JUDGMENT : The appellant in this second appeal was the first defendant in the suit. The first respondent in the second appeal filed a suit against the appellant and against the second respondent, who was second defendant in the suit for redemption of a mortgage Ext. A/1 dated 22-4-1957. The first respondents case was that though the document Ext. A/1 was ostensibly a sale deed it was in real fact intended to toe a mortgage deed, that while the consideration for Ext. A/1 is stated as Rs. 340/-, the property mortgaged which was a little over one pari of land was worth Rs. 1,300/- on the date of sale and it was agreed that the first respondent was to continue in possession of the property and continue to pay the revenue and to pay interest at the rate of 12 pots of paddy a year, that ignoring all this the appellant transferred the property by sale to the second respondent and that accordingly the first respondent and the appellant went to the Sub-Registrars Office on 8-1-1958 for the purpose of redemption of the mortgage deed and for the execution of the necessary document and the first respondent offered the mortgaged money to the appellant but that the appellant evaded to execute the document on some pretext and on the same day the appellant transferred the property to the second respondent for Rs. 900/- and hence the first respondent was forced to file the suit. 2. The appellant alone contested the suit and the second respondent was ex-parte. According to the appellant, the document Ext. A/1 was an out and out sale deed and he further contend 3d that Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act was a bar to any evidence being let to show that Ext. A/1 was a mortgage. He further said that the property was worth only Rs. 340/-, that he had obtained possession and that the value of the property rose because he had spent Rs. 1,000/-for improving the property before he sold it to the second respondent. 3. Both the lower Courts did not accept the appellants contention that Sec. 92 was a bar to the document being proved to be a mortgage. The first Court allowed evidence about the surrounding circumstances to be let in and both the lower Courts came to the conclusion on the evidence that the property was worth Rs. 3. Both the lower Courts did not accept the appellants contention that Sec. 92 was a bar to the document being proved to be a mortgage. The first Court allowed evidence about the surrounding circumstances to be let in and both the lower Courts came to the conclusion on the evidence that the property was worth Rs. 1,300/- on the date of Ext. A/1. They further found that the first respondent continued in possession of the property and that he paid the revenue for the property even after the date of Ext. A/1. They also accepted the first respondents case that he had tendered the mortgaged money to the appellant at the Sub-Registrars Office where they had gone for the redemption of the mortgage on 8-1-1958. Both the Courts disbelieved the story of the alleged improvements effected by the appellant to the extent of Rs. 1,000/-. The appellant did not persist in that the story in the course of the evidence and the appellants own witnesses admitted that the property was worth over Rs. 1,000/- on the date of Ext. A/1. Hence, the first Court decreed the suit for redemption and the appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. Hence, the appellant has come up in second appeal. 4. What was seriously urged before me was that in the face of the clear and plain language of the document Ext. A/1, showing it to be an and out sale deed, parole evidence to show that it was in fact, intended to be a mortgage deed should not have been allowed to be let in by the lower Courts in view of Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act. The lower appellate Court had relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in Sait Balumal Dharmdas Firm Bankers v. G. Venkata Chelapathi Rao, (S) AIR 1955 Mad 78 , in coming to the conclusion that parole evidence to prove a fact showing in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts may be let in. My attention was drawn by the appellant to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Firm Bolumal Dharmdas v. Venkatachelapathi Rao, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 612, to show that the said decision of the Madras High Court had gone in Letters Patent Appeal to the Andhra Pradesh High Court and that the Andhra Pradesh High Court had reversed the said decision and held that extrinsic evidence to prove the intention of the parties for construing an instrument will violate Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act, and that it is not competent for Court to look into the evidence of surrounding circumstances to find out whether a document, which purported to be an out and out sale, was intended to take effect only as a security bond. For the first respondent, my attention was drawn to the-decision of this Court Thongam Ningol Mema v. Thongam Bokul Singh, AIR 1962 Manipur 45 , in which this Court had held that oral evidence though not of the parties or attesting witnesses or the scribe to show that at the time of the execution of the document the parties agreed as between themselves that the document was not a sale but a mortgage, will be admissible to show the surrounding circumstances or the conduct of the parties which will show that it was only a mortgage and not a sale deed. 5. Thus, we have two opposite views on this question. What we have sot to see is whether the views of this Court should continue to be followed or whether the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court should be preferred. Section 92 of the Evidence Act is as follows : "92. When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representative-in-interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms : x x x x x". If the section had stood by itself, it is clear that no oral evidence can be let in for the purpose of contradicting, varying adding to, or subtracting from the term of a document. If the section had stood by itself, it is clear that no oral evidence can be let in for the purpose of contradicting, varying adding to, or subtracting from the term of a document. But there are six provisos to the said section which qualified the main body of the section and which mentioned the exceptions under which certain facts in respect of the document in question can be proved. We are not concerned with the first 5 provisos in the present case, but with proviso 6, which is as follows : "Proviso "(6) - Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing fact". Proviso 6, is further clarified by the 3 following sections, namely, Sections 93, 94 and 85, which are as follows : "93. When the language used in a document is on its face, ambiguous or defective, evidence may not be given of facts which would show its meaning or supply its defects, 94. When language used in a document is plain in itself, and when it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it was not meant to apply to such facts. 95. When language used in a document is plain in itself, but is unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may be given to show that it was used in a peculiar sense". 6. Now Sec. 93 provides that where the language used in a document is on its face, ambiguous or defective, evidence may not be given on facts which would show its meaning or supply its defects. This makes it clear that proviso 6 of Sec. 92 will not apply to a case where the language is ambiguous or defective as any fact, which will clarify the ambiguity, in relation to existing facts cannot be proved in the face of Sec. 93. Thus, proviso 6 would apply only to cases where the language used in a document is not ambigous or defective. This takes us to Secs. 94 and 93. Section 94 states that when the language is plain in itself and when it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it was not meant to apply to such facts. This takes us to Secs. 94 and 93. Section 94 states that when the language is plain in itself and when it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be given to show that it was not meant to apply to such facts. This would mean that when language used in the document is plain in itself hut it does not apply accurately to existing facts, evidence may be given to prove that it was not meant to apply to such existing facts. This is made further clear by Section 95. When language used in a document is plain in itself, but is unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may be given to show that the language was used in a peculiar sense. I wish to emphasise that Secs. 94 and 95 dealt with cases where the language used in a document is clear and unambiguous, but where it does not apply accurately to existing facts. 7. We have now to see what is meant by the expression "existing facts" in Sec. 92, proviso 6 and in Secs. 94 and 95. To my mind, it means the surrounding circumstances existing at the time the document as executed. It will also mean the conduct of the parties at the time. It will also mean if the document is questioned after a passage of some time after its execution, the conduct if the parties subsequent to the execution of the document and up to the time when the document was questioned in Court. Thus, where the language in a document is clear and unambiguous, but it was alleged in the proceeding in Court that the said language had no meaning in relation to existing facts, namely, in relation to the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties at the time of the execution of the document and the conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of the document, the Court can allow parole evidence to be let in under proviso 6 to Sec. 92 to prove the said facts to show in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts. 8. We have the well-known decision of the Privy Council Balkishen Das v. W.F. Legge, ILR 22 All 149. 8. We have the well-known decision of the Privy Council Balkishen Das v. W.F. Legge, ILR 22 All 149. That was a case of a deed of sale of land for value which was accompanied by a deed of agreement between the parties for purchase back by the Render of the land on payment by him of money to the vendee on a future date fixed. The vendor did not exercise his right of repurchase within the fixed time. But after many years he gave notice of his intention to redeem and brought the suit to enforce his right of redemption as upon, a mortgage by conditional sale. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the case had to be decided on a consideration of the documents themselves, with only such extrinsic evidence of circumstances as might be required to show the relation of the written language to existing facts. It has to be mentioned however that it was admitted, before their Lordships that the case before them could not be brought within any of the provisos to Sec. 92 and hence their Lordships did have to consider any of the provisos in that case. Another decision of the Privy Council is Narasingerji Gyanagerji v. P. Parthasaradhi Rayanim Garu, AIR 1924 PC 226. That was again a case of a sale deed along with a document of repurchase within a fixed date and the question was whether it amounted to a mortgage by conditional sale. Though on the face of it, it was an out and out sale, their Lordships held that the transaction ostensibly a sale with a right of repurchase in the vendor was only mortgage by conditional sale and referred to the fact that the price paid for the same was extremely inadequate, that the vendors right in mines were not sold and other circumstances. Their Lordships further held that the view that there has been introduced in the law of India by Sec. 92 such a radical change in the law of evidence as would have the effect of excluding from the class of mortgages many transactions which before the Evidence Act would have been held to be within that class is not correct. Further they held that surrounding circumstances such as clearly go to show in what manner the language of the documents was related to existing facts are to be taken into consideration. Further they held that surrounding circumstances such as clearly go to show in what manner the language of the documents was related to existing facts are to be taken into consideration. 9. It is in the light of these well-known decisions of the Privy Council that the decisions of the High Courts cited before me have to be considered. In the decision, AIR. 1959 Andh-Pra 612, it has been held on a construction of Secs. 92, 94 and 95 of the Evidence Act that it is only in cases where the terms of the document leave the question in doubt, that resort could be had to proviso 6 of Sec. 92, but that when a document is a straightforward one and presents no difficulty in construing it, the proviso does not apply. I find myself unable to agree with these observations. I have pointed out earlier that where the terms of a document are ambiguous or defective, Sec. 93 of the Evidence Act has specifically laid down that evidence to show its meaning or to supply the defects cannot be let in. Thus, proviso 6 of Sec. 92 will not apply to a case where the terms of a document are ambiguous. Proviso 6, on the other hand, applies only to cases where the terms of a document are clear and unambiguous, but where the terms have no meaning in relation to existing facts. This is made cleat beyond doubt by Secs. 94 and 95. The illustration to Sec. 95, which is as follows - "A sells to B by deed my house in Calcutta. A had no house in Calcutta, but it appears that he had a house at Howrah, of which B had been in possession since the execution of the deed. These facts may be proved to show that the deed related to the house at Howrah". clearly proves this. From the terms in the document, it was clear and unambiguous that the house old was in Calcutta. But it did not fit in with the existing fact that possession was given of the house at Howrah and that the vendor had no house in Calcutta, but had one in Howrah. In such a case parole evidence can be let in to show that the term of the document was wrong in relation to existing facts. But it did not fit in with the existing fact that possession was given of the house at Howrah and that the vendor had no house in Calcutta, but had one in Howrah. In such a case parole evidence can be let in to show that the term of the document was wrong in relation to existing facts. I should say that the illustration disproves that parole evidence cannot be let in, where the terms of a document are plain and unambiguous. No doubt, in the two Privy Council decisions, which I cited earlier, proviso 6 to Sec. 92 was not relied on and so their Lordships did not have to consider the question whether parole evidence should be allowed to be let in. In those cases even though the two documents were ostensibly sales, there were indications in the documents themselves to show that they were intended as mortgages and so parole evidence was not necessary. But where parole evidence is necessary to decide the question, it has to be allowed to be let in the light of proviso 6 of Sec. 92 read with Secs. 93, 94 and 95 of the Evidence Act. 10. In order that the main body of Sec. 92 should apply to prevent evidence being admitted for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from the terms of a document, two things are necessary, namely, that the language used in the document is plain in itself and that it applies accurately to existing facts. If the language is plain but it does not apply accurately to existing facts and is without meaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may be given to show that the language in the document was used in a peculiar sense. 11. Now coming to the matter before us, we have here a document, which is written as a sale deed. The contention of the vendor is that the language used in the document had no meaning to relation to existing facts. He pointed out that the consideration, namely, Rs. 840/- shown in the document was far less than the real value of the property which according to him was Rs. 1,300/-. Secondly he pointed out that no possession of the property was given, but that it continued to be with the vendor. Thirdly he showed that even after the document, He continued to pay the revenue. 840/- shown in the document was far less than the real value of the property which according to him was Rs. 1,300/-. Secondly he pointed out that no possession of the property was given, but that it continued to be with the vendor. Thirdly he showed that even after the document, He continued to pay the revenue. Lastly he pointed out that subsequent to the execution of the document the appellant was agreeable to the property being redeemed and that both of them went to the Sub-Registrars Office for the purpose and at the Sub-Registrars Office the first respondent tendered the money, but the appellant put off the redemption on some pretext and immediately thereafter he executed the sale deed in favour of the second respondent. The question in this case is whether evidence in respect of the above existing facts, which would go to show that Ext. A/1 was not sale deed, but was only a mortgage deed should be allowed to be let in. In my opinion, the trial Court was perfectly right in applying proviso 6 to Sec. 92 read with Secs. 94 and 95 of the Evidence Act in allowing the existing facts to be proved in order to show that the Ext. A/1 was really only a mortgage and not sale deed. On the evidence both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that all the above facts have been proved by the first respondent, which would go to show that Ext. A/1 was not intended as a sale deed. Under the circumstances, I see no reason to interfere in this second appeal and hold that the lower Courts were right in treating Ext. A/1 as a mortgage and in granting a redemption decree. The second appeal fails and it is dismissed with the costs of the first respondent. Appeal dismissed.