ORDER :- These 3 applications are filed respectively by T. Ibomcha Singh, Forester I. Tombi Singh, Deputy Ranger and L. Indrajit Singh, Ranger, who were in charge of the Sekmai Forest Range against the orders of dismissal passed against them by the Chief Commissioner of Manipur, which orders of dismissal were confirmed by the President of India. The prayers in the writ applications are for the issue of writs of mandamus directing the respondents, who are the Chief Commissioner of Manipur, the Union Territory of Manipur and the Union of India to cancel the said orders of dismissal and to forebear or refrain from giving effect to the said orders and to treat the petitioners to be in continuous service as if the orders of dismissal had never been passed against them. 2. The petitioners in the 3 petitions along with 4 other forest officials who were in charge of the said Sekmai Range were put under suspension on May, 1959 and charges were framed against them by the Chief Commissioner, Manipur of failure to discharge their responsibilities as public servants and for violation of Rule 3 of the Central Civil Service Conduct Rules, 1955. Mr. G.S.L. Joneja, Commissioner for Departmental Enquiries, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to hold a joint enquiry. I shall go into the details of the charges and of the enquiry later on. In the said enquiry, the Enquiry Officer found that the charge of failure to discharge their responsibilities as a public servant between the period from January 1st 1959 to 12-5-1959 against Indrajit Singh the Forest Ranger and between 1st January, 1959 and 20th May, 1959, against Ibomcha Singh and Tombi Singh, the Forester and Deputy Ranger have been proved against them. The Chief Commissioner issued show cause notices to them why they should not be dismissed from service and after their representations were received and perused, he passed the orders of dismissal against the three of them on 19-8-1960. All the 3 of them filed appeals to the Union Government. The Union Government consulted the Union Public Service Commission, about the appeals and the Union Public Service Commission gave their opinion that they agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and advised that the appeals may be rejected. Accordingly, by orders dated 31st July, 1962, their appeals were dismissed. The Union Government consulted the Union Public Service Commission, about the appeals and the Union Public Service Commission gave their opinion that they agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and advised that the appeals may be rejected. Accordingly, by orders dated 31st July, 1962, their appeals were dismissed. It is on the dismissal of the appeals that these writ applications were filed by the petitioners after first issuing notices to the Chief Commissioner. 3. In all the 3 writ applications, the Union Government have been made parties and the writs of mandamus have been prayed for against them also. The respondents took the preliminary plea that no writs can be issued against the Union Government by this Court and that they cannot be made parties. Thereupon, in their reply statement, the respective petitioners stated while reiterating that this Court has got jurisdiction to issue writs against the Union of India that the Union of India was made only a pro forma respondent, that the orders to be quashed were the orders of the Chief Commissioner of Manipur and that the relevant records are within the Union Territory of Manipur and the proceedings were also completed within the Union Territory of Manipur and hence writs of mandamus can be issued by this Court. There is no doubt that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue writs against the Union of India. I have held, this in my decision as Judicial Commissioner of Tripura in Sambhu Ratan Tewari v. Administrator and Chief Commr. of Tripura, AIR 1963 Tripura 1, after considering all the Supreme Court decisions on the point including the latest decision, namely, Khajoor Singh v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 532 . The Union of India has therefore to be struck out from all the 3 writs and it is accordingly so ordered. Thus, the writs will remain only against S the Chief Commissioner and the Union Territory of Manipur. 4. The Union of India has therefore to be struck out from all the 3 writs and it is accordingly so ordered. Thus, the writs will remain only against S the Chief Commissioner and the Union Territory of Manipur. 4. The learned Government Advocate took the next preliminary point that if the Union of India is not a party to the writs and no writs are to be issued against them, then the present writs are infructuous as the final orders of dismissal in these 3 cases have been passed by the Union of India in the appeals filed by the 3 petitioners, that no writs can be issued against the subordinate authorities, like the Chief Commissioner of Manipur and the Union Territory of Manipur, who are bound by the orders of the Union of India, that the effect of issuing of writs against them will be to put them in a dilemma as they are bound by the orders of the Union of India and cannot disobey them and that this Court cannot therefore direct that the orders of the Chief Commissioner, which have merged with the orders of the Union of India should be quashed when this Court cannot issue any such directions as far as the orders of the Union of India are concerned, or in other words, that this Court cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, that is, it cannot quash the orders of the subordinate authority when it has no jurisdiction to quash the orders of the superior authority by issuing a writ against it. 5. It was contended for the petitioners that this was not the correct position. 5. It was contended for the petitioners that this was not the correct position. They pointed out that the petitioners were dismissed by the orders of the Chief Commissioner, that the orders in appeal passed by the Union of India which merely rejected the appeals against the orders of the Chief Commissioner and did not modify or vary them in any manner have no special force, that the orders of the Chief Commissioner came into force immediately and did not have to await the orders in appeals, that where the appellate orders merely confirmed the orders of the subordinate authority, there was no question of any merger, that the writs are to be issued against the records and the records are all within the jurisdiction of this Court and that this Court had therefore jurisdiction to direct the Chief Commissioner, namely, the authority within the jurisdiction of this Court, by quashing the orders of dismissal and commanding him not to put the said orders, into effect. 6. There is divergent opinion in judicial pronouncements of the various High Courts on this point. But this Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court and what we have got to see is the view taken by the Supreme Court on this point. The learned Government Advocate has relied on certain observations in the Supreme Court decision Thangal Kunju v. Venkatachalam, (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 . That was a case where a writ was issued by the Travancore-Cochin High Court against M. Venkatachalam Potti, who was the authorised official appointed under the Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigating Commission) Act, by the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission and he had to hold certain enquiries into evasions of tax. The writ was sought for against him and also against the Indian Income-tax Investigation Commission, the latter of whom was outside the jurisdiction of the Travancore-Cochin High Court, against undertaking the enquiry. But the Travancore-Cochin High Court issued the writ against M. Venkatachalam Potti alone. Then, the matter went up in appeal to the Supreme Court and the objection raised was that as the authorised official was under the control of the Income-tax Investigation Commission, no writ could be issued against him as he was bound by the orders of the Commission, who cannot be bound down by any orders of the High Court. Then, the matter went up in appeal to the Supreme Court and the objection raised was that as the authorised official was under the control of the Income-tax Investigation Commission, no writ could be issued against him as he was bound by the orders of the Commission, who cannot be bound down by any orders of the High Court. Their Lordships repelled this argument and held that the authorised official though under the general control and supervision of the Commission performs his various functions assigned to him on his own initiative and in the exercise of his jurisdiction and that if he does anything in the discharge of his functions as authorised official which is not authorised by law or is violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner, he would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court. Their Lordships went further and said that it cannot be contended that as he was under the direction of the Commission, no writ can issue against him because the principal who directs the activities and not the agent would be liable for the same, as there can be no agency in the matter of the commission of a wrong and the wrong doer would certainly be liable to be dealt with as the party directly responsible for his wrongful action. In the course of the arguments, the attention of the Supreme Court was drawn to certain High Court decisions, namely, Azmat Ullah v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, U.P. Lucknow. (S) AIR 1955 All 435 ; Burhanpur National Textile Workers, Union Burhanpur v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, (S) AIR 1955 Nag 148 and Joginder Singh Waryam Singh v. Director, Rural Rehabilitation, Pepsu, AIR 1955 Pepsu 91, in all of which it was held that the order passed by the authority within the jurisdiction of the High Court concerned had merged in the order in appeal or revision of the superior authority, which was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Courts and hence it was held that a writ against the inferior authority within the territory could be of no avail and could give, him no relief as the order of the superior authority beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court would remain outstanding and operative against him. Really speaking, these decisions and the theory of merger upheld in those decisions were not relevant in the case before the Supreme Court, as in the case, the question of merger did not arise at all and what the Supreme Court stated was that there was no question of merger of any judicial order in the case before them and hence the said decisions did not have to be considered in the case before the Supreme Court. Hence their Lordships did not consider as they did not have to whether the theory of merger as applied in the said decisions was right or wrong, but merely stated that the question of merger did not arise in the case before them. There was no detailed discussion on the question of merger. But in passing their Lordships observed that as no writ could be issued against the outside authority and as the orders against the authority within the territory would, in view of the orders of the superior authority have been infructuous, the High Court concerned had, of necessity to dismiss the petition. The above observations were treated in certain subsequent decisions of various High Courts as binding on them and the theory of merger was applied in those decisions on the basis of the Supreme Court decision cited above. It is not necessary to deal with those various decisions of the High Courts in view of the later Supreme Court decisions State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1938 SC 86 and Sita Ram v. Municipal Board, Kanpur, AIR 1958 SC 1036 . 7. The decision, AIR 1958 SC 86 , arose out of certain Departmental Proceedings as in our present case and there the question of merger of the order of the subordinate authority with the order of the superior authority had to be directly decided by the Supreme Court. A certain Head constable was dismissed by the Superintendent of Police of Fatehpur on 20-4-1948. His appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police was dismissed on 7-6-1949 and his revision to the Inspector General of Police was dismissed on 22-4-1950, that is, after the Indian Constitution came into force. In the writ filed by his, it was argued before the High Court that the order of dismissal was passed by the Superintendent of Police before the Constitution came into force. In the writ filed by his, it was argued before the High Court that the order of dismissal was passed by the Superintendent of Police before the Constitution came into force. But the High Court rejected this plea as they held that the dismissal became final only on 22-4-1950, when the revision petition was dismissed by the Inspector General of Police and that as the said order was passed after the Constitution came into force, the High Court had jurisdiction to exercise its writ power. This was on the basis of the merger of the order of the Superintendent of Police in the final order in revision of the Inspector General. Then, the High Court proceeded to consider the merits of the case and held that the principles of natural justice were violated in the enquiry and hence the dismissal was illegal. This decision went in appeal to the Supreme Court. On the merits of the case, the 5 Judges of the Supreme Court who composed the Bench were unanimous that the Head constable was wrongly dismissed. But on the question of merger, 4 judges who composed the Bench held that the order of the Superintendent of Police did not merge with the order of the superior authority, the Inspector General of Police. It is better that I give the observations of the Supreme Court verbatim : " x x x x As we have already observed, an order of dismissal passed on a departmental enquiry by an officer in the department and on order passed by another officer next higher in rank dismissing an appeal therefrom and an order rejecting an application for revision by the head of the department can hardly be equated with any propriety with, decrees made in a civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure by the Court of first instance and the decree dismissing the appeal thereform by an appeal Court and the order dismissing the revision petition by a yet higher Court, as has been sought to be done by the High Court in this case, because the departmental tribunals of the first instance or on appeal or revision are not regular Courts manned by persons trained in law although they may have the trappings of the Courts of law. The danger of so doing is evident from what has happened in the very case now before us. The danger of so doing is evident from what has happened in the very case now before us. In the next place, while it is true that a decree of a Court of first instance may be said to merge in the decree passed on appeal therefrom or even in the order passed in revision, it does so only for certain purposes, namely, for the purposes of computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree as in Batuk Nath v. Mt. Munsi Dei, 41 Ind App 104 : (AIR 1914 PC 65) or for computing the period of limitation for an application for final decree in a mortgage suit as in Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singly 53 Ind App 197 : (AIR 1926 PC 93). But as pointed out by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Juscurn Boid v. Pirthichandlal, 46 Ind App 52 : ILR 46 Cal 670 at pp. 678 and 679 : (AIR 1918 PC 151 at pp. 152-153) whatever be the theory under other systems of law, under the Indian Law and Procedure an original decree is not suspended by the presentation of an appeal nor is its operation interrupted where the decree on appeal is merely one of dismissal. There is nothing in the Indian Law to warrant the suggestion that the decree or order of the Court or tribunal of the first instance becomes final only on the termination of all proceedings by way of appeal or revision. The filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified it remains effective. In that view in the matter the original order of dismissal passed on April 20, 1948 was not suspended by the presentation of appeal, by the respondent nor was its operation interrupted when the Deputy Inspector General of Police simply dismissed the appeal from that order or the Inspector General simply dismissed application for revision. The original order at dismissal, if there were no inherent infirmities in it, was operative on its own strength and it did not gain any greater efficacy from the subsequent orders of dismissal of the appeal or the revision except for the specific purposes hereinbefore mentioned. The original order at dismissal, if there were no inherent infirmities in it, was operative on its own strength and it did not gain any greater efficacy from the subsequent orders of dismissal of the appeal or the revision except for the specific purposes hereinbefore mentioned. That order of dismissal having been passed before the Constitution and rights having accrued to the appellant State and liabilities having attached to the respondent before the Constitution came into force, the subsequent conferment of jurisdiction and powers on the High Court cannot have no retrospective operation on such rights and liabilities. Even, if the order of dismissal of the respondent was a nullity on the ground that it was passed by disregarding the rules of natural justice, the High Court could not property be asked to exercise its newly acquired jurisdiction and powers under Article 226 to correct errors, irregularities or illegalities committed by the inferior departmental tribunal before the commencement of the Constitution, for then there will be no limit to its going backward and that will certainly amount to giving the provisions of Art. 226 a retroactive operation. X x x x x". I find that the earlier decision, namely, (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 was not cited before the Supreme Court in dealing with this theory of merger in the later case. But it will be seen that the question was considered in detail and it was definitely held that the orders passed in departmental enquiries cannot be equated with decrees made in a Civil Court by the Court of first instance and the decrees dismissing the appeal by an appellate Court and the orders dismissing the revision petition by a yet higher Court. The distinction has been pointed out by their Lordships by saying that departmental tribunals of the first instance or in appeal or revision are not regular Courts manned by persons trained in law, although they may have the trappings of the Courts of law. The distinction has been pointed out by their Lordships by saying that departmental tribunals of the first instance or in appeal or revision are not regular Courts manned by persons trained in law, although they may have the trappings of the Courts of law. They have further pointed out that even in the case of decrees of Courts, the question of merger arises only for certain limited purposes, namely, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation or for an application for final decree and they have further pointed out that there is nothing in the Indian Law to warrant the suggestion that the decree or order of the Court or tribunal of the first instance becomes final only on the termination of all proceedings by way of appeal or revision. They have also said that the filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified it remains effective and that the original order is not suspended nor its operation interrupted by the presentation of the appeal and further that the original order of dismissal if there were no inherent infirmities in it, was operative on its own strength and it did not gain any greater efficacy from the subsequent orders of dismissal of the appeal or revision. The said observations are very relevant on the question of merger. 8. This decision of the Supreme Court was considered in the later case, AIR 1958 SC 1036 , and the observations which I have given above have been quoted with approval. That was a case in which the question of limitation for filing a suit arose. If the date of the order of the first tribunal dismissing the plaintiff in that case was taken into account, the suit was barred by limitation. But if the date of the order in appeal was taken, the suit was in time and it was argued before the lordships that the order of the first tribunal merged with the order of the appellate tribunal and that the cause of action should be therefore treated as having arisen on the service of the order of the appellate tribunal. This argument was repelled by their Lordships by holding that the order of the first tribunal did not merge with the order of the appellate tribunal in the case of departmental enquiries and in coming to that conclusion their Lordships relied on the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 86 . 9. In the face of these two decisions, it is not possible to say that the theory of merger would apply in the case of orders in departmental enquiries. No doubt, where in an appeal, the order of the subordinate tribunal is varied or altered or modified the said order is no longer in force and the grievance of the party concerned would be against the appellate order and if the appellate authority is outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, the High Court cannot entertain a writ against the appellate authority. But where it is a case of dismissal of the appeal and confirmation of the order of the subordinate authority, the appellate order has no special efficacy about it and it is the original order of the subordinate authority, which is in force. In such a case if the subordinate authority which passed the original order is within the jurisdiction of the High Court, the High Court has certainly the power to issue directions to that authority. 10. Though the decision, (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 was not considered in the 2 later decisions, namely, AIR 1958 SC 86 and AIR 1958 SC 1036 , we have now to take it that the Supreme Court has held that the theory of merger does not apply in the case of orders in departmental enquiries and that the order of the subordinate tribunal where it is merely confirmed by the appellate tribunal does not merge with the latter. The observations in (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 , regarding merger were not necessary for the purpose of the decision in that case and their Lordships made the observations, because the 3 cases, (S) AIR 1955 All 435 , (S) AIR 1955 Nag 148 and (S) AIR 1955 Peps 91 were cited and their Lordships were only pointing out that the decisions in the said cases did not apply to the case before them. But in the 2 later Supreme Court decisions, the question of merger had to be considered. But in the 2 later Supreme Court decisions, the question of merger had to be considered. In AIR 1958 SC 86 , if the order of the subordinate tribunal had merged with the order of the appellate and revisional tribunals, the High Court would have had jurisdiction to deal with the matter as the order of the revisional tribunal was Certainly after the Constitution came into force and their Lordships held that because there was no merger and because the order of the subordinate tribunal was before the Constitution came into force Article 226 did not give the High Court jurisdiction. In AIR 1958 SC 1036 , if there was merger the suit in that case would not have been barred by limitation and because there was no merger, their Lordships held that the suit was barred by limitation. Thus, I have to take it that the plea of merger in the case of orders in departmental enquiries was found against in the said two cases and the said decisions are therefore binding on this Court. Certainly, the decision of a Supreme Court on a question which directly arose before it has got greater binding authority on High Courts than mere obiter dicta made in a case where the said question did not arise for decision and was not dealt with exhaustively for the said reason. I would therefore follow the principle laid down in the two Supreme Court decisions, mentioned above in preference to the decision (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 . 11. After the 2 decisions of the Supreme Court, this matter came up before various High Courts. This question arose in Altafur Rabman v. Collector Central Excise, Allahabad. AIR 1960 All 551 and the decision, AIR 1958 SC 86 , was considered in paragraph 18 therein. With great regret I must say that the decision of the Supreme Court was not considered in any detail and it was stated that so far as the said case was concerned that decision actually did not consider the question of jurisdiction in a writ petition, but that it was only a question of execution of decree which was before their Lordships and that it did not have any application in the case before the Allahabad High Court. It will be seen on a perusal of the Supreme Court decision that it was not a case of execution of a decree and that the question of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 was directly before the Supreme Court in that case and their Lordships held that since there was no merger of the subordinate tribunals orders with the order of the revisional tribunal, the High Court did not have jurisdiction. 12. In a later Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, reported in Abul Hasan v. Works Manager, Nortrern Rly., Lucknow, AIR 1961 All 338 the said decision of the S.C. namely, AIR 1958 SC 86 was considered and it was held that there was no merger in the case of orders in departmental proceedings. That case is directly in point as far as the present case before me is concerned. That was also a case of departmental enquiry. The Government servant was discharged in that case by the Works Manager of the Loco Workshop of the Northern Railway and his appeal to the Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer Delhi, which was a tribunal beyond the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court was dismissed. Thereupon, a writ application was filed in the Allahabad High Court, which was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court, on the ground that there was merger of the order of dismissal passed by the Works Manager with the order in appeal of the Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer Delhi and hence the High Court cannot interfere as the appellate tribunal was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court. The matter was then taken in appeal to a Bench of the High Court and in the appeals the High Court relying on the Supreme Court decision AIR 1958 SC 86 held that there was no merger and they held that it is the order of the Works Manager which was challenged and that was within the reach of the High Court, it will not matter that the Deputy Mechanical Engineer happened to be outside the territory of the High Court and that inability to issue a writ or other corrections to the authorities in Delhi, cannot render the remedy which the person was granted against the order for his removal made by the Works Manager ineffective. Thus, the latest Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court is against the previous ruling of the single Bench in AIR 1960 All 551 . I certainly agree with the Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court and it applies with full force to the case before me. 13. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in 2 decisions, namely, J. Harimal Oil Mills, Raipur v. Asst. Collector, Central Excise Jabalpur, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 148 and in Malkhansingh Nirpatsingh v. Inspector of Central Excise, P. I., Jabalpur, AIR 1962 Madh Pra 112, have applied the two decisions of the S.C. namely AIR 1958 SC 86 and AIR 1958 SC 1036 and has held that in the case of departmental matters where the departmental appeal was simply dismissed by a superior tribunal, which is outside the Courts jurisdiction without setting aside or modifying the original order, there was no merger and the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the order of the subordinate tribunal remained, unaffected. In the earlier of the two decisions, AIR 1961 Madh Pra 148, the matter was considered in great detail and all the 3 decisions of the Supreme Court cited above were dealt with and it was held that the two authoritative pronouncements, namely AIR 1958 SC 86 and AIR 1958 SC 1036 furnished a conclusive answer on the question of merger in the case of departmental appeals and revisions and that the original order would remain operative and would not gain any greater efficacy from the subsequent orders passed in appeal or revision and hence they refused to follow a previous Full Bench decision of the said High Court, namely, Surajmal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 103, where it had been held on the strength of the decision, (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 that there would be merger in the case of orders in departmental proceedings. 14. The Calcutta High Court has also taken the same view in the decision East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1960 Cal 1 (SB). That was a case which arose under the Sea Customs Act, where the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, had levied a penalty and the said order was confirmed by the Central Board of Revenue, whose Office was located outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1960 Cal 1 (SB). That was a case which arose under the Sea Customs Act, where the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, had levied a penalty and the said order was confirmed by the Central Board of Revenue, whose Office was located outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The question arose whether the High Court can issue a writ in such a case against the Collector of Customs. In the said decision, the decisions of the Supreme Court, (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 and AIR 1958 SC 86 were considered and it was held that the latter decision of the S.C. was a clear authority for the proposition that whether it be decrees of Courts or orders of other judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals, the original order passed by the Court of first instance or the inferior tribunal is not, for the purpose of Article 227 of the Constitution, merged in the order of the superior tribunal when that tribunal merely confirms the original order and dismisses the appeal or revision and it is the first order which is the operative order even after the appellate authority made its order. It was further held that after the appeal is dismissed and the original order is confirmed, the formal existence of an order by the appellate authority is no reason why the Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of the original order and further that there was no question of a writ issued to the authority within the territories being infructuous because of the continued existence of the order made by the appellate authority situated outside the jurisdiction, for the order of the appellate authority has merely a formal existence and the real order is that by the original authority. 15. Thus, the High Courts of Allahabad, Madhya Pradesh and Calcutta are all of the view that after the Supreme Court decisions in AIR 1958 SC 86 and AIR 1958 SC 1936, the observations made as obiter dicta in (S) AIR 1936 SC 246 are no longer binding and that the High Courts have to proceed on the basis that there is no merger of the original orders in departmental proceedings with the orders in the appeal or revision of appellate or revisional tribunals who are outside the jurisdiction of the High Court. 16. 16. Strong reliance however was placed by the learned Government Advocate on the recent decision of the Gujarat High Court in T.P. Kumaran v. Kothandaraman, Commr. of Income-tax, Gujarat. AIR 1963 Guj 6 . No doubt, that decision considered the two Supreme Court decisions, (S) AIR 1956 SC 246 as well as AIR 1958 SC 86 and it held that the former decision lays down the principle of merger and that it was an authority for the proposition that an original order of the inferior authority ceases to be an outstanding order once an appeal therefrom is disposed of whether the appellate Court confirms the original order or reverses it or modifies it. Then it proceeded to consider the later Supreme Court decision and attempted to distinguish it by stating that in the later case the Supreme Court was not dealing with the principle of merger, but was dealing only with the question as to when the order of dismissal passed by the first tribunal acquired finality. I have perused the decision, with very great care and it is with very great regret that I have to say that I cannot agree with the said decision. I have already pointed out that in the earlier derision of the Supreme Court, the question of merger did not, in fact, arise and that in the later decision the question directly arose, as, if there had been a merger in that case, the High Court as well as the Supreme Court, would have had jurisdiction to deal with the case and it was because they held that there was no merger that the Supreme Court with very great regret had to hold that the High Court had no jurisdiction in that case to issue a writ against the order of the first tribunal which had arisen before the Constitution came into force. It will be seen that the Gujarat High Court held that if the order of the tribunal of first instance was wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or was contrary to the rules of natural justice and accepted rules of procedure, the High Court may properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court in tribunal of first instance even if in appeal the tribunal confirmed the said order and for this purpose they have relied on the observation of the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 86 which had held that in such a case the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance would be loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. It is only in such cases that the High Court would usually interfere in writ proceedings with the orders of the inferior tribunal and errors in appreciation of evidence or in not following the rules of procedure will not be interfered with by the High Court. But the point is that in such cases if there is merger of the order of the tribunal of first instance which is within the jurisdiction of the High Court with the appellate order of a tribunal which is outside the jurisdiction the High Court cannot issue a writ against the order of the tribunal of first instance. If the principle of merger applies, whatever infirmity remained in the order of the tribunal of first instance would become merged with the order of the appellate tribunal and if the appellate tribunal is outside the jurisdiction of the High Court and the principle of merger applies, it cannot issue a writ of certiorari or mandamus against the order of the tribunal of first instance and the party aggrieved will have to apply only to High Court within whose territory the appellate tribunal is situated. It is only by holding that there is no merger as held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 86 that the High Court within whose territory the tribunal of first instance is situated can issue a writ in such cases against the said tribunal. It is only by holding that there is no merger as held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 86 that the High Court within whose territory the tribunal of first instance is situated can issue a writ in such cases against the said tribunal. With great respect therefore I must say that in upholding the right of the High Court to issue a writ against the order of the tribunal of the first instance, the Gujarat High Court has accepted that the principle of merger did not exist in such cases and that in attempting to distinguish the Supreme Court decision, AIR 1958 SC 86 it has tacitly accepted that the principle of merger did not exist. I cannot therefore accept the decision of the Gujarat High Court when it holds that there is such merger and I prefer to accept the decision of the Allahabad, Madhya Pradesh and Calcutta High Courts. Evidently, the Gujarat High Court felt bound by certain decisions of the Bombay High Court referred to in paragraphs 14 and 17 of its judgment, in which in the matter of decrees of Courts, the principle of merger of the lower Court decree in the decree of the appellate Court has been accepted by the Bombay High Court. But we are here not dealing with decrees of Courts and the Supreme Court has pointed out in AIR 1958 SC 86 , the distinction between decrees of Courts and orders in departmental proceedings and also held that even in the case of decrees of Court, the principle of merger would apply only for certain purposes like computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree or for an application for a final decree in a mortgage suit. I have referred to the later Supreme Court decision AIR 1958 SC 1036 , where it had been held even for the purpose of limitation for a suit against the orders in departmental enquiries the principle of merger will not apply. 17. Thus, I have to hold that the preliminary objection raised by the Government Advocate: cannot be upheld. 18. Now I shall proceed to consider the merits of .the application. But before doing so, it is necessary to say something about the manner in which the forests of Manipur were being worked before and after the integration of Manipur in the Indian Union. 18. Now I shall proceed to consider the merits of .the application. But before doing so, it is necessary to say something about the manner in which the forests of Manipur were being worked before and after the integration of Manipur in the Indian Union. During the time of the Maharajahs Rule there was no Forest Act or Forest Rules, but only instructions and orders which used to be issued in respect of these matters by what are known - as Darbai Resolutions which were got approved by the Maharajah. Thus, we have Annexures-A/3 and A/5, the copies of the Darbar Resolutions Nos. 11 and 11/R dated 13-5-1936 in which reference is made also to certain rules made in Darbar Resolution No. 3/R dated 13-5-1936 regulating Forest Toll Stations. In the Darbar Resolution No. 11 of 13-5-1936, it was decided that royalty should be collected at Forest Toll Stations in respect of wood brought from forests. We are only concerned with the Seimai Toll Station in that list as we are concerned with the Seimai Check Post in the present case. It states that in respect of wood extracted from Koubru hill and from the hills overlooking D.M.C. road and lying beyond Thengal Lok which is the southern boundary of the foreigners reserve and which are carried to and through the Sakmai area, royalty was to be collected from the Saikmai Toll Station. Then we have Darbar Resolution No. 8 dated 6-9-1944, fixing the rates of the royalty to be collected at the Toll Stations. It is in accordance with these Darbar Resolutions 3/R, 11, 11/R all of 1936 and Darbar Resolution No. 8 of 1944 that the Toll Station or Check Post at Sekmai was fixed at its present place and royalty on timber was being collected. After the integration of Manipur with the Indian Union in October, 1949, the same system appears to have continued. We have to remember that under the Manipur Administration Order, 1949 and Article 372 of the Constitution, those Darbar Resolutions which have the force of law in Manipur as having been issued by the then law making authority, namely, the Maharajah continued in force in the Territory of Manipur, until they were altered, repealed or amended by a competent authority and the Chief Commissioner of Manipur was invested with the powers of the Maharajah. Hence, after the integration the same system of Toll Stations or Check Posts and the rates, royalty and the method of collection of royalty for various classes of timber continued after the integration. 19. On 15-4-1950, the Indian Forest Act and various other enactments of the Indian Union which had been made applicable to the merged States by the Merged (States) Laws Act were extended to Manipur, which then became a Part "C" State, by the Part "C" States Laws Act, 1950. By Section 4 of the said Act. any law which immediately before the commencement of the said Act was in force in the State of Manipur and corresponds to an Act extended to that State by the said Act was to stand repealed. But there was an important proviso, namely, that the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any such law and further that anything done or any action taken including any appointment or delegation made notifications, orders, instructions or directions issued, rule, regulation, forms, by-laws, or scheme framed certificate, patent, form or licence granted or registration effected under any such law, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act extended to the State and shall continue in force accordingly unless and until supressed by anything any action taken under the said Act. 20. Now, if we turn to the Indian Forest Act, it will be seen that Section 2(2) provides for the appointment of Forest Officers by the State Government or by any Officer empowered by the State Government in this behalf, to carry out all or any of the purposes of the Act or to do anything required by the Act or by any rule made thereunder to be done by a Forest Officer. Section 30 Chapter VI permits the levy of a duty by the Central Government on all timber or other forest produce and further permits the levy of duty by a State Government made before the Act came into force to continue. Section 40 Chapter VI provides that nothing in the said Chapter shall be deemed to limit the amount, if any, chargeable as purchase money or royalty on any timber or other forest produce, although the same is levied on such timber or produce while in transit, in the Fame manner as duty is levied. Section 40 Chapter VI provides that nothing in the said Chapter shall be deemed to limit the amount, if any, chargeable as purchase money or royalty on any timber or other forest produce, although the same is levied on such timber or produce while in transit, in the Fame manner as duty is levied. Thus, Section 40 saves royalty charged on timber and other forest produce by the Manipur Administration. Then Sections 41 and 42 provide for the control of timber and other forest produce in transit and permits the framing of rules to regulate their transit by prescribing routes for their movement and prohibiting their movement without a pass and providing for the payment of fees, for the stoppage, examination and marking of timber or other forest produce in transit, in respect of which money is payable to the Government on account of the price thereof, or on account of royalty, fee, charge etc. due thereon, for the establishment and regulation of depots to which such timber or other forest produce shall be taken for examination, for the payment of money etc. and again for penalties for the contravention of such rules. Then, we have Section 76, which gives additional powers to make rules prescribing and limiting the powers and duties of forest Officers under the Act and generally to carry out the provisions of the Act. 21. It was admitted for the respondents that up till now after the extension of the Forest Act to this territory in 1950, no Rules have been framed under Sections 41, 42 and 76 of the said Act. By notification dated 24-8-1950, the Union of India, constituted the Chief Commissioner of Manipur to exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the State Government under the Indian Forest Act. One of the orders passed by the Chief Commissioner subsequently is regarding the royalty rates on forest produce with effect from 15-11-1950 by order dated 3-51-1950 vide Annexure-4. Evidently, Annexure-4, was in suppression of the rates fixed under Annexure-6 by the Darbar Resolution No. 8 of 1944. I have mentioned the above details in view of certain legal arguments questioning the very validity of the enquiries conducted against the 3 petitioners, which I shall advert to presently. 22. Now the petitioner Ibomcha Singh, was appointed as Forester in 1944, that is before the Forest Act was introduced. I have mentioned the above details in view of certain legal arguments questioning the very validity of the enquiries conducted against the 3 petitioners, which I shall advert to presently. 22. Now the petitioner Ibomcha Singh, was appointed as Forester in 1944, that is before the Forest Act was introduced. The petitioner Tombi Singh was appointed Deputy Ranger in 1953 and the petitioner Indrajit Singh as Range Officer also after the extension of the Forest Act to Manipur. The duties of these Forest Officers were referred to by the Chief Forest Officer in the course of his evidence in the departmental enquiry and they have been given in Annexure-A/7. It is pertinent to mention that the said duties were not laid down under any rules made under Sections 41, 42 and 76 of the Indian Forest Act. 23. Now I shall proceed to the case against the 3 petitioners. Briefly put, the case arose on the night of 20th May, 1959 when the Police seized a truck No. MNS.113 carrying 12 pieces of timber not covered by any valid transit pass. Thereafter, the Police searched the house of a Forest Guard one K. Chaoba Singh and seized 8 pieces of timber therefrom of which 7 pieces of timber were not covered by any transit pass and the 8th piece was found to have been under-assessed. Then, further investigation followed. The Police found out by checking the Import and Export Register of the Police Check Post at Kankpokpi about 29 miles from Imphal that between 1-1-1959 and 20-5-1959, out of 1,553 trucks loaded with forest produce which passed Kangpokpi Police Check Post, 746 trucks had passed the Sakmai Forest Check Post without any transit pass and without paying Government royalty when compared with the Transit Pass Book kept by the Officer in charge of the Sakmai Forest Check Post. It was after this that 7 Forest Officers including the 3 petitioners were suspended and charges were framed and a joint enquiry held against alt of them. Petitioner Indrajit Singh was the Ranger in charge of the Check Post from 1-1-1959 to 12-5-1959, while petitioner Ibomcha Singh and petitioner Tombi Singh were the Forester and Deputy Ranger respectively from 1-1-1959 to 20-5-1959 in the said Check Post. During the period of Indrajit Singh, only 706 trucks had passed the Check Post while the remaining 40 had passed between 12-5-1959 and 20-5-1959. During the period of Indrajit Singh, only 706 trucks had passed the Check Post while the remaining 40 had passed between 12-5-1959 and 20-5-1959. Two charges were framed against each of 3 petitioners. We are not concerned with charge 2 of corruption at the petitioners were exonerated of the said charge. We are concerned with charge 1. Charge 1, against all of them was that they failed to discharge their responsibilities as public servants during the period they were in charge of the said Post. Allegations in support of the charge were also given along with the charge. Regarding Indrajit Singh, the allegations were in respect of 706 trucks which passed Sakmai Forest Check Post between 1-1-1959 and 12-5-1959 without the collection of the royalty and without issue of transit passes and in respect of the 8 unauthorised pieces of timber, seized from the Forest Gaurd Chaoba Singh, which were alleged to have come through the Check Post without due transit passes and hence Indrajit Singh was said to have failed in discharging his responsibilities by failure to check the transit passed and the forest produce passing through the Check Post and to verify and exercise effective supervision over the work of his subordinate staff. Regarding petition Tombi Singh, the Deputy Ranger, trip allegations were in respect of 746 trucks which passed between 1-1-1959 and 20-5-1959 and regarding the 8 pieces of timber seized from Chaoba Singh and regarding the 12 pieces of timber seized from the truck MNS. 113 without the necessary transit passes and about the failure to mark on the transit passes Nos. 7, 14, 15 and 16 of the Transit Pass Book of 925, the numbers of the vehicles and be was said to have failed in discharging his responsibilities by his failure to check the transit passes and the forest produce and to issue the necessary transit passes and to collect the revenue due to Government in respect to them and also to verify and exercise effective supervision over the subordinate staff. The allegations against the petitioner Ibomcha Singh, the Forester were the same as against Tombi Singh, except that the failure to verify and exercise effective supervision over the subordinate staff was not mentioned against him. 24. The allegations against the petitioner Ibomcha Singh, the Forester were the same as against Tombi Singh, except that the failure to verify and exercise effective supervision over the subordinate staff was not mentioned against him. 24. The defence of the petitioners in the enquiry was that the Kangpokpi Police Check Post was 12 miles away, that when the trucks passed the Police Check Post, no information was given to the Forest Check Post with the result that the trucks evidently passed through the village diversion road at Sekmai thereby avoiding the Forest Check Post at Sekmai with the result that no transit passes were issued or no royalty collected for the forest produce in the trucks. The petitioners did not actually accept that those trucks had passed through the diversion road, but in order to explain the discrepancy between the Import and Export Register at Kangpogpi and the Transit Pass Book at Saikmai, they put forward the suggestion that the trucks may have passed. In actual fact, the said trucks appear to have used the said diversion road. In dealing with this defence, the Enquiry Officer in his report in paragraph 31.9 of his report said that the petitioner Indrajit Singh admitted that he knew the existence of the diversion road and that a truck could pass over it and bypass the forest check post and that the Ranger and the Deputy Ranger being supervising officers they had to ensure the interest of the Government and safeguard it in every manner and unless they were grossly negligent, the existence of the village road would have been one of the first things to come to their notice and for which appropriate action should have been taken. Particularly, if trucks with their head-lights passed at night through the diversion road, the petitioners who had their quarters near the Check Post cannot avoid noting that they were passing through the diversion road and they should have immediately shifted the Check Post south of the point where the diversion road met the main road. He, therefore, found that they were negligent in the performance of their duties and thereby failed to discharge their responsibilities. With this finding of the Enquiry Officer, the Union of India have agreed in appeal as we find from the opinion of the Union Public Service Commission in the documents marked as Annexure-C in Writ Petition Nos. He, therefore, found that they were negligent in the performance of their duties and thereby failed to discharge their responsibilities. With this finding of the Enquiry Officer, the Union of India have agreed in appeal as we find from the opinion of the Union Public Service Commission in the documents marked as Annexure-C in Writ Petition Nos. 14 and 16 and Annexure-F in Writ petition No. 15 of 1962. 5. With regard to the 8 pieces of timber seized from the Forest Guard - Chaoba Singh, the Enquiry Officer in paragraph 20 of his order held that 7 of these pieces passed through the Sekmai Check Post between January, 1959 and 21st April, 1959 without a transit pass and without paying royalty and there was no evidence of connivance of the petitioners except the statement of Chaoba Singh himself in the matter. He stated that the 3 petitioners were in charge of the Check Post at the time thereby indicating that they failed to discharge their responsibilities in respect of these 7 timbers. With this finding also the Union Public Service Commission agreed. 26. With regard to the 12 timbers, seized from Truck No. MNS. 113, the Enquiry Officer held that two Forest Officials, namely, Indramani Singh and Chaoba Singh, who were not parties to these writ petitions were the persons primarily responsible for allowing the trucks to pass and he found them guilty. But he also said that the petitioners Tombi Singh and Ibomcha Singh were also on duty on that night thereby indicating that they also failed in discharging their responsibilities in allowing the truck to pass. The Union Public Service Commission also agreed with this view of the Enquiry Officer and held that Tombi Singh and Ibomcha Singh have to be held guilty of negligence in not ensuring that the subordinate staff did their work properly. 27. Regarding the non-mentioning of the lorry numbers in 4 transit passes, the Enquiry Officer in paragraph 3 of his order had said that there was no departmental order stating that the vehicle numbers should be recorded in the transit passes and so he did not hold them guilty of failure of responsibilities in this respect. But the Union Public Service Commission stated in Annexure-C that the petitioner Ibomcha Singh showed a certain amount of negligence regarding this matter as all the transit passes excepting these four showed the vehicle numbers. But the Union Public Service Commission stated in Annexure-C that the petitioner Ibomcha Singh showed a certain amount of negligence regarding this matter as all the transit passes excepting these four showed the vehicle numbers. There is of course a slight mistake in this, because another Forest Officer Shri Indramani Singly was actually responsible for not mentioning the vehicle numbers on transit passes Nos. 14, 15 and 16, while Ibomcha Singh was responsible only for not mentioning it on transit pass No. 7. But with regard to Tombi Singh, the Union Public Service Commission agreed that the allegations cannot be held to have been proved against him. 28. Thus, as far as the petitioner Indrajit Singh is concerned, the failure of responsibility found proved against him was in respect of 706 trucks and the 7 pieces of timber seized from the Forest Guard Chaoba Singh. In the case of Tombi Singly it was in respect of 746 trucks and the 8 pieces of timber and there was also the additional instance in respect of the 12 timbers seized from MNS. 113. In the case of Ibomcha Singh, besides these three instances there was the fourth one relating to the transit passes. Though the Enquiry Officer did not find him guilty for not mentioning the truck number in transit pass No. 7, with which alone be was concerned, the Union Public Service Commission had wrongly held him guilty of negligence in respect of the 4 transit passes 7, 14, 15 and 16. 29. It is on these findings that the petitioners were dismissed from service by the Chief Commissioner with whose order the Union of India agreed. 30. Now the contention of the petitioners is that no reasonable opportunity was given to them to defend and that the principles of natural justice have been violated in the enquiry. In support of this it was stated that the charges framed against them were not specific, but were vague and secondly that though they were not found guilty under the charge framed against them namely of failure of responsibility to issue transit passes and collect royalty, they were found guilty of a new charge, namely, neglect of duty in allowing the trucks to pass along the diversion road which charge they had no opportunity to meet. Hence it was argued that the findings on the new charge given by the Enquiry Officer went arrived at without giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to meet the same and hence their dismissals passed on the findings on the said charge should not be allowed to stand. It was further argued that this was a very complicated case where the petitioners should have been allowed to appear through counsel, that their applications to engage counsel were most unreasonably rejected and that this was against the principles of natural justice and it vitiated the entire enquiry. Certain further legal questions were also raised which I shall deal with after disposing of the above points relating to the enquiry. 31. Before I deal with the said points, it is necessary for me to refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court which deal with the powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, The first of these decisions is Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, (S) AIR 1955 SC 233 . In paragraph 21 of the decision, it is laid down that writ of certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction and when an inferior Court acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it or fails, exercise it and secondly when the Court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction and when it decides without an opportunity to the parties to be heard or violates the principles of natural justice. It was further held that the Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction and cannot therefore review the findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal even if they be erroneous and that this is based on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right and that a superior Court cannot therefore re-hear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari. It was further held that a writ of certiorari can be issued to correct an error of law but that it should be an error manifest on the face of the record and that the test for this was that the error must be self-evident and should not require an examination or argument to establish it and that since an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident may not be considered so by another, it must be felt to be determined judicially on the facts of each case whether there was such an error which would call for interference. 32. The other decision of the Supreme Court on this point is Nagendra Nath v. Commr. of Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 398 . In that decision if was laid down that the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened should be decided not under any pre-conceived notions, but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions, and where no such rules which could be said to have been contravened by a tribunal are brought to the notice of the Court it is no ground for interference either under Articles 226 or 227 simply because the tribunal had viewed the matter in a light which is not acceptable to the Court. With regard to error of law apparent on the face of the record their Lordships said that it is not every error of law or fact, which can be corrected by a superior court, and that the writ of certiorari was not meant to take the place of an appeal where the statute does not confer a right of appeal that mere formal or technical errors even though of law will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction, that the errors cannot be said to be errors of law apparent on the face of the record if they are merely errors in appreciation of documentary evidence or affidavits, errors in drawing inferences or omission to draw inference or in other words errors, which a Court sitting as a Court of appeal only, could have examined and if necessary corrected. 33. Keeping these principles in view, we have to see whether the principles of natural justice have been violated. 33. Keeping these principles in view, we have to see whether the principles of natural justice have been violated. With regard to the first contention that the charge is vague and not specific, I do not find it possible to accept it. If the charge had merely stood, namely of failure of responsibilities as a public servant without the allegations in support of it, it may be said to have been vague. But the allegations in support of the charge which were also supplied with the charge gave specific instances, in the case of Indrajit Singh two instances, while in the case of Tombi Singh and Ibomcha Singh, 4 instances of such failure to discharge their responsibilities that is to check up the transit passes and the forest produce passing through the Check Post and failure to issue the necessary transit passes and to collect revenue due to Government and in the case of Indrajit Singh and Tombi Singh, who had the duty to supervise, of failure to verify and effective supervise over the work of the subordinate staff. Thus, all the petitioners knew the full details of the charge which they had to meet. 34. The next, contention, namely, that they were found guilty of a charge different from that which was framed against them will not also stand scrutiny. What was pointed out was that though the charge against them was that they allowed the trucks to pass through the Check Post without, collection of royalty and without the issue of transit passes and failed to check the transit passes to verify and exercise effective supervision, what they were found guilty of was a new charge, namely, of negligence, of duty in allowing the trucks to pass through a diversion road. Thus, they pointed out that the charge against them that they allowed the trucks to pass through the Check Post was not found proved. They were found guilty of a new charge, namely of allowing the tracks to go through the diversion road, which charge they did not have a proper opportunity to meet. But it has to be mentioned here that this plea of a diversion road wag set up by the petitioners themselves in the course of the enquiry and the Enquiry Officer had to see whether this defence will absolve them from the charge. But it has to be mentioned here that this plea of a diversion road wag set up by the petitioners themselves in the course of the enquiry and the Enquiry Officer had to see whether this defence will absolve them from the charge. The petitioners case was that they did not know of a diversion road until the enquiry started and that from the fact that so many trucks have passed the Check Post, without collection of royalty and issue of transit passes they had to conclude that the trucks used the diversion road. The Enquiry Officer had to see whether this defence was true and on the, evidence adduced before him he came to the conclusion that all the petitioners knew of the existence of the diversion road and knowingly they were allowing the trucks to pass through the diversion road and it is this which he held to be their neglect of duty, as it was incumbent on them to prevent the escape of these trucks without obtaining the necessary passes and paying of royalty and hence he found that they were guilty of neglect if duty and thereby of failure to discharge their responsibility. It cannot therefore be said that the petitioners did not have any opportunity to prove that there was no failure of responsibility on their part or that they were found guilty of a different charge. After all, neglect of duty cannot be said to be a charge different from failure of responsibility. The diversion road was visible from the Check Post and the defence that the trucks passed at night through the diversion read only meant that the petitioners failed in their responsibilities to prevent the trucks from passing through the diversion road thereby avoiding the payment of royalty and the taking of transit passes. Hence, I cannot say that there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice or that the petitioners were not given any reasonable opportunity to meet the charge, it is not for this Court to assess the sufficiency of the evidence. If, is enough to say that there was evidence before the Enquiry Officer in this respect and that the finding was based on evidence and not arrived at without any evidence whatsoever. 35. If, is enough to say that there was evidence before the Enquiry Officer in this respect and that the finding was based on evidence and not arrived at without any evidence whatsoever. 35. The next contention that this was a very complicated case in which the aid of course should not have been denied to the petitioners, was sought to be supported by relying on various decisions which shall refer to presently. It was also pointed out from paragraph 17 of the report of the enquiry officer that most of the Officers under enquiry were neither very familiar with English or Hindi and that the services of Sri S. Sarat Singh S.D.C., Manipur Administration had to be obtained for assistance in translating the proceedings in Manipuri and in reading over and explaining to the witnesses the depositions in Manipuri wherever necessary. It was also pointed out that the Enquiry Officer himself did not know Manipuri. From all this, it was pointed out that in a case like this where lots of documents were also involved and there was a joint enquiry the help of counsel should have been given to the petitioners and should not have been denied. In that connection, I may refer to Rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Services (C.C. and A.) Rules, 1957, which states that the disciplinary at thority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the Inquiring authority and that the Government servant may present his case with the assistance of any other Government servant approved by the disciplinary authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the person nominated by the disciplinary authority as aforesaid is a legal practitioner or unless the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. It has to be mentioned here that the case for the prosecution was conducted by Sri B.C. Battacharjee, Assistant Secretary, Manipur Administration, who was not a legal practitioner. The petitioners cannot, therefore as of right claim to be represented by a legal practitioner. It has to be mentioned here that the case for the prosecution was conducted by Sri B.C. Battacharjee, Assistant Secretary, Manipur Administration, who was not a legal practitioner. The petitioners cannot, therefore as of right claim to be represented by a legal practitioner. It was a matter in the discretion of the disciplinary authority and if the disciplinary authority exercised its discretion against allowing a legal practitioner, this Court, normally will not hold that the entire enquiry was vitiated by this alone, unless it was proved that for want of a legal practitioner to help in the defence, the petitioners were prevented from defending themselves properly. The enquiry report does not show this at all. The petitioners could have asked for a Government servant to assist them in their defence which they did not do. Instead, they themselves cross-examined the witnesses and it is not contended that they were not given full opportunity to cross-examine. I may also refer to paragraph 17,5 of the report of the Enquiry Officer in which it is stated that at the close of the enquiry, all the officers under enquiry stated that they had no handicap in presenting their cases at the enquiry. It was not challenged that this statement of the Enquiry Officer was wrong. One fails to see how the petitioners could now make a grievance out of this. 36. After all the question whether the refusal to allow a lawyer was denial of adequate opportunity should depend on the facts and circumstances of f.fl.ch case and the decisions of Courts on this matter which are based on the particular circumstances in each case will not be very useful. This was recognised in the decision relied on by the petitioners, namely, Nripendra Nath v. Chief Secy. Govt. of West Bengal, AIR 1961 Cal I (SB). In paragraph 54 therein it was held that in the particular circumstances of that case where as many as 30 P.Ws., 13 D.Ws. and 2 Court witnesses were examined and a number of documents exhibited by the tribunal, the refusal to allow a lawyer even to take notes was denial of opportunity. Even in that case, the dissenting judgment of Bose, J. did not agree that the Government servant in that case who was an experienced Judicial Officer was deprived of adequate opportunity to defend himself because a lawyers assistance was not given. Even in that case, the dissenting judgment of Bose, J. did not agree that the Government servant in that case who was an experienced Judicial Officer was deprived of adequate opportunity to defend himself because a lawyers assistance was not given. The other decisions, namely, Dr. Subba Rao v. State of Hyderabad, (S) AIR 1957 Andh Pra 414, Ramesh Chandra v. R.D. Verma, AIR 1958 All 532 and Nitya Ranjan v. The State, AIR 1962 Orissa 78, all dealt with cases where the denial of the aid of a lawyer in those particular cases wag considered denial of adequate opportunity and they need not be dealt with at length, as I have shown that every opportunity was given in the case before me to the petitioners to defend themselves and it was not a case of great complexity in which the petitioners could not adequately defend themselves without the help of a lawyer. 37. It was next pointed out that there were certain legal points involved in the enquiry which would go against the very root of the jurisdiction to hold the enquiry, which the petitioners not being aided by lawyers could not raise before the Enquiry Officer and that therefore the enquiry was vitiated because the petitioners were deprived of the opportunity to raise the legal questions before the Enquiry Officer or before the appellate tribunal. I now proceed to those legal questions. All the facts necessary for the appreciation of the legal questions have been mentioned by me earlier. I now proceed to those legal questions. All the facts necessary for the appreciation of the legal questions have been mentioned by me earlier. What was argued was that when the Indian Forest Act came into force in April, 1950, the Darbar Resolutions by which the royalty was charged and the forest Check Posts were established got repealed by Section 4 of the Part "C" States (Laws) Act, 1950 that as Section 39 of the Indian Forest Act had come into force, no royalty can be charged by the Manipur Administration on timber and other forest produce and further that as no rules were framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the said Act, regulating the transit of timber and other forest produce and making breach of the rules penal, the Manipur Administration had no authority to have Check Posts or to direct the issue of transit passes or to collect royalty and further that as no rules were framed prescribing and limiting the powers and duties of the Forest Officers under the Act, the Chief Forest Officer, had no authority to fix the said powers, duties and responsibilities of the petitioners and that therefore no enquiry can be held against them for failure to discharge these responsibilities. It was further argued that in the absence of any Rules framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, the petitioners had really no authority to stop any vehicles on the public road as it would amount to wrongful restraint on their part within the meaning of Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code, that in this view they cannot also stop any vehicles using the diversion road and avoiding the payment of royalty and taking of transit passes. It was further pointed out that an Executive Order imposing a royalty or duty would go against Article 265 of the Constitution and reliance was placed on State of Kerala v. P.T. Joseph, AIR 1958 SC 296 . Neither collection of royalty nor the issue of transit passes were based on any law or rates framed under the Indian Forest Act and further that the duties and responsibilities which the petitioners were said to be bound to follow were again not under rules framed under Section 76 of the Indian Forest Act. Neither collection of royalty nor the issue of transit passes were based on any law or rates framed under the Indian Forest Act and further that the duties and responsibilities which the petitioners were said to be bound to follow were again not under rules framed under Section 76 of the Indian Forest Act. It was thus stated that this was an error apparent on the face of the record which vitiated the whole enquiry and which this Court should therefore correct by quashing the orders of dismissal passed on the strength of such an enquiry. 38. The learned Government Advocate raised a preliminary point that this matter which went to the very root of the jurisdiction to hold the enquiry should have been raised before the tribunal and should not be allowed to be raised for the first time in the writ proceedings and he relied upon certain decisions, namely, Punjab and Sind Bank Ltd. v. Kameshwar Dayal, AIR 1958 Punj 14, Jasoda Jiban Shaha (Pr.) Ltd. v. S.K. Chatterjjee, AIR 1961 Cal 105 and Somayajulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1961 Andh Pra 528. But I these cases cannot apply here as in those cases the persons were represented before the respective tribunals by counsel who could be expected to raise the legal points before the tribunal. But in our present case such a question of law which can only be thought of by persons trained and experienced in law, cannot be expected to be urged before the tribunal by the petitioners without the help of counsel and even if raised, the Enquiry Officer who was not a person experienced or trained in law cannot be expected to meet it. Hence, I have permitted the question to be raised and argued before me. 39. Before I deal with this matter. I must really express any surprise that, even though the Indian Forest Act was applied to Manipur as early as April, 1950 and even though more than 90 percent of the area of the Manipur Union Territory is forest land, the valley area being only about 700 square miles and the forest area being over 7000 square miles, the Manipur Administration has not till now framed any Rules under the Indian Forest Act. This is not so in the Union territory of Tripura even though the forest area in Tripura is far less than in Manipur. This is not so in the Union territory of Tripura even though the forest area in Tripura is far less than in Manipur. This is a serious omission which the authorities concerned would do well to remedy and the sooner they do it the better it will be. 40. The question now is whether the absence of any rules under the Indian Forest Act would make the imposition and collection of royalty ? the fixing of check posts and the issue of transit passes etc., altogether illegal and whether the enquiry against the petitioners for failure to issue transit passes and to collect royalty at the check posts would thereby be vitiated. As I said earlier, royalties on timber and other forest produce were fixed by Darbar Resolution No. 3 in 1944 Annexure-A/6 and they were subsequently revised by the Chief Commissioner under Annexure-A/4 in November, 1950, after he was invested with the powers of a State Government under the Indian Forest Act in August, 1950. The Check Post or Toll Station at Sakmai was established by the Manipur Darbar under Annexures-A/3 and A/5 dated 13-5-1956 and it was directed that the royalty should be collected by each Toll Station on wood extracted from and brought from particular areas. There has been no fresh establishment of Check Posts after the Indian Forest Act came into force by framing rules under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act. Thus, we have to take it that the collection of royalty is still being enforced under Annexures-A/4 and A/6 and the establishment of the Check Post at Sakmai is on the basis of Annexures-A/3 and A/6. The duties and responsibilities of Forest Officers are not fixed under any rules framed under Forest Act but as per Annexure-A/7, issued by the Chief Forest Officer. Thus, if Annexures-A/3 to A/7 are still valid, it will mean that the enquiry held against the petitioners is a valid enquiry. If it is held that they are not valid, the question will then arise whether the enquiry on the basis of which the petitioners were dismissed has to be held by this Court to be without jurisdiction. 41. I shall take up the question of royalty first. As I stated at the beginning, Section 39 of does not deal with the imposition of royalty. 41. I shall take up the question of royalty first. As I stated at the beginning, Section 39 of does not deal with the imposition of royalty. Sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 39 saved the duties imposed on timber and other forest produce by the State Government before the Indian Forest Act came into force. We are however not concerned with the imposition of duties in the present case. Royalty is dealt with under Section 40 of the Indian Forest Act. Royalty is not a duty. It is, in fact, the value of the timber extracted from Government forest and may be treated as purchase money, which is quite different from duty. If it is duty, then it may be said that Article 26 of the Constitution would affect it. But Section 40 states that nothing in Chapter VI of the Indian Forest Act shall be deemed to limit the amount, if any, chargeable as purchase money or royalty on any timber or forest produce, although the same is levied on such timber or produce while in transit, in the same manner as duty is levied. In our case, the timber or other forest produce are brought from Government forest. Thus, the royalty prescribed under Annexures-A/6 and A/4 is the value of the timber assessed by the Government to be levied on purchasers of such timber which is directed to be collected at the Toll Station or Check Post at Sekmai, because all the timber and other produce extracted in that area have to pass through the Sakmai Check Post in the course of transit. In the face of Section 40 and in the face of the notification by the Union of India, constituting the Chief Commissioner a State Government under the Indian Forest Act, it is permissible for the Chief Commissioner to issue the order Annexure-A/4 fixing such royalty from time to time. Thus, it cannot be said that Annexure-A/4, or any subsequent orders passed by the Chief Commissioner fixing the royalty would be affected by Section 39 of the Indian Forest Act which deals only with the duty leviable. Thus, the collection of royalty cannot be stated to be invalid because it is done on the orders of the Chief Commissioner as he is the valid authority to fix the royalty from tune to time. 42. Thus, the collection of royalty cannot be stated to be invalid because it is done on the orders of the Chief Commissioner as he is the valid authority to fix the royalty from tune to time. 42. The next question is about the fixing of the Check Post at Sakmai and the collection of royalty and the issue of transit passes at the Check Post. Now Annexures-A/3 and A/5, the Manipur Darbar Resolutions which fixed the Toll Station at Sakmai would amount to a law and the said law was in force when Manipur became an Union Territory in October, 1949. The Manipur Administration Order, 1949 provided by Section 5 that all laws in force in Manipur or any part thereof immediately before the commencement of this order shall continue in force until repealed or amended by a competent legislature or authority and that all powers exercisable under the said laws by His Highness the Maharajah or the Government of the State shall be exercisable by the Chief Commissioner. Section 6 further provided that all taxes, duties cesses or fees which immediately before the commencement of the order, were being lawfully levied in Manipur or any part thereof shall continue to be levied and applied to the same purposes, until other provision is made by a competent legislature or authority. Section 6 would thus save the royalty charged the Forest Act deals with the powers to impose under Annexure-A/6, before the Constitution came duties on timber and other forest produce and it into force. The establishment of the Check Post at Sakmai under Annexures-A/3 and A/6 would also be saved by Section 5 of the Administration Order in any case, until the Constitution came into force. I may also refer here to Section 4(2) of the Administration Order which says that all Judges, Magistrates and other Officers who immediately before the commencement of this Order, are exercising lawful functions in Manipur or any part thereof shall, until other provision is made by the Chief Commissioner, continue to exercise their respective functions in the same manner and to the same extent as they were doing before the commencement of this order. This will in any case apply to the petitioner Ibomcha Singh who was appointed as forester before the integration of Manipur. 43. Now we shall see the position after the Constitution came into force on 26-1-1950. This will in any case apply to the petitioner Ibomcha Singh who was appointed as forester before the integration of Manipur. 43. Now we shall see the position after the Constitution came into force on 26-1-1950. Article 372 of the Constitution provides that all the laws in force in the Territory of India, immediately before the Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered, repealed or amended by competent legislature or other competent authority. Thus, Article 372 would permit the continuance in force of the Annexures-A/3, A/5 and A/6 and also of the Manipur Administration Order, 1949. Thus, the collection of royalty, and the fixing of Toll Stations, under Annexures-A/3, A/5 and A/6 and the exercising of their respective functions by the Officers as provided by the Manipur Administration Order continued in force after the Constitution came into force on 26-1-1050. 44. Then the Part "C" State Laws Act, 1950, extended the Indian Forest Act, 1927 to Manipur on 15-4-1960. Section 4 of the Part "C" States Laws Act, repealed any law which immediately before the commencement of the Act was in force in the State of Manipur which corresponded to the Indian Forest Act; which was extended by the andaid Act to Manipur. The question will therefore a rife whether Annexures-A/3, A/5 and A/6 which relate to the fixing of the Toll Stations and the imposition of royalty which are subjects dealt with the Indian forest Act would stand repealed. If they stand repealed, then no further action can be taken by the Manipur Administration on the strength of Annexures-A/3, A/5 and A/6. This would have been the situation, but for the important proviso to Section 4 which provides that any appointment, notification, order, instruction or direction, rule, regulation, form by law or scheme etc., under the repealed law shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of the Indian Forest Act unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under the Indian Forest Act. But for this proviso the position would have been different. But under this proviso, the imposition of royalty by the Manipur State Darbar under Annexure-A/6 has to be treated as royalty permitted to be collected under Section 40 of the Indian Forest Act. But for this proviso the position would have been different. But under this proviso, the imposition of royalty by the Manipur State Darbar under Annexure-A/6 has to be treated as royalty permitted to be collected under Section 40 of the Indian Forest Act. Similarly, Annexures-A/3 and A/5 which provide, for the fixing of Toll Stations will have to be treated as a rule issued under Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act. Thus, this proviso saves Annexures-A/3, A/5 and A/6. The collection of royalty and the fixing of the Toll Stations for the purpose under Annexures-A/3, A/,6 and A/6, can therefore be validly continued until superseded by anything done or action taken under the Indian Forest Act. 45. Thus, the petitioner Ibomcha Singh who was already a Forest Officer before the Indian Forest Act came into force continued to be a Forest Officer under the Act. As for petitioners Indrajit Singh and Tombi Singh, who were appointed after the Indian Forest Act, came into force, we have to take it that they were appointed as Officers under the Indian Forest Act. Their orders of appointment have not been produced by them and so we have to presume that they were appointed as Forest Officers under the Act. If we turn to Indian Forest Act, we find that under Section 73, all Forest Officers shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, all the petitioners are public servants. Section 74 of the Act, says that no suit shall be against any public servant for anything done by him in good faith under the Act. I have already referred to Annexure-A/4, by which the Chief Commissioner by virtue of his powers as State Government under the notification of the Government: of India, issued in August, 1950, fixed the rates of royalty to be collected for various type of timber. Annexure-A/4, must be deemed to have been validly issued under Section 40 of the Indian Forest Act. Section 32 of the Indian Forest Act. provides that all money payable to the Government under the Act, on account of the price of any forest produce may, if not paid when due, be recovered under the law for the time being in force, as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Section 82 thus permits the collection of royalty on timber and other forest produce. provides that all money payable to the Government under the Act, on account of the price of any forest produce may, if not paid when due, be recovered under the law for the time being in force, as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Section 82 thus permits the collection of royalty on timber and other forest produce. Section 83 of the Act, provides that when any such money is payable to the in respect of any forest produce, the amount thereof shall be deemed to be a first charge on such produce, and such produce may be taken possession of by a Forest Officer until such amount has been paid. 46. Sections 82 and 83 as well as Annexures-A/3 to A/6, are thus a complete answer to the arguments of the petitioners that as no rule has been framed under Section 41 of the Forest Act they would be guilty under Section 341 of the I.P.C. for wrongful restraint if they stopped the trucks carrying timber and other forest produce on the road. They will show that even without any rules under Section 1 of the Indian Forest Act, collection of royalty at the Toll Stations Of Check Posts is permitted and that the Forest Officers can take possession of the forest produce for realising the money due to the. Government. There is no doubt that royalty has to be paid for the timber and other forest produce. The Chief Post or Toll Station is provided for the collection of the same and Section 83 permits the Forest Officers to take possession of the timber and ether forest produce for realisation of the money. This duty has to be performed by the Forest Officer irrespective of any Rules under Section 41. The issue of the transit pass is closely connected with the collection of the royalty. After all, transit pass is issued by the Forest Officer on the collection, of the royalty to show to other forest office who may subsequently stop the timber in transit that Government dues have been collected. Thus, even without any rule framed under Section 41, issue of transit passes which is closely connected with the collection of royalty is a matter of necessity. Annexure-A/y shows the nature of the duties of the Forest Officers prescribed by the Chief Forest Officer. Thus, even without any rule framed under Section 41, issue of transit passes which is closely connected with the collection of royalty is a matter of necessity. Annexure-A/y shows the nature of the duties of the Forest Officers prescribed by the Chief Forest Officer. As the highest Forest official under the Indian Forest Act, he has certainly got the authority to prescribe the duties to his sub-ordinates for the purpose of the Indian Forest Act. We need not for the present get into the question whether all the duties prescribed therein could be enforced in the absence of rules under Sections 41,l 43 and 76 of the Indian Forest Act. We are in this case concerned with the duties imposed for the realisation of Government revenue and for the issue of transit passes and for the checking of the transit passes. The said duties can be prescribed by the Chief Forest Officer in the face of Annexures-A/3 to A/6 and even in the absence of rules under Sections 41, 42 and 76 of the Act. After all, Section 76 only says that the Government may make rules to prescribe and limit the powers and duties of a Forest Officer, cannot issue orders to his subordinates prescribing the duties for the collection of Government dues. All such orders will be valid orders without the framing of any rules under the Indian Forest Act. Even, without framing of any rules the various Sections of Indian Forest Act give powers to the Forest Officers including the powers under Sections 82 and 83 of taking possession of timber and forest produce for the realisation of Government dues. Thus, the petitioners cannot be heard to say that the duties given to them will amount to an offence under Section 341 of the I.P.C. and that no enquiry could be held against them for failure to discharge their duties. The Manipur Administration had jurisdiction to hold the enquiry. 47. The petitioners have been performing the duties entrusted to them by the Chief Forest Officer all through. I cannot understand their raising an argument that they are not bound to perform those duties. This is like saying that they are public servants under the Indian Forest Act and entitled to the emoluments as such public servants, but that they are not bound to perform the duties entrusted to them as such public servants. I cannot understand their raising an argument that they are not bound to perform those duties. This is like saying that they are public servants under the Indian Forest Act and entitled to the emoluments as such public servants, but that they are not bound to perform the duties entrusted to them as such public servants. Of course, I understand that the argument advanced was a legal argument and I have not the legal argument and pointed out that the duties given to them are legitimate duties. I have also shown that all reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioners to defend themselves and that the enquiry is not vitiated. This Court is not concerned with the punishment meted out to them as a result of the enquiry. It would appear, however, that when the charge of corruption was not proved against them and when the charge of neglect of duty was not connected in any way with the charge of corruption as it was originally attempted to be made out in the enquiry, the, punishment of dismissal is too harsh. But that is a matter for the Administration to decide. 48. In View of my above findings, these Writ Applications, must fail. They are accordingly dismissed with the costs of the respondents. Advocates fee Rs. 100/- Applications dismissed.