Judgment Kamla Sahai, J. 1. The Sub-divisional Magistrate of Dumka drew up a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against 22 persons. An inquiry was held by Shri B. N. Charan, Magistrate, 1st Class, Dumka, who by his order dated the 5th June, 1962, directed all of them under Sec.118 of the Code to execute bonds of Rs. 500.00 each, with two sureties of the like amount each, to maintain the peace for a period of one year. Their appeal before the learned Sessions Judge failed. Seventeen of them have filed this application for revision in this Court. Five of the 22 persons have not joined them. 2. Sridhar Pandey (opposite party No. 2) is the only Brahmin resident of village Chandra. There was a proceeding between him on one side and some of the petitioners on the other under Sec.145 of the Code with respect to the possession of plots Nos. 315 and 318 of the same village. It may be mentioned that all the petitioners are also resident of that very village. The proceeding was decided in favour of Sridhar Pandey, His case was that, after the termination of that proceeding, the petitioners became infuriated, and started harassing him and threatening to kill him. Their object in doing this was either to drive him away or to end his life. He, therefore, filed an application before the Sub-divisional Magistrate on the 26th August, 1960. The Magistrate sent the matter for inquiry to the Police. When the police report was received, he, by his order dated the 17th September, 1960, drew up the present proceeding. 3. The first point which Mr. Sachchidanand has urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the Courts below have not considered the evidence properly. His grievance is that the Magistrate proceeded mainly upon his view of the characteristics of villagers belonging to the Goala community as most of the petitioners are Goalas. I do not think that this criticism is justified. The learned Magistrate was wrong to lay down characteristics of different communities because there can be no general rule of that kind. There are persons with different characteristics in all communities. For instance, the Magistrate has said that the Brahmins are pious and timid; but there may be Brahmins who are neither pious nor timid. He has said that the Goalas are over-bold and impulsive. There are persons with different characteristics in all communities. For instance, the Magistrate has said that the Brahmins are pious and timid; but there may be Brahmins who are neither pious nor timid. He has said that the Goalas are over-bold and impulsive. I am quite sure that one may find Goalas who cannot be said to be over-bold or impulsive. At the same time, however, he has considered the evidence. He has not proceeded only upon his view of the characteristics of these communities. 4. The grievances which Mr. Sachchidanand has made against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is that he has not considered the cross-examination of the witnesses, that he has not considered whether the allegations made by the witnesses are in consonance with the allegations made in Sridhar Pandeys original petition, and that he has not considered whether the evidence of one witness tallies with that of the other. I have carefully perused his judgment, and I have also looked, through the evidence. It seems to me that the learned Sessions Judge has discussed the evidence as elaborately as necessary. He has also considered the statements of some of these witnesses made in their cross-examination. He has given a substance of what each witness has said, and has thus made clear how and to what extent the evidence of each witness tallies with that of the other. He has not compared the evidence relating to the incidents with the allegations in the petition because the witnesses have spoken of more incidents than are mentioned in the petition, 5. Mr. Sachchidanand has submitted that evidence relating to incidents which are not mentioned in the petition could not be taken, and that the learned Sessions Judge was wrong in taking such evidence into consideration. In my opinion, there is no substance in this argument. Sec.107 lays down the circumstances in which a Magistrate may draw up a proceeding under that section. Sachchidanand has submitted that evidence relating to incidents which are not mentioned in the petition could not be taken, and that the learned Sessions Judge was wrong in taking such evidence into consideration. In my opinion, there is no substance in this argument. Sec.107 lays down the circumstances in which a Magistrate may draw up a proceeding under that section. Sec.112 states that the Magistrate "shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and, the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required." Sub-section (i) of Sec.117 lays down that "the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary". It is manifest that the words "to take such further evidence as may appear necessary" mean that the Magistrate need not confine himself to the question of truth of the information which he has received, and that he may take further evidence relating to other incidents. It follows also from the fact that the Magistrate has to satisfy himself whether it is necessary for him to direct that the person or persons proceeded against should execute bonds. If he leaves out evidence relating to all that happens between the date on which the proceeding is drawn up, or information is received, and the date of the final order under Sec.118, he may lose sight of some very important evidence bearing upon the points on which he has to be satisfied. 6. Clause (b) of the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Sec.117 reads : "(b) the conditions of such bond, whether as to the amount thereof or as to the provision of sureties or the number thereof or the pecuniary extent of their liability, shall not be more onerous than those specified in the order under Sec.112." Sec.112 speaks of these matters, and the only other matter that it speaks of is that the substance of the information received has to be reduced into writing. If the iatention of the legislature was that the Magistrate should not consider any incident beyond the incidents contained in the information received by him, surely that would also have been mentioned in Clause (b) of the proviso. If the iatention of the legislature was that the Magistrate should not consider any incident beyond the incidents contained in the information received by him, surely that would also have been mentioned in Clause (b) of the proviso. Instead of that, as I have already shown, the words used in Sub-section (r) of Sec.117 lead to the contrary inference. 7. For the reasons which I have given above, I have not the slightest doubt that the Magistrate is fully entitled to consider, in an inquiry under Sec.117, evidence relating to incidents which take place while the proceeding is pending or, in other words all incidents included or not included in the information originally given to the Magistrate, ton the basis of which he draws up a proceeding. 8. Learned Counsel has drawn my attention to Emperor V/s. Rasulbux, AIR 1942 Sind 122. He has laid stress upon the observation made in the judgment that an order drawn up under Sec.112 of the Code is analogous to a charge framed in the case of a regular trial of an accused person for an offence. The learned Judges have not, and could not have, said that the order is just the equivalent of a charge. The mere fact that the order is analogous to a charge is not of any help in this case. Besides, their Lordships have not considered the effect of the words in Sub-section (i) of Sec.117 which I have referred to. He has further relied upon the decision of a single judge of this Court in Pir Ali Kasab V/s. Emperor, AIR 1920 Pat 550. That case is clearly distinguishable. His Lordship held in that case that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction, in the facts and circumstances of that case, to draw up a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code at all. The Assistant Government Advocate referred to some evidence relating to subsequent conduct of the persons who had been proceeded against, and then his Lordship remarked, "I am of opinion that if there was anything in the allegations themselves on which proceedings could be initiated, evidence of subsequent conduct would be admissible in support of those allegations." These observations support the view which I have taken, though I must say that there is no discussion in the Judgment as to how evidence of subsequent conduct would be admissible. 9 The last point which Mr. 9 The last point which Mr. Sachchidanand has urged is that there is nothing to show that the order made under Sec.112 was read over to the petitioners. I am unable to accept this argument also. Under Sec.113, the order has to be read over to a person proceeded against, if he is present in Court, and, if he so desires, the substance has also to be explained to him. Sec.114 refers to persons proceeded against who are not present in Court, and it lays down that a summons or, in some cases, a warrant can be issued. There is nothing in the Section to show that the order has to be read over to the person concerned when he appears. Indeed, Sub-section (i) of Sec.117 lays down that, when a person proceeded against appears or is produced before a Magistrate, he shall proceed to make the inquiry. This sub-section also does not say that the order has to be read over to such a person after he appears or is brought before the Magistrate and before the Magistrate starts the inquiry. Thus, I do not think that the proceedings have been vitiated. 10. In the circumstances mentioned above, the application fails and it is dismissed.