Ibrahim Kassam Sait v. Kerala Wakf Board Ernakulam — 1963 DIGILAW 58 (KER)

JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingain, J. 1. In this writ petition, Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioners, challenges the demand made under Ext. P.6 by the respondent, the Kerala Wakf Board, Ernakulam, calling upon the petitioner to pay the amount mentioned therein, as contribution under section 46(1) of the Wakf Act, 1954, Central Act XXIX of 1954, hereinafter to be called the Act. 2. At the outset it must be stated that the learned counsel does not challenge the right of the Wakf Board to claim contribution at the rate of 5 per cent nor does, he challenge the Act or any provisions in the Act itself; but the contention of the learned counsel is that in making the demand evidenced by Ext. P.6, the Wakf Board has not properly considered, as to what in law, is the total income of the petitioners, for the purpose of arriving at the net income, is defined under section 3(g) of the Act. 3. The petitioners are the managing trustees administering the affairs of the Abdul Sathar Haji Moosa Sait Dharmasthapanam stated to have been created by the testament executed by the late Abdul Sathar Haji Moosa Sait on 25th Kanni 1099 M. E. A printed copy of the said document is, no doubt, produced in these proceedings as Ext. P.1. 4. According to the petitioners, there are three sets of properties taken in by Ext. P.1 and described in schedules A, B and C. It is their further claim that with respect to A schedule properties, a regular Wakf has been created for the dominant purpose of maintaining a mosque. The B schedule properties again are constituted into, what the testator designates a Dharmasthapanam, for the benefit of the testators descendants and for other charitable purposes. The petitioners also claim that the C schedule properties form an out-right gift to the testator's grandson Moosa and his descendants. 5. It is not necessary to go into all these aspects in these proceedings; but the only point to be noted is that, according to the petitioners, only the properties in the B schedule form the Dharmasthapanam. 6. The respondent Board issued a notice, Ext. P.2, dated 26 11 1961 to the Dharmasthapanam calling for statement of accounts, budget, etc. for the relevant period. 6. The respondent Board issued a notice, Ext. P.2, dated 26 11 1961 to the Dharmasthapanam calling for statement of accounts, budget, etc. for the relevant period. The petitioners sent up three statements to the Board in response to the Board's notice, namely, accounts for the year 1960-61, the budget for the year 1961-62 and a statement for the year 1960-61. Copies of these proceedings are filed as Exts. P.3, P.4 and P.5 respectively. 7. Under Ext. P.6, dated 24 12 1961, the respondent Board has issued a notice to the petitioners calling upon them, under section 46 of the Act, to make a contribution in the sum of Rs. 6,574.72, being the annual contribution for the year 1960-61. 8. According to the petitioners, the accounts for the year 1960-61, Ext. P.3, will show the gross income, expenditure incurred, and the taxes paid for the year in question. It is desirable to extract those items at this stage: "Gross income of the estate Rs. 1,58,516.62 The expenditure incurred for the maintenance of the landed properties and administration. Rs. 71,896.1.6 The total of the taxes paid on behalf of the estate. Rs. 27,022.22." 9. On this basis, according to the petitioners, the net income of the estate, after defraying the expenditure incurred for maintainance of the landed properties and administration, and after meeting the tax liability will be only Rs. 59,598.24. That is, according to the petitioners, the net income of the estate will have to be arrived at by deducting the total expenditure incurred namely, Rs. 98,918.38. (made up of Rs. 71,896.16 plus Rs. 27,022.22) from the gross income of the estate, namely Rs. 1,58,516.62. On this basis, according to the petitioners, the net income of the estate will be only Rs. 59,598.24, on which a demand at the rate of 5 per cent can, if at all, be claimed as contribution under section 46(1) of the Act. 10. But according to the Board, from and out of the gross income of Rs. 1,58,516.62 only the taxes paid on behalf of the estate, namely, Rs. 27,022.22 can be deducted to arrive at the net income. Therefore, on this basis, according the Wakf Board, the net income of the petitioners is Rs. 1,58,516.62 minus Rs. 27,022.22 (i.e.) Rs. 1,31,494.40. Treating this as the net income in Ext. P.6, he Board has made a demand for contribution at 5 per cent. 11. 27,022.22 can be deducted to arrive at the net income. Therefore, on this basis, according the Wakf Board, the net income of the petitioners is Rs. 1,58,516.62 minus Rs. 27,022.22 (i.e.) Rs. 1,31,494.40. Treating this as the net income in Ext. P.6, he Board has made a demand for contribution at 5 per cent. 11. If the petitioners are right in their contention that the net income can be fixed only after allowing for the expenditure incurred for the maintenance of the landed properties and administration as claimed by them, the demand under P.6 must be held to be not justified; but, if, on the other hand, the Board's contention that only taxes can be deducted, from the gross income the net income, then it goes without saying, that the demand issued by the respondent is perfectly correct. 12. I may also state that the question as to whether the petitioners are entitled to claim the entire amount of Rs. 71.896.16 as expenses incurred for the maintenance of the landed properties and administration has not the investigated and that may become necessary, only if this court accepts the principal enunciated by the petitioners that they are entitled to claim such expenses, before the net income can be fixed under the Act. 13. Before I advert to the contentions that have been advanced before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners, as well as the stand taken by the Wakf Board, it is desirable to advert to certain provisions of the Act. The Wakf Act, 1954, Central Act 29 of 1954, is an Act to provide for the better administration and supervision of Wakfs. Section 2 provides that, except as otherwise expressly provided, the Act shall apply to all Wakfs whether created before or after the commencement of the Act. Section 3 defines some of the express occurring in the Act. Section 3(c) defines 'Board' as a Board of Wakfs established under section 9. Section 3(g) defines 'net income' and it is desirable to extract clause (g) which is as follows: " "Net income" means the total income less any revenue, cess, rates to the Government or any local authority". Section 3(1) defines the expression "wakf" and section 3 (m) defines the expression "wakf deed". Chapter II containing sections 4 to 8 deals with survey of Wakfs. Section 3(1) defines the expression "wakf" and section 3 (m) defines the expression "wakf deed". Chapter II containing sections 4 to 8 deals with survey of Wakfs. Under section 4, power is given to the State Government, by notification in the Gazette, to appoint for the State, a commissioner of Wakfs Additional or Assistant Commissioners of Wakfs for the purpose of making a survey properties existing in the State at the date of commencement of the Under sub-section (3) of section 4, the Commissioner is to submit to the Government a report containing the various matters mentioned in clause © to (f). In particular, clause (c) relates to "the gross income of the property in each wakf"; clause (d) relates to "the amount of land revenue, cesses rates and taxes payable in respect of such property"; and clause (e) relates "expenses incurred in the realisation of the income and the pay or other remuneration of the mutawalli of each wakf". In particular, I am referring to these clauses because, in my view, they will have a bearing, in considering the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, that the expression "total income" occurring in the definition of "net income" under section 3(g) of the Act means gross income minus the expenses incurred in the realisation of the income and for the maintenance of the properties. Under section 6 a right is given to the Board, the Mutawalli of the Wakf, or any person interested to institute a suit in a civil court when any question arises whether a particular property is wakf property or whether a wakf is a Shia Wakf or a Sunni Wakf. The period within which such a suit is to be filed is also provided in the proviso to section 6(1). The other provisions in the said chapter do not require to be noticed for the present purpose. 14. Chapter III relates to the establishment of Boards and the functions. Chapter IV containing sections 25 to 30 relates to the registration of Wakfs, section 25(1) makes it obligatory for every Wakf to be registered at the office of the Board and under section 25(2) the application for registration is to be made by the Mutawalli. There is also a proviso making provision for such applications for registration being made by persons other than Mutawallis also. 15. There is also a proviso making provision for such applications for registration being made by persons other than Mutawallis also. 15. Sub-section (3) of section 25 specifies in particular, the various particulars that are to be furnished in an application for registration, apart from any other particulars that may have been prescribed. Here again, clause (b) relates to "the gross annual income from such properties." Clause (c) relates to "the amount of land revenue and cesses, and of all rates and taxes annually payable in respect of the wakf properties." Clause (d) relates to "an estimate of the expenses annually incurred in the realisation of the income of the wakf properties." It may be stated that these three clauses are more or less analogous to clauses (c), (d) and (e) occurring in section 4(3), referred to earlier. 16. Chapter VI wherein sections 46 to 54 occur, deals with Finance of the Board. Though the demand for contribution evidenced by Ext. P.6 is issued only under section 46(1) it is desirable to refer also to the various other sub-sections of section 46. Section 46 is as follows: "46(1) The Mutawalli of every wakf shall pay annually to the Board such contribution not exceeding five per cent of the net annual income of such of its property as is situate in the State as the Board may, subject to the sanction of the State Government, from time to time, determine: Provided that no such contribution shall be payable by the Mutawalli of a wakf of which the net annual income does not exceed one hundred rupees. (2) The Board may in the case of any particular wakf reduce or remit such contribution for such time as it thinks fit. (2) The Board may in the case of any particular wakf reduce or remit such contribution for such time as it thinks fit. (3) "The Mutawalli of a wakf may realise the contributions payable by him under sub- section (1) from the various persons entitled to receive any pecuniary or other material benefits from the wakf, but the sum realisable from any one of such persons shall not exceed such amount as shall bear to the total contribution payable the same proportion as the value of the benefits receivable by such person bears to the entire net annual income of the wakf: Provided that if there is any income of the wakf available in excess of the amount payable as dues under this Act, other than as the contribution under sub-section (1), and in excess of the amount payable under the wakf deed, the contribution shall be paid out of such income. (4) The contribution payable under sub-section (1) in respect of a wakf shall subject to the prior payment of any dues to the Government or any local authority or any other statutory first charge on the wakf property or the income thereof, be a first charge on the income of the wakf and shall be recoverable, on a certificate issued by the Board after giving the Mutawalli concerned an opportunity of being heard, as an arrear of land revenue. (5) If a Mutawalli realises the income of the wakf and refuses to pay or does not pay such contribution; he shall also be personally liable for such contribution which ma be realised from his person or property in the manner aforesaid". 17. It will be seen from the above extract that under section 46(1) an obligation is cast upon a Mutawalli of every wakf to pay an annual contribution to the Board not exceeding 5 per cent of the net annual income of such of its property" as is situate in the State. There is no controversy that the Board in this case is entitled to ask for contribution at the maximum rate provided therein, namely, 5 per cent. 18. Sub-section (3) gives power to the Mutawalli to realise the contributions payable by him under sub-section (1) from persons who receive any pecuniary or other material benefits from the wakf to the extent and in the manner referred to therein. 19. 18. Sub-section (3) gives power to the Mutawalli to realise the contributions payable by him under sub-section (1) from persons who receive any pecuniary or other material benefits from the wakf to the extent and in the manner referred to therein. 19. There is only one other section that requires to be noted, namely, section 27, where, under sub-section (1) provision is made for the Board deciding the question as to whether a particular property is wakf property or whether a wakf is a Sunni Wakf or a Shia Wakf. Sub-section (2) makes the decision of the Board on such a question final, unless it is revoked or modified by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. 20. This is broadly the scheme of the Act and it will be seen that under sub-section (1) of section 46, the contribution is to be paid at a rate not exceeding 5 per cent "of the net annual income;" and I have already indicated that the expression "net income" has been defined in section 3(g), as meaning the total income less any revenue, cess, rates or tax payable to Government or any local authority. 21. Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioners, has raised two contentions before me, namely, that the expression "total income" occurring in section 3(g) really means the balance out of the income remaining, after defraying the expenses incurred in making that income, and that the Board has committed an error in law in not fixing the net income for purposes of calculating the contribution, properly under the Act. The second contention of Mr. V. K. K. Menon is that the demand evidenced by Ext. P.6 is vitiated by another error of law, inasmuch as the Board has proceeded on the basis that the entire property comprised in Schedule B of Ext. P.1 has been constituted as Wakf property, whereas Ext. P.1 will clearly show that the said assumption of the Board is not correct. 22. So far as the second contention is concerned, that really relates to the interpretation to be placed upon the various provisions contained in Ex: P.1 and with particular reference to the properties comprised in Schedule B. That is, the question is as to whether the entire properties comprised in Schedule B are constituted as Wakf or not. 22. So far as the second contention is concerned, that really relates to the interpretation to be placed upon the various provisions contained in Ex: P.1 and with particular reference to the properties comprised in Schedule B. That is, the question is as to whether the entire properties comprised in Schedule B are constituted as Wakf or not. So far as that is concerned, I have already referred in particular, to section 27, wherein jurisdiction is given to the Board to decide the question as to whether any particular property is wakf property or not and under sub-section (2) of section 27 a party is given a right to approach a civil court to revoke or modify the said decision of the Board. Therefore, if there is any question arising as to whether any property covered by schedule B to Ext. P.1 is a wakf property or not, it is a matter for the petitioners to take appropriate proceedings as indicated in the statute itself. Therefore, I express no opinion on this matter and I have also declined to hear any arguments on that aspect. 23. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration is regarding the interpretation to be placed upon the expression "total income" occurring in section 3(g) of the Act. 24. According to Mr. V. K. K. Menon, the expressions 'income' or 'total income' have not been defined in the statute. No doubt, there is an artificial definition of the expression "net income" in section 3(g) of the Act. In the absence of a definition of the word "income" in this statute, according to the learned counsel, the said expression has to be interpreted as meaning "the balance amount remaining after deducting the legitimate expenditure incurred to earn that income from the gross receipts". Therefore Mr. V. K. K. Menon urges that the expression "net income" as defined in section 3(g) of the Act should be understood to mean "gross income" minus expenditure legitimately incurred to earn that income, and also less any revenue, cess, rates and taxes payable to the Government or any local authority. 25. If this contention is accepted, the learned counsel urges, that the net income in this case can be fixed only after deducting not only total taxes paid but also the expenses incurred for the maintence of landed properties and administrative charges. 25. If this contention is accepted, the learned counsel urges, that the net income in this case can be fixed only after deducting not only total taxes paid but also the expenses incurred for the maintence of landed properties and administrative charges. That is, according to the learned counsel, the net income for the purpose of fixing the liability for contribution in this case for the year in question is Rs. 59,598.24. 26. On the other hand, Mr. Mohammed Naha, learned counsel appearing for the Wakf Board, has urged that accepting the contentions of the petitioners will mean that the definition of the expression "net income" under section 3(g) is very much enlarged in scope whereas the legislature has chosen to define that expression in a particular manner. The learned counsel also urged that there is a definition of the expression "net income" in the statute itself and, therefore it is not necessary to look for guidance to any other statute as to how exactly the net income is to be computed. Mr. Mohammed Naha, learned counsel, urges that the expression "net income" has been defined in clear and unambiguous terms and the only deduction that the petitioners are entitled to claim is the amount that may have been paid by way of revenue, cess, rates and taxes and no other deductions are permissible in arriving at the net income. The expression "total income" occurring in section 3(g) according to the learned counsel must be understood in a natural manner, namely, the total gross income received during the year, without reference to any outgoings. 27. Therefore, the question is regarding the proper interpretation to be placed upon the expression "total income" occurring in section 3(g) of the Act. 28. In support of his contention that the expression "total 'income" occurring in section 3(g) must really be understood to mean the balance out of the income remaining after defraying the expenditure incurred in making that income, the learned counsel for the petitioners referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court in Badridas v. I. T. Commissioner (A. I. R. 1958 S.C. 783). 29. According to the learned counsel, section 6 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, provides the various Heads of income, profits and gains mentioned therein, especially chargeable to income-tax. 29. According to the learned counsel, section 6 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, provides the various Heads of income, profits and gains mentioned therein, especially chargeable to income-tax. Section 10 (1) provides: "The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head "Profits and gains of business, profession, or vocation" in respect of the profits or gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him." Sub-section (2) of section 10 laid down as to how exactly such profits or gains are to be computed after making the various allowances mentioned therein. 30. Though the expression "income" has not been defined in the Income- tax Act, 1922, nevertheless, according to the learned counsel, the Supreme Court, in the decision cited by him, held that though section 10 (1) imposes a charge on the profits or gains of a trade, it does not provide how these profits are to be computed and that though section 10(2) enumerates the various items which are admissible as deductions, they are not exhaustive of all allowances which could be made in ascertaining profits taxable under section 10(1). On this basis, the Supreme Court ultimately has recognised the principle that when a claim is made for deduction for which there is no specific provision in section 10(2) the question as to whether such a claim is admissible or not will depend on whether having regard to accepted commercial practice and trade principles it can be said to arise out of the carrying on of the business and to be incidental to it and if that is established, ( the deduction must be allowed provided, of course, there is no prohibition against it express or implied in the Act. 31. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in that case admitted a claim for deduction in respect of a loss incurred by the assessee due to an embezzlement of certain amounts caused by one of his employees and this claim was recognised under section 10 (1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. 32. I do not think that this decision of the Supreme Court will assist the petitioners in these proceedings. The learned Judges admittedly were dealing with the provisions contained in section 10 (1) of the Income Tax Act relating to profits and gains of business, profession or vocation. 32. I do not think that this decision of the Supreme Court will assist the petitioners in these proceedings. The learned Judges admittedly were dealing with the provisions contained in section 10 (1) of the Income Tax Act relating to profits and gains of business, profession or vocation. In that connection learned Judges also refer to the observations of Lord Halsbury in Grosham Life Assurance Society v. Styles (1892 A. C. 309 at page 315), that the word "profits" is to be understood in its natural and proper sense in a sense which no commercial man would misunderstand. The learned Judges also refer to the observation of Lord Russel in Commissioner of Income Tax, C.P. & Berar v. S. M Chitnavis (A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 178 at pages 180-81) that "in assessing the amount of the profits and gains of a year, account must necessarily be taken of all expenses incurred, otherwise, you would not arrive at the true profits and gains." In this case, admittedly section 3 (g) does not at all refer to any profits or gains which case a different approach will have to be made by this court. 33. Mr. V.K.K. Menon, next referred me to a passage in 'The Principles of Income & Taxation' (Hannan and Farnsworth) at page 323 to the effect: "Where an Act passed in such bald terms that it merely impose a tax on income without definitions, explanations or limitations, and without any provision for exemptions or deductionsit would require to be interpreted as taxing what is income according to the general understanding of that word. For example, a statute of New Brunswick imposed a tax upon "the amount of income received", and the word "income" was interpreted to mean the balance of gain over loss. It was pointed out that very clear language would be required to justify the taxation of gross income, i.e., without allowing for the incurred in earning it." According to the learned counsel, there is no clear language occurring in the Wakf Act showing the intentions of the Legislature to tax gross income. 34. Learned counsel also referred me to certain passages in Halsbury's Laws of England where the learned author discusses the several items of expenses which could be said to have been incurred for the purpose of a trade. 34. Learned counsel also referred me to certain passages in Halsbury's Laws of England where the learned author discusses the several items of expenses which could be said to have been incurred for the purpose of a trade. But I do not think it necessary to refer to those passages because in my view they have no application at all to the construction of the expression "total income" occurring in the Act in question. 35. The expression "income" is dealt with in Blacks Law Dictionary as "'Income' means that which comes in or is received from any business or investment' of capital, without reference to the outgoing expenditures, while 'profits' generally means the gain which is made upon any business or investment when both receipts and payments are taken into account. 'Income' when applied to the affairs of individuals expresses the same idea that 'revenue' does when applied to the affairs of a State or nation." The learned author, it will be seen from the above extract, clearly indicates that there is a difference in the connotation of the words "income" and "profits". That is, income ordinarily means that which comes in without any reference to the outgoing expenses. In the Law Lexicon of British India by Ramanatha Iyer, at page 574 it is stated: "Income: The return in money from business, labour, capital investments, gain, profit. That which comes in to a person as payment for labour or services rendered in some office, or as gain from lands, the investment of capital, etc." In Murrays' New English Dictionary the expression "income" is dealt with as "that which comes in as the periodical produce of one's work, business, lands or investments (considered in reference to its amount, and commonly expressed in terms of money); annual or periodical receipts accruring to a person or corporation; revenue". The same definition has been given in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 36. It is well-settled that when a statute itself provides a dictionary, that dictionary will have to prevail and the words defined must bear the meaning given under the statute itself. No doubt, the expression "income" has not been defined in this statute. The same definition has been given in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 36. It is well-settled that when a statute itself provides a dictionary, that dictionary will have to prevail and the words defined must bear the meaning given under the statute itself. No doubt, the expression "income" has not been defined in this statute. But, in my view, there is clear indication in the statute itself to show that the expression "total income" occurring in the definition of "net income" in section 3(g) of the Act, means the gross income that has accrued to a party without making any deduction whatsoever. That is, that expression takes the whole of the income that a party must have got without allowing for any deduction or abatement. I have also referred to the meaning of the expression "income" as is to be found in the several dictionaries and also in the Law Lexicon. 37. I have already referred to clauses (c), (d) and (e) occurring in section 4(3) as well as to clauses (b), (c) and (d) occurring in section 25 of the Act. Clause (c) of section 4(3), I have already indicated, refers to gross income of the property and clause (d) refers to the amount of land revenue, cess, rates and taxes payable in respect of such property and clause (e) refers to "the expenses incurred in the realisation of the income" and the pay or other remuneration of the Mutawalli of each wakf. In fact, clause (e) of section 4(3) itself give an indication as to what is meant by the expression "income". This clause specially deals with expenses incurred "in the realisation of the income". The "income" referred to herein can and must mean only the "gross income", referred to in clause (c), to earn which, expenses have been incurred and from which no reduction has been made at any earlier stage. If that is so, the same meaning must be attached to the expression "income" in section 3(g) also, i.e., the income from which no deductions have been made for any purposes. 38, The claim that is made in these proceedings by the petitioners, I have already mentioned, relates to the expenses stated to have been incurred for the maintenance of the landed properties and administration. 38, The claim that is made in these proceedings by the petitioners, I have already mentioned, relates to the expenses stated to have been incurred for the maintenance of the landed properties and administration. That such expenses have to be incurred by a trust for realisation of the gross income, was clearly within the knowledge of Parliament when it enacted the Wakf Act, 1954. Section 3 deals independently with gross income and also two major items of expenses, namely, (a) the amount of land revenue, etc., payable and (b) expensess, incurred for the realisation of the income and pay, etc. Again, clauses (b), (c) and (d) of section 25(3) relate substantially to the same matters dealt with in clauses (c), (d) and (e) of section 4(3); but notwithstanding the fact that Parliament was certainly well aware that not only taxes, revenue, etc. have to be met from the gross income but also the expenses incurred for the realisation of the said gross income have also to be taken note of, nevertheless when it defined the expression "net income" for the purpose of this statute, in section 3(g), it was prepared to allow a deduction from the total income of only those amounts that had been paid as revenue, cess, rates and taxes. That is, according to this definition, so far I as this Act is concerned, the net income is to be arrived at, after deducting the amounts that may have been paid by way of land revenue, etc. from the gross income of the property. 39. Though the expression "gross income" does not occur in section 3(g), in my view, the expression "total income" must be considered to be synonymous to that expression, indicating the income that has come into the hands of the trust, without making any allowance for any expenses, and from such a total income, the net income is to be arrived at for the purpose of the statute, by deducting only the revenue, taxes, etc. 40. If the contention of Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioners, that the expression "income" occurring in section 3(g) really means the balance out of the income remaining after defraying the expenditure incurred in making that income is accepted, it will really amount to re-writing or re-drafting the definition of "net income" occurring in section 3(g) of the Statute. 41. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioners, that the expression "income" occurring in section 3(g) really means the balance out of the income remaining after defraying the expenditure incurred in making that income is accepted, it will really amount to re-writing or re-drafting the definition of "net income" occurring in section 3(g) of the Statute. 41. Therefore, the expression "total income" occurring in section 3(g) means all receipts of every kind without making any deduction or abatement for any purpose whatsoever. As to why Legislature did not permit a further deduction of expenses incurred for the realisation of income to arrive at the "net income" is hot for this court to speculate upon. That is the interpretation to be placed, on the expression "income", in my view, both having regard to the natural meaning of that expression and also having due regard to the indications provided in the Act itself. 42. Therefore, it follows that the disallowance of Rs. 71,896.16 claimed by the petitioners, when computing the net income for purposes of claiming contribution by the Board, is perfectly legal, and valid. 43. Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for the petition contended that the above construction will result in inequality of treatment in toe matter of claiming contributions from various trusts. That is, according to the learned counsel, in this case, the trust owns several cocoanut gardens, the upkeep and maintenance of which, is very costly. But these expenses cannot be taken in to account for arriving at the net income, whereas in the case of trusts which have invested in Government Promissory Notes, the expenses for realising the interest will be almost negligible. The latter kind of trust will stand on a more favourable footing than trusts like that of the petitioners. I am not impressed with this contention, because there is absolutely no inequality perpetrated by the statute as such; and the difference pointed out by the learned counsel is not one created by the statute but because of the difference in the nature of the properties owned by different trusts. 44. I have already indicated that the second contention that has been raised, namely, that particular items comprised in schedule B do not constitute wakf property, does not arise for consideration in these proceedings. 45. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed Parties will bear their own costs.