Judgment :- 1. This case, if it has served little else, but served to expose a disquieting state of affairs regarding the disposal of valuable forest lands . belonging to a religious institution known as the Sree Pulpally Devaswom of which I trust due notice will be taken by the competent authority in the interests of the public administration and the preservation of our forest wealth no less than in the interests of this particular institution. 2. The Devaswom is in the Kozhikode District where the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short, the Act) is in force. It is governed by a scheme settled under the [since repealed] Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 which must, by reason of S.103 of the Act, be deemed to be a scheme settled under the Act. The scheme requires the Hindu Religious Endowments Board (now replaced by the Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments) to appoint a paid manager for the day to day management of the Devaswom, & in making the appointment, the Board is to have due regard to the claims and qualifications of the members of the family in which the hereditary trusteeship of the Devaswom is vested. Accordingly, the Board appointed the petitioner, a member of that family, as manager in November 1946, and the petitioner continued as manager until, by Ext. D dated 318 1962, the 1st respondent Commissioner suspended him from office and appointed the 4th respondent, the executive officer of another Devaswom, to function as manager until a suitable person was chosen from among the members of the trustee family. In between, in January 1955, the hereditary trustee, the 3rd respondent (the karanavan of the trustee family) had been suspended under S.45 of the Act and the petitioner appointed as "fit person" to discharge the functions of the trustee in his stead under sub-section (3) of that section. The petitioner held the office of fit person in addition to the office of manager until, in January 1962 the 3rd respondent was restored to the office of trustee as a result of his suspension being quashed by the High Court. 3. The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari or mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order quashing the order of suspension and restraining the 1st respondent Commissioner and his subordinates from giving effect to that order. 3. The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari or mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order quashing the order of suspension and restraining the 1st respondent Commissioner and his subordinates from giving effect to that order. The grounds on which he seeks this are: (1) That the order was without jurisdiction; and (2) That it was actuated by mala fides. 4. The first ground is based on the circumstances that while the scheme (Ext. A) makes provision for the dismissal of the manager by the Board (now the Commissioner) it does not expressly provide for the suspension of the manager pending enquiry into charges against him. Therefore, it is argued on the strength of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union (AIR. 1959 Supreme Court 1342 para 10), the 1st respondent Commissioner had no jurisdiction to suspend the petitioner. 5. This argument forgets that by rules made under S.100 (2) of the Act and issued in G. O. MS. No. 182, Rural Welfare, 5th February, 1953-page 50 of the Madras Rules and Notifications, 1953 in the 1953 supplement to the Madras Law Journal express provision is made for sudh suspension. R.1 of these rules says that the expression, "Executive Officer" includes any paid officer appointed under a scheme settled or deemed to be settled under the Act, by whatever designation called, provided that he is the highest executive authority in charge of the administration of the religious institution; and it is not disputed that the petitioner, although designated manager, satisfies this definition. R.15 empowers the appointing authority in the present case the Commissioner to impose penalties ranging from censure to dismissal upon Executive Officers and the last sentence of the first paragraph of R.16 which prescribes the procedure to be followed says, "an executive officer may be placed under suspension pending enquiry into grave charges where such suspension is necessary in the public interest and in the interest of the religious institutions concerned". Although the rule does not say who may make an order of suspension there under the rule is, on the face of it, badly drafted it is obvious that at least the authority competent to dismiss must have that power; and it is clear that the rule confers on the Commissioner the power to suspend the petitioner pending enquiry into grave charges the word "charges" here only means accusations and has no reference to the formal charges which under the earlier part of the rule have to be framed in the course of an inquiry so that the rule does not mean that suspension can be ordered only after formal charges have been framed where such suspension is necessary in the public interest, or the "and" of the rule doubtless, means "or" in the interest of religious institution concerned. Therefore the question whether the effect of an unauthorised suspension by a master is merely that he remains liable to pay the servant his wages or whether the latter can also insist on doing his work does not arise. 6. It is next contended that the conditions required by the rule for the exercise of the power of suspension are not satisfied. I do not agree. There are only two conditions, firstly, that an inquiry into grave charges should be pending, and, secondly, that suspension is necessary in the interests of the public or of the particular institution. Show cause is not a prescribed preliminary, nor does the rule contemplate a preliminary inquiry pending the formal inquiry before an order of suspension is made. Now, Ext. D shows that the 3rd respondent trustee hud, by a petition dated 30 81962, represented to the Commissioner that the petitioner had alienated large extents of Devaswom forest, with the timber, without the trustee's knowledge or consent, that he had misappropriated large sums of money, and that he had connived with trespass on Devaswom lands and colluded with the illicit removal and sale of timber causing loss to the tune of lakhs to the Devaswom. The Trustee's petition was forwarded by the Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioner for enquiry and report, and it was pending enquiry into the accusations made by the trustee, that the petitioner was placed under suspension with immediate effect. The Trustee's petition was forwarded by the Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioner for enquiry and report, and it was pending enquiry into the accusations made by the trustee, that the petitioner was placed under suspension with immediate effect. There can be no doubt that the charges levelled against the petitioner and in respect of which an enquiry was ordered were grave charges which, if proved, would merit dismissal. It is obvious, having regard to their nature, that if there were, the least basis for the charges, it would be necessary to place the petitioner under suspension in the public interest and in the interest of the Devaswom. And, it has to be inferred from the fact that the 1st respondent Commissioner directed an inquiry and that he thought there were sufficient grounds for holding an inquiry. It is true that the allegations as set out in Ext. D are rather vague and that no particulars whatsoever are given of the alleged misappropriation, the alleged trespass, and the alleged removal and sale of timber, beyond the statement that thousands and thousand of rupees had been misappropriated and loss to the tune of lakhs had been caused. Also, that one would like to have seen more evidence in the order itself of the Commissioner having applied his mind to the requirements of R.16 and. that he was satisfied on proper grounds that suspension was necessary in fact, the order does not refer to the rule at all; even the counter-affidavit filed by the 1st respondent Commissioner does not mention the rule but contends itself with saying that the relevant provisions under which the. Commissioner acted would be explained at the hearing. But I think that, in the circumstances of this case, it is reasonable to infer that the 1st respondent ordered the enquiry because he considered that the allegations made by the 3rd respondent trustee merited investigation, and, that being so, I think it follows that the suspension of the petitioner was necessary in the interests of the public and of the Devaswom. The charges in respect of which enquiry was ordered were without doubt grave charges and I think that the other element of suspension being necessary in the interests of the public, or of the religious institution concerned is satisfied, whether the rule prescribes this as an objective test or leaves it for the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner. 7. The charges in respect of which enquiry was ordered were without doubt grave charges and I think that the other element of suspension being necessary in the interests of the public, or of the religious institution concerned is satisfied, whether the rule prescribes this as an objective test or leaves it for the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner. 7. The 1st respondent Commissioner has indeed stated in his counter affidavit that he had previously had complaints from other sources, including the District Collector, which lent support to the charges levelled by the 3rd,; respondent trustee against the petitioner. And, although that is not expressly stated, he has implied that these complaints influenced him in ordering an enquiry and placing the petitioner under suspension. It would therefore appear, unless of course the charge of mala fides is established, that the Commissioner had good grounds for ordering an enquiry and for placing the petitioner under suspension pending the enquiry. 8. I might add that it is not necessary that the order of suspension should repeat the formula of the rule that suspension is necessary in the public interest and in the interests of the religious institution concerned. As I have said more than once, if the charges are of such a nature that, on their very face, it is apparent that it would be unsafe in the interests of the public or of the institution to retain the person concerned in office pending an investigation into the charge, it can be inferred, even if it is not expressly stated that the suspension was ordered because it was considered necessary in the interests of the public or of the institution concerned. 9. It has been argued that an order of suspension under the rule must he a speaking order, that the order itself must disclose the grounds on which it is based and that subsequent statements regarding the grounds cannot be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining whether the order was proper or not. The observations in Para.9 of the report in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas (AIR. 1952 Supreme Court 16) are relied upon as they often are in arguments of this sort. I do not think that the observations mean anything of the kind. The observations in Para.9 of the report in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas (AIR. 1952 Supreme Court 16) are relied upon as they often are in arguments of this sort. I do not think that the observations mean anything of the kind. What they mean is that a public order publicly made in exercise of statutory authority must be construed according to its tenor and cannot be construed in the light of subsequent statements, whether by way of clarification, explanation or modification, made by its author. But here we are not seeking to find out the meaning of the impugned order in the light of the 1st respondent's subsequent statements. The meaning is clear enough that the petitioner is placed under suspension, and the petitioner knows that as well as anybody else. Otherwise he need not have come to court. What the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent Commissioner does is to state grounds for the order which do not appear in the order itself. This is not construing the order and is clearly permissible See Glaxo Laboratories v. A. V. Venkataswaran (AIR. 1959 Bom. 272, Para.16). 10. The impugned order is a purely administrative order not subject to appeal, and ordinarily not subject to correction by court, and while I am far from suggesting that it is not desirable that an administrative order should be well-written and well-reasoned, I do not think that it can be assailed on the ground that it is not, or on the ground that it is not a speaking order. 11. The first ground on which the petitioner would have the impugned order quashed fails. With regard to the second, the averment in the affidavit filed in support of the petition is this: "I submit the order Ext. D is passed without bona fides and under circumstances which justify the apprehension that the said order was issued on grounds which are non-existent and untenable." However, a number of affidavits have since been filed both by the petitioner and by the 1st respondent Commissioner making charges & counter charges, the latter professedly by way of abundant caution and subject to his protest that the charges made and facts stated in the subsequent affidavits filed by the petitioner without as such obtaining the leave of the court, should be ignored. The sum total of what has been urged by the petitioner on this aspect of the matter is this. The 1st respondent Commissioner was directing the disposal of valuable forest lands and of valuable standing timber belonging to the Devaswom to his own nominees in violation of the law, and it was because he found that the petitioner would not agree to some of his proposals and was "a stumbling block" in his way that, taking advantage of what was probably an inspired complaint by the 3rd respondent trustee, he passed the impugned order placing the petitioner under suspension and appointing in his place the 4th respondent, the Executive Officer of a distant Devaswom, one of his own favourites who would have no such quales as the petitioner entertained. 12. Regarding the first part of this charge, namely, that the 1st respondent Commissioner was directing the lease of forest lands and the disposal of valuable timber in favour of his own nominees otherwise than in accordance. with the law, it is to be borne in mind that, under the general law, the power to acton behalf of a Devaswom vests in its trustee and that he, and he alone, can alienate the property of the Devaswom and even he only for a binding purpose. S.20 of the Act places further restrictions on this power of the trustee and provides, among other things, that any lease for a term exceeding five years of any immovable property of a religious institution shall be null and void unless it is sanctioned by the Commissioner as being necessary or beneficial to the institution. The section itself and the rules framed thereunder, make provision for an elaborate enquiry by the Commissioner after publishing the proposed transaction and inviting objections and suggestions in respect thereto and duly considering the objections and suggestions. An appeal is also provided to the Government from the order of the Commissioner, so that it would appear that the Commissioner acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. An appeal is also provided to the Government from the order of the Commissioner, so that it would appear that the Commissioner acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. That being so, notwithstanding that S.20 of the Act says that subject to the provisions of the Act and this qualification is important the administration of all religious endowments shall be subject to the general superintendence and control of the Commissioner and that such superintendence and control shall include the power to pass any orders which may be deemed necessary to ensure that such endowments are properly administered, I do not think that this power of general superintendence and control extends to the Commissioner initiating particular proposals for the disposal of the properties of a religious institution although it would doubtless extend to giving general directions regarding the matter. In fact, in a case for 'which his sanction would be necessary under S.29, I think it would be improper for the Commissioner to initiate action and then sit in judgment over his own proposal. Then, there is R.1 of the rules made under S.100 (2) (a) of the Act (issued in G. 0. MS. No. 281, Rural Welfare dated 12 81952 see page 265 of Ramanatha Iyer's commentary on the Act, Fourth Edition) which provides that all leases of immovable properties and rights (which perhaps would include felling rights) belonging to a religious institution shall be made by public auction held at the place where the property is situate. The succeeding rules make elaborate provision for giving wide publicity to the auction and for ensuring that the best possible price is secured. Yet we find from the documents filed in the case, and from his own counter affidavit, that the 1st respondent Commissioner was directing the petitioner, in his capacity as fit person discharging the functions of the trustee, to grant 99 year leases of extensive forest lands with the right to the valuable timber standing thereon to particular persons on stated terms without any public auction; that he was forwarding applications from these persons to the petitioner for disposal; and that, on applications by the petitioner for granting leases accordingly, he was according permission under S.29 of the Act holding that the leases were beneficial to the institution. 13. 13. That such is clear from the following undisputed facts: On 26 61961, the 1st respondent Commissioner held a conference with some of his own subordinates and the fit person and at this conference it was decided that out of the total available forest area of about 13,000 acres belonging to the Devaswom, 3000 acres would be earmarked for the bonafide needs of the Devaswom (whatever that might mean), that the timber value (sic) of 5000. acres would be sold in public auction, that the timber value (sic) of another 5000 acres along with the land would be made available to corporate institutions serving public interests ab the Kuttikanom rates approved by the Forest Department, and that these 10,000 acres, after extraction of the timber, would be reserved for colonisation by members of the Hindu community so that the sanctity of the temple may be preserved. (Ext. R2). This was followed by applications (Exts. E3 dated 2181961 and R6 dated 27 81961) by the petitioner as fit person to the 1st Commissioner for sanctioning the, lease of 6000 acres of forest land to the N.S.S., a corporate institution serving public interests, and 1000 acres to one Kolathu Iyer whose application (Ext. T3 dated 6 41961) for a lease of 2000 acres had been forwarded by the 1st: respondent to the petitioner. Then followed a number of applications (13 have been marked) from various persons for leases of the forest land, almost all of them to the 1st respondent Commissioner and forwarded by him to the fit person for necessary action. On 2111961, there was what has been described as a high level conference at the residence of the Minister for Religious Endowments in which the 1st respondent Commissioner, some of his subordinates, the petitioner as fit person, and an Ex-M. L. A. participated, At this conference it was decided that the lands belonging to the Devaswom should be leased out in blocks of 200 acres and 500 acres, the 200 acre blocks to individuals and the 500 acre blocks to groups, at a premium of Rs. 40/- per, acre and a rent of Rs. 40/- per, acre and a rent of Rs. 5/- per acre for dry lands and 71/2 paras of paddy per acre for paddy lands, that an extent of 500 acres close to the temple should be, preserved as virgin forest for the purposes of the temple and that 3000 acres should be earmarked for clear felling, on terms to be fixed by the 1st respondent after negotiation with a concern called the Elixir Trading Company, Kottayam, who it was said, had offered attractive rates. (Ext. R7, the minutes of this conference, was signed by the Minister in token of approval).On 4-11-1961, the 1st respondent Commissioner forwarded to the petitioner Ext. L, which describes itself as a list of persons to whom the forest lands had been allotted, and the endorsement made thereon by the 1st respondent said that the list had the concurrence of the Minister (H. R. & C. E.). This list showed that 2000 acres of forest land had already been granted on lease. Of the 13000 acres still available, 1500 acres were to be reserved for encroachers, 500 acres, for the Devaswom, and 4500 acres for the N. S. S. making a total of 6500 acres. The remaining 6500 acres were to be distributed amongst the 34 persons named therein (from all over the State, only the Districts of Cannanore and Palghat being unrepresented) in blocks of 500 acres and 200 acres, many of them persons whose applications had been forwarded by the 1st respondent Commissioner to the petitioner for necessary action. (One of these persons to whom 200 acres was allotted is, it is not disputed, a nephew of the 1st respondent Commissioner. The lease to him was also sanctioned by the 1st respondent under S.29 of the Act, but by a D. O. letter dated 28 51962 (R. 15) addressed to the petitioner the 1st respondent stayed the execution of the lease deed until further orders. A group of persons to whom 500 acres was originally allotted included, according to the 1st respondent himself, the wife of the petitioner, but since it was suggested that it would not look proper that the fit person's wife should figure as an allottee the name of some other person was substituted). A group of persons to whom 500 acres was originally allotted included, according to the 1st respondent himself, the wife of the petitioner, but since it was suggested that it would not look proper that the fit person's wife should figure as an allottee the name of some other person was substituted). Then, on 18121961 on applications made by the petitioner for granting leases to the persons named in the list, and to others, the 1st respondent Commissioner, after observing the formalities prescribed by S.29 of the Act and the rules thereunder, passed orders, Exts. X and AA18, granting permission for 99 year leases on a premium of Rs. 40/- per acre and an annual rental of Rs. 5/- per acre on the collection of Rs. 225/- to Rs. 300/-per acre as the value of the timber standing on the land. The timber and the lands were thus to be disposed of in favour of persons nominated by the 1st respondent Commissioner on specified terms not by public auction as required by the rules. And the 1st respondent certified that the leases were beneficial and in the best interests of the Devaswom for the reason that in the case of similar leases he had sanctioned in respect of the Emoor Bhagavathy, the Kottiyoor, and the Naduvil Vellat Devaswoms, dispensing with public auction, the premium and timber value received were much less! 14. The present petition was brought on 10 91962. A week later, on 17 91962, the 1st respondent Commissioner issued the memorandum, Ext. S. to the 3rd respondent trustee saying that although he (the Commissioner) had from time to time granted permission under S.29 of the Act for leasing out the forest lands of the Devaswom, it was understood that no lease deeds had actually been executed. He directed the trustee to satisfy himself that the leases for which permission had been accorded by him were really beneficial to the Devaswom; and if he (the trustee) had reason to think that any of the proposed leases was detrimental to the interests of the Devaswom, he was not to proceed with the execution of the lease deed but was to submit fresh proposals if necessary. 15. 15. Under S.3 of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1940, the lease of forest land, or the cutting of trees in a forest, requires the previous permission of the District Collector even though the forest is a private forest. It would appear that the 1st respondent was obtaining applications for the purpose from persons in whose favour he had sanctioned the grant of leases, on forms cyclostyled in his office (even making corrections in the applications in his own handwriting), and forwarding them to the petitioner for signature and transmission to the Collector. Under the Act in question, the permission is to be granted by the Collector in the exercise of his own discretion after due enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the rules; and yet, the 1st respondent Commissioner (who in his capacity as Member, Board of Revenue, is the official superior of the Collector) got his Personal Assistant to write a D. O. (Ext. A A19 dated 26 51962) to the Personal Assistant of the Collector to see to it that the applications were granted so that the Devaswom may proceed with the execution of the lease deeds. 16. It would also appear that the 1st respondent Commissioner was, from time to time, granting permission to the N. S. S. and the other nominees in Ext. L and to others, leases to whom were pending sanction by him, to enter upon the lands proposed to be leased and construct sheds thereon and appoint watchmen to guard against encroachments. Further, that he was interesting himself in the actual allocation of the lands between the several nominees and demarcating, on a sketch prepared for the purpose, the particular portions to be given to each. 17. All this is, as I have already observed, most disquieting. It has been urged by the 1st respondent that there were compelling reasons; that the only way of preventing wholesale trespass on the forest lands with the consequent loss of those lands and the timber to the Devaswom was to lease the lands to individuals known to be powerful enough to repel trespass; and that the decisions were not his own but were high level decisions in which the Minister himself participated. I am not really concerned with this although I must confess I am unable to follow why it should be assumed that the highest bidder at a public auction will prove to be a weakling, helpless, like the Devaswoms, to protect or secure protection for, his rights. I am, however, tempted to observe that reasons however compelling, and administrative decisions, howsoever high the level at which they are taken, cannot alter the law, or the fact that the 1st respondent Commissioner who is by law charged with the duty of seeing that endowments coming within the scope of the Act are properly administered and that the trustees do their duties faithfully and properly, has been taking an undue interest in the disposal of very valuable properties belonging to the Devaswom in favour of particular persons leading, literally, to the charge of nepotism, and that he has been directing disposal otherwise than in accordance with the law. 18. But, as I have indicated, we are not here directly concerned with the conduct of the 1st respondent Commissioner, and, if the petitioner is to succeed in his plea of mala fides he must establish the connection he has alleged between the conduct of the 1st respondent Commissioner and the order of suspension, namely, .that it was really because he (the petitioner) was a "stumbling block" in the way of the 1st respondent, and not because of the allegations made against him by the 3rd respondent trustee, that the 1st respondent directed an enquiry and placed him under suspension pending the enquiry. I am afraid that there is little to establish the connection. There is nothing to show that the petitioner ever stood in the 1st respondent's way. On the other hand it would appear that he was actively and willingly participating in everything that was done, often improving on the directions he received. Quite apart from the allegations made by the 3rd respondent trustee, I should think that there is sufficient material in this case justifying the order made against the petitioner. 19. The petitioner relies on four circumstances to establish the connection he alleges. Quite apart from the allegations made by the 3rd respondent trustee, I should think that there is sufficient material in this case justifying the order made against the petitioner. 19. The petitioner relies on four circumstances to establish the connection he alleges. The first is that the impugned order was made the very day the petition on which it purports to proceed was received by the 1st respondent-Commissioner the suggestion is that the petition was obtained for the purpose and that the order was made without the petitioner being heard, and without any manner of enquiry, on the basis of allegations which though tall were vague. The second is that the impugned order reads as if the suspension was directed merely because the 3rd respondent trustee asked for it. It states no grounds for ordering the suspension, and gives no indication, at any rate no express indication, that the 1st respondent Commissioner himself thought that there was any substance in the accusations and that the suspension of the petitioner was necessary in the interests of the public and of the institution, in fact, that the 1st respondent Commissioner had R.16 which alone gives him the power to order suspension, in mind when he ordered the suspension. The third is that the impugned order while directing the Deputy Commissioner to hold the inquiry proclaimed that the Assistant. Commissioner (who should ordinarily have held it) could not be thought of since it had been alleged that he was hand in glove with the petitioner. It is said that the implication of this statement is that the Deputy Commissioner should find the petitioner guilty on pain of being similarly branded. And the fourth is that the 4th respondent, the full time Executive Officer of a Devaswom about a hundred miles away, should have been chosen to take the petitioner's place as manager. 20. Taking the last first I must say that there is nothing whatsoever to support the suggestion made that the 4th respondent is a favourite of the 1st respondent Commissioner and nothing to show that the 1st respondent's case that for a mere stop-gap arrangement, pending the selection of a suitable member of the trustee family, the 4th respondent was the most suitable man available that he could think of, is not true. Moreover this circumstance can gain significance only if we first assume the hypothesis to be proved and the attempt made by the petitioner is reminiscent of attempts sometimes made by prosecutors to show how well a particular circumstance fits in with a hypothesis of guilt and from that argue that it proves the guilt. 21. Turning next to the third, I say nothing, and need say nothing, about the administrative propriety of condemning the Assistant Commissioner in a communication addressed to a person over whom it is his duty to exercise superintendence and control, but I think that the inference which the petitioner would have me draw is very farfetched. And I might add, though it is scarcely relevant to the present matter, that a new officer has taken charge as Commissioner so that the petitioner need have no apprehension of the scales being weighted against him. 22. With regard to the second circumstance, I think it might well be argued-that it is a circumstance which tends to show the contrary. For, it might well be said that mala fides is, as a rule incompatible with indifference and is generally able to muster a certain measure of competence in order to carry out its object. If the impugned order were actuated by mala fides one would expect it to protest over much rather than otherwise. 23. So far as the first circumstance is concerned I have already said all that there is to be said about it and I do not think that it in any way serves to establish the alleged connection. 24. In the view I have taken I think it unnecessary to pronounce upon the contention advanced on behalf of the 1st respondent that the impugned order being a purely administrative order not affecting any fundamental rights does not come within the scope of interference under Art.226 of the Constitution. 25. I dismiss the petition but make no order as to costs. Dismissed.