JUDGMENT The petitioner in these Civil Revision Petitions is one Kathayya Radayachi. The respondents, Ponnan, Thangayyan ana Marimuthu filed ‘applications before the Rent Court, Kumbakonam, under section 9of Madras Act XXIV of 1956 for fixation of fair rent in respect of parcels of wet lands alleged to be in their possession as “cultivating tenants”. They claimed that they were tenants under Kathayya Padayachi under a tenancy agreement and that the Act conferred upon them the privilege of paying not the stipulated rent agreed to be paid, but the rent payable as “ fair rent” to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act. These applications were resisted by Kathayya Padayachi and one of the grounds urged by him was that the applicants for fixation of fair rents were not entitled to the benefits of the Act as they were merely sub-tenants holding under him who was himself a tenant having taken on lease the lands forming the subject-matter of the dispute from the owners thereof. Admittedly, the lands belonged to two individuals, Muruga Doss and Natarajan, and, admittedly Kathayya Padayachi had taken the lands on lease from them. There was thus no dispute regarding the status of Kathayya Padayachi as the chief tenant and the status of the applicants in the fair rent applications as subtenants. The question raised therefore was whether the sub-tenants holding agricultural lands for cultivation would be entitled to seek the aid of the provisions of the Fair Rent Act (Madras Act XXIV of 1956). The Rent Court, Kumbakonam, reached the conclusion that the applications were not maintainable and accordingly dismissed the applications. The respondents herein preferred appeals before the District Munsif's Court, Kumbakonam, the Rent Tribunal constituted under the Act as the appellate forum, and were successful. The learned District Munsif held that the applications were maintainable and remanded the applications for the purpose of fixing the quantum of fair rent. These orders are now challenged before me by Kathayya Padayachi. It will be convenient to refer to Kathayya Padayachi as the chief tenant and to the respondents Ponnan, Thangayyan and Marimuthu as sub-tenants in this judgment. The rights of a sub-tenant in possession of agricultural lands holding under the chief tenant in the light of the provisions of the two enactments, Madras Act XXV of 1955 (The Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955) and Madras. The rights of a sub-tenant in possession of agricultural lands holding under the chief tenant in the light of the provisions of the two enactments, Madras Act XXV of 1955 (The Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955) and Madras. Act XXIV of 1956 (The Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Payment of Fair Rent Act, 1956) have been the subject of controversy and have given rise to conflict of judicial opinion. The reason is not far to seek. Though the question is purely one of construction of the relevant provisions of the statute, learned Judges have endeavoured to import the general law, if such an expression is permissible, of landlord and tenant into the rigid framework of the statute law. It seems to me that it would be very difficult for the common law of landlord and tenant, by which I mean the non-statutory law, to breathe-in the artificial atmosphere of the special statute governing the agrarian relationship of parties. The Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955, is a temporary Legislation the operation of which is being extended from time to time. Under Madras Act XII of 1959 the period of operation is prescribed as six years. The Act has made serious inroads upon the normal relationship of landlord and tenant governed by terms of contract between them, and, there cannot be any doubt that during the operation of the statute contractual rights cannot be recognised or enforced contrary to the statute. This Act uses the expression “ cultivating tenant” and “ landlord” and these terms have been defined. “ Cultivating tenant” is defined thus: “ Section 2 (a).-‘Cultivating tenant’ in relation to any land means a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied and includes- (i) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement, and (ii) the heirs of such person, but does not include a mere intermediary or his heirs.” “Landlord” is defines as follows: “ Section 2 (e).-‘Landlord ‘in relation to a holding or part thereof means the person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding or part.” The ‘cultivating tenant’ under this Act is a person clothed with special rights and he is certainly not the equivalent of a contractual lessee. He may be called a tenant or a lessee but, in the context of the Act, his rights and obligations are purely statutory. In regard to such a person it would be very difficult to hold that he is in possession of an interest in immovable property like that of a lessee having a leasehold interest with reversion in favour of the lessor. A ‘lease ‘as it is ordinarily understood in law and as defined under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, is a transfer of an interest in immovable property, that is, a right to enjoy such property. The essential characteristic of a lease is that the owner carves a subordinate interest out of his own without extinguishing his own interests in the corpus. During the currency of the lease the rights forming the bundle of ownership lie distributed between the lessor and lessee. Subject to the terms of the lease the lessee is entitled to be in possession and enjoyment of the property, should pay the stipulated rent to the lessor, should keep the property under proper repair and should surrender possession at the end of the lease period. The provisions of the Act do conflict with several of the legal aspects governing the relationship between landlord and tenant and to that extent they are really of an overriding character. But, it would be a misnomer to call a cultivating tenant, whose rights are mere creatures of the statute, a lessee in occupation of a demised land. A statutory tenant has no estate or property as a tenant but has only a personal right conferred by the statute. ( Roe v. Russel1 ; Carter v. S.U. Carburettor Co.2 ). It seems to me that such a person cannot have the best of both the worlds and say that for purposes of the Act he has certain rights which he can enforce against the landlord and that for other purposes he would fall back upon what the law would otherwise allow him. This certainly is an impossible position for any cultivating tenant to take because the result of the Act is to override and supersede the ordinary rights subsisting between landlord and tenant flowing from contractual agreement between them. Madras Act XXIV of 1956 is not a temporary Act like Madras Act XXV of 1955. The Legislature has not fixed any period for its operation. Madras Act XXIV of 1956 is not a temporary Act like Madras Act XXV of 1955. The Legislature has not fixed any period for its operation. So long as it remains unrepealed and is on the statute book it should be deemed to be a permanent piece of legislation. The limited scope of this enactment is only to prevent landowners from exacting high uneconomic rents from the tenant on the land and to rehabilitate the living conditions of tillers of the soil. This is not a new conception as even under the Madras Estates Land Act suitable safeguards had been made to prevent landlords levying and collecting exorbitant rents. A similar provision is also to be found in the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Payment of rent is only one of the aspects of the tenancy agreement, and, mere fixation of fair rent may not amount to the disturbance of other rights between the parties as secured by the terms of the agreement. But so long as Madras Act XXV of 1955 is in force, both that Act and the Fair Rent Act have got cumulative application and they have got to be read and construed together. I must also point out, however, that the definition of ‘landowner’ and ‘cultivating tenant’ under the Fair Rent Act is not precisely the same as the definition of those corresponding expressions in the Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act. The Fair Rent Act defines ‘cultivating tenant’ thus: “ Section 2 (b).-‘Cultivating tenant’ means a person who contributes his own physical labour or that of the members of his family in the cultivation of any land belonging to another, under tenancy agreement, express or implied, and includes any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement or the heirs of such person but shall not include a mere intermediary or his heirs.” Landowner ‘is defined thus: “ ‘landowner’ means the owner of the land let for cultivation by a cultivating tenant and includes the heirs, assignees, legal representatives of such owner, or person deriving rights through him.” The definition of the word ‘landowner’ in this Act is certainly significant, as I shall show presently in discussing the question whether a sub-tenant can put forward rights under the Act against his lessor, viz., the chief tenant. Unless the chief tenant can be brought within the definition of ‘landowner ‘no rights can be put forward against him even by a person who is let into possession at his instance under a tenancy agreement, express or implied. There are two decisions of this Court arising under the Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 to which I wish to refer. The question raised in those cases was whether the sub-tenant had any rights vis-a-vis his lessor, viz., the original lessee, which he could urge having regard to the provisions of the Act. The first decision is that reported in Ganapathi Iyer v. Ayyakannu3 , to which I was a party. The sub-tenant filed an application under section 3 (3) (b) of Madras Act XXV of 1955 which provides for an enquiry by the Revenue Divisional Officer into the quantum of rent payable by a cultivating tenant to his landlord. The landlord himself was a lessee under the owner and the owner, against whom the application was filed, resisted it on the ground that it was not maintainable. It was held that the sub-tenant had no rights under the Act and that therefore his application should fail. We observed as follows regarding the status of the sublessee: “Such under-lessee cannot claim to have any interest in the land derived from the cultivating tenant as such interest as is conferred upon the cultivating tenant is purely personal to him and his heirs. If the cultivating tenant himself cannot be supposed in law to have any estate as between himself and the head lessor much less can the sub-lessee claim any interest in himself. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that a sub-lessee or an under-lessee is wholly beyond the pale of the Act.” This decision proceeded on the footing that a cultivating tenant under the Act was not strictly a tenant as such but was only a creature of the statute, having only personal statutory rights. The under-lessee, whatever may be his contractual rights as against his lessor, was held not to be a person on whom the Act conferred any rights expressly or by necessary implication. In C.R.P. No. 1868 of 19601, another Division Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Anantanarayanan, J. again discussed the status of an under-lessee under the Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act. In C.R.P. No. 1868 of 19601, another Division Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Anantanarayanan, J. again discussed the status of an under-lessee under the Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act. The proceedings arose out of an application for restoration of possession under section 4 (5) of the Act. The learned Chief Justice, delivering the judgment of the Bench, agreed with the view taken in Ganapathi Iyer v. Ayyakannu2 , and observed thus: “In Ganapathi Iyer v. Ayyakannu2 , Jagadisan and Kailasam, JJ., held that an under-lessee or a person deriving title through a cultivating tenant would not be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of section 2 (l) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act. That was a case where the chief tenant was himself a statutory tenant under the Act. His sub-tenant claimed rights under the Act even as against the head lessor. That claim was rejected by the learned Judges. We express our respectful concurrence with that view.” But the learned Chief Justice, however, was of the opinion that certain of the observations contained in Ganapathi Iyer v. Ayyakannu2 , would not be correct. He was of opinion that the observations of Umamaheswaram, J., in Rangayya v. Tatayya3 , holding that a sub-lessee could put forward rights against his lessor was correct. I must mention that the Division Bench in Ganapathi Iyer v. Ayyakannu2 , had expressed its disagreement with this view of Umamaheswaram, J. The facts of the case dealt with by the learned Chief Justice clearly show that it was a case of term lease and that the sub-lease itself was during the period of the currency of the term. That was not a case where the sub-lessee was holding under a mere statutory tenant without a term of a lease period. The observations in C.R.P. No. 1868 of 19601have to be understood in the light and context of the facts of that case and I am not able to read that judgment as expressing any dissent from the general view taken by the Division Bench in Ganapathi Iyer v. Ayyakannu2. The observations in C.R.P. No. 1868 of 19601have to be understood in the light and context of the facts of that case and I am not able to read that judgment as expressing any dissent from the general view taken by the Division Bench in Ganapathi Iyer v. Ayyakannu2. The ratio of the decision of the learned Chief Justice is clearly brought out in the following observations: “In the present case there was no contractual lease by the respondent to the petitioner extending beyond his own term under the lease granted to him by the head lessor: the rights claimed now by the petitioner are not under any grant or contract by the respondent but only under the statute. The principle of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act which applies only to the case of a grant cannot obviously apply to a claim under the statute. The petitioner will therefore be not entitled to claim that he is a statutory tenant under the respondent even in respect of the subsequent lease obtained by him.” After having considered the view expressed by the learned Chief Justice with great care and due deference, I still adhere to my view that in a case where a sub-lessee is only a derivative holder from a cultivating tenant who is simply and merely a statutory tenant not clothed with any contractual rights as between himself and the head lessor he, the sub-lessee, cannot have any rights either under the Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 or under Madras Act XXIV of 1956. I have already attempted to point out that there is not any great difference of opinion or conflict between the view in Ganapathi Iyer v. Ayyakannu1and the view of the learned Judges in (C. R. P. No. 1868 of 1960.)2 Coming to the provisions of Madras Act XXIV of 1956, I am quite clear that the very definition of ‘landowner’ would not include within its scope, a sub-tenant or a sub-lessee. A ‘landowner’ is defined as a person owning the property let for cultivation or his heirs, assignees, and legal representatives or as one who is deriving rights through that owner. A contractual lessee, whose rights under the contract are not in any way impaired, may be said to be a holder of a derivative tenure from the lessor. A ‘landowner’ is defined as a person owning the property let for cultivation or his heirs, assignees, and legal representatives or as one who is deriving rights through that owner. A contractual lessee, whose rights under the contract are not in any way impaired, may be said to be a holder of a derivative tenure from the lessor. But, where the lessee himself is only a person with statutory rights with no estate in his possession, any person claiming title or putting forward rights through him cannot acquire the statutory right. A conveyance or grant can only operate to transfer rights of property. Personal rights cannot be the subject-matter of a contract. Of course no statutory right can be the subject-matter of a conveyance. An under-lessee or sub-lessee, therefore, of a statutory tenant: is a person without an estate and he is not a person having rights in regard to the property. Unless the chief tenant is a “ landowner” within the meaning of the Act, the sub-tenant cannot sustain the application. Section 3 states that every cultivating tenant shall be bound to pay the landowner and every landowner shall be entitled to collect from the cultivating tenant fair rent payable under the Act. Where a chief tenant is only a statutory tenant (without a term lease in his favour) he is not one who is deriving rights through the owner. Therefore a sub-lessee from another cultivating tenant who has no existence apart from the statute (Madras Act XXV of 1955), is not entitled to claim fixation of fair rent either against his landlord, because that landlord is not a ‘landowner’ or against the head lessor (owner) because there is no privity of contract between the sub-lessee and the head lessor. In C.R.P. No. 892 of 1959 Ganapatia Pillai, J., has taken the view that a subtenant can apply for fixation of fair rent under the Act. A contrary view has been taken by the learned Chief Justice in C.R.P. Nos. 1375 to 1377 of 1959. it is just likely that in the former case the application was against the chief tenant and in the latter case it was against the head lessor. If so there would be no conflict of opinion. A contrary view has been taken by the learned Chief Justice in C.R.P. Nos. 1375 to 1377 of 1959. it is just likely that in the former case the application was against the chief tenant and in the latter case it was against the head lessor. If so there would be no conflict of opinion. In the result, these Civil Revision Petitions are allowed, the order of the Rent Tribunal (District Munsif of Kumbakonam) is set aside and that of the Rent Court restored. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. V.S.-----Petitions allowed.