Nayudu, J.- This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Upper Assam Districts, Jorhat, decreeing the plaintiff's suit as prayed for. (2-3) The dispute in this proceeding relates to the succession to the property of one late Thomas, an Indian Christian, who died in or about December 1953. According to the plaintiff, he is the paternal uncle of late Thomas and he is the nearest heir and successor to the estate of the said Thomas, he having left no nearer heirs. To the suit were impleaded Defendants 1 and 2, who are said to be in possession of the property. The third defendant was apparently Impleaded as he too made a claim to be entitle' to inherit to the estate of late Thomas. He filed a written statement but gave up the contest subsequently. The decree in the court below was passed against him ex parte, and he has not preferred any appeal against it. We are, therefore, not concerned with the case put forward by the third defendant, in this appeal. (4) Defendants 1 and 2 filed a joint written statement, in which they churned that they are the rightful heirs of late Tomas both by reason of their relationship with him as well as by reason of adoption. There is nothing much mentioned in the written statement as to when the adoption took place, how it was taken place and how such an. adoption could be regarded as valid or acceptable under the law applicable to Christians. (5) On these pleadings a number of issues were framed, of which the following may be noticed: "1. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 6. Whether defendants No. 1 and 2 or 3 are the heirs of the late Thomas as claimed? 8. Is (he plaintiff entitled to any compensation? If so, ho.w .much? 9. To what relief, if any, are the parties entitled?" (6) On issue No. 1, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff has cause of action as he is the only person who is entitled to the estate of late Thomas. On Issue No. 6, he found that neither of the defendants 1 and 2 had been adopted by late Thomas and that the story of adoption was not true. On Issue No. 6, he found that neither of the defendants 1 and 2 had been adopted by late Thomas and that the story of adoption was not true. He further held that under the Indian Succession Act, the provisions whereof govern the inheritance to the estate of late Thomas, neither the first defendant nor the second defendant is a heir of the late Thomas. In this context it may be necessary to point out that the second defendant claimed no relationship at all by blood whereas the first defendant claimed to be the husband of late Thomas's sister's daughter. Obviously, lie does not fall within the line of succession indicated in the provisions of the Succession Act. In any event, as the plaintiff is admittedly the paternal uncle of the late Thomas, he is certainly a nearer heir to defendants 1 and 2, even assuming that there is some distant relationship between these persons and the late Thomas. After careful consideration, we are satisfied that the learned Subordinate Judge's findings cannot be assailed in this regard and that the defendants 1 and 2 cannot make any preferential claim to the property of late Thomas as against the plaintiff. (7) The main argument advanced by Mr. Medhi, the learned counsel for the appellants, is that as the plaintiff, although he is the paternal uncle of the deceased is a Hindu, he could not inherit the property of the late Thomas who was a Christian. In other words, the contention of Mr. Medhi is that no Hindu relation of a deceased Christian could inherit to his estate. This wide proposition receives no support from any of the provisions of the Succession Act. Our attention has also not been drawn to any reported decision laying down the same. He, however, placed reliance on two Privy Council decisions in the cases of Kamawati v. Digbijai Singh, AIR 1922 PC 14 and Mitar Sen Singh v. Maqbual Hasan Khan. AIR 1930 PC 251. In the former decision, the only question that came up for consideration was whether a person, who ceased to be a Hindu in religion and became a Christian, could elect to be bound by the Hindu Law in the matter of succession after the passing of the Indian Succession Act. AIR 1930 PC 251. In the former decision, the only question that came up for consideration was whether a person, who ceased to be a Hindu in religion and became a Christian, could elect to be bound by the Hindu Law in the matter of succession after the passing of the Indian Succession Act. It was therein held that there was no, such election that a Hindu converted to Christianity is governed solely by the Indian Succession Act, this decision has hardly any bearing on the point that falls to be considered in the instant case. In the latter decision, the scope and applicability of the provisions of the Caste Disabilities Removal Act (21 of 1950) came to be considered. It was therein held that Section 1 of that Act in terms only, applied to protect the actual person who either renounced his religion or had been excluded from the communion of any religion or had been deprived of caste, and that the section was intended to protect such a person from losing any right of or of succeeding as heir. In that context the learned Judges had to consider the question whether when once a person had changed his religion and changed his personal law, that personal law would govern the rights of succession of his children, and naturally the decision was that it is the personal law that has been accepted by the person to whom succession opens that should govern the rights of such succession. On the facts of that case, a Hindu became a Mohammedan, and the question arose as to whether the heirs according to Hindu Law should succeed to him or the heirs according to the Mohammedan Law, and their Lordships of the Privy Council held that as the personal law to which the deceased was subject to at the time of his death governs the case, it is only the heirs according to the Mohammedan Law that would inherit his estate. In that context it may be also noticed that according to the Mohammedan Law an heir entitled to inheritance has necessarily got to be a Mohammedan and a non-Mohammedan is not recognised under the Mohammedan Law as an heir" entitled to inheritance. That case has, therefore, no application to the facts of the instant case. Mr. In that context it may be also noticed that according to the Mohammedan Law an heir entitled to inheritance has necessarily got to be a Mohammedan and a non-Mohammedan is not recognised under the Mohammedan Law as an heir" entitled to inheritance. That case has, therefore, no application to the facts of the instant case. Mr. Medhi has also relied on a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Sundarammal v. Ameenal, AIR 1927 Mad 72 . That was a case under Act 21 of 1950, the limitations whereof had already been made clear by the shove Privy Council decision, and the basis of the decision for that Madras case was that according to personal law applicable to Muslims, no persons other than Muslims can be legal heirs entitled to succeed to the property of a Muslim. This case has, therefore, no application to the present case. (8) On the other hand, there are direct authorities on the question that was raised before us. Reference may first be made to one of the earliest decision of the case, namely the decision in the case of Administrator-General of Madras v. Anandachari, ILR 9 Mad 466. It. was therein held that a Hindu father was entitled to succeed to his son who accepted Christianity and died as a Christian. This is a direct case applicable to the facts of the present case. It. was therein held that a Hindu father was entitled to succeed to his son who accepted Christianity and died as a Christian. This is a direct case applicable to the facts of the present case. In the case of Benoy Kumar Mondal v. Panchanon Majumdar, AIR 1956 Cal 177 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a relation, if .he is, as a nearest consanguine or blood relation is entitled to letters of administration to the estate of a Christian deceased, even though he is a Hindu and it was therein observed that the Succession Act does not concern itself with the religion of the claimant for succession although the religion of the deceased plays an important role - and, indeed, it is almost the determining factor - in the matter of applicability or otherwise of the rules of succession, laid down in the Act, to a particular case, and that this distinction in the nature of character of the relevant estate, depending upon the religion of the deceased owner, runs throughout the Act, but stress is nowhere laid in the matter of its devolution upon the religion of the heir of 'the inheritor, and that the religion of the claimant as distinguished from the religion of the deceased owner is entirely irrelevant for the purpose. We are fully in agreement with these observa­tions of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court. (9) In this context it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Succession Act. Section 2, 19 is as follows: "If the deceased has died intestate and was not a person belonging to any of the classes referred to in section 218 those who are connected with him, either by marriage or by consanguinity, are entitled to obtain letters of administration of his estate and effects in the order and according to the rules hereinafter stated, namely: (a) If the deceased has left a widow, administration shall be granted to the widow, unless the court sees cause to exclude her, either on the ground of some personal disqualification, or because she has no interest in the estate of the deceased." ............... Coming to the Question of succession to a deceased Christian governed by the Act, we find the order of succession laid down in sections 41 to 48. Coming to the Question of succession to a deceased Christian governed by the Act, we find the order of succession laid down in sections 41 to 48. Section 41 lays down that where an intestate has left no lineal descendants, the rules for the distribution of his property shall be those contained in sections 42 to 48. Section 42 lays down that if the intestate's father is living, he shall succeed to the property. Section 43 lays down that if the intestate's father is dead, but the intestate's mother is living and there are also brothers or sisters of the intestate living and there is no child living of any deceased brother or sister, the mother and each living brother or sister shall succeed to the property in equal shares. Section 48 lays down that where the intestate has left neither lineal descendant, nor parent, nor brother, nor sister, his property shall be divided equally among those of his relatives who are in the nearest degree of kindred to him. None of these provisions contain any limitation based on religion. If it was the intention of the Parliament when enacting the Indian Succession Act, to exclude from succession persons of non-Christian denomination or religion, that important circumstance and fact would have found a place in the Act itself. On the other hand, a careful reading of the various provisions of the Act shows that succession or a right to succeed to the property is dependent on relationship and consanguinity. It is not disputed that if the pleas of the defence are negatived, the plaintiff would be the nearest heir entitled to succeed to the estate of the late Thomas. In this connection Mr. Medhi contended that the plaintiff cannot succeed in view of the fact that there was evidence in the case that there was a sister of the deceased Thomas living. At the outset it must be noticed that no such plea had been taken in the written statement filed by the defendants; nor was any defence taken on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. At the outset it must be noticed that no such plea had been taken in the written statement filed by the defendants; nor was any defence taken on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. Such a plea has necessarily to be taken at the earliest instance and no such plea was taken and there was also no issue framed in regard to this very important point, and had the plea been true, nothing could have been more simple for the defendant to defeat the plaintiff's suit by raising this defence and to follow it up with adequate proof. In the circumstances, the court below was not satisfied that there was a sister living, apparently also because of the discrepancy in the evidence of D. Ws. 2 and 3. It is unnecessary for us to consider the evidence as we feel that no evidence could be regarded or taken into consideration in deciding the face of a litigation unless it is based on a plea taken in the pleadings. As no such plea was taken, we do not consider it necessary consistent with justice to deal with this aspect of the matter. That apart, we experience no difficulty in upholding the finding of the court below in this regard even on the evidence that bad been adduced in the case. In any view of the matter, the plaintiff's suit must succeed and has been rightly decreed by the court below. (10) This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. AH/P/D.V.C. Appeal dismissed.