JUDGMENT S.D. Singh, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent for the preceding three years and for ejectment of the defendant under Cl. (a) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 3 of 1947 (to be referred to hereafter as the Act). The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff for about 10 years by the time the suit was filed and according to the plaintiff's allegations no rent was paid by him at all during that period. The plaintiff, therefore, served a notice of demand under Cl. (a) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act on him, mentioning the entire arrears for the preceding ten years and also a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant sent a money order for five year's rent, but the plaintiff refused to accept the same, and filed this.suit for his ejectment. He, however, claimed arrears of rent in the suit for only three years. The defendant alleged that rent for the first five years had already been paid by him, and that the rent for the remaining five years was sent by him by money order, which the plaintiff refused to accept and that, therefore, he was not liable to be ejected. This contention was accepted by the Munsif, who dismissed the suit for ejectment, but decreed the suit for arrears of rent for the last three years. The plaintiff went up in appeal, and the appellate court held that no payment was made by the defendant towards the rent for the first five years, that rent for that period was also due and that, as the defendant sent the money order for five year's rent only, there was default in the payment of rent within the meaning of Sec. 3 (1) (a) of the Act. The suit for ejectment of the defendant was also, therefore, decreed in appeal. 2. The first question, which was raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant in this second appeal, was about the payment of rent for the first five years. The finding recorded by the Civil Judge in respect of that question is, however, a finding of fact based on evidence, and cannot, therefore, be interfered with in second appeal. 3. 2. The first question, which was raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant in this second appeal, was about the payment of rent for the first five years. The finding recorded by the Civil Judge in respect of that question is, however, a finding of fact based on evidence, and cannot, therefore, be interfered with in second appeal. 3. The only other question urged in this appeal was as to whether the plaintiff could serve a notice of demand under Cl, (a) of sub-Sec. (I) of Sec. 3 of the Act in respect of even those arrears of rent which had already become barred by time, and in respect of which no suit for recovery could be filed, and if non-payment of such arrears would also entail the consequences contemplated in Sec. 3 of the Act. 4. There is one decision of this court reported in Sohan Lal Kharbanda v. Dr. Sri Ram Sinha, 1957 A.L.J. 503. It is based on Cl. (a) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1954. This clause then read: (a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within a month of the service upon him of the notice of demand from the landlord." It was held in that case that the expression "arrears of rent" meant that rent for a certain period which should have been paid when it became due was not paid. Reference is also made in this decision to the word "any" and it has been held that the plain meaning of the clause is that the arrears referred to therein include even those arrears the recovery of which had be-come barred under the law of limitation. 5. The appellant's contention was that Cl. (a) aforesaid was so interpreted in that case because of the use of the word `any' in it, and that since that word is not to be found in the present clause, that decision would no longer be of any help in interpreting the provisions of the present clause. 6. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on two decisions, one of this court and the other of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, viz., Sharafat Ullah Khan v. Raja Udairaj Singh, A.I.R. 1959 Alld. 6. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on two decisions, one of this court and the other of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, viz., Sharafat Ullah Khan v. Raja Udairaj Singh, A.I.R. 1959 Alld. 416 = 1959 A. L.J. 644 and Ram Narayan v. Benji, A.I.R. 1959 M.P. 36. Neither of these two decisions has, however, any application to the facts of the present case. The Madhya Pradesh decision relates to a notice of demand, which mentioned a false and excessive claim for arrears of rent, under a provision similar to Sec. 3(1) (a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The view taken is even contrary to the decisions of this court, two among them, Ram Pratap v. Panna Lal, 1956 A.L.J. 787 and Manohar Lal v. Bimal Kumar, 1955 A.W.R. (H) 395 = 1955 A.L.J. 435 having been referred to and dessented from. 7. In Sharafat Ullah Khan's case, A.I.R. 1959 Alld. 416 = 1959 A. L.J. 644 also the question for decision was whether the amendment made in Cl. (a) of Sec. 3(1) in 1954 applied to pending suits for ejectment and it was held that it did not. 8. The main question for consideration in this case is whether the expression "arrears of rent" used in Cl. (a) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act includes only recoverable arrears of rent or even those arrears of rent which were due at the time of service of notice of demand, though recovery thereof may have been barred under the law of limitation. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the provisions of the Act should be so construed as not to militate against the provisions of other enactments, particularly Sec. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act. Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act does not, however, make time-barred debts non existent. All what that section provides is that a suit, instituted after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed therefor, shall be dismissed, even though limitation may not have been set up in defence. That does not mean that a debt which has become time barred ceases to exist. All what that section provides is that a suit, instituted after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed therefor, shall be dismissed, even though limitation may not have been set up in defence. That does not mean that a debt which has become time barred ceases to exist. This is in fact what has to be inferred even from the provisions of Sec. 60 of the Indian Contract Act which provides: "60 - Where the debtor has omitted to intimate and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits." The clear implication under this section is that even though a debt may have become barred by time, it continues to be due and payable and payable to an extent that if at the time of making a particular payment the debtor has not specified towards which particular debt the payment is to be appropriated, the creditor may appropriate it even towards it, i.e., the time-barred debt. 9. A time-barred debt, therefore, continues to be payable, and debts may even be paid by the debtors. The question is whether arrears of rent, for the recovery of which a suit cannot be filed, are to be included in the expression "arrears of rent" within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act. If the intention of the Legislature were that the arrears of rent, which are to be taken into consideration in applying the provisions of Cl. (a) aforesaid, are to be only those arrears in respect of which a suit for recovery could be filed, the expression used would have been "arrears of recoverable rent" or "arrears of rent" or some similar expression in Cl. (a), rather than the bare expression "arrears of rent." 10. Although in Sohan Lal Kharbanda v. Dr. Sri Ram Sinha, 1957 A.L.J. 503 even the use of the word `any' has been considered and given its due meaning, the bare expression "arrears of rent" has been understood to be wide enough to include even those arrears recovery of which has already become barred by time. Although in Sohan Lal Kharbanda v. Dr. Sri Ram Sinha, 1957 A.L.J. 503 even the use of the word `any' has been considered and given its due meaning, the bare expression "arrears of rent" has been understood to be wide enough to include even those arrears recovery of which has already become barred by time. It is observed: "The plain and natural meaning of the expression `arrears of rent' is that the rent for a certain period which should have been paid when it became due was not paid. The recovery of past arrears may be barred by law of limitation, nevertheless the default made in the payment of rent remains an arrear. The expression `arrears of rent' is wide enough to include even those arrears which could not be recovered in a court of law. The reason is obvious. The remedy of a landlord to recover an arrear may be lost by reason of the law of limitation but the tenant's liability in equity to pay the past rent subsists." 11. Even though, therefore, the word `any' which was used prior to 1954 is not used in the present Cl. (a), the intention behind the use of words "arrears of rent" has been to include any arrears recovery of which may be within or beyond time. 12. It was urged that Sec. 3 of the Act cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to enlarge the rights of a landlord, giving him rights which he did not otherwise possess. While there is no question of interpreting the pro-visions of the Act in that manner, it is not even, at the same time, permissible to enlarge the scope of the restrictions placed upon his rights. Sec. 3 curtails the rights of a landlord, inasmuch as he can of file a suit for ejectment except under one or the other of the circumstances enumerated in the section. One of those circumstances is the non payment of arrears of rent in spite of notice of demand. The restriction on the landlord's right to file a suit for ejectment is thus relaxed to that extent. One of those circumstances is the non payment of arrears of rent in spite of notice of demand. The restriction on the landlord's right to file a suit for ejectment is thus relaxed to that extent. It may be that the land lord is not entitled to file a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent which have already become time barred, but the Legislature could all the same say that a tenant who wants to conto retain his tenancy rights in the accommodation should not have any arrears of rent against him, and should pay even those arrears which have become barred by time, and that even though the landlord may not be entitled to file .a suit for the recovery of those arrears, the tenant would have no right to resist the suit for his ejectment, if he, in spite of a notice of demand, does not pay those arrears which have become barred by time. The Legislature has been only fair to the landlords in making the provision for the ejectment of the tenant to that effect inasmuch as a tenant who does not pay arrears of rent cannot in equity be said to be entitled to retain possession over it merely because the arrears of rent cannot be recovered by the landlord. 13. The meaning of Cl. (a) of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, is, therefore, clear. The tenant is liable to be ejected if he does not pay even those arrears of rent recovery of which has become barred by time. 14. The appeal is dismissed under Or. 41, R. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.