These two petitions raise the same question and can be disposed of by one common judgment. The petitioners in both these petitions are some of the members of the Karara Anchalik Panchayat. The Anchalik Panchayat has been constituted under the Assam Panchayat Act, 1959. The meeting of the Panchayat was held on the 3rd April 1962 in which by majority a certain village was selected for the headquarters of the Panchayat. Some action was taken in accordance with the resolution. Thereafter it appears that on the 13th July, 1962 notices were issued to the members for convening another meeting of the Panchayat on the 21st July, 1962. Coming to know of this a petition was filed in this Court on the 20th July, 1962, on which rule was issued by this Court and that is the subject matter of Civil Rule No. 264 of 1962. Although the rule was issued on this petition but no stay was granted and thus on the 21st July, 1962 the meeting was convened as under the notice and by majority the site of the headquarters was changed, and another site was selected for the establishment of the headquarters of the Panchayat. After the Panchayat passed the resolution on the 21st July, 1962 this Court was again moved challenging the validity of the resolution of the Panchayat. The said rule is No. 389/62. Thus both these petitions challenge the validity of the meeting held on the 21st July, 1962. (2) Three points have been mainly urged by Mr. Lahiri for the petitioners. His first contention is that this item was not included in the agenda. Item No. 3 of the agenda is as follows: "Discussion regarding H/Q of the Block." Item No. 4 of the agenda is as follows: "Any other matters." It is contended by Mr. Lahiri that this item does not give any indication as to what was to be discussed with regard to the headquarters of the Block. He further contends that this does not indicate that the Panchayat intended to consider the question of rescinding its earlier resolution regarding the selection of the site. Lahiri that this item does not give any indication as to what was to be discussed with regard to the headquarters of the Block. He further contends that this does not indicate that the Panchayat intended to consider the question of rescinding its earlier resolution regarding the selection of the site. He relies upon the provision of Section 29(7) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1959 - Assam Act No. XXIV of 1959 (hereinafter called 'the Act'), which provides as follows: "Notice shall be sent in the manner prescribed to the members of an Anchalik Panchayat clear 7 days before the date fixed for an ordinary or a special meeting in which the nature of the business to be transacted shall be described." He has urged that there has not been proper compliance with the provisions of Section 29(7) inasmuch as the nature of the business to be transacted on that date has not been specified. In our opinion item 3 which says that the headquarters of the Panchayat will be discussed, gives sufficient indication that all matters relating to the establishment of the headquarters will be considered. Apart from that the requirement of Section 29(7) cannot be said to be mandatory. In each case the requirement and validity of the notice will have to be determined in accordance with the constitution of the body and unless the constitution prescribes a rigid rule the provisions are not mandatory. The proviso to Section 29(7) says that the non-receipt of notice by a member shall not vitiate the proceedings of a meeting of an Anchalik Panchayat. Section 31(4) of the Act says, - "Accidental omission to serve notice of meeting on any member of a Gaon Panchayat, or on a member of an Anchalik Panchayat or Mohkuma Parishad or Committee or Sub-Committee or. Standing Committee shall not affect the validity of a meeting of a Gaon or Anchalik Panchayat or Mohkuma Parishad or any Committee or Sub-Committee or Standing Committee." These provisions clearly go to show that the requirements of Section 29(7) are not mandatory. If it is found that the members knew the subject-matter of the discussion and that the matter was clearly placed before the Panchayat and thereafter a resolution was passed in that meeting, it cannot be said that the requirements of Section 29(7) are not complied with. If it is found that the members knew the subject-matter of the discussion and that the matter was clearly placed before the Panchayat and thereafter a resolution was passed in that meeting, it cannot be said that the requirements of Section 29(7) are not complied with. Some of the members on the date of the meeting no doubt left the meeting and all of them did not subscribe to the resolution. But a majority of the members did subscribe to the resolution and the matter was clearly placed before the meeting and discussed. It is not alleged by the petitioners that they had no knowledge of the fact that the matter was going to be dis­cussed. In fact the first petition which was filed' two days before the meeting itself, is based on' the apprehension that the matter is going to be discussed in the meeting. Mainly the ground as I have said, is that the notice does not comply with the requirement of Section 29(7) and if these provisions are not mandatory, then the proceedings will not be vitiated on that account. (3) Reference in this connection may be made to the case of 'Vice Chancellor, Utkal University v. S. K. Ghosh, reported in AIR 1954 SC 217 . The matter which came up before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was from a decision of the Orissa High Court. The Orissa High Court had to consider the decision of the Syndicate of the Utkal University arrived at in a meeting with regard to the M.B.B.S. examination and it was held by the Orissa High Court that as notice was not given properly to all the members of the Syndicate, the proceedings were vitiated. This decision was upset by their Lordships of the Sup reme Court and it was observed as follows: "Though an incorporated body like an University is a legal entity it has neither a living mind nor voice. It can only express its will in a for mal way by a formal resolution and so can only act in its corporate capacity by resolutions properly considered, carried and duly recorded in the manner laid down by its constitution. It can only express its will in a for mal way by a formal resolution and so can only act in its corporate capacity by resolutions properly considered, carried and duly recorded in the manner laid down by its constitution. If its rules require such resolutions to be moved and passed" in a meeting called for the purpose, then every member of the body entitled to take part in the meeting must be given notice so that he can attend and express his views. Individual assents given separately cannot be regarded as equivalent to the assent of a meeting because the incorporated body is different from the persons of which it is composed. Hence, an omission to give proper notice even to a single member in these circumstances would invalidate the meeting and that in turn would invalidate resolutions which purport to have been passed at all. But this is only when such inflexible rigidity is imposed by the incorporating constitution. The position is different when, either by custom or by the nature of the body or by its constitution and rules, .greater latitude and flexibility are permissible. Each case must be governed by its own facts and no universal rule can be laid down; also it may well be that in the same body certain things, such as routine matters, can be disposed of more easily ;and with less formality than others. It all depends on the nature of the body and its rules. The substance is more important than the form and if there is substantial compliance with the spirit and substance of the law, an unessential defect in form will not be allowed to defeat what is otherwise a proper and valid resolution." In this case also one objection taken was that 'the item was not included in the agenda and their Lordships said that the last item in the agenda was 'any other matter", which was sufficient to include the matter under dispute in this agenda. Reference in this case has been made to the earlier case of 'Radha Kishan Jaikishan v. Municipal Committee', reported in AIR 1934 PC 62. There also their Lordships of the Privy Council said that so far as the members of the body are concerned they could waive their right of the notice by appearing in the meeting. Reference in this case has been made to the earlier case of 'Radha Kishan Jaikishan v. Municipal Committee', reported in AIR 1934 PC 62. There also their Lordships of the Privy Council said that so far as the members of the body are concerned they could waive their right of the notice by appearing in the meeting. But if something is done which affects the right of the third parties such as the imposition of the tax, then the third party can certainly come to the Court and say that that is not binding. But so far as the members of the body are concerned their Lordships of the "Privy Council have laid down that such defect can be waived by participating in the meeting. (4) The second point taken is that there was no seven days clear notice given. The argument with regard to the absence of the agenda also equally applies to this infirmity. That provision as we have already said, is not mandatory. Besides this the only requirement of Section 29(7) is that seven days clear notice should be given. The notice was issued on the 13th July, 1962 and thus seven days clear notice was given. The notice was undoubtedly served on some of the members later. But the section does not require that the notice should give seven days clear time to the members so as to imply that they should receive the notice and should be given seven days time after the receipt of the notice before the meeting is convened. The members knew of the meeting and thus they cannot be said to have been misled by the notice. Even according to the contention of the petitioners only three persons were not served with the notice and out of these three only one did not attend the meeting. If the members after the receipt of notice attended the meeting, they can even be said to have waived their right to receive clear seven days notice. (5) The last point urged was that the Panchayat had no right to rescind its earlier resolution. There is no bar in our opinion, to the Anchalik Panchayat rescinding its earlier resolution. In this connection reference may be made to Rule 10(4) of the Assam Panchayats (Constitution) Rules, 1960. (5) The last point urged was that the Panchayat had no right to rescind its earlier resolution. There is no bar in our opinion, to the Anchalik Panchayat rescinding its earlier resolution. In this connection reference may be made to Rule 10(4) of the Assam Panchayats (Constitution) Rules, 1960. This rule says,- “No resolution of a Gaon or Anchalik Panchayat or Mohkuma Parishad shall be modified, amended, varied or cancelled within a period of three months from the date of passing thereof except by a resolution supported by two-third of the total number of members of the Gaon or Anchalik Panchayat or Mohkuma Parishad concerned." This rule clearly shows that there is a power in the Gaon or Anchalik Panchayat to rescind its resolution. The only limitation is that if the Panchayat wants to rescind within three months, then the majority of two-thirds has to be obtained. But if the resolution is sought to be rescinded after the three months, then a bare majority can do so. This rule to our mind, clearly gives a right to the Panchayat to rescind its earlier resolution if the majority wishes to do so. In the present case the meeting, of the 21st July, 1962 was held after three months of the earlier resolution and thus the Anchalik Panchayat had power to rescind its earlier resolution. We see no force in these petitions and they are rejected but there will be no order as to costs. BH/BNP/R.G.D. Petition dismissed.