JUDGMENT : The learned counsel for the appellant has given an application to convert this first appeal into an appeal from order. The learned counsel for the respondents have no objection, and hence this appeal is treated as an appeal from order. 2. The appeal is against the order of the lower court rejecting an application to set aside the Court sale held in Darkhast No. 156/50 in Jurisdiction Suit No. 236/47 to recover mortgage money. The contentions of the judgment-debtor contained in that application were all rejected by the lower Court, and they are re-argued in this appeal. The first is that the property was purchased by a person who had acted as a Panch at the time of the valuation of the property. It is, therefore, contended that under Order 21, Rule 73, C.P. Code, the sale is vitiated. Order 21, Rule 73, C.P. Code reads as follows :- "No officer or other person having any duty to perform in connection with any sale shall, either directly or indirectly, bid for, acquire or attempt to acquire any interest in the property sold". 3. A person who acts as Panch at the time of the valuation of property for the purpose of including the estimation of the value of the property in a proclamation cannot be regarded as an officer or a person having any duty to perform in connection with the sale. He acted as a Panch because he happened to be selected as a Panch. If he had not been selected as a Panch he would not have acted as a Panch. He had no duty to perform in connection with the sale. There is no duty on the Court to make a Panchnama as to the valuation of the property. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 4. The next contention is that after the original decree was passed, an application was given by the judgment-debtor under Section 24 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act for payment of decretal amount by instalments, and accordingly the Court which passed the decree allowed the decretal amount to be paid by instalments. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 4. The next contention is that after the original decree was passed, an application was given by the judgment-debtor under Section 24 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act for payment of decretal amount by instalments, and accordingly the Court which passed the decree allowed the decretal amount to be paid by instalments. Section 24 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act reads as follows : "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court may at any time on application of a judgment-debtor after notice to the decree-holder, direct that the amount of any decree-passed against him, whether before or after the date on which this Act comes into force, in respect of a loan shall be paid in such number of instalments and subject to such conditions, and payable on such dates as, having regard to the circumstances of the judgment-debtor and the amount of the decree, it considers fit." It is, therefore, contended that the decree should have been amended, and that unless the decree is amended, it cannot be executed after the decretal amount is ordered to be paid in instalments. Reliance is placed on Bilimoria. v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1943 Nag 340 (FB). But in the Nagpur case, instalments were not granted. Any observations that were made in the Nagpur case have therefore to be read along with the fact that the instalments were not granted in that case. Whatever observations have been made in that case cannot be applicable to a case where instalments are granted. Section 24 of the Money Lenders Act does not talk of an amendment of a decree before it can be executed. There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that the decree as such should be amended. It is true that the decree should be read with the order passed under Section 24 of the Money Lenders Act. But, admittedly in this case there has been a default in the fulfilment of the terms of the order regarding instalments and what is being executed is the original decree as read along with the subsequent order for instalments what is being executed is not the original decree de-hors, the order for instalments. There is therefore no merit in this contention. 5. The last contention is that the property is worth Rs. There is therefore no merit in this contention. 5. The last contention is that the property is worth Rs. 75000/- and that in the proclamation the value is stated as about Rs. 25,000/-. It is, therefore, contended that the property has been inadequately valued and that consequently there has been an irregularity in the conduct of the sale, which vitiates the sale. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on Sitabai v. Gangadhar, AIR 1935 Bom 331, and in particular the following observations : "Order 21, R. 66, Civil P.C. makes it obligatory on the part of the Court to issue a proclamation. Sub-s. (2) cl. (e), provides that : (2) such proclamaiton shall be drawn up after notice to the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor and shall state the time and place of sale and specify as fairly and accurately as possible : (e) every other thing which the Court considers material for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property." 6. The learned Judges of the Bombay High referred to the following observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Saadatmand Khan v. Phul Kuar, 25 Ind App 146 (PC) : "Whatever material fact is stated in the proclamation (and the value of the property is a very material fact) must be considered as one of those things "which the Court considers material for a purchaser to know", and it is enacted in terms (though express enactment is hardly necessary for such an object) that those things shall be stated as fairly and accurately as possible. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court then observed as follows : "Now it is clear, on the authorities, that, in order to state the value of the property, an inquiry is necessary; and if an inquiry into the value of the property is necessary, the Court is bound to hold the inquiry. The Court is not at liberty to take any imaginary figure, or to state the value of the property at any figure which it thinks to be proper. The Court is not at liberty to take any imaginary figure, or to state the value of the property at any figure which it thinks to be proper. If the value is understated in the proclamation, and the understatement is such as is calculated to misled bidders and to prevent them from offering an adequate price, and the sale results in a price altogether inadequate, the sale must be set aside on the ground of material irregularity in publishing the sale within the meaning of O. 21, R. 90, Civil P.C. This, then, being the effect of the decisions, the question is, whether the present case comes within them." 7. In all humility and with great respect to the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court and their Lordships of the Privy Council, it is difficult to say that the estimate of the value of property is a material fact. The estimate of the value of the property depends on the person, who estimates its value and that may differ from person to person. It is therefore difficult to consider an estimate of the value of the property as a material fact. It is true that opinions with regard to the value of property may diner. But here we are not dealing with the estimation of opinion regarding the value of property of an individual person. What Order 21, Rule 66, C.P. Code deals with is every other thing which the Court considers material for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property. The Civil Procedure Code regards the nature and value of the property as a matter to be judged by the purchaser. The Civil Procedure Code talks of material things which such a person should know. The Civil Procedure Code does not contemplate the value of property as a material fact. The value of the property is something to be judged by a purchaser and in order to judge the value of the property, the Court has got to state the time and place of the sale of the property, the area of the property, its situation, its assessment and the nature of incumbrance etc. These are illustrations of the material things contemplated in Order 21, Rule 66, C.P. Code. Order 21, R. 66, C. P. Code does not contemplate the value of the property as a material thing. These are illustrations of the material things contemplated in Order 21, Rule 66, C.P. Code. Order 21, R. 66, C. P. Code does not contemplate the value of the property as a material thing. To take the contrary view would make Order 21 R. 66 C. P. Code read thus : "the Court must state the value of the property in order to enable a purchaser to judge the value of the property. It is, therefore, clear that Order 21, Rule 66, C. P. Code does not require the court to state the value of the property. In fact, there is no such provision in Order 21, R. 66 C.P. Code that the court should state the value of the property. Order 21, Rule 66, C. P. Code does not require the Court to give its opinion about the value of the property or to state the opinion of Panchas regarding the value of the property. It is necessary for the Courts to see that the proclamation contains the particulars as provided in Order 21, R. 66, C. P. Code and to understand the scope of the clause "material facts for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property". 8. For the reasons given above, in all humility and with great respect, I am of the opinion that the value of the property or the opinion regarding the value of the property either of the Court or of Panchas is not a material thing to be stated in the proclamation for the sale of property. With great respect, I find it impossible to agree with the reasoning of the Bombay High Court given in AIR 1935 Bom 331 (supra). 9. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that by mentioning an estimate of the value of the property as made by the Panchas in the proclamation for sale, the Court committed an irregularity in conducting the sale. In any case, it is difficult to hold that the opinion or estimation of the value of the property is grossly inadequate in view of the reasoning contained in para 26 of the judgment of the lower Court. I, therefore, reject this contention. 10. The last contention urged is that the mention of Survey No. 2124/4 in the decree and the proclamation is wrong. That number was stated because it was included in the decree. I, therefore, reject this contention. 10. The last contention urged is that the mention of Survey No. 2124/4 in the decree and the proclamation is wrong. That number was stated because it was included in the decree. If there is any error in the decree, the executing Court is not responsible. This contention is therefore rejected. 11. The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.