 17. As regards the second point, it was contended that as the opposite party is now a student in Srirampur College and is dependent entirely on his mother Pushpamayee no order of maintenance could be passed against him as he has no means to pay. It is true that an order u/s 488, Code of Criminal Procedure can be passed only if a person having sufficient means neglects to maintain his wife or child. Judicial decisions are unanimous that the expression 'means' occurring in Section 488 Code of Criminal Procedure does not signify only visible means such as real property or definite employment, and that if a man is healthy and able-bodied he must be held to possess the means to support his wife and children and he cannot be relieved of his obligation on the ground that he is a mere boy 19 years old and is unemployed-see 33 CriL.J. 625 and A.I.R 1944 Lah 492 (394). Again in 1937 CriL.J. 86 it was observed that the words "sufficient means" should not be confined to the actual pecuniary resources but should have reference to the earning capacity. The opposite party is now a major, though a student in Srirampur College, and should not be relieved of his liability to maintain his illegitimate son, who is now about 5 years of age. The Petitioner is destitute and she cannot obviously look after the child properly. Pushpamayee admitted that on the date of her deposition (1-9-1962) her son was studying in the Final Year Degree Course in the aforesaid College. By now he must nave completed his course and as he is a major he is certainly in a fit position to earn his livelihood. Hence the aforesaid decision would apply with full force. 18. As regards the quantum of maintenance, considering the age of the child (more than five years) and the abnormal rise in the cost of living in these days, I think a sum of Rs. 20/-(Twenty) per month is the minimum. The monthly maintenance at this rate should however be paid only from the date of this judgment and not from any earlier date. 19. For these reasons the order of the Lower court is set aside and the application of the Petitioner u/s 488 Code of Criminal Procedure is allowed to the extent of directing opposite party No. 1 to pay, every month, a sum of Rs. 20/- (Rupees twenty to the Petitioner for the maintenance of his illegitimate son with effect from today.