JUDGMENT Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.- This is an appeal from the order of the Tribunal constituted under Act XXX of 1956, dismissing an application filed by the Government of Madras under section 4 of the said enactment, praying for a declaration that the village of Alagappapuram in Tiruchendur Taluk in Tirunelveli District is an “estate” within the meaning of section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. Soon after the passing of the Abolition Act (XXVI of 1948), the Miscellaneous Settlement Officer, Ramanathapuram, initiated proceedings suo motu to ascertain whether the village was an inam estate. By his order dated 28th February, 1951, he held that it was not an inam estate. After the passing of Madras Act (XXX of 1956), the Government, with a view to challenge the correctness of that decision, filed an application under section 4 of that Act, contesting the order of the Miscellaneous Settlement Officer before the Tribunal constituted under the Act. The application was filed within the period of one year contemplated under section 4 of Act XXX of 1956 against one Arumugha Mudaliar, who was the landholder at the time when the Settlement Officer's order was passed. But after the notice was issued it was found that he died even by 25th September, 1954. The Government thereupon filed an application for impleading his heirs as legal representatives to the application ; that application was ordered on 23rd January, 1959. When the substantive application came up before the Tribunal, the question was raised whether the application filed under section 4 by the Government against a person who had been dead by the time the application came to be filed could be said to be proper and valid according to law. The Tribunal answered that question in the negative and dismissed the application. Hence this appeal. Learned Government Pleader has challenged the conclusion of the Tribunal on the ground that the provisions of Act XXX of 1956 do not contemplate the existence of any party to an application under section 4 and that the non-impleading of a living person at the time when the application was filed before the Tribunal is therefore not fatal to it. Learned Government Pleader has challenged the conclusion of the Tribunal on the ground that the provisions of Act XXX of 1956 do not contemplate the existence of any party to an application under section 4 and that the non-impleading of a living person at the time when the application was filed before the Tribunal is therefore not fatal to it. In support of the contention, reference has been made to the provisions of section 4 of the Act, which enabled the Government to challenge the decision of any Court or Settlement Officer by an application filed within one year of the date of coming into force of the Act. It is contended that the right given under the statute is an absolute one which will exist irrespective of the form adopted in regard to application filed for determination of the relevant question. We are, however, unable to agree with the contention. Section 4 contemplates a challenge of an order by a competent Court or by a Settlement Officer functioning under the provisions of Act XXVI of 1948. In other words, it empowers the Government to challenge an order passed in favour of a party earlier by a Court or a Settlement Officer as the case may be. That means that the application is in respect of rights declared earlier by a competent authority. The other provisions of the Act make it clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal for adjudication of the question arising under section 4 is a judicial one for the determination of the rights of the parties in regard to the village in question. Section 6 , which is mandatory in form, makes this clear when it prescribes that, if the State Government is the applicant under section 4, the landholder should be made a party. The Government have also framed Rules under section 14 of the Act. Rule 3 states that, where such an application is made by the State Government or by any person other than the landholder of the non-ryotwari area, the landholder shall be made a respondent to the application. That rule also contemplates that without the landholder being the respondent, there could be no proper application under section 4. An application against a dead man cannot be said to be a proper application. That rule also contemplates that without the landholder being the respondent, there could be no proper application under section 4. An application against a dead man cannot be said to be a proper application. On the death of the previous landholder, the estate or property must have vested in his heirs or legatees, as the case may be, and they alone would be the landholders who could come and contest any application filed by the Government under section 4. What section 6 and the rule to which we have made reference above contemplate is that the landholder for the time being should be made a party to an application thereunder. An application not impleading him will therefore be incompetent. In the present case, the legal representatives of the deceased landholder were made parties in an application filed on 19th November, 1958: but in the present case, the application being against a dead person, no question of impleading his legal representatives as if he had died pending the application can at all arise. The utmost that can be said in favour of the Government will be that the Tribunal should have treated the application filed on 19th November, 1958 as a substantive application against the legal representatives of the deceased landlord. But by that time, the period of time allowed under section 4 had expired. Even so regarded the application will have to fail on the ground of limitation. We are in agreement with the Tribunal that the application as originally filed under section 4 of Act XXX of 1956 was incompetent in law, as the landholder had not been made a party. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. K.L.B.-----Appeal dismissed.