JUDGMENT Mithan Lal, J. - These two second appeals have been heard together because a common question of law is involved in both the cases. Second Appeal No. 3698 of 1960 has been filed by the plaintiff. He alleged that former Omkar Nath Singh sold the plot in question to him on 2nd December 1946 and since then the plaintiff has remained in possession and has constructed some tin shed and a pucca gher with the door towards west. The gher was said to be situate within the Municipal limit of Shamli in plot No. 3056. It was stated in the plaint that under Sec. 117-A of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the site of the gher which had vested in the State Government has been made to vest in the Municipal Board, Shamli. The Sub-Divisional Officer wrongly served a notice on the plaintiff under Rule 115-C of Z. A. and L. R. Rules on 14th May 1955 for re-moving the construction though the land should have been deemed to be settled with the plaintiff under Sec. 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act). On these allegations the plaintiff sought a relief for a declaration that he was the owner in possession of the Gher in dispute and the defendant had no right to get it demolished. 2. Both the defendants contested the suit by filing separate written statement. It was admitted to the Municipal Board that the land had vested in that body under Sec. 117-A of the Act. This was not denied to the State Government. The ground which was raised in the written statement was that the gher was not a building within the meaning of Sec. 9 of the Act and so its site could not be deemed to have been settled with the plaintiff and the plaintiff had no right to maintain the suit. 3. The trial court held that the plaintiff was the owner of the gher in dispute, that the constructions were old and that the plaintiff had a right to maintain the suit. The suit was accordingly decreed. 3. The trial court held that the plaintiff was the owner of the gher in dispute, that the constructions were old and that the plaintiff had a right to maintain the suit. The suit was accordingly decreed. The lower appellate court also came to the conclusion that the gher had been constructed in the year 1947 but there were no roofed construction inside the gher and so the gher could not be deemed to be a building within the meaning of Sec. 9 of the Act. On this finding, the decree of the trial court was reversed and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said finding, the plaintiff has come in appeal. 4. Second Appeal No. 1827 of 1960 had been filed by the defendant. The plaintiff brought a suit for possession over a gher and for recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits alleging that the defendant-appellant was a tenant from month to month at -/4/- annas per mensem as rent under a lease deed dated 19th July, 1957. A notice to quit was given but as the defendant continued in possession, the plaintiff claimed a decree for possession by ejectment of the defendant, for past rent and for mesne profits. The defence was that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and that the defendant became the owner of the gher on account of his possession on the date of vesting under Sec. 9 of the Act. It appears that in the trial court another argument was raised i.e. that the gher was not a building and so the site would be deemed to have vested in the State Government and the Gaon Samaj and consequently the plff. could not maintain the suit. The trial court accepting this argument, dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court held that the gher was a building within the meaning of Sec. 9 and so the suit was decreed. Aggrieved from that finding, the defendant has come in appeal. 5. The first appeal has been argued by Sri K. C. Agarwal on behalf of the appellant and his contention is that after the lower appellate court found that the gher was constructed by the plaintiff in 1947, the site should have been deemed to have been settled with the plaintiff as the gher constituted a building. 5. The first appeal has been argued by Sri K. C. Agarwal on behalf of the appellant and his contention is that after the lower appellate court found that the gher was constructed by the plaintiff in 1947, the site should have been deemed to have been settled with the plaintiff as the gher constituted a building. According to the argument of the learned counsel, any structure which is considered by an ordinary man to be a building and any structure which is a built one should be deemed to be a building. In support of this view, learned counsel has relied upon the case of the State of Bombay v. Sardar Venkat Rao Krishna Rao Gujar, Decided by the S.C. on 6th April 1962 in Civil Appeal No. 455 of 1959 reported in Blue Prints of Aug. 1962. He has also relied upon certain observations and first and third tests laid down by a Division Bench in the case of Newand Ram v. Gaon Samaj, 1961 A.L.J. 910. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that it is not necessary that all the three tests laid down by the Division Bench should apply before a structure is held to be a "building", and if that was the intention of the Division Bench, that view stands modified by the Supreme Court case aforesaid. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon my decision in Ram Diya v. Gram Samaj, S.A. No. 577 of 1958 decided on 13th Sept. 1962. The learned counsel for the respondent and Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, who represented the appellant in Second Appeal No. 1827 of 1960, have contended that in order a structure may amount to a "building", it is necessary that the structure must have four walls and a roof, and if the structure has no roof, it cannot be called a "building". Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, whose assistance to this Court is appreciated, has made a reference to several authorities interpreting the word "building" under Secs. 442 and 457, I. P. C., under the U.P. Municipalities Act and Sec. 60, C.P.C. and has contended that in all these cases what has been held to be a building was a roofed structure and not a mere enclosure without roofs. 442 and 457, I. P. C., under the U.P. Municipalities Act and Sec. 60, C.P.C. and has contended that in all these cases what has been held to be a building was a roofed structure and not a mere enclosure without roofs. The authorities of Kohmi v. Emperor, AIR 1914 Lahore 584 and Buta v. K. E., AIR 1924 Lahore 623 are on the interpretation of the word "building" used in Sec. 442, I. P. C. It has been observed that a mere enclosure of an open space by walls or fence or a mere court-yard would not constitute a building. The cases of Bala Prasad v. Muzammil Husain, AIR 1934 Allahabad 190 = 1934 A.L.J. 541 and Lalit Narain Dubey v. The State, 1957 A.L.J. 711 are both cases under the U.P. Municipalities Act. That Act defines the word "building" as well as the expression "part of a building" and so whatever meaning may have been assigned to the word "building" under the U.P. Municipalities Act the same cannot be assigned to the word "building" used in the Act where no definition is given. Learned counsel for the respondent made a reference to rule 141 of the U.P. Panchyat Raj Rules and contended that after the enforcement of the U.P. Panchavat Raj Act the administration in villages has become analogous to the municipal administration in cities and towns and so the word "building" should be assigned the same meaning as given to this expression under the U.P. Municipalities Act. I am unable to accept this contention because if that had been the intention of the legislature they would not have left the word `building' undefined in the Act and would have defined it in the same or similar language as used in the U.P. Municipalities Act. The learned count. also made a reference to the case of Bala Din v. Lakhan Singh, AIR 1927 Allahabad 214. That ease is based upon the interpretation of the word `building' of an agriculture e issued in Sec. 60(1) (c), C.P.C. That was also a case where the agriculturist judgment-debtor claimed exemption of the ruins of a house and it was held that such ruins could not be treated to be a "building" within the meaning of clause (c) of the said section. This case again affords no criterion for holding that a building within the meaning of Sec. 9 of the Act should be a roofed structure. The aforesaid authorities cannot be taken to lay down that wherever the word "building" has been used in any other enactment it should be given the same meaning as given in the aforesaid authorities. Each enactment has to be interpreted by the language used in a particular provision of law, and the words and phrases used in any section of any enactment have to be given such meaning as is consistent with the other provisions of the Act. These authorities, cited on behalf of the respondent in one case and on behalf of the appellant in the other, are of little help. 6. The question for consideration in both cases is whether a Gher bounded by walls and having no roofed structure inside, is a building within the meaning of Sec. 9 of the Act. That section, so far as it is relevant for the purposes of these cases, reads as follows :- "...all buildings situate within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other persons shall continue to belong to or to be held by such intermediary, tenant or person as the case may be and the site of the buildings shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and condition as may be prescribed." As stated earlier, the word "building" has not been defined anywhere in the Act. It has, therefore, to be given its ordinary meaning. In its ordinary meaning the word "building" means something which is built, but this meaning will be flexible depending upon the provisions of law and the context in which that word has been used in a particular law. In the case of State of Bombay the Supreme Court while quoting certain observations of Lord Esher and certain other observations made in another English case held that though according to the ordinary meaning the word "building" means something which has been built, yet that meaning would be modified if the provisions of law justify giving some other meaning. It was also observed that in the particular context "building", may be given its popular meaning. It was also observed that in the particular context "building", may be given its popular meaning. According to the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court the meaning of the Word "building" is flexible depending upon the provisions of law and the context in which that word has been used in a particular law. The same meaning cannot be given to this expression for purposes of different enactments. In the said Supreme Court case Sec. 5-A of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 came for interpretation. That section snakes a provision analogous to Sec. 9 of our Act. The relevant portion of Sec. 5(a) reads: "...all buildings . . . within the limits of a village site belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor or any other person shall continue to belong to or be held by such proprietor or other person, as the case may be and the land there of shall be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as it may determine?" In that case what was claimed to be a building were ottas and chabutras and the Supreme Court after making a reference to the case of Moir v. Williams, 1892 Q.B. 217 and two other English cases, which have been relied upon by our Division Bench in Newand Ram's case, 1961 A.L.J. 910 came to the conclusion that ottas and chabutras fell within the term "building" as used in Sec. 5(a) of the Act. In the Division Bench case of New and Ram three tests were laid down by this Court i.e. :- (1) Whether an ordinary man thinks that the structure was a building? (2) Has the relevant structure four walls and a roof? and (3) Can any one say that the structure was building? 7. That was a case in which the Division Bench was required to interpret the word 'building' in relation to a brick kiln and it was held that the brick kiln was not a building. The case of a Gher was not before the Division Bench and certain observations, if they are in any way inconsistent with the Supreme Court case of State of Bombay, shall stand modified to the extent of inconsistency. The case of a Gher was not before the Division Bench and certain observations, if they are in any way inconsistent with the Supreme Court case of State of Bombay, shall stand modified to the extent of inconsistency. If ottas and chabutras were considered such constructions as to constitute a `building' the Gher which is in the form of an enclosure would certainly be a building within the meaning of that word as used in Sec. 9 of the Act. This view was also taken by me in the case of Ram Diya v. Gaon Samaj, S.A. No. 577 of 1958 decided on 13th Sept. 1962 but at the time that case was decided, the Supreme Court case had not been reported and my attention was not drawn to the Division Bench case of Newand Ram 1961 A.L.J. 910, but I expressed the view that having regard to the structure of society in urban and rural areas, the same connotation cannot be placed upon the word "building". I further observed that what may not be a building in a city may be a building in a rural area because in a rural area such buildings, which are mere enclosures and which are necessary for agricultural purposes, are of common existence. Having regard to the living conditions in rural areas and also the purpose for which Sec. 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was enacted, a Gher must be deemed to be a building and its site must be deemed to have been settled with the owner or tenant or other person as the case may be. In this view of the matter, the Second Appeal No. 3698 of 1960 must succeed. 8. So far as the other appeal goes, there is one other factor in that case and it is that in the lease deed, which was executed between the parties, at the time the building was let out, to the defendant appellant, the building was described as "ek Manztl Makan maruf gher." That means at the time of the letting, the parties understood it to be a building. It did not lie in the mouth of the defendant to say that he did not take on rent any building but merely a vacant piece of land or structure which was not a building. That appeal must also fail. It did not lie in the mouth of the defendant to say that he did not take on rent any building but merely a vacant piece of land or structure which was not a building. That appeal must also fail. The learned civil Judge, who decided the appeal, rightly held that the Gher was a building and the defendant appellant being a mere tenant was liable to ejectment. 9. Second Appeal No. 3698 of 1960 is allowed with costs. The plaintiff's suit for a declaration that he was the owner in possession of the Gher in dispute is hereby decreed with costs throughout. The Municipal Board or the State Government has no right to demolish that Gher. Second Appeal No. 1827 of 1960 is dismissed with costs.