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1963 DIGILAW 69 (ORI)

MADANLAL JOSHI v. MADANLAL CHHAPOLIA

1963-05-02

MISRA

body1963
JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - This is a judgment-debtor?s appeal u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant facts are as follows: 2. Respondents are admittedly the owners and landlords of Municipal Holding Nos. 56, 57 and 58 of Ward No. XI in Cuttack Municipality. They filed an application u/s 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act. 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) against 7 persons alleging that opposite parties 1 to 3 in that application were the tenants and opposite parties 4 to 7 were sub-tenants in respect of specified portion: of the house inducted by opposite parties 1 to 3 without written consent of the landlords. Before the House Rent Controller (hereinafter called the Controller) only the tenants (opposite parties 1 to 3) contested alleging that they were not liable to be evicted and that they had indicted opposite parties 4 to 7 as sub-tenants with the consent of the landlords. In House Rent Control Cases Nos. 28 of 1959 and 46 of 1960, the Controller held that opposite parties 1 to 4 and 6 were not liable to be evicted. Orders for eviction were passed against opposite parties 5 and 7 as one of the tenants admitted that he had no knowledge if they were inducted as sub-tenants. Against the order of the Controller the landlords filed an appeal (House Rent Control Appeal No. 10 of 1961) which was dismissed. A Writ application to the High Court and an appeal against that order of the High Court to the Supreme Court by the landlords failed. The order of the Controller refusing to evict the tenants became final and conclusive against the landlords. The landlords have categorically asserted that the, tenants have been inducted in respect of the entire building for a monthly rent of Rs. 340/-. 3. Opposite party No. 5, before the Controller, is the present Appellant. He had also made an appeal (House Rent Control Appeal No. 11 of 1961) wherein he had taken the stand that as he was a sub-tenant under the tenants, the Controller had no jurisdiction to pass an order for eviction against him when the prayer for eviction was rejected as against the tenants His appeal failed. The order of the Controller directing eviction of the Appellant became final. 4. The order of the Controller directing eviction of the Appellant became final. 4. The landlords filed an application in the Court of the First Munsif, Cuttack, for execution of the order of the Controller as a decree. The judgment-debtor-Appellant took objection to the executability of the decree u/s 47, CPC alleging that the order of the Controller was without jurisdiction as it was passed against him on the footing that he was a trespasser. This contention was accepted by the learned Munsif. The landlords filed an appeal before the District Judge and the learned Judge allowed the appeal holding that the order for eviction passed by the Controller against the Appellant was on the footing that he was a sub-tenant and not a trespasser. This second appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned Judge. Mr. Pal raised the following contentions: (i) That the Controller passed the order of eviction against the Appellant on the footing that he was a trespasser such an order is without jurisdiction; (ii) A sub-tenant does not come within the definition of a tenant and the order of eviction passed against the sub-tenant is not a decree within the meaning of Section 7(1) of the Act; and (iii) The Controller having refused to eject the tenants under the landlords, the order passed by him directing eviction of the sub-tenants is incapable of execution. 5. The first contention that the order of eviction passed by the Controller was on the footing that the Appellant was a trespasser is not correct. Even the Appellant himself took the stand at the Appellate stage before the learned Additional District Magistrate that he was a sub-tenant. The landlord had taken the plea that the Appellant was a sub-tenant inducted by the tenants without their consent. It as the common case of the parties that the Appellant was a sub-tenant under the tenants. The difference only related to the question whether the sub-tenants were inducted with the consent of the landlords. After discussion of all the necessary facts, the learned Additional District Judge rightly held: These facts would show that he was treated as trespasser as held by the trial Court. The contention that the Appellant was evicted as a trespasser and the Controller had no jurisdiction to pass such an order, has no force. 6. After discussion of all the necessary facts, the learned Additional District Judge rightly held: These facts would show that he was treated as trespasser as held by the trial Court. The contention that the Appellant was evicted as a trespasser and the Controller had no jurisdiction to pass such an order, has no force. 6. Section 2, Sub-sections (4) and (5) of the Act define 'landlord' and 'tenant': (4) "Landlord" includes any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive a rent of a house whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others. (5) "Tenant" means any person by whom or whose behalf rent is payable for any house and includes every person who from time to time derives title under a tenant, or a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than under the provision of this Act, and shall include any person against whom a suit for ejectment is pending in a Court of competent jurisdiction but not a person against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made by such a Court. The definition of 'landlord' is not exhaustive while that of 'tenant' is exhaustive. Every person who from time to time derives title under a tenant comes within the definition of 'tenant'. This wide definition has been given to that persons, inducted as sub-tenants, may not take a defence for continuance of possession even though an order for ejectment is passed against the tenant. On these definitions there can be no doubt that a 'sub-tenant' is included the definition of a 'tenant'. 7. Mr. Pal relied on Section 7(1) of the Act in support of the contention that a landlord only can evict his tenants but cannot evict the sub-tenants. Section 7(1) enacts: A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. Emphasis is put on the word 'his'. It is contended that if a sub tenant would be included within the definition of 'tenant' then the word 'the' would be used in place of 'his'. It is merely a way of statutory drafting and nothing turns on the user of the word 'his'. Section 7(1), Clause (ii), Sub-clause (a) of the Act reinforces the conclusion that the sub-tenant come within the definition of tenant. It is merely a way of statutory drafting and nothing turns on the user of the word 'his'. Section 7(1), Clause (ii), Sub-clause (a) of the Act reinforces the conclusion that the sub-tenant come within the definition of tenant. The relevant portions of Sub-section 7(1) run as follows: 7. (i) x x x If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied. (ii) that the tenant has without the written consent of the landlord. (a) transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the entire house or any portion thereof (if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so); There is, therefore, no force in the contention that the order passed by the Controller directing eviction of the sub-tenants is not order u/s 7(i) of the Act. The order shall be deemed to be a decree u/s 13 of the Act and is executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within whose jurisdiction the house is situate. The second contention has no force. 8. Mr. Pal next contended that the order of eviction against the sub-tenant after refusal by the Controller to evict the tenants is illegal and not executable. The sub-tenants have been inducted by the tenants in respect of specified portions of the house. An order refusing eviction of the tenants must necessarily lead to the result that the sub-tenants cannot be evicted. In other words, no order for eviction of the sub-tenants should have been passed by the Controller when he refused to evict the tenants. The conception can be made clear by an illustration. Supposing a landlord files a suit for eviction of sub tenants without making the tenants parties to the suit. Can a decree for eviction of the sub-tenants be passed? The obvious answer is in the negative. This is based on the theory that no Court would pass a decree which would be rendered infructuous or ineffective. If the decree for eviction is passed against the sub-tenants, the landlord cannot still get possession of the house as the tenants are in possession and not evictable under the decree. The same consequence ensues where the landlord is a party to the eviction proceeding and an order is passed by the Controller refusing evicting of the tenants but directing eviction of the sub-tenants. The same consequence ensues where the landlord is a party to the eviction proceeding and an order is passed by the Controller refusing evicting of the tenants but directing eviction of the sub-tenants. Such a decree would lead to an absurd situation and the tenants would make the execution of the decree ineffective. On this basis the order of eviction passed by the Controller against the Appellant should not have been passed when he refused eviction of the tenants. The Appellant did not file a writ application in the High Court against the Appellate order of the Additional District Magistrate. 9. Now the question is can the Executing Court on the basis of the aforesaid theory refuse execution? Certainly the passing of such an order against the Appellant was not one without jurisdiction. It is an order which on the face of it cannot be effectively executed as the tenants can frustrate it. If the tenants had not been parties to the eviction proceeding, a mere order of eviction against the sub-tenants would not have been executable and the Executing Court could have refused to execute such a decree. But in this case the tenants were parties and in their presence such an order was passed. The order of the Controller should be construed in such a manner that it does not lead to absurdity. It must be held that the tenants had no objection to the eviction of the Appellant from the specified portion of the building which constitutes a part of the entire tenancy. The tenants also filed no appeal against the order of the Controller which virtually amounted to their eviction from that portion of the building in the occupation of the Appellant. They therefore abandoned the objection of non-executability that such a decree should not be passed as would make it inexecutable. The Executing Court has full jurisdiction to construe the order of the Controller in a manner so as to make it executable. The construction to be put is that the tenants agreed to the eviction of the Appellant from the specified portion of the building in his occupation. This amounted to renunciation of their tenancy in respect of that portion. On such view of the matter, the decree cannot be said to be inexecutable. All the contentions fail. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed