MEHROTRA, C.J.- This is an appeal by defendant No. 1, arising out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 30,000/- as compensation for the injury caused to the plaintiff-respondent by the driver of Motor Lorry No. A. S. D. 931 on 4th March, 1951. The lorry belonged to defendant No. 1. The appellant Messrs. Premraj-Gobindram was impleaded as defendant No. 1 and Messrs. Warden Insurance Co., Ltd., Bombay was impleaded as defendant No. 2. In the present appeal by defendant No. 1 plaintiff has been impleaded as respondent and the second respondent has been described as 'Messrs. Warden Insurance Company Limited, Bombay, now taken over by the Insurance Corporation of India with its Head Office at Bombay'. On the basis of this description in the memorandum of appeal, notice was issued to the Insurance Corporation of India. The Insurance Corporation filed an objection stating that they have been unnecessarily impleaded as party as the Motor Insurance business has not been taken over by the Life Insurance Corporation. The Warden Insurance Company Ltd., thus still remains liable for the policies other than the life insurance policies. (2) The trial Court decreed the suit against both the defendants and directed that the decree be executed against defendant No. 2 at the first instance. The defendant No. 2 filed no appeal. An application was filed by the appellant praying for the amendment of the memo of appeal, whereby the description of respondent No. 2 was sought to be altered, namely, that the words "now taken, over by the Insurance Corporation of India with its head Office at Bombay" are to be deleted and in its place the words "now in liquidation" should be written. The result of this amendment will be that the Warden Insurance Co., Ltd., is to remain as a respondent and the said company is alleged to have gone into liquidation. (3) So far as the Insurance Corporation of India is concerned, it was wrongly alleged in the memorandum that the Warden Insurance Co., has now been taken over by the Life Insurance Corporation. Those words thus have to be struck out. As the Life Insurance Corporation had to put in appearance because of the wrong description, they are entitled to their cost, irrespective of the result of the appeal. Those words thus have to be struck out. As the Life Insurance Corporation had to put in appearance because of the wrong description, they are entitled to their cost, irrespective of the result of the appeal. (4) It was pointed out by the respondent No. 1 that if the Warden Insurance Co., Ltd., is now described as 'now in liquidation', the appeal cannot proceed without the sanction of the Court as the winding up proceedings are going on. The words "now taken over by the Insurance Corporation of India with its head office at Bombay" have to be deleted. As no notice was sent to the Warden Insurance Co., for the purposes of this appeal, the Warden Insurance Co., is no party to the appeal and is not entitled to any relief in this appeal. The decree of the trial Court as against the Warden Insurance Co., Ltd., remains undisturbed and the decree-holder is entitled to take steps before the Liquidator permitted under the law. (5) Coming to the merits of the appeal filed by defendant No. 1, the case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint is that the plaintiff was working as an accountant of Tezpur Balipara Railway at Tezpur on a monthly salary of Rs. 236/-. The defendant appellant carried on business at Steamer Ghat Tezpur Town and owned Motor Lorry No. ASD 931. Defendant No. 2 Messrs. Warden Insurance Company Ltd., carried on business of motor insurance having its head office at Bombay. The Motor Lorry No. ASD 931 belonging to defendant No. 1 was insured with defendant No. 2. On 4th March, 1951, while the plaintiff was passing by the road at Tezpur Steamer Ghat, the Motor Lorry No. ASD 931 coming from the opposite direction knocked the plaintiff and in spite of his best efforts to save himself, the plaintiff received severe injuries. The bones of the plaintiffs left leg were broken into pieces. He was taken to Calcutta by Air immediately under medical advice after the first aid had been given at the Tezpur Civil Hospital. In Calcutta he was in the hospital for treatment. The plaintiff has claimed a sum of Rs. 3O,ooo/- against both the defendants. He has claimed Rs. 10,000/- as the actual expenses incurred by him for his treatment and Rs. 20,000/- for his financial loss, physical trouble and mental agony. In Calcutta he was in the hospital for treatment. The plaintiff has claimed a sum of Rs. 3O,ooo/- against both the defendants. He has claimed Rs. 10,000/- as the actual expenses incurred by him for his treatment and Rs. 20,000/- for his financial loss, physical trouble and mental agony. The defence taken by the appellant was that the plaintiff was not entitled to any damages. Mainly the contention was that the driver was not driving the lorry rashly and negligently. The injury to the plaintiff was caused by his own contributory negligence and thus he is not entitled to any compensation. It is further urged that the expenses were met by the Railway Company with whom the plaintiff was employed. It was a gratuitous payment by them to the plaintiff which the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. As to the compensation for mental agony and physical incapacity the plaintiff has failed to prove the quantum of compensation. (6) The trial Court repelled the defendant's contention and decreed the suit for Rs. 6,369-10-0 as actual costs and expenses incurred by the plaintiff and Rs. 12,000/- as being permanently crippled for life. The suit was thus decreed for Rs. 18,369-10-0. (7) The appellant has challenged the decree of the Court below on the following grounds. Firstly it is urged that there being no allegation in the plaint that the accident occurred in the course of the employment of the driver, the plaintiff is not entitled to any decree. The defendant No. 1 being the master would only be liable for any tort committed by a servant in the course of his employment. Secondly it is urged that the driver was a necessary party to the suit and in the absence of the driver the suit could not proceed. The plaintiff could get a decree only if he could establish the negligence of the driver and the driver being the only person who knew of the accident, has been deprived of any opportunity to meet the charges against him and thus in his absence the suit could not proceed. Thirdly it is urged that the plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negligence and is thus not entitled to any compensation. Fourthly it is urged that the plaintiff was not entitled to any expenses incurred by him after the suit was filed. Thirdly it is urged that the plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negligence and is thus not entitled to any compensation. Fourthly it is urged that the plaintiff was not entitled to any expenses incurred by him after the suit was filed. The expenses which were incurred before the suit were met by the company - the employer of the plaintiff - and the plaintiff thus is not entitled to get any decree for the said expenses. Lastly, it is urged that the damages have not been proved by the plaintiff. The Court below has arbitrarily fixed the sum of Rs. 12,000/- as the amount of compensation on account of the plaintiff being crippled and the loss of future income to the plaintiff. (8) We shall now take up the first point urged that the plaintiff is not entitled to any decree against the appellant as he has not alleged that the wrongful act was done in the course of the employment by the driver. The plaintiff alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint that the driver of the Motor Lorry No. ASD 931 belonging to the defendant No. 1 caused grievous injuries to the plaintiff on 4th March, 1951, by driving the lorry most rashly and negligently while the plaintiff was passing by the road at Tezpur Steamer Ghat. That the lorry belonged to the defendant appellant has not been disputed. That the lorry was being driven by the driver of the defendant appellant on the 4th March, 1951, when the accident took place is also not disputed. In these circumstances it cannot be said that there is no allegation in the plaint that the wrongful act was done in the course of the employment. It cannot be doubted that the master cannot be held liable for the wrongful act of his servant unless first the relationship of master and servant is proved to exist between the person committing the wrong and the person against whom damages are claimed and secondly the servant committing the wrong is shown to have been acting in the course of his employment. A master who is vicariously liable for the wrongful act of his servant cannot be held liable unless the wrongful act has been done in the course of his employment. The question which really arises for consideration is what is the meaning of the words in the course of his employment. A master who is vicariously liable for the wrongful act of his servant cannot be held liable unless the wrongful act has been done in the course of his employment. The question which really arises for consideration is what is the meaning of the words in the course of his employment. The words 'in the course of employment' may have two connotations. One may refer to the period of employment and the second may be the nature of the duty. It cannot be doubted in the present case that the accident took place during the period when the driver was in the employment of the defendant appellant. The first question will be to see what for the servant was employed. It is not necessary that every wrongful act for which the master is held liable should be proved to have been expressly authorised by the master. In the present case it is evidently clear that this driver was employed to drive the lorry and if while driving the lorry he commits any mistake, which results in an injury to the third party or in driving the lorry if he acts negligently, the master will be liable inasmuch as the negligence will be in the course of employment. If a wrongful act is entirely unconnected with the employment, the master cannot be made liable. If a person goes and kills a man or commits an assault on a man, merely because at the time when he commits the assault he is in the employment of his master, the master cannot be held liable. But if in doing a certain act which the servant is authorised to do he acts negligent the master will be liable, to our mind, for the negligence of the servant. It is not necessary in these circumstances for the plaintiff to prove further that the servant was authorised at that particular moment to take out the lorry and drive it. The act should be so connected with the acts which have been authorised by the master that they can be regarded as modes of doing that act, although the mode of doing it in a particular time may have been improper. The act should be so connected with the acts which have been authorised by the master that they can be regarded as modes of doing that act, although the mode of doing it in a particular time may have been improper. If a servant does negli­gently that which he was authorised to do carefully, or if he does fraudulently that which he was authorised to do honestly, or if he does mistakenly that which he was authorised to do correctly his master will answer for that negligence, fraud or mistake. The master may not have authorised that particular act but by authorising the driver to drive the lorry, the master becomes liable for the manner in which the driver has conducted himself in driving the lorry for which he was employed. There is thus no substance in the appellant's contention that the suit must fail on the ground that the plaintiff has not alleged that the act was done in the course of the employment. No plea was taken on the other hand by the defendant appellant that at that particular time the Driver was prohibited to take out the lorry and drive it. (9) The next point urged is that the suit must fail as the driver has not been impleaded as a defendant to the suit. The suit can only fail for want of impleading a necessary party, but not for want of impleading a proper party. Some persons may be proper parties to the suit and yet they may not be necessary parties so that their absence from the array of the defendants may lead to the dismissal of he suit itself. The objection as to the non-joinder of the necessary party should have been taken at the earliest stage. The Advocate-General has, however, made three submissions in his connection, hirstly, that as the driver has a right to defend himself inasmuch as it is his negligence which is alleged to be responsible for injury to the plaintiff, he is a necessary party to the suit, and secondly that as it is his negligence which is the cause of action for the suit, he is a necessary party. Both these points are the two aspects of the same submission. Both these points are the two aspects of the same submission. Thirdly it is urged that as the master and the driver are joint tort-feasors and there is a right of contribution by the master as against the servant, the driver was a necessary party. (10) Reliance is placed on the case of Poonam Chand v. Motilal, reported in AIR 1954 Raj 287 . The facts of that case are entirely different. The respondent in that case had purchased certain property in execution of a decree against one Gulabdas. One Motilal had transferred that property by a sale made to Gulabdas's father and grand-father. The plaintiff in the suit had challenged the transfer by Motilal in favour of Gulab­das's predecessors on the ground that the property had been partitioned and had fallen to the share of the plaintiff and it was no longer in possession of Motilal who had thus no right of transferring it to Gulabdas. It was in these circumstances held that although Motilal was no longer interested in the litigation, he was a necessary party as the foundation of the title of Gulabdas's father and grand-father was the sale-deed executed by Motilal which was challenged. Really what was to be decided in that case was the question whether the plaintiff had title to the property or Motilal, which could not be decided in the absence of Motilal. This case thus has no application to the facts of the present case. (11) The next case relied upon is Subbaraya Sastri v. Seetha Ramaswami, reported in AIR 1933 Mad 664 . Reliance, is placed on the following passage at p. 667:- "This rule of Dicey is quoted in AIR 1924 Pat 172 as if it supported the decision there but, with respect? in my opinion it is opposed to it for I take it that if a person has a right to defend, it is the same thing as saying that he is a necessary defendant, for it is not within the discretion of the Court to say whether it will add him or not." There the plaintiff had brought a suit for ejectment of the defendant on the ground that the property belonged to him. The defendant had taken the plea that the property belonged to the municipality from whom the defendant had taken the land. It was held that the municipality was a necessary party. The defendant had taken the plea that the property belonged to the municipality from whom the defendant had taken the land. It was held that the municipality was a necessary party. In that case the suit was defeated because in spite of the point being raised at the earliest stage, the plaintiff failed to implead the Municipal Board as a party. There was thus no alternative left to the Court than to dismiss the suit on that ground. The following passage in Dicey on Parties to an Action, Rule 113 (p. 495) was quoted in support of the contention that the municipality was not a necessary party:- “The persons who have a right to defend in an action of ejectment are any persons named in the writ and any person who is in possession by himself or his tenant." The following observation of Dicey on Parties to an Action was also quoted:- “The object of the plaintiff in ejectment is to obtain, not damages but possession of the land. He brings his action against the persons actually in possession, and if he succeeds, e. g., through their letting judgment go by default, he turns them out and himself obtains possession. This may cause damage to a person, who owns but does not himself actually occupy the land and is therefore not made a party to the action." The facts of this case also are not applicable to the present case. We do not think that merely because the driver has got a right to defend his action of negligence and that it is his negligence which makes the owner liable, the suit can fail on the ground that the driver has not been impleaded as a party. (12) The next case cited is Dwijendra Lal v. Harekrishna Konar, reported in AIR 1963 Cal 218 . There the question which came up for consideration was whether the returning officer in the circumstances of the case was a necessary party to the election petition or not. We do not think that the case applies to the facts of the present case. (13) 'Salmond on Torts', Eleventh Edition Section 25 says as follows:- "Where the same damage is caused to a person by two or more wrongdoers those wrongdoers may be either joint or independent tort-feasors. We do not think that the case applies to the facts of the present case. (13) 'Salmond on Torts', Eleventh Edition Section 25 says as follows:- "Where the same damage is caused to a person by two or more wrongdoers those wrongdoers may be either joint or independent tort-feasors. Persons are to be deemed joint tort-feasors within the meaning of this rule whenever they are responsible for the same tort - that is to say, whenever the law for any reason imputes the commission of the same wrongful act to two or more persons at once. This happens in at least three classes of cases - namely, agency, vicarious liability, and common action, i.e., where a tort is committed in the course of a common action, a 'joint act done in pursuance of a concerted purpose. * * * Joint wrongdoers are jointly and severally responsible for the whole damage. That is to say, the person injured may sue any one of them separately for the full amount of the loss; or he may sue all of them jointly in the same action, and even in this latter case the judgment so obtained against all of them may be executed in full against any one of them." At another place in Section 30 Salmond observed: "A master is jointly and severally liable for any tort committed by his servant while acting in the course of his employment." These passages clearly show that the liability of the master is joint and several with the servant. By operation of law the master is deemed lo be responsible for the wrongful act done by the servant. His liability is his own, although for the action of the servant and not for his own act and thus if the liability is joint and several, we see no reason why joint tort-feasors cannot be sued alone and the non-joinder of the other joint tort-feasors will defeat the suit. (14) The respondent relies upon the decision of Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Sarla Devi, reported in AIR 1959 Punj 297 for this proposition. This case fully supports the contention of the respondent. It is urged by the counsel for the appellant that the point raised by him does not seem to have been considered in the judgment of that Court. This case fully supports the contention of the respondent. It is urged by the counsel for the appellant that the point raised by him does not seem to have been considered in the judgment of that Court. Even apart from that decision with which we are in complete agree­ment, we see no principle on which the suit can be defeated on the ground that the driver is not impleaded as a party. If the master as a joint tort-feasor is jointly and severally liable for the damages, the suit cannot fail simply because the driver who is also liable, has not been impleaded as a party. (15) The question whether the defendant's driver committed negligence is a question of fact. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish negligence of the defendant before getting a decree for damages. It is also to be established that the injury to the plaintiff is the result of the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff has examined a number of witnesses. On behalf of the defendant no eye witness appears to have been examined. (16) Ganga Charan Basak was examined on commission by the plaintiff. He was working in the account branch of M/s. Mc Leod and Company, Ltd., Calcutta. So far as the actual accident is concerned, his evidence is not material. He has said about the advance made by the Company to the plaintiff for meeting the expenses of 'his treatment. Dr. P. K. Das is the Civil Surgeon, Kamrup at Gauhati. At the relevant time lie was at Tezpur as Civil Surgeon. He examined the plaintiff on the 4th March, 1951, the date of occurrence, in the Civil Hospital and discovered that plaintiff had compound fractures of left femur and simple fracture of left tibia and fibula. On his advice the plaintiff was taken to Calcutta. According to his evidence the plaintiff cannot walk without any support neither he can bend his left knee joint. In his opinion the plaintiff has no chance of his left leg being cured. He cannot move like a normal man. (17) The next witness is Promode Kumar Dey plaintiff. He has stated that on 4th March, 1951, at "about 7-45 A. M. he was coming towards the town from his residence by the side of the Railway Station, Tezpur, on foot by the road which leads one to the Bazar area. He cannot move like a normal man. (17) The next witness is Promode Kumar Dey plaintiff. He has stated that on 4th March, 1951, at "about 7-45 A. M. he was coming towards the town from his residence by the side of the Railway Station, Tezpur, on foot by the road which leads one to the Bazar area. When he reached near the stall of Satyanath Sarma, he saw a vehicle coming from the opposite direction. That was a lorry belonging to Messrs. Premraj Govindram and it was driven by one Sirajuddin Driver. The vehicle came suddenly to the side by which he was proceeding. He was proceeding by the left side of the road. The vehicle was about to knock him down when he seized one bar of the vehicle in front and people around began to raise halla saying that a man had been killed. The vehicle was still in motion and the plaintiff cried out. The vehicle then crossed the road towards the south from the north and went down the low lying area by the side of the Road. There was a hard jerk and so he lost his grip and fell down on the ground. One of the front wheels then passed over his left leg when he was making an attempt to get up. The leg was in a bending position. On account of this accident he sustained grievous in jury. He was taken to the hospital and thereafter he was taken to Calcutta for better treatment. In cross-examination he said that he saw the vehicle at a distance of about 20/30 feet as the Road by which the vehicle was proceeding had a turning towards the one on which he was proceeding. The vehicle was not visible while it was beyond the turning. The turning was about 16/17 feet from the place of accident. He was proceeding by the side of the Road to the left. The road side on which he was proceeding was lower than the road by about 2/2½ cubits. There were few stalls by the side of the Road on the lower level. In reply to the question put to him in cross-examination he said he could not say why he did not jump towards the northern side of the road. The vehicle came so suddenly that he found no time to save himself. There were few stalls by the side of the Road on the lower level. In reply to the question put to him in cross-examination he said he could not say why he did not jump towards the northern side of the road. The vehicle came so suddenly that he found no time to save himself. He has denied that the road side was not lower than the main road. He has admitted that the vehicle was moving slowly. He has denied that the driver blew the horn. The trend of the cross-examination shows that the defence case has that this man was absent-minded, walking in the middle of the street and did not catch any rod and due to his own negligence ha was injured. It was a Sunday, there was no heavy movement of vehicles. (18) The next witness is Satyanath Sarma who had his stall on the road-side near the junction of Cotton Road and the one leading to the Railway Station. The plaintiff according to him was coming from the side of the Railway Station. He was coming on the side on which the witness's stall was situated which is towards the left and the vehicle was coming by the Cotton Road and took a turn for going towards the Railway Station. The vehicle was proceeding by the northern side of the road and the plaintiff was coming from the opposite direction by the northern side of the road. This evidence indicates that the plaintiff was coming on the left side of the road while the vehicle was coming towards his right. When the vehicle suddenly came in front of the plaintiff, the plaintiff caught hold of the rod. Then the witness raised halla when the vehicle moved towards the south. Then the vehicle stopped in low land by the side of the road and the witness saw the plaintiff on the ground being injured. The plaintiff was at a distance of about 10 cubits from the junction when the vehicle was about to knock him. (19) The next witness is Phanindra Kumar Sen who says that he saw the plaintiff being injured by a vehicle which belonged to Premraj Govindram. He was taking tea in the stall by the side of the road. He came out on hearing halla, and saw the plaintiff being dragged. He was holding something of the vehicle. (19) The next witness is Phanindra Kumar Sen who says that he saw the plaintiff being injured by a vehicle which belonged to Premraj Govindram. He was taking tea in the stall by the side of the road. He came out on hearing halla, and saw the plaintiff being dragged. He was holding something of the vehicle. In cross-examination a suggestion was put to him that the vehicle was not proceeding by the northern side, but he categorically denied it. (20) All other witnesses are not eye-witnesses to the occurrence and thus they cannot say about the manner in which the accident took place. As we have already said the defendant did not examine any witness. The evidence of three witnesses including the plaintiff examined on behalf of the plaintiff clearly show that the plaintiff was moving on the left side of the road. He was walking on the road-side the level of which is lower than the main road. The vehicle suddenly came in front of the plaintiff and while he feared the danger of being knocked down, he caught hold of the rod in front of the vehicle. People cried and then the vehicle went towards the low land where plaintiff received injuries. It is also clear from the question put in cross-examination to the plaintiff that the driver did not blow any horn. The vehicle of the defendant was obviously going on the wrong side. From the trend of the cross-examination the defence case seems to be that the plaintiff was absent-minded and was walking in the middle of the road. The driver blew the horn and it was due to the plaintiff's own negligence that the accident occurred. There is no reason to disbelieve the plaintiff's evidence and if the evidence of the plaintiff is believed, the driver was driving on the wrong side. He did not blow the horn and the plaintiff was walking on the road-side towards his left, the level of which is lower than that of the main road. It is true that there was not much heavy traffic as it was a Sunday and further that the vehicle was driven slowly. But to our mind it is all the more reason why the driver should not have gone towards his right when taking a turn. It is true that there was not much heavy traffic as it was a Sunday and further that the vehicle was driven slowly. But to our mind it is all the more reason why the driver should not have gone towards his right when taking a turn. It is not suggested in cross-examination that it was impossible for the driver to take a turn without going to his right on the road side. Some questions have been put to show the distance of the crossing from the place where the plaintiff was injured and the length and breadth of the vehicle but no evidence is led on behalf of the defendant to show the actual length and breadth of the vehicle nor the actual situation of the crossing, nor has anything definite been elicited from the plaintiff's witnesses. Two things thus clearly emerge out of the evidence of the plaintiff, firstly that the vehicle was on the wrong side of the road and the plaintiff was walking on his left on the road-side which is lower than that of the main road and secondly that the driver did not blow the horn. It has also not come out in evidence that there was any heavy traffic at the time when the accident took place, and there was any other vehicle coming from the other direction, to avoid which the driver had to take to the wrong side of the road. (21) The case set up by the defendant No. 1 in paragraph 1 of the written statement is that the lorry was driven very cautiously, carefully and slowly by the driver. The plaintiff sustained the injuries due to his own negligence and carelessness and not to any negligence or carelessness or any other fault on the part of the driver. Barring this statement in paragraph 1 there is no other statements in the written statement specifying the circumstances under which the accident took place and the facts on which the defendant asserted that the injury was the result of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. As we have already pointed out, in the cross-examination suggestions were made to show that the plaintiff was negligent and absent-minded. The second trend of the cross-examination is that when the plaintiff saw the cat he should have jumped to his left to avoid the impact of the vehicle and should not have held. As we have already pointed out, in the cross-examination suggestions were made to show that the plaintiff was negligent and absent-minded. The second trend of the cross-examination is that when the plaintiff saw the cat he should have jumped to his left to avoid the impact of the vehicle and should not have held. the rod by his hand which resulted in the injury to him. As pointed out by Lord Simon in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Rly., 1951 AC 601 at p. 611, "All that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed, by this want of care, to his own injury. For when, contributory negligence is set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiffs-claim, the principle involved is that, where a man is part author of his own injury, he cannot call on the other party to compensate him in full." As observed by Lord Blackburn in Cayzer, Irvine and Co. v. Carron Co., (1884) 9 AC 873, "The rule of law is that if there is blame causing the accident on both sides, however small that blame may be on one side, the loss lies where it falls." Each case will have to be examined in the light of its own facts. (22) The two cases of Sooniram Ramniranjandas v. Gopala Krishna reported in AIR 1937 Rang 519 and J. K. Rau v. S. N. Davey reported in AIR 1936 Mad 195 are instructive. In the Rangoon case there was a collision between a motor cycle and a motor car. The motor car was driving on the wrong side and the motor cycle was on the right side. It was however argued that the motor cycle driver was guilty of contributory negligence inasmuch he could avoid the accident by going further away from the motor car. It was held that though the rule of the road is not to be adhered to, if, by departing from it, an injury can be avoided, yet in cases where parties meet on the sudden, and an injury results, the party on the wrong side should be held answerable, unless it appears clearly that the party on the right had ample means and opportunity to prevent it. In the Madras case the plaintiff appellant had been injured by the car belonging to the defendant and had sued for damages for the injury. It was held that a person who drives a motor car along the road is under the obligation to keep a careful look out so that he may avoid pedestrians. Pedestrians also no doubt are under an obligation to keep a look out for vehicles including motor car. But where a person who was driving his car did not see a pedestrian who was only at a distance of six feet from his car, he was held to be clearly guilty of negligence. (23) It was further suggested in the argument on behalf of the defendant that when the plaintiff saw the vehicle coming, he should have stepped" a bit further and his failure to do so contributed to the injury caused to him. We do not think that there is any substance in this contention. The plaintiff as we have said, was walking on the right side on the side road which was below the main road. In these circumstances when ha saw the vehicle turning towards his direction he could not have anticipated that the driver will take a wrong turn and suddenly come in his front. The driver of the vehicle should himself have seen that by taking a turn like that he was likely to .knock if a pedestrian was coming and he should have taken all care to stop the car or to go on his right side to avoid suddenly coming in front of the pedestrian. There is no evidence even to show that any attempt was made by the driver when he saw the man, to stop the vehicle. In these circumstances we are clearly of opinion that the driver was guilty of negligence and the injury was not caused by the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. (24) The question now remains about the amount of damages which the plaintiff is entitled to get. (25) In paragraph 7 of the plaint the plaintiff has stated that plaintiff had spent more than Rs. 10,000/- for his treatment, passage etc. In paragraph 8 he has said that the plaintiff has 'been deprived of his pay, allowance and other benefits being unable to attend his duties for one year and loss so sustained is more than Rs. (25) In paragraph 7 of the plaint the plaintiff has stated that plaintiff had spent more than Rs. 10,000/- for his treatment, passage etc. In paragraph 8 he has said that the plaintiff has 'been deprived of his pay, allowance and other benefits being unable to attend his duties for one year and loss so sustained is more than Rs. 2,000 and besides the financial loss the plaintiff has been suffering from great physical troubles, mental agony being under surgical treatment and confined to bed in absolute rest, not being allowed to move even over and above being faced with being permanently disabled of one leg. In short the plaintiff has claimed Rs. 10,000/- for actual expenditures and Rs. 20,000/- for his financial loss and physical troubles, mental agony etc. Thus he claimed a decree for Rs. 30,000/-. The Court below has granted him a decree for Rs. 18,369-10-0. It granted him Rs. 6,088-12-0, Rs. 188-14-0 and Rs. 92/- as actual expenses and further a sum of Rs. 12,000/- as being permanently crippled for life. (26) The case of the plaintiff is that after he was injured, he was taken to Calcutta for medical treatment by his employer. The advances which were made by Messrs. Mc. Leod and Co., Ltd. for meeting the expenses of treatment of the plaintiff are set out in detail in Ext. 2. The total comes to Rs. 6,088-12-0. This amount has been actually advanced by the Company and the details of payment to the hospital authorities and other authorities have also been proved. The defendant has not seriously contested the amount. The Advocate General has argued that some of these amounts relate to the period subsequent to the suit. But on further examination of the document he has conceded that the amount related to the expenditure made by the Mc. Leod and Co. in the treatment of the plaintiff. The point, however, to be considered is whether the defendant is liable to pay this amount to the plaintiff. Plaintiff's case is that this was an advance made to the plaintiff by the company and the plaintiff was a debtor to the company to the extent of this amount. It was really spent as plaintiff's money Whether the creditor chooses to recover that amount from the plaintiff or not is a matter between his creditor and the plaintiff. Plaintiff's case is that this was an advance made to the plaintiff by the company and the plaintiff was a debtor to the company to the extent of this amount. It was really spent as plaintiff's money Whether the creditor chooses to recover that amount from the plaintiff or not is a matter between his creditor and the plaintiff. But so far as the defendant's liability is concerned, the amount was actually spent by the plaintiff and lie is entitled to recover that amount from the defendant. The plaintiff was not in a position to meet this huge amount of expenses. But foi this treatment given to him at Calcutta, his life would not have been saved. The case of the defendant, however, is that this was a gratuitous advance made to the plaintiff by the Company, the plaintiff was not under any obligation to pay this amount to the Company. In fact it was the expenditure incurred by the Company which the plaintiff is not entitled to recover from the defendant. (27) Plaintiff has examined on commission Sri Ganga Charan Basak who was working in the Accounts Branch of Messrs. Mc. Leod and Company Ltd., Calcutta. In answer to the interrogatories he has stated that the money advanced to P. K. Dey during his treatment in Calcutta amounted to Rs. 5,577-11-0 as at 31st March, 1952. Subsequently certain sums were again advanced and the total sum advanced to him was Rs. 6,088-12-0. Then in reply to the question - "Then how could you say that Mc. Leod and Co., is maintaining P. K. Dey's account still now?" he stated, - "Because money was advanced to P. K. Dey from time to time for his hospital treatment, etc., and the amounts are still due by him." Therefore, this account is maintained in answer to another question - "Excepting your words of mouth, is there anything to show that Mc. Leod and Co. still considers the money spent by them in P. K. Dey's treatment is a living debt?", he replied, - "Mc. Leod and Co., considers if as a living debt as P. K. Dey gave an undertaking in writing for repayment." (28) Another witness D. A. Neame has been examined by the plain tiff on commission. He was in the employment of M/s. Mc. Leod and Company, Calcutta for twenty-six years and left that service on 31st December 1952. Leod and Co., considers if as a living debt as P. K. Dey gave an undertaking in writing for repayment." (28) Another witness D. A. Neame has been examined by the plain tiff on commission. He was in the employment of M/s. Mc. Leod and Company, Calcutta for twenty-six years and left that service on 31st December 1952. He was Traffic Superintendent and the plaintiff was working under him. In answer to the question "Did Messrs. Mc. Leod and Co. Ltd., advance any money to Promode for his treatment?", he replied that it was paid to him as an advance to be repaid. In reply to another question "The money paid to the Hospital by Mc. Leod and Go. Ltd., for Mr. Dey's treatment was in the sort of a gratuitous help to an old employee of the Company, is it not so?" he relied, - "No, it was an advance to P. K. Dey." The next question was - "Do you mean to say that this sum was meant to be recovered from Mr. P. K. Dey?" The reply was, "Yes." The next question was "In what manner you proposed to recover that amount from Mr. P. K. Dey". The answer was - "By securing from him an undertaking in writing that he would surely pay the money advanced to him." In answer to another question "Did you make any attempt to recover the said advance from Mr. Dey?", he replied, - "Yes. But apart from obtaining a written guarantee from him to repay the advance no actual repayment was received in cash. The man was penniless and he had no money." In answer to the question - "Then you know that a heavy amount was advanced on his account and paid to the Hospital and as he was penniless you cannot recover the money", the answer was, - "No. He could have borrowed the money from somewhere or encahsed an Insurance Policy if he had one and repay the advance." The question was put to him - "I put it to you that at the time of his admission to Hospital and during the time he was detained in Hospital you never expected that the money spent on him by your Company will be realised from Mr. P. K. Dey" and the answer was, - "we certainly expected to recover the money from him." The next question was - "Excepting taking something in writing in a scrap of paper from Mr. Dey after his discharge from the Hospital your Mc.Leod and Co. took no steps whatsoever to realise money or safeguard their financial interest against Mr. Dey" and the reply was - "we thought that the guarantee was suffi­cient and P. K. Dey's person (sic) integrity." An­other question put to him was "I put it to you if Mr. Dey chooses not to repay the advances you will not take any action against him" and the reply was - "How can I? He is no longer under my control and ceased to be under my control when it was taken over by the North-Eastern "Railway in September, 1952." (29) The guarantee given by the plaintiff is printed at page 336 of the paper book and is marked Ext. 8. It is as follows: "As the company were kind enough to advance me the sum of Rs. 6,088-12-0 (rupees six thousand eighty-eight and annas twelve) towards the cost of my medical treatment from March 1951 to May 1952, in Calcutta, I agree to refund to them this sum of money when my claim, on the insurance company has been paid in full." This guarantee of course postponed the date of the payment. The liability to pay the amount arises from the fact that the money was advanced to P. K. Dey. If a certain amount is advanced to a person, he becomes liable in law to pay that amount. It may be that the liability may become time barred or that the debtor may not be financially in a position to repay the money, but nonetheless if it is an advance made to the debtor, then the money spent out of the advance is the debtor's money and it cannot be said that this amount was not spent by the plaintiff in meeting the expenses of his treatment. (30) The other sum claimed by the plaintiff is the loss of salary and allowances to him. An account showing the loss of salary to the plaintiff has been proved and filed and is marked Exts. 3., 3(1) and 3(2). Under this account the plaintiff has suffered loss of salary to the extent of Rs. 3,170-2-6. (30) The other sum claimed by the plaintiff is the loss of salary and allowances to him. An account showing the loss of salary to the plaintiff has been proved and filed and is marked Exts. 3., 3(1) and 3(2). Under this account the plaintiff has suffered loss of salary to the extent of Rs. 3,170-2-6. He has also proved a loss of allowance to the tune of Rs. 262-8-0 by the account which has been duly proved and marked Exts. 4, 4(1) and 4(2). Another sum of Rs. 188-14-0 has been proved to have been paid by the plaintiff towards meeting different expenses, namely that a sum of Rs. 70/- has been proved by a receipt granted by Dr. B. B. Sengupta dated 2nd April 1951, a sum of Rs. 50/- has been proved by another receipt granted by Dr. S. C. Lahiri dated 2nd April 1951 and a sum of Rs. 68-14-0 is the cost of the dressing materials supplied to plaintiff by Tezpur Pharmacy, Tezpur which is proved by a certificate dated 17th September 1952. Ext. 1 also shows a sum of Rs. 92/- spent for his air freight from Calcutta to Tezpur. This is also an actual expense incurred which the plaintiff is entitled to get. (31) Coming to the claim of the plaintiff decreed by the Court below for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- as being permanently crippled it should be pointed out that the plaintiff can get a damage for the loss of the normal expectation of life. Secondly he can also get damages for nervous shock. Plaintiff has claimed Rs. 20,000/- under this head. The trial Court has awarded a lump sum of Rs. 12,000/- as being permanently crippled for life. In his judgment he says that this sum has been fixed with due regard to his status in life and the usual inconveniences which he had to suffer for all the years that have elapsed since the time of the mishap and which he shall suffer for the rest of his life. It is difficult to estimate the actual amount of damage which the plaintiff is entitled to claim under this head. Yet it has to be decided on the objective basis. There is no question of the plaintiff getting any damage for the loss of the normal expectation of life. It is difficult to estimate the actual amount of damage which the plaintiff is entitled to claim under this head. Yet it has to be decided on the objective basis. There is no question of the plaintiff getting any damage for the loss of the normal expectation of life. No evidence has been led to show as to what would have been his normal expectation of life which has been impaired by the injury caused to the plaintiff. In Benham v. Gambling, reported in 1941 AC 157 Lord Simon laid down as follows: "The main rule is that, whether in the case of a child or an adult, very moderate figures should be chosen. In putting a money value on the prospective balance of happiness in years that the deceased might otherwise have lived, the jury or judge of fact is attempting to equate incommensurables. .........The sum given is not to be determined by applying a statistical or actuarial test as to the number of days or years of life of which the individual has been deprived. For 'the thing to be valued is not the prospect of length of days, but the prospect of a predominantly happy life.'" The amount of actual expenses and the loss salary and allowance conies to Rs. 9,871-2-6. In our opinion the plaintiff is thus entitled to a decree for Rs. 10,000/- as damages. The judgment of the Court below is modified and the plaintiff's suit is decreed for Rs. 10,000/- with proportionate cost throughout. The order of the Court below that the decree be executed as against defendant No. 2 at the first instance is maintained as the defendant No. 2 has not come up in appeal against the decree. CH/BNP/R.G.D. Order accordingly. -----------------------